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Alain-G. GaGnon & José María Sauca
This book on Negotiating Diversity builds on a research programme 
pertaining to Identity, Pluralism and Democracy that has been financed by 
the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación de España (DER 2009-12683) and 
the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and it is 
part of a larger joint initiative led by the Research Group on Plurinational 
Societies (Université du Québec à Montréal) and the Research Group on 
Democracy and Justice (Carlos III University of Madrid). Since 2007, 
members of our research groups have been in constant dialogue and have 
organized a series of scientific activities both in Madrid and Montreal. Our 
two research groups have teamed up in developing a scientific discourse 
that stresses concepts such as Culture, Identity, Diversity, Pluralism, Trust, 
Civil Society, Citizenship and Governance. Members of our research 
teams have not only shared conceptual tools but they have also taken a 
stand on many fronts including respect to deep diversity, strengthening 
democratic practices, and empowering political communities.
The last two decades have witnessed an increase of interest in the 
domains of identity politics, legal and constitutional pluralism as well as 
in the implementation of democratic practices in complex societies. This 
is why we decided to concentrate on those key issues to improve present-
day political life.
Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we have experienced the 
emergence of new themes pertaining to cultural identity that brought 
to the fore not only religion, nationality, and gender but also historical 
trajectories, memory, migration, issues related to inclusion and exclusion 
and by extension citizenship. Minority and majority nations have been 
busy working on these fronts so as not to lose any ground, as if everything 
about these issues could reduced to a zero-sum game. In short, in addition 
to usual debates pertaining to community tensions and redistributive 
policies inspired by a theory of justice, there has emerged a field still to 
be plowed in the areas of recognition and empowerment.
Such political changes have led researchers to embark on a new 
journey and go beyond questions that are essentially descriptive and often 
times technical. Instead of examining qualitative dimensions linking 
political bodies, specialists have too often portrayed power relations from 
Negotiating Diversity
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a quantitative perspective. Scholars have generally focused on who is 
best positioned to find a solution that would concern the entire country. 
Responses have generally favored the central state. Other times, authors 
have focused on the separation of powers between the executive, legislative 
and judiciary branches, failing to explore political dynamics between those 
powers or, in the cases of federal states, between orders of government.
Subsequent to an intense workshop, hosted in May 2010 by the 
Universidad Carlos III, we mandated conference speakers to write original 
contributions that took into account up-to-date materials and to cross-
examine the literature. Contributions to this volume benefitted greatly 
from interactions with several professors involved in the conference. 
Many thanks to Xavier Arbos, Jesús Prieto de Pedro, Luis Rodríguez 
Abascal, Andrés de Francisco, Rainer Nickel, Francisco Colom, Carlos 
Thiebault Louis-André, José María Rosales, Maria José Fariñas and 
Alicia Cebada.
Colleagues took on the challenge and revisited their contributions 
with inspiration and drive. In addition to these original contributors, we 
invited Ramón Máiz (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela), Gérard 
Bouchard (Université du Québec à Chicoutimi) and Isabel Wences (Centro 
de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales and Carlos III University of 
Madrid), three well-established scholars, to join this book project. These 
specialists study complex societies from three distinct vantage points, 
namely political philosophy, history, and political science, and innovate 
by providing an ambitious multi-dimensional approach to tackle issues of 
identity, pluralism and democracy.
The book is organized around four parts. In part I, Ramón Máiz and 
François Rocher explore political and social dynamics in plural societies 
and reflect on a series of normative issues that ought to be considered by 
political actors in the management of federal and non-federal societies. 
This is followed in Part II by studies conducted by Alain-G. Gagnon, 
José María Sauca and Jocelyn Maclure of a growing literature pertaining 
to governance, recognition and empowerment as it applies to countries 
experiencing tensions with respect to identity politics, majority/minority 
cultures and religion. In Part III, José Woehrling, Ascensión Elvira and 
Eduardo Ruiz team up in proposing an in-depth exploration of human 
rights, political rights and institutional pluralism in Europe and Canada 
with a special interest in the protection of rights and freedoms, the 
role of supranational bodies in upholding national and sub-national 
political rights as well as the evolving nature of self-determination 
from a human rights angle. In Part IV, Gérard Bouchard, Joxerramon 
Bengoetxea and Isabel Wences address a central concern in the politics 
of diversity by putting to test approaches founded on multiculturalism 
and interculturalism. Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland constitute relevant 
11
Introduction
experiments for societies seeking to advance models of deep diversity in 
advanced liberal democracies.
In connection with this international initiative, it is worth pointing out 
some recent publications produced by our respective research teams that 
provide foundational elements to the present endeavour.
Members of the Research Group on Plurinational Societies (www.
grsp.uqam.ca) have released several important studies among which 
is included Multinational Democracies1 that provided theoretical and 
normative considerations for three structuring projects. In 2009, GRSP 
published an important volume entitled Dominant Nationalism, Dominant 
Ethnicity2 in which contributors explain how nation-states proceed to 
impose their own nationalism and how minority nations resist or not or 
even renegotiate their place within a given state. A parallel endeavour 
led to the publication of Contemporary Majority Nationalism3. This book 
illustrates the extent to which minority nations do not have a monopoly 
over the incarnation of nationalism and that, often times, majority nations 
have advanced their own nationalist agenda through the implementation 
of targeted public policies. These two previous studies have led GRSP 
members to launch into a new project addressing trust and mistrust4 
between majority and minority nations that bring together European and 
Canadian scholars specializing on divided polities.
Similarly, members of the Research Group on Law and Justice (www.
derechoyjusticia.net/en) have been working on pluralism in its different 
dimensions: cultural diversity, human rights, cosmopolitanism, religion, 
immigration, and gender. Their collectives works have focused on 
reinforcing civil society’s ideals5, on recovering historical memory6 and 
on deepening trust and lawfulness7. As a result, researchers in the areas of 
1 Gagnon, Alain-G. and James Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
2 Lecours, André and Geneviève Nootens (eds.), Dominant Nationalism, Dominant 
Ethnicity. Identity, Federalism and Democracy, Brussels, PIE Peter Lang, 2009.
3 Gagnon, Alain-G., André Lecours and Geneviève Nootens (eds.), Contemporary 
Majority Nationalism, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011.
4 Karmis, Dimitrios and François Rocher (eds.), La dynamique confiance-méfiance dans 
les démocraties multinationales: le Canada en perspectives comparatives, Québec, 
Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2012.
5 Sauca, José María and Isabel Wences (eds.), Lecturas de la sociedad civil. Un mapa 
contemporáneo de sus teorías, Madrid, Trotta, 2007.
6 Pallín, José Antonio Martín and Rafael Escudero Alday (eds.), Derecho y Memoria 
Histórica, Madrid, Trotta, 2008; Alday, Rafael Escudero (ed.), Diccionario de memoria 
histórica. Conceptos contra el olvido, Madrid, Libros de la Catarata, 2011.
7 Mendieta, Manuel Villoria and Isabel Wences (eds.), Cultura de la Legalidad: 
Instituciones, Procesos y Estructuras, Madrid, Libros de la Catarata, 2009. See also 
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legal theories, political philosophy and international law have developed 
an interdisciplinary approach to diversity from different vantage points 
and especially exploring the impact of law on the social construction of 
identity. 
Building on these political and juridical interpretations, this book 
seeks not only to synthesize and question current-day literature but to go 
beyond conventional approaches. It does so in three ways: first, by moving 
beyond the debates between communitarianism and liberalism through an 
in-depth interpretation of cultural and national diversity in the context 
of democratic multinational societies; second, by further sensitizing 
political and social actors in countries such as Canada and Spain, as well 
as the United Kingdom, Belgium and Switzerland, to the importance of 
both legal and constitutional implementation of diversity; and third, by 
advancing a theoretical stance that questions conventional wisdom and 
puts to the test dominant approaches in the field of comparative politics 
and law. Through these efforts, we will continue to advance a project 
based on an ongoing intellectual exchange within as well as across 
national settings.
As editors of this book, we are particularly grateful to all authors for 
their continued trust and support as well as to Olivier De Champlain 
and Thomas Lafontaine (UQAM) as well as Kyle Ritchie (Concordia 
University) who have assisted us in the last phase of the book preparation.
Eunomía. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad (eunomia.tirant.com) edited by the 
Program on Culture of Lawfulness (www.trust-cm.net).
Part I




The Normative Theory of Federalism  
and the Idea of Nation
Ramón Máiz
Professor, Department of Political Sciences and Public 
Administration, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
“[…] not merely a nation but a teeming nation of nations”
Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, Preface
Introduction: Is a Normative Theory of Federalism 
Necessary Today?
The positive theory of federalism of an empirical and comparative 
orientation has flowered in recent years, to a great extent driven by neo-
institutionalist perspectives and those of political economy1. But this has 
not, however, been a mere development and perfecting of traditional 
analyses, facilitated by the availability of new models and theoretical 
tools, nor of the appearance, up until recently non-existent, of reliable 
empirical evidence. If we compare it with the works of classic political 
thinkers – Althusius, Madison, Tocqueville –, or with the most recent 
works of economics (Public choice theory, Welfare economics, etc.), 
current theory on federalism introduces, with a rare unanimity, at least 
two ruptures of significant importance. First, it is formulated from an 
1 Inman, Robert and Daniel Rubinfeld, “Rethinking federalism”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 11, nº 4, 1997, pp. 43-64; Máiz, Ramón and Pablo Beramendi, 
“La segunda generación de análisis institucionales del federalismo” in Pablo 
Beramendi and Ramón Máiz, Federalismo y Neoinstitucionalismo, Zona Abierta, 
nº 104-105, 2003, pp. 1-16; Rodden, Jonathan, “The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: 
Grants and Fiscal performance around the World”, American Political Science Review, 
vol. 46, nº 3, 2002, pp. 670-687; Colino Cámara, César, Teoría y realidad del cambio 
institucional de las federaciones. Ph.D. dissertation, Madrid, UNED, 2005; Wibbels, 
Erik, “Madison in Baghdad?: Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative 
Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 9, 2006, pp. 165-188.
Negotiating Diversity
16
openly positivist perspective and with an empirical orientation, indebted 
to the most recent social sciences, and with the intention of being on 
the margin of the traditional normative issues which monopolized earlier 
debate. Thus, the extravagant assumptions underlying initial economic 
analyses (complete information on voters, on the responsibility of each 
level of government, on the mobility of business and individuals, on the 
fidelity of local politicians to the preferences of the electorate, etc.) have 
been subject to an empirical scrutiny from which they have not come out 
well2. Secondly, it is much more circumspect, if not openly reticent in 
arguing that there are unlimited universal and decontextualized benefits to 
the federal form of organization of the state for the quality of democracy 
or the functioning of the economy. The prospective beneficial effects of 
federation (overcoming problems of aggregating preferences through local 
spheres of decision making and control) are not considered ubiquitous and 
universal, but rather dependent on the concurrence of a good number of 
contextual variables, such as: a greater or lesser clear distinction between 
levels of government, broad economic powers of regional governments, 
general control over the market on the part of the central government, the 
internalization of costs by each level of government, etc3.
However, does the confirmation that federation is not the panacea that 
some of the classical thinkers dreamt of and the excellent quality of a good 
part of the disillusioned recent literature obviate the need for a substantive 
normative theory of federalism? The general thesis defended here is that 
this new body of positive empirical studies does not exhaust or resolve 
by itself the need for a substantive normative theory. In other words, the 
question of the stability of federal systems, specific to positive empirical 
theory, does not by itself provide an answer to the question regarding 
the justice of the political-territorial organization of complex societies4. 
It is still imperative to have a theory capable of providing answers to 
questions such as: is the federal organization of states desirable, should 
multinational states have a federal structure, upon what normative 
principles should political-territorial organization be constructed, how do 
we evaluate different federal designs, etc. In the end, the evaluation of the 
2 Rodden, Jonathan and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Does Federalism Preserve Markets?”, 
Virginia Law Review, vol. 83, 1987, pp. 1521-1572; Treisman, Daniel, The Architecture 
of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.
3 Gagnon, Alain-G., “The moral foundations of asymmetrical federalism: a normative 
exploration of the case of Quebec and Canada” in Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully 
(eds.), Multinational Democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
4 Gagnon, Alain-G., “The moral foundations of asymmetrical federalism: a normative 
exploration of the case of Quebec and Canada” in Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully 
(eds.), Multinational Democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
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institutional performance of a federation or a federal mechanism depends 
on the normative perspective of the evaluator. Moreover “empirical study 
in the social sciences is meaningless if it has no normative import”5. And 
this cannot be at the mercy of mere subjective opinions, ad hoc normative 
assumptions or unchallenged pre-judgments; rather, it requires the 
systematic and substantive elaboration of an argument through internally 
consistent propositions that can be debated and tested.
To do this, however, the rigid separation between federalism and 
federation must be overcome6; in other words, between the theories, 
movements and ideologies that propose federal formulas and solutions; 
and those existing federal political systems, in debt to historically specific 
ideas, traditions, contexts, experiences and trajectories. In short, an 
autonomous argument that federation is the institutional architecture of 
a just political order is essential, or in other words, an argument for the 
moral political value of the federal principle7. In fact, today more than 
ever, from Canada to Iraq, from Spain to India, major issues related to 
peace, liberty, equality and political stability are found to be connected 
to the design of federations. And this design requires normative, as much 
as positive empirical debate, on values, institutional solutions and federal 
public policies.
In this sense, the reintroduction of politics and institutions, as well 
as the endogeneity of the latter, in the most recent federalist theory of 
an empirical and comparative orientation, opens up the possibility for 
a fruitful dialogue between both positive/empirical and normative 
dimensions, which can only be beneficial to both. In any case, although 
autonomous and substantive, a normative theory of federalism, to respond 
to the problems and challenges of modern democracies, cannot be distant 
from the developments of positive/empirical theory, nor the advances 
made in the comparative politics of federalism. On the contrary, endowed 
with a new modesty regarding its pretensions, it should be, in the strictest 
sense, contextualist and developed, overcoming the endemic tradition of 
“separate tables” within the broad discipline of political science.
In this vein, the arguments discussed in this text revolve around two 
basic assertions. (1) Federalism constitutes not only a specific institutional 
5 Gerring, John and Joshua Yesnowitz, “A Normative Turn in Political Science?”, Polity, 
vol. 38, nº 1, 2006, pp. 101-133.
6 King, Preston, Federalism and Federation, London, Croom Helm, 1982; Elazar, 
Daniel, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, Alabama University Press, 1987; Burgess, 
Michael, Comparative Federalism, London, Routledge, 2006.
7 Gagnon, Alain-G. and Charles Gibbs, “The Normative Basis of Asymmetrical 
Federalism” in Robert Agranoff (ed.), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in 
Federal States, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999, p. 76.
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formula based on political decentralization and accommodation, but an 
authentic political philosophy, a normative model of democracy based 
on the covenant and the pact, clearly differentiated from liberalism 
and communitarianism and in debt to the republican tradition; and 
(2) federalism has, however, historically developed into two well 
differentiated traditions: one, monist, derived from the North American 
experience of the federal construction of a nation-state, which has been 
predominant (national federalism); and the other pluralist, minoritarian, 
focused on reconciling different and overlapping local, regional and 
national identities (plurinational federalism)8.
However, to take into account the synthesis of self-government 
and shared government, of unity and diversity, of the federation as 
a conceptual design of a state of states; as well as, in contrast to the 
premises of the nation-state, the coexistence of different nations within 
one state, requires at least two tasks. These are (1) the reformulation 
in a democratic-republican key of the classic, organic and pre-political 
concept of the nation; and (2) the construction of a normative theory of 
federal democracy.
1. The Veil of Ignorance and the Federal Principle  
of Autonomy (Self-Government)
Surprisingly, the canonical theory of liberalism is absolutely silent 
regarding the normative questions raised by the federal principle. As 
Norman recently pointed out, “our ‘mentors’ – philosophers like Rawls, 
Nozick, and Dworkin – were silent on the mysteries of federalism”9. In 
effect, as is well-known, Rawls thought that the institutional details of a 
just society should only be addressed subsequent to when the parties in 
the original position have established the principles of justice, in other 
words, when the veil of ignorance is partially lifted and the basic details of 
8 Caminal, Miquel, El federalismo pluralista. Barcelona, Paidós, 2002; Hueglin, 
Thomas, “Federalism at the Crossroads: Old meanings, New Significance”, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 36, nº 2, 2003; Karmis, Dimitrios and Wayne 
Norman, Theories of Federalism: A Reader, London, Palgrave, 2005; Máiz, Ramón, 
“Democracy, Federalism, and Nationalism in Multinational States” in Ramón Máiz 
and William Safran, Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies, London, 
Frank Cass, 2000; Requejo, Ferran, Multinational federalism and Value Pluralism, 
London, Routledge, 2005; Norman, Wayne, Negotiating Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006; Gagnon, Alain-G., Au-delà de la nation unificatrice: Plaidoyer 
pour le fédéralisme multinational, Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2007; 
Gagnon, Alain-G. and Raffaele Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2007; Beaud, Olivier, Théorie de la Fédération, 
Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2007.
9 Norman, op. cit., p. 80.
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society, public opinion and the political culture are revealed. In addition, 
the principles of justice are applied to the basic structure and should not 
reflect specific characteristics of society or of concrete political systems. 
Only once we begin to lift the veil of ignorance and we see the general 
characteristics of our society (cultural pluralism, for example) can we 
design institutions which attend to these specific characteristics, with 
these institutions always following the patterns marked by the principles 
of justice that we have previously chosen in the original position, under 
the veil of institutional ignorance.
Among other things, this model implies that the parties in the original 
position accept de facto: (1) the foundational irrelevance of a multilevel 
distribution of political power in contrast to claims of sovereignty; and 
(2) the consideration of the borders of the state as natural, as given and 
existing in “perpetuity”10. The first assumption means that the plurality 
of political wills and constitutional and legislative spheres within a state 
of states constitutes a minor detail, irrelevant in any case for the theory of 
justice. The second implies that the really existing political community 
(nation-state) and with it the overlapping of political and cultural 
dimensions are considered prior to justice and equity, and the question 
of the homogeneity and unity of the demos (a question, i.e. who are the 
people of the state, which is in reality, from the point of view of logic, 
prior) is considered normatively resolved by factual history. The naturalist 
fallacy which the model incurs, deducing from the “is” (construction of a 
nation-state) a “should be” (the equation state = nation) thus incorporates, 
without any elaboration, a postulate which conceals from us ab initio the 
possibility of a normative foundation on the basis of unity and diversity.
It should be noted that these premises lead to a self-evident and 
undisputed corollary: the unitary national state is the model taken as 
the basis for the theory of justice. And this is true in a dual sense, first, 
as the theory considers – contradicting without any explanations the 
North American constitutional tradition – that the federal dimension of 
the republic, its character as a “compound republic”, lacks foundational 
importance in regards to principles. And secondly, the overlapping 
of political and cultural borders is taken for granted in the theory – in 
this case following the constitutional-nationalist tradition of the US of 
“centralized federalism”11 – and the interpretation of the national state 
in a monistic manner as nation-state is considered as self-evident. This 
position is, of course, common to all egalitarian liberalism12.
10 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, 
p. 278.
11 Riker, William, The Development of American Federalism, Boston, Kluwer, 1987.
12 Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985.
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The result is that the decisive dimension of the “compound republic” 
(Madison), of a state of states, of the articulation of self-government 
and shared government, the overcoming of the concept of sovereignty – 
as a means (1) to construct democracy in states of wide territorial 
dimensions, in addition to (2) providing innovative “republican remedies 
for republican diseases” – is elided in the foundations of a theory which 
aspires to provide the normative guidelines for a just political order. 
Based on the “veil of ignorance” federalism is irrelevant as the federation 
is considered to be an institutional peculiarity of second order, derived 
from specific historical circumstances, its theoretical nature discarded 
in a radical way by implicitly postulating that it should not enter into 
the principles of justice or the basic structure of society. Only once the 
principles of justice are established is it the moment to partially lift the 
veil of ignorance and begin to descend the ladder of abstraction to take 
into account the particularities of public culture and the economy of 
each society in designing institutions. For Rawls, only in the subsequent 
descent toward the level of constitutional and legislative law would the 
federal dimension perhaps appear as relevant13.
However, to take state borders as given and to exclude the plurality 
of centres from which political will generates as an element of the basic 
structure, the theory of Rawls and, in general, egalitarian liberalism, 
adopt two extremely problematic hypotheses. These hypotheses are 
(1) in contrast to Madison, the hypothesis of sovereignty, the concept 
of the sovereign state endowed with a single (or ultimate or original) 
centre from which political power emanates; and (2) in contrast to 
Calhoun, (apart from other considerations) the hypothesis of the 
nation-state, the coincidence between cultural and political borders, 
the theoretical impossibility that the demos can consist in a plurality of 
demoi, and the existence of minority communities that can suffer the 
eventual oppression or exclusion under the state’s protection of the 
majority community. A theory of justice which implicitly begins from 
these propositions is a seriously flawed theory on its own terms, as it 
assumes postulates in debt not to principles of justice that are object of 
an eventual overlapping consensus, but rather to a particular idea of the 
good; namely, the imposition by the state of a comprehensive doctrine 
(majority nationalism) regarding one of the most disputed problems 
among contemporary states and international society.
One would think that in the contemporary republican perspective we 
would find the normative-theoretical elaboration of federalism absent 
13 King, Loren, “The federal structure of a Republic of Reasons”, Political Theory, 
vol. 33, nº 5, 2005, pp. 629-653.
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from liberalism14. But that is not at all the case. A good example of this is a 
work of reference in contemporary republican theory: Republicanism by 
Philip Pettit. In responding to the question, how can the state be organized 
so that state interference is not arbitrary, in other words, to address 
republican forms of constitutionalism and democracy, Pettit postulates 
three fundamental conditions. These are (1) the rule of law, (2) separation 
of powers, (3) that the law be relatively resistant to the will of the majority. 
However, only in regards to the second condition is “the decentralization 
of power that is achieved by having a federal system” admitted as one 
of the measures possible. He concludes with an empirical observation 
that leaves the federal dimension of republicanism without theoretical 
elaboration. “It is no accident that republicans have been traditionally 
in favour of federations”15. What is more, in addressing the deliberative 
dimension of republicanism, the absolute necessity that people “be able 
to coalesce around group identities that were previously suppressed”16 is 
recognized, but this observation referring to individuals and groups is not 
complemented by a reinterpretation of what institutional framework is 
capable of reconciling unity and diversity and plurality with overlapping 
identities, which are principal elements of federalism. It is also striking, 
regarding the same issue, that Mauricio Viroli, for example, could write 
a book called For Love of Country, and despite its subject, “an essay on 
patriotism and nationalism”, there is no mention of the federal republican 
tradition17.
Nevertheless, the contribution of federalism to a theory of the just 
society18 is of normative foundational importance that goes far beyond 
the mere adjectival and ad hoc concretion that is conceded in the last 
phases, that is, far from the “constitutional essentials” of the Rawls’ 
model or its condition as one mere “measure” among many others that 
institutionalize the republic (Pettit). There are important reasons to assume 
that federalism should be inscribed into the very heart of the normative 
theory of democracy.
To begin with, we should remember the centrality of federalism in the 
republicanism of Kant. In effect, even though this is often neglected in 
14 Maynor, John, Republicanism in the modern world, Cambridge, Polity, 2003; Laborde, 
Cécile and John Maynor, Republicanism and Political Theory, London, Blackwell, 
2008.
15 Pettit, Philip, Republicanism, Barcelona, Paidós, p. 234.
16  Ibid., p. 254.
17 Viroli, Maurizio, For Love of Country, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
18 LaSelva, Samuel, Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism. Paradoxes, Achieve-
ments, and Tragedies of Nationhood, Montréal-Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University 




many classic and modern interpretations19, it is not only (1) the separation 
of legislative and executive powers as well as (2) the form of representative 
government that constitute the factors that are the core of Kantian 
republicanism. In the “second definitive article” of Zum ewigen Frieden 
(For a Perpetual Peace), written in 1795, he adds a third factor; namely: 
“The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states”. In 
this way “a federation of nations (Völkerbund) which, however, should 
not be an worldwide, international state (Völkerstaat)” is postulated as an 
alternative scenario to war20. Certainly, in Kant we find an ambiguous use 
of the concept of federalism, sometimes as federation and other times as 
confederation, induced by his classic concept of sovereignty as absolute 
power (unlimited and indivisible). Yet, in his view, in contrast to Madison, 
only under sovereignty can the full condition of a state of law be reached 
and hence the ultimate aspiration of a world republic21. However, the 
ultimate objective of a world republic (Weltrepublik), of a state of nations 
(Civitas Gentium) is, first, too distant for a world of states that rejects in 
hipótesis what is just in tesis. The federation of states raises the normative 
horizon of the possible. “The practicability (objective reality) of this idea 
of federation (Idee der Föderalität), which should gradually spread to all 
states and thus lead to perpetual peace, can be proved”22.
Secondly, and above all, the Kantian world republic is shaped as a 
federal republic. Thus, in the work, Die Religión innerhalb der Grenzen 
der blossen Vernunft of 1793, he postulates a “state of perpetual peace 
based on a league of peoples, a world republic (auf einen Völkerbund 
als Weltrepublik gegründeten)”23. This is, then, the so often neglected 
key. Völkerbund als Weltrepublick is, in other words, a world federal 
republic, a Staatenverein Republik freir verbünder Völker (a republic of 
free federated nations), not only as an alternative to the “monstrosity” 
(Ungeheuer) of a world monarchy, but also to a unitary world republic 
in debt to a single sovereignty. Thus, Kant’s view was that, given the 
regulative nature of the idea of reason, a unitary world republic would 
19 Vlachos, Georges, Fédéralisme et raison d’État dans la pensée internationale de 
Fichte, Paris, Pedone, 1948; Bobbio, Norberto, Diritto e Stato nel pensiero di Emanuele 
Kant, Torino, Giappichelli, 1969; Philonenko, Alexis, Théorie et praxis dans la pensée 
morale et politique de Kant et Fichte en 1793, Paris, Vrin, 1968.
20 Kant, Immanuel, Zum ewigen Frieden Akademie Textausgabe, vol. VIII, Berlin, De 
Gruyter, 1968 [1795], p. 354.
21 Pogge, Thomas, “Kant’s Vision, Europe, and a Global Federation” in Luigi Caranti 
(ed.), Kant’s Perpetual Peace. New Interpretative Essays, Rome, Luiss University 
Press, 2006, pp. 75-98.
22 Kant, op. cit., p. 356.
23 Kant, Immanuel, Die Religion innehalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft Akademie 
Textausgabe, vol. VI, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1968 [1793], p. 34.
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only ever constitute the horizon of an always unfinished trend, while 
he conceived of an international order for a new plural and cooperative 
world.
Third, the federal association (föderative Vereinigung) not only 
constitutes for Kant a superior alternative to that of a world government, 
the fusion of states under one power which will control all the others, 
but is also preferable from the point of view of the very diversity of 
humanity24. Nature, as he says in the first Supplement of For a Perpetual 
Peace, “wisely separates nations (weislich die Völker trennt)”. “She 
employs two means to separate peoples and to prevent them from 
mixing: differences of language and of religion” (der Verschiedenheit der 
Sprachen und der Religionen)25. In short, what is a source of war and 
conflict, the plurality of states and nations, is also for the philosopher 
from Königsberg/Kaliningrad a source for the possibility of international 
accommodation and political cooperation. The departure from the state 
of war, conceived as a natural state of states and the emergence into a 
new cooperative, federal order, does not mean the construction of a new 
world sovereign. And in this way is indicated, in the very core of Kantian 
political philosophy, the incipient normative republican foundation of the 
pluralist federal synthesis of self-government plus shared government, 
and unity in diversity.
We see then, some of the basic components of the major normative 
contribution of federalism to republican democracy. First, federalism 
makes it possible to overcome the interpretation of the state based on 
the concept of sovereignty, this image that is so difficult to let go of, 
referring to the necessary existence of a single monopolizing centre of 
political power which governs the whole society. In contrast, federalism 
unequivocally points to a system of multilevel government, integrated by 
diverse spheres of decision-making and control. It posits the necessity 
to overcome the unilaterally vertical, hierarchical and pyramidal vision 
of the state26, replacing it with a more horizontal version, with political 
power exercised and coordinated from diverse spheres.
Federation consists of a state of states based on an integrated, 
cohesive and supportive institutional design. In other words, strictly 
speaking the federation is not a state, but a new kind of polity. Federalism 
involves the substantive and guaranteed self-government of the federated 
24 Marini, Giuliano, La filosofia cosmopolitita di Kant, Rome, Laterza, 2007.
25 Kant, Die Religion innehalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft Akademie Textausgabe, 
op. cit., pp. 366-367.
26 Friedrich, Carl Joachim, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, New York, 




units; but also requires, and to no small degree, co-government, shared 
government and the involvement and participation of the federated 
units in the general political will of the federation. But even more so, 
federalism links autonomy with solidarity and difference with cohesion 
in an indivisible manner. Said in another way, the two Rawlsian principles 
of justice, reformulated in a territorial key, become inseparable: the 
liberty of federated communities with inter-territorial equality. Thus, the 
loyalty to the federation and its correlate, respect for the self-government 
of the federated states, constitutes only one decisive dimension of the 
constitutional loyalty which is the cement of egalitarian liberalism, of a 
social and democratic state of law. Federalism could have as its emblem, 
with greater legitimacy than any other political system, the celebrated 
republican triad: liberty, equality and fraternity. In contrast, as the Spanish 
federalist Pi I Margall wrote many years ago, “a centralized republic is a 
monarchy in disguise with a Phrygian cap”.
A federal state is, by definition, a constitutional state without a 
sovereign, considering that all its powers are distributed in different 
spheres, as well as being limited and subject to the constitution of the 
federation and the constitutions/statutes of its member states. And under 
the principle of competence, which substitutes for that of hierarchy, there 
is no place for any supposedly originating or unlimited power of the state 
or of the federated states. As Harold Laski recognized, from a liberal 
pluralist perspective, a federal system implies not only “the abandonment 
of the sovereign state”, but that “because it abandons the principle of 
sovereignty, it abandons the principle of hierarchy also”27. 
Focus on the reach of all this. Federalism opposes itself to the theory of 
unitary popular sovereignty (demos) as constituting power and constitution 
in singular (Sieyès), with the theory of a pluralist popular sovereignty 
(demoi) as constituting power(s) and compound constitution(s) (Madison), 
or better still, a complex Multilevel Constitution, Verfassungsverbund 
(Pernice). Federalism, in short, unequivocally points to “demoicracy”28, or 
more specifically, the presence of a plural and shared constituting power 
among various (co)constituting subjects: the people of the federation and 
the singular peoples of each community or federated state. The guarantee 
of a guardian of the constitution in service to its effective superiority, in 
other words, a constitutional court – to the effects that interest us here, 
constitutionally protected territorial autonomy – leads to, moreover, at 
27 Laski, Harold, A Grammar of Politics, London, Allen & Unwin, 1925, p. 271.
28 Nicolaidis, Kalypso, “The Federal Vision Beyond the Federal State” in Kalypso 
Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision. Legitimacy and Levels of 
Governance in the United States and The European Union, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 439-482.
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least two additional normative requirements. They are (1) on the one 
hand, the territorially sensitive integration of the constitutional court, and 
(2) the indeclinable participation of federated units in the reform of the 
federal constitution.
The federal state adds to the horizontal division of powers between the 
legislative, judicial and executive, an additional division, also horizontal of 
constituting and constituted powers, like a state of states29. The latter redounds 
in a democratizing complexity of self-governing scenarios, facilitating the 
articulation of differentiated preferences and a political richness which 
the existence of subsystems of parties reflecting those preferences entails. 
It even permits the manifestation of diverse intensities of preferences, 
based on the participation in different elections (general, regional or local). 
It facilitates, in short, the widest experimentation and, in the best republican 
tradition, it multiplies the accessibility to and the scenarios for political 
participation and encourages greater accountability in public policy and 
different institutional solutions to problems of equality and welfare.
But in addition, federalism, in debt to the idea of a pact between com-
munities to carry out a common project, cannot be represented normatively 
as an institutionally crystallized structure30. Connected, as we have seen, 
by definition to the idea of limited power, to a constitution, but also 
to the idea of multilevel government and the pact, it is configured as an 
open process of interaction between institutional actors, which reaches 
successive states of equilibrium due to the forces generated by the 
experience of self-government and the challenges that changing internal 
and external contexts raise. What from the perspective of positive theory 
could be seen as indetermination, openness to successive renegotiations of 
the pact and incentives for eventual opportunistic behaviour on the part 
of the actors (who make the very rules of the game a matter of debate), is 
from a normative perspective a possibility to reach successive equilibriums 
in response to changing contexts and needs; which converts the federation 
in, to use the now classic terminology of Elazar, “a continuing seminar in 
governance”31. In addition, it situates a principal dimension for a normative 
theory of federalism in a republican key in the foreground, namely, the 
overcoming of the horizon of a mere aggregation of interests and attention 
on the political production of preferences through deliberation32.
29 Bednar, Jenna, “Federalism: Unstable by Design”, Paper proposed to the American 
Political Science Association meeting, Atlanta, 1999; Bednar, Jenna, The Robust 
Federation: Principles of Design, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
30 Friedrich, op. cit.
31 Elazar, op. cit., p. 85.
32 Máiz, Ramón,“Deliberación e inclusión en la democracia republicana”, Revista 
Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, vol. 113, nº 6, 2006, pp. 11-48.
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However, a basic element in the renegotiation of equilibriums 
and the common commitment upon which federation is grounded is 
the redistribution of economic resources following universal criteria 
of solidarity between different communities, which also permits the 
development of self-government and cohesion. In the classic terms 
of Althussius: “the symbiotes pledge themselves each to the other, by 
explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is 
useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life”33. Thus, 
federalism, as mentioned earlier, as a state of states, contains a principal 
dimension of equality, of solidarity, an unwavering calling for equality 
between territories as the foundation for the justness of the collective 
project. Inter-territorial solidarity, financial self-sufficiency for the 
exercise of self-government, but also, and to no less extent, fiscal co-
responsibility, all constitute basic pillars of its structure and institutional 
dynamics which possess a necessary cooperative dimension, although 
not exclusively (as federalism always contains a certain competitiveness 
between the different units to stimulate better service to the citizenry). In 
this way, federalism, and we must insist on this, integrates not only liberty 
in its dimension of collective self-government, but also social equality, 
cohesion and the strengthening of the welfare state. Do not all these 
arguments then, reinforcing the republican dimension of democracy, 
oblige us to revise the foundational, in short, normative exclusion of 
federalism from the basic principles of egalitarian liberal/republican 
theory of a just society?
But in addition, pluralist federalism permits us to overcome the 
seemingly so self-evident but unsustainable equation: state = nation, 
implicitly or explicitly assumed both in the postulate that each state must 
contain only one nation, as in the idea that each nation, by the very fact 
of being one, in inexorable logic, must possess its own independent state. 
Plurinational federalism permits the practice of not only non-violent 
accommodation, but also an accommodation which is mutually beneficial 
and culturally, economically and politically enriching for the various 
nations within the same state, reaching consensus on a common project 
for co-existence. Thus, non-monistic federalism allows for (“unity in 
diversity”) the recognition of the profound moral significance that national 
identities have for individuals, which provide the cultural context through 
which politics is accessed34, but does so without subscribing to the theses 
and the language of communitarianism and nationalism (the unilateral 
right of self-determination, secession, etc.), offering an alternative of 
33 Altusio, Juan, Política, Madrid, CEPC, 1990 [1603], p. 15.
34 Kymlicka, Will, Finding Our Way. Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada, 
Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1998.
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accommodation and co-existence through union (“self-government and 
shared government”)35.
Plurinational federalism becomes then a possible meeting place which, 
without aspiring to “resolve” or “finish with” nationalisms of the state or 
against the state, but contributing a differentiated solution of meaningful 
self-government and willingness to co-govern, can provide a sufficiently 
attractive sphere for negotiation and pacting with multiple winners. This 
is in contrast to other alternatives that are much more costly, conflictive 
and impoverishing (monistic federalism, confederation, secession), if not 
directly unviable in cultural, political, social and economic terms.
Thus, federalism democratically institutionalizes ideological, cultural 
and territorial pluralism, not only as an irremediable fact, but as an authentic 
political-constitutional value which, more than being preserved as a given, 
has to be constructed and shaped among all. Plurinational federalism 
does not reify identities, it does not institutionally bind them so that they 
become closed or exclusive, it does not isolate different communities, in 
short, it is not multi-communitarianism. Rather, it conceives identities, 
both as a whole and individually, as democratic processes of participation, 
internal diversity and deliberation, and reorients them so that they are, 
without eroding their differences, compatible and overlapping. Federalism 
involves an active recognition, but always from the perspective of an 
encounter, a negotiation and pact (foedus), of supportive co-involvement 
from positions of difference. As a result, federalism is completely distant 
from closed identities, forever crystallized in the past. Its normative core 
cannot be reduced to the passive recognition of the organic, cultural or 
historical basis of its constituent units. Rather, it is built around collective 
decisions and political compromise, democratically generated through 
pluralism, participation and deliberation. In view of everything mentioned 
there are no major theoretical reasons for the foundational exclusion of 
federal autonomy from a hypothetical discussion of the principles of justice 
in the original position; nor are there reasons to negate the contextual value, 
giving sense to democracy, of the different cultures for many citizens in 
plurinational federalism36.
35 Máiz, “Democracy, Federalism, and Nationalism in Multinational States”, op. cit.; 
Caminal, op. cit.; Requejo, op. cit.
36 Kymlicka, Will, “Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective” in David 
Miller and Solail Hashmi, Boundaries and Justice, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2001; Gagnon, “The moral foundations of asymmetrical federalism: a normative 
exploration of the case of Quebec and Canada”, op. cit.; Gagnon and Iacovino, op. cit.; 
Norman, Negotiating Nationalism, op. cit.; King, op. cit.
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2. A Federal-Republican Concept of Nation
The fact that federalism consists in coordination which generates 
mutual benefits to its different parts – the federal state and federated states – 
and is not a contract based on the coercive authority of a sovereign 
power, leaves open, especially in the case of plurinational states, the 
question of the ties that should link the members of the federation. Federal 
coordination requires a difficult balance between self-government and 
shared government, between autonomy and a common project, and each 
of these dual aspects are equally unrenounceable.
This implies that we should carefully consider, from the perspective of 
the normative theory that concerns us here, the connections that ground 
the institutions. The key question is whether, discarding the centrality of 
negative incentives (the sanctioning power of an external sovereign power) 
as the foundation for the stability of the federation, selective positive 
incentives are enough, that is, the common interest that emerges from 
both the common benefit of the union, as well as the greater comparative 
cost of coordinating on another solution (secession, for example, or 
centralism). Or in other words, to formulate it in Rawlsian concepts: Is 
a mere modus vivendi sufficient as the basis for interfederal trust? The 
latter, following Rawls’ criteria37, would indicate that the parts of the 
federation possess established objectives and interests and the union rests 
exclusively on the fact that the foundational federal agreement represents 
a mere equilibrium. That is, the terms of the agreement for federation 
under the modus vivendi are formulated in such a way that their unilateral 
violation does not generate any benefits for any of the parts. However, the 
modus vivendi is based on a conception of zero-sum power, or what is the 
same; each one of the parts is always ready to pursue its preferences to 
the cost of others, and the stability of the system thus depends on contingent 
circumstances that maintain a fortuitous confluence of interest. This 
results in an endogenous instability. A state, for example, that has been the 
beneficiary for a period of time of federation, could become disloyal the 
moment in which it becomes a net contributor to the federation; or a state 
might oppose the consolidation of a “hyper solidarity” in favour of other 
communities that would negatively impact its own level of wealth, etc. In 
short, the ties that bind a federation as mere modus vivendi, the interests, 
the benefits or, possibly the loss of profits from the “exit” and “voice” 
options, do not resolve the problem of self-enforcing coordination and 
are prone to endemic instability. It seems necessary then, that expressive 
incentives somehow be added to the selective incentives, such as ties of 
a cultural or moral type, in other words, of an identitary nature. These 
will reinforce the federation as a plural and ethical community, endowed 
37 Rawls, op. cit., p. 245.
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with certain empathy and even, in a wider sense, moral obligations which 
emanate from a commitment toward a future of shared co-existence.
However, does this lead us to a normative conception of federation 
from the opposite angle, that is, a comprehensive vision of federalism? 
Must citizens of the federation share the same idea of the common good, 
the same set of shared substantive values? Does federalism require a sort 
of communitarism as its foundation? Must we say that all federations must 
be grounded, in a monistic manner, on only one nation? The response to 
these questions has to be negative, as stability cannot be achieved at the 
price of the oppression that results from a communitarist or nationalist 
vision of the state, imposed from above on all the units of the federation, 
these possessing very different interests, desires and representations. And 
this is so for two reasons: (1) because federalism implies autonomy, in other 
words, the possibility of making political and differentiated decisions and 
not merely administrative or executive decisions. This means that different 
majorities in the states produce different preferences (and even intensity 
of preferences) and have their own political will not only in regards to 
public policies but also regarding the global vision of the state. In addition, 
there exist diverse manners to evaluate and understand the federation, a 
product of history, language, culture, social structure, identities, ideologies 
and interests. And (2), because above all, plurinational federalism implies 
a diversity of cultures, traditions, institutions, identities, etc. that are 
incompatible, by normative definition, with a comprehensive or monistic 
and ultimately nationalist vision of the state of the federation. Everything, 
therefore, points to the federation requiring ties that involve a common 
bond more tenuous than those of a comprehensive moral doctrine, but 
certainly more solid than a mere circumstantial interest, the relative mutual 
indifference of a modus vivendi.
Does the political philosophy of federation demand a normative 
horizon of overlapping consensus between the states?38 Certainly, it cannot 
be denied that the Rawlsian model of liberal-egalitarian legitimacy is of 
interest here: political power exercised based on a constitution, which 
would be expected to be accepted by all citizens as free and equal (and 
autonomous), rational and reasonable individuals, based on principles and 
ideals acceptable to common human reason. And this affecting not only 
the constitutional essentials, but also the legislative issues that develop 
from it: a political conception of federal justice whose acceptance on the 
part of the citizenry and the states can reasonably be expected to serve as 
the basis for public reason.
38 Norman, Wayne, “Les points faibles du modèle nationaliste libéral” in Guy Laforest 




However, this leads us in an inexorable manner, from the perspective 
of normative theory, to postulating federalism as a political-moral 
conception that involves not only constitutional formulas, but also 
principles, values and political virtues (a federal culture), through which 
those principles are expressed and materialize in public life. This, in turn, 
obliges us, for the moment, to broaden Rawls’ two restrictive principles 
of justice, liberty and equality, with the federal principle of autonomy, 
formulated from a federal perspective of fraternity. This latter principle 
being, in effect, closely tied to the first two, as the collective dimension of 
the very liberty of autonomous political wills and equality rooted in the 
solidarity and equity of federalism.
Of course, overlapping consensus contributes greater stability in 
contrast to a modus vivendi, dependent on favourable circumstances and 
the circumstantial correlation of forces which, in the case of change, can 
convert the very rules of the game into an object of political competition. It 
is also in contrast to the comprehensive vision that state nationalism would 
involve (but not “republican patriotism”, as there is no civic nationalism 
that does not contain inevitable ethno-cultural components), which 
imposes a single, hegemonic vision of the community based on the culture, 
myths, narrative and interests of the majority community in the territorial 
sphere concerned. But the optic of overlapping consensus is, nonetheless, 
ultimately not sufficient grounds for a plurinational federalism, taking 
into account its excessively procedural and scarcely republican nature. 
Among other reasons this is because: (1) it greatly reduces the public 
agenda, the public uses of reason, apart from the identitarian, cultural and 
political demands of the citizenry; (2) it is formulated as an ideal reasoning 
process which imposes hyper-rational standards on the citizenry, ignoring 
the world of feeling which resides within language and the political value 
of the mythic-symbolic dimension; and (3) it is designed, as we have 
seen, taking the coincidence between political and cultural borders for 
granted, based on an uncritical acceptance of the nation-state.
In contrast, the configuration of national identity itself, its plural 
or singular character, its self-comprehension of us/them, the familiar/ 
unfamiliar, its future as a space of assimilation or multiculturality, its 
relation with other eventual nations within the state, etc., are all issues that 
cannot be dealt with limited by the inheritance of tradition, resolved once 
and for all in a past perceived by successive generations as an essential, 
pristine and untouchable origin, not permitting any re-evaluation. In 
contrast, all of this must be the central object of open public discussion. 
Thus, deliberation39 constitutes a principal dimension, not reducible to a 
39 Máiz, Ramón, “On Deliberation: Rethinking Democracy as Politics Itself” in Ernest 
Gellner (ed.), Liberalism in Modern Times, London, Central European University 
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mere overlapping consensus, in the democratic construction of nations, 
even more so plural and contested nations. Nation as deliberation means 
that the selection of myths and symbols which are never neutral, the 
historical narrative fraught with decisions regarding what is remembered 
and what is forgotten, the language differences protected by institutions 
and statutes regarding minority languages, the relationship with other 
nations and the state, the definition of the common future regarding 
economic and social aims and in relation to justice, these and other issues 
have to explicitly enter into the public sphere so they can be debated by 
majority and minority groups. The placement of deliberation in the very 
heart of the nation, far from meaning a transformation of a philosophical 
argument over autonomy and the cultural context of decision making into 
a political argument40, also subjects the very cultural core of the nation to 
public debate, to criticism and to the exercise of autonomy and judgment. 
For this reason, the radical interpretations of the modus vivendi such 
as the comprehensive vision of communitarianism or the overlapping 
consensus of liberalism are insufficient. If it is about how to make it 
possible for the diversity of individuals and territorial communities of 
late-modern societies to coexist in common institutions which everyone 
accepts as legitimate41, a normative theory of pluralist federalism of a clear 
republican spirit gains in importance in contrast to both state nationalisms 
and the “mosaic” of (multi)communitarianisms.
At the same time, something fundamental which escapes from the 
Rawlsian model of overlapping consensus as the normative horizon of 
federalism is the extent of the republican thesis (and if federalism loses its 
republican theoretical substance it becomes a caricature of itself) that the 
same thing happens to collective rights to self-government and cultural-
territorial autonomy as to individual rights; namely, that the recipients 
of said rights can only acquire complete autonomy as a group to the 
extent that they understand themselves as authors of the decisions and 
institutions that regulate them. For this reason the political autonomy of 
nations as a collective right is closely linked to the construction of a public 
space which, through participation and deliberation, issues of interest, 
cultural and linguistic difference and the relevant criteria for recognition 
and self-government are elucidated. In other words, we must remind 
ourselves once again, that it is necessary to incorporate within the logic 
of self-government what Habermas referred to as an “internal conceptual 
Press, 1996, pp. 145-173; Máiz, Ramón, “Nation and Deliberation” in Ramón Máiz and 
Ferran Requejo, Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism, London, Routledge, 
2005, pp. 58-79.
40 Benhabib, Seyla, The Claims of Culture, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
41 Gray, John, Las dos caras del liberalismo, Barcelona, Paidós, 2001, p. 141.
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connection” (begrifflich notwendingen Zusammenhang) between rights 
and democracy42. This is because there is not, to the effects that interest 
us here, a plurinational pact of accommodation within a federation 
without a demanding democracy, which converts its beneficiaries into its 
authors, the protagonists of agreement through representation, pluralism, 
participation and deliberation. It is difficult to formulate the collective 
rights to self-government and cultural autonomy in a non-paternalistic 
manner if the very members of the nation do not previously articulate and 
ground their aspirations, objectives, demands and the scope of their own 
unavoidably plural national culture in public discussions exempt from 
coercion.
However, federalism formulated as a space for deliberation is not 
intended to overcome the conflict of multi-nationality through a yearning 
for a chimerical harmonious society or an earthly “communion of saints”; 
nor to eliminate from the political scene the comprehensive nationalist 
visions of the state or those against the state, their demands for self-
determination and secession, nor deny their legitimacy as long as they 
comply with the normative requirements of pluralist democracy. Rather, its 
intent is the very opposite, to facilitate a normative focus which prescribes 
spheres for negotiation and deliberation, multilateral and bilateral spaces 
of convergence and divergence or conflict, in the interest of achieving 
a partial compromise and a common project for coexistence that can be 
revised based on the genesis of compatible and overlapping identities.
But the normative horizon of this deliberative federal nation, which 
aspires to construct a plural community, superimposed on internal 
communities, requires internal effects to construct its own logic. These 
are not only the abandonment of a state nationalism (national federalism) 
for being too all-embracing, but also the overcoming of a merely 
institutionalist and legalist reading of federation in an exclusively state 
key, for being excessively in debt to an insufficient and proceduralist 
overlapping consensus. It requires, in short, the reformulation of the very 
idea of the nation, the abandonment of organic nationalism, the liquidation 
of the idea – both impossible and unjustifiable – of a homogeneous and 
monocultural community, in favour of a theory of the nation as a plural 
political community, integrated by majorities and minorities which share, 
debate and renegotiate a common project at the same time as they construct 
it. In other words, it demands a non-nationalist conception of the nation, 
towards a concept which is, (1) political (not culturalist, although culture 
plays more than a minor role) and (2) pluralist (not monistic, both as a 
totality and within each of the communities). A federalist concept of the 
nation, or to be more precise, beyond the false dichotomy ethnic/civic 
42 Habermas, Jürgen, Faktizität und Geltung, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1996, p. 142.
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nationalism, a republican-federalist concept of the nation, is one which 
reconciles unity and diversity in all of the federal and sub federal units, 
as a correlate to the synthesis of self-government and shared government, 
and illuminates overlapping identities. This is something unthinkable both 
for the principle of the nation-state, as for the principle of nationalities; 
and both from centralist Jacobin nationalism as well as from the national 
federalism of the “compound Republic” – an authentic people of peoples 
in their dimension as nation of nations.
Conclusion: Toward a Normative Theory of Federalism
The obvious shortcomings of liberal egalitarian and republican 
theory and its underlying (and poorly reasoned) normative dimension 
in many analyses of the positive/empirical theory of federalism demand 
the elaboration of a complementary substantive normative theory of 
federalism. A theory, in other words, which serves as a prescriptive guide 
in the orientation of political debate and which helps in the formulation 
of empirical questions, as well as providing a basis for the evaluation of 
really existing federations. A normative theory which, as a result of what 
has been discussed here, must address at minimum the following core 
arguments:
1.  Federalism is not only an institutional model for the territorial 
organization of power – the federation – but also a political theory 
of justice, a normative political theory grounded in accommodation, 
trust and pact (fides/foedus) and based on the articulation of three 
basic principles: liberty, equality and autonomy.
2.  Federalism is, above all, an alternative to the theory of sovereignty; 
being, in reality, a theory of a constitutional state without a sover-
eign, based upon all powers being distributed in different spheres 
and limited by the constitution. The basic federal mechanism is 
multilateral coordination between different political units through 
endogenous genesis and moral and political mechanisms of self-
reinforcement (solidarity, recognition, loyalty).
3.  In addition, federalism, in its pluralist formulation is a normative 
alternative to the national state and it basic equation (state = nation) 
as it is a multinational federalism, in other words, a pluralist 
and deliberative setting which aspires to accommodate various 
nations within the same polity. To this end it involves multilateral 
and bilateral spheres of negotiation and deliberation, a complex 
system of parties (parties at the state and non-state levels) and 
overlapping and compatible identities. But it must also reformulate 
a non-nationalist (plural and inclusive) concept of the nation (as a 
pluralist nation of pluralist nations).
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4.  The core of federalism is the integration and articulation of self-
government and shared government, through the principle of 
competence against that of hierarchy. And its normative model is 
a horizontal matrix of the distribution and interaction of powers, a 
polycentric structure, networked not pyramidal, of political power. 
5.  Federalism is a process, more than a definitive and stitched together 
structure, of interaction among actors and institutions that reaches 
successive states of equilibrium. As such it has no closure, by 
definition being contestable and open to periodic renegotiations. 
Thus, federalism consists of a federalization with rhythms, 
requirements and experiences specific to each community, through 
interaction based on broad autonomy and joint involvement in the 
interest of a general political will.
6.  Federalism points to a system of multilevel government based on 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, with recognition 
and autonomy constitutionally guaranteed (through complex 
constitutions: a constitution of the federation and that of member 
states, which safeguard the different spaces of self-government). 
This multi-centric system opens upward toward complex units 
(for example, the European Union in a federalist interpretation) 
or downward toward more elemental units, reinforcing local 
democratic government (new municipalism).
The normative theory of federalism, in short, goes beyond the 
theoretical framework of egalitarian liberalism and requires the widening 
of the model of republican democracy. This contributes a fundamental 
vector of normative evaluation: a concept of strong citizenship, through 
the complex overlapping of the dimensions of liberty and equality, 
and articulating in an innovative manner, with the end of constructing 
both a state of states and a nation of nations, the classic principles of 
representation, deliberation and inclusion. But, all of this necessitates 
rethinking from a republican perspective, not only the state but also the 
nation itself beyond the false ethnic/civic dichotomy. In the same way that 
we cannot postulate republicanism as a total rupture, as a sort of world 
apart with respect to liberalism (or socialism); nor should we abandon the 
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The literature on Canadian federalism is characterized by two 
particular phenomena. First, Quebec Francophone scholars have, in large 
measure, attempted to illustrate that the spirit which marked the adoption 
of a federated state in Canada has been betrayed. Federal initiatives are 
invariably judged by these authors to be contrary to the initial division of 
powers. Conversely, scholars from English Canada have dealt with more 
pragmatic questions. Their approach to political institutions has been 
influenced by three dominant questions. On one hand, they have studied 
the links between federalism and democracy. On the second hand, they 
have explored the capacity of governments to develop public policies 
responsive to the needs of their citizens. Finally, they have focused on 
federalism as a way to manage Canada’s diversity and reduce tensions by 
giving territorially concentrated minorities control of institutions which 
would allow them to protect and promote their distinctive features. In 
this presentation, I would like to argue that a third perspective has been 
absent from the reflections on federalism in Canada in the sense that the 
principles and normative dimensions of federalism are rarely discussed, 
at least compared to studies on federalism’s political and institutional 
dimensions.
The modes of representation of federalism and its ideals have not 
solicited much attention. Without suggesting that the idea of federalism 
should determine its practice, it is important to recognize that representations 
are crucial bases for the evaluations that we make.
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1. Federation, Federalism, Federal Society: From 
Organizational Principle to Normative Model
Federalism is foremost conceived of as a mode or principle of insti-
tutional organization. However, the concept of federalism also refers to the 
principle, the idea and the belief upon which the federal system is built.
The taking into account of the normative dimensions of federalism 
carries with it practical consequences that are important to mention before 
we start. The notion of federalism refers to both the collection of federal 
institutions and the collection of principles which must precede the putting 
into place of these institutions. In this regard, the analysis of federalism 
cannot only pay attention to the organization of power. Rather, it requires 
a detour for the exploration of ideas, representations, values and ideals. 
What philosopher Daniel Weinstock calls the normative justification of 
federalism consists of examining the desirability of the values that a 
federal system of government allows to be realized. This justification 
contrasts with another justification, which is purely instrumental, in 
which the choice of a federal system is only the fruit of a calculation 
of the advantages to be obtained and the relations of forces which are 
present. It is also a question of attitude.
The power of a central structure is not and should not be absolute. 
Rather, it must co-exist with the autonomy of federated entities. The 
recognition of autonomy must be substantial enough to permit groups 
participating in a federation to manage their own affairs with the means 
at their disposal. In summary, it is not the majority who governs the 
minorities, but the minorities who are self-governing. The federation 
organizes this heterogeneity and does not oblige the “minorities” to bow 
to demands defined by the general government. The sharing of powers 
guarantees the autonomy both of the federated entities and the general 
government. It presupposes that federated entities are exempt from all 
guardianship by and hierarchal links with the general government. 
The notion of non-subordination comes from this conception of a lack 
of guardianship and, thus, liberty within the areas where the federated 
government is presumed to be autonomous.
The autonomy and the multiplicity of powers within the federated 
governments and the general state should be balanced by the necessity 
to establish reciprocal contacts. The federation organizes this solidarity 
through common institutions. The imperative of autonomy is tied to the 
requirement of cooperation and participation.
Further, federated communities should be conscious of the fact that 
the decisions that they make, even within their own sphere of autonomy, 
could affect the other communities constitutive of the federal space. 
This interdependence obliges the putting in place of mechanisms to 
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ensure dialogue and cooperation among the federated communities 
(horizontality) and between the federated communities and the general 
government (verticality).
Federalism calls for a collective transformation of societal conscious-
ness. For Elazar, “the first step is a shift of minds of men from thinking 
statist to thinking federal. Once begun, the possibility for combining 
various arrangements of different degrees of scope and intensity has wide 
limits”. Thus, for the federal experiment to function well, it is required 
that the different federal components (states, groups, collectivities) 
abandon the idea that a concentration of power constitutes the best way 
to govern. In other words, a federal culture has to be valorized, promoted 
and respected. Federalism, like all other forms of government, constitutes 
a response to the values present in societies characterized by diversity and 
pluralism. While federalism cannot be reduced to bargaining, its study 
should include that of the negotiation process. Societies claiming to be 
federal can call upon a diversity of political arrangements but these must 
reflect the diversity out of which the society is constituted. Therefore, 
while the political act which directs a society towards the federal style 
of organization could be guided by economic or military considerations, 
or is the result of a “reasonable marriage” to use Maurice Lamontagne’s 
expression, the ultimate success of federalism depends on the correlation 
which exists between governmental structures and social consensus. 
Thus, the management of territorially defined social cleavages – whether 




These general institutional and normative considerations allow us to 
put into focus four aspects that will illuminate our path to understanding 
the evolution of the federal idea in Canada. First, in a federal state, 
structures and attitudes are closely connected. There must be a level of 
congruence between the mode of organization and societal values. 
Second, the presence of several orders of autonomous governments, 
and more generally a federal culture, implies both a double loyalty and 
a shared identity. Loyalty expressed towards the general state, which 
coordinates solidarity, is as important as the reinforcement of the 
autonomy of the constitutive groups of a federation. 
Third, the federal order, which encompasses a multiplicity of powers 
which are both autonomous and interdependent, cannot be definitive. It 
is important to mention that the federation evolves not only because it is 
Negotiating Diversity
38
exposed to internal conflicts, but because it permits the expression and 
affirmation of such internal conflicts. 
Fourth, the significance accorded to normative principles in relation 
to institutional arrangements underlines the importance of the function 
of legitimacy. Federal legitimacy is, in large measure, dependent upon 
the capacity to reflect normative principles. Moreover, federal legitimacy 
is reinforced by the necessary linkage between the presence of a federal 
culture and the institutions which nourish it. The absence of either a 
federal culture or the institutions to sustain that culture could only plunge 
the federal political regime into a profound crisis. This crisis would not 
take the form of disagreements over certain choices but the fundamental 
questioning of the conditions which allow the continuance of the federal 
political community.
2. The Evolution of the Canadian Political System  
or the Negation of the Federal Ideal
It is my argument that the contemporary representations of federalism 
have been consistently articulated for several decades. In Quebec, the 
dominant understanding of federalism and federal institutions has its 
origins in the Tremblay Report, named for the president of the Quebec 
provincial government’s Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems, 
published in 1956. Since then, while evidently being adapted for 
particular political conjunctures, the Quebec-Canada debate has taken 
place almost exclusively within the argumentative framework set out 
in the report. Similarly, English Canadian literature on federalism, as 
well as the practice of federalism by the general government, follows 
the argumentation advanced by the Rowell-Sirois Commission, named 
for co-presidents of the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations, which published its report in 1940.
These two documents have shaped the manner in which intergov-
ernmental relations and citizen-state relations are understood in Canada. 
The reasoning that we find in these reports has nurtured the way in which 
political actors and intellectuals have understood the evolution of the 
Canadian federal system and have interpreted the key events, such as the 
putting into place of the Canadian welfare state; the constitutional debate 
which culminated in the repatriation of the Constitution of Canada, which 
included a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an amending formula; the 
saga of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords; the creation of NAFTA 
(inspired by the recommendations of the Macdonald Commission); and 
more generally, the diminishing role of the general government which 
paralleled the increasing power of the provinces. The representations of 
federalism contained in the Rowell-Sirois and Tremblay reports, as well 
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as the understanding that flows from these reports, do not respect the 
ideal and normative federal project articulated within the above triptychs 
that have as their central element the twin notions of autonomy and 
interdependence. The dominant understanding of the English Canadian 
literature on federalism pays no heed to the notion of autonomy in favor 
of the notion of efficiency, while Quebec Francophone scholars and the 
practices of the Quebec provincial government have not adequately 
taken into account the notion of interdependence. If the institutional 
problems concerning the functioning of the federal system which are 
raised in the literature are often pertinent, the understanding of such 
problems is embedded in a mode of thought which leaves little place for 
a federal conception of the nature of relations that should characterize a 
federation.
2.1 A Double Obsession: Pact and Autonomy 
The work on the evolution of federalism emanating from Francophone 
Quebec emphasizes the Canadian federal regime’s invariably centralizing 
character and desires the rehabilitation of the original federative idea. 
This interpretation must recognize the fact that the political regime put 
in place in 1867 was not completely federal and, in fact, subordinated the 
provinces to the general government. The political regime of 1867 did not 
respect the principle of autonomy of the provinces nor did it permit the 
provinces to participate in the decisions taken by the general government. 
Essentially, the above interpretation follows the principal arguments of 
the Tremblay Commission and adapts them to contemporary realities.
The definition of federalism for the authors of the Tremblay Report 
was explicitly inspired by the classic works of Albert Dicey, Kenneth 
C. Wheare and Georges Burdeau. The emphasis is placed on both the 
balancing of unity and pluralism, and the presence of two orders of equal 
and co-coordinated governments. The regional governments have the 
mission to protect the particular interests of their political communities. 
The Tremblay Commission insisted that the actions of each order of 
government should be limited to its proper sphere of jurisdiction, within 
which it has independence vis-à-vis the other order of government. 
The principle of non-subordination thus occupied a place of privilege 
within the structure of federal institutions. Non-subordination was even 
presented as the “first and general idea of the regime, which applies to all 
authentically federal states”.
The question of the origins of the political system is central because it 
determines the way in which the federation is evaluated and its evolution 
judged. The reading of the BNA Act of 1867 by the Tremblay Commission 
illustrates the clash of two tendencies: the unitary spirit embodied by 
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John A. Macdonald and the federal spirit articulated by those who wanted 
provinces to have real autonomy and sovereignty.
The spirit of the federation rests on the implicit recognition of the 
equal treatment of two national peoples as associates and partners, each 
possessing rights regarding and ensuring the survival of their group 
within the Canadian union.
While the Tremblay Commission’s report is almost entirely devoted 
to the philosophical, historical, judicial and institutional justification of 
the principle of provincial autonomy (and therefore the principles of 
heterogeneity and non-subordination), it devotes only six pages to the 
matter of how the principle of interdependence should be materialized. 
The issue of the coordination of policies, which is nonetheless essential 
to respecting federal principles, merits only superficial consideration in 
the Commission’s report.
This imbalance constitutes no less than the distortion of the federal 
ideal, a distortion which subsequently had a profound influence on 
the way political discourse was articulated around the question of the 
Quebec-Canada dynamic.
For Quebec governments, the Quebec-Canada dynamic is illustrated 
through several concepts: attachment to the principle of autonomy, 
respect for and the expansion of provincial jurisdiction, achieving a 
distinct status, and asymmetrical federalism. The position of Quebec 
governments (and the majority of intellectuals) is not one of holding 
back Quebec. Rather, the position of Quebec governments aims at 
the construction and legitimatization of a “national” political space 
which corresponds to the proclaimed and proven particularities by 
which Quebec defines itself as a “complete society”. It is remarkable 
to note that this construction has taken place, both at the discursive 
level and concerning Quebec-Canada state relations, on the basis of the 
non-participation of Quebec in the building of the Canadian political 
community. In other words, Quebec’s relationship with the rest of 
Canada is primarily utilitarian (Premier Robert Bourassa spoke of a 
“profitable federalism”).
2.2 A Double Preoccupation: Performance and Legitimacy
The interpretation of the federal regime within English Canadian 
literature emphasizes the transition from a highly centralized system, in 
which the general government could intervene in provincial jurisdiction 
using declaratory powers of reservation and disallowance, to one of the 
most decentralized federations in the world. The narrative is generally 
that the recourse to unitary mechanisms has diminished over time to 
the point where the power of disallowance has not been exercised since 
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1943. Responding to the demands of the provinces, including Ontario, 
the JCPC in London rendered several decisions which contributed to 
the “federalization” of the Canadian political regime through the forcing 
of the general government to respect the original division of powers. 
Therefore, the authority of the provinces was confirmed and their 
subordination to the general government was reduced.
Ultimately, the growth of the Canadian state made the compartmental-
ized model of federalism obsolete. The increase in the size of the Canadian 
state was accompanied by an interpretation of the federal regime which 
aimed less at accommodating its constitutive communities and more at a 
“pragmatic” approach to the sharing of jurisdictions. Postwar federalism was 
characterized by a dense overlapping of jurisdictions, an interdependence 
of policies and a greater level of intergovernmental competition. Thus, 
several mechanisms of “intergovernmental collaboration” were put into 
place though the increased practice of executive federalism.
In summary, federalism within English Canadian literature is presented 
first, foremost and above all as a formula or an arrangement relative to the 
exercise of power. Viewed through the lens of functionality, the overall 
evaluation of the Canadian political regime is generally positive despite 
the inevitable tensions it creates.
On the whole, the criteria used to evaluate the evolution of the Canadian 
political regime make little reference to the dimensions pertaining to the 
normative federal project. Richard Simeon remarked that recent studies 
have mostly emphasized the analysis of the efficiency of public policies. 
The value judgments contained in these studies are not concerned with 
notions of autonomy or interdependence but with the themes of democracy 
and access to the exercise of power, social justice, equality and, only 
secondarily, with the accommodation of the constitutive communities 
(Quebec and First Nations).
This mode of understanding Canadian federalism with its insistence 
on efficiency, transparency, legitimacy and, more specifically, the capacity 
to deepen democracy is not new. Already in 1940, the Rowell-Sirois 
Report displayed a political discourse in which the concepts of efficiency, 
rationalization, (fiscal) equity between the two “orders” of government, 
constitutional flexibility and national unity occupied a central place. 
Indeed, the quest for efficiency and the rebalancing of federal-provincial 
relations was at the heart of the mandate of the Rowell-Sirois Commission. 
However, since the publication of the report, observers have noted the 
absence of deep reflection on the underlying principles of the Canadian 
federal regime. Nonetheless, similar to the Tremblay Commission, the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission played a determining role in the understanding 
of federalism throughout Canada.
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The general philosophy of the Commission attempts to legitimize a 
more functional approach to the federal regime. Thus, the principle of 
provincial autonomy was never directly questioned in areas of health, 
social assistance and education. In the same vein, the centralization of 
powers was never favoured in order to respect regional particularities.
The novelty of the approach put forth by the Rowell-Sirois Report 
was not in its search for a new division of powers which would favour 
the general government, but its argument for the decompartmentalization 
of federalism. In this respect, the notion of interdependence is well 
represented in the Report.
This change in perspective permitted the Canadian federation to 
gradually transform itself without having to make numerous formal 
modifications to the Constitution. Inter-governmentalism, presented as 
the vector of flexibility1, became the principal preoccupation of elites and 
political analysts in Canada. 
Further, the judgments and opinions of the Supreme of Court of Canada 
have also shifted towards emphasizing functionality over principles.
It is clear that the return of the compact or covenant thesis becomes 
increasingly less likely as the Canadian political community consolidates 
itself. According to the new principles which have accompanied the re-
founding of Canada, such as the primacy of individual rights as guaranteed 
by the Charter and the formal equality of the provinces entrenched by the 
amending formula of the Constitution, the demands formulated by the 
“federalist” political elites in Quebec are incompatible with the modern 
representation of the pan-Canadian civic republican nation. For Cairns, 
only this new type of Canadian nationalism could correspond to the new 
constitutional foundations of the Canadian federation.
What remains of the normative federal political project as defined 
by the literature? Honestly, very little. The principles of autonomy, non-
subordination and heterogeneity are contradictory to the managerial 
approach that has gradually taken over since the work of the Rowell-Sirois 
Commission emphasized notions of efficiency, performance and formal 
equality in 1940. Even the normative principle of interdependence, which 
arises from the multiple mechanisms of federal-provincial collaboration, 
only seeks participation as part of the quest for efficiency.
Conclusion
This analysis invites us to re-visit the terms on which the debates and 
analyses of Canadian federalism rest. The interpretative frameworks have 
1 Wheare, Kenneth C., Federal Government (4th ed.), London, Oxford University Press, 
1963, p. 227.
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evolved very little over time. In the case of Quebec, the dominant way 
of understanding the Quebec-Canada dynamic is based upon the work 
of the Tremblay Commission which took place over a half a century 
ago. Similarly, the preoccupations which animate English Canadian 
literature on federalism have their roots in the work of the Rowell-Sirois 
Commission whose mandate was defined in 1937. Perhaps, it is time 
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In a world that is said to be post-nationalist and post-sovereign, why 
do nations said to be without states get so much attention? The golden 
age of nation-states is said by several authors to be over, but this is far 
from meaning that nations and national identities have lost their relevance 
and power to mobilize. To the contrary, far from having lost their appeal 
and importance, national communities remain key actors in current-day 
politics. In this chapter, I will be focusing on two main dimensions. First, I 
will be discussing why nations are still relevant actors in the struggle against 
unfair practices in a world led by neo-liberal practices and second, I will be 
advancing the argument that multinational federalism could provide major 
instruments to institutionalize a fairer representation of political claims in 
complex political settings. The argument that will be developed here is 
that the optimal way to bring communities together and to develop trust in 
such settings is through a policy of empowerment of communities rather 
than through the imposition of a strategy that would consist in constraining 
minority nations in their desire to assert themselves.
Pierre Elliott Trudeau has been both a strong advocate of federalism 
and Canadian nationalism and has expressed during his life-time a firm 
opposition to separatism. Here is a revealing quote from Trudeau that gets 
to the heart of his political thought and constituted the cornerstone of his 
approach to politics:
One way of offsetting the appeal of separatism is by investing tremendous 
amounts of time, energy, and money in nationalism, at the federal level. 
A national image must be created that will have such an appeal as to make 
any image of a separatist group unattractive. Resources must be diverted into 
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such things as national flags, anthems, education, arts councils, broadcasting 
corporations, film boards; the territory must be bound together by a network 
of railways, highways, airlines. […] the whole citizenry must be made to feel 
that it is only within the framework of the federal state that their language, 
culture, institutions, sacred traditions, and standards of living can be protected 
from external attack and internal strife1.
Trudeau’s argument was that, especially in cases of pluriethnic and 
multinational states, a pan-nationalism would be the best option to 
advance in order to avoid what he portrayed as a slippery slope toward 
secession. In this chapter, I will proceed in three steps with a view to 
exploring the concept of empowerment and conciliation under the ambit 
of two distinct domains: nationalism and federalism. First, let’s turn our 
attention toward the idea that nationalism could offer a fertile ground to 
advance fairer public policies in a multinational liberal context. Quebec-
Canada dynamics will be at the very heart of this essay and will constitute 
a central building block for a series of reflections on the management of 
deep diversity in multinational federations.
1. Empowerment through Nationalist Mobilization
Sociologist Marc Renaud wrote a useful summary of the social and 
economic conditions prevailing in the 1960s in Quebec. At the time, 
francophone Quebeckers represented 80% of the population of the 
province and owned 50% of the enterprises, but controlled barely 15% of 
the value added in the industrial sector2. In short, francophones controlled 
the least profitable sectors of the economy, those sectors being, first and 
foremost, agriculture, and to a much lesser degree, retail trade, services, 
and construction. Let me quote an excerpt from Renaud’s account:
[…] quite a few French Canadians had the formal training enabling them to 
fulfill top managerial, professional, and technical jobs in the economy and, 
after the educational reforms of the mid-1960s, their number considerably 
increased. In effect a new middle class was born […]. This new middle class 
is, in essence, different from Quebec’s old middle class and traditional elites 
whose power and status derived above all from their position vis-à-vis the 
religious order.
In the early 1960s, this new middle class was confronted with a private 
economy quite incapable of generating new job outlets and quite inhospitable 
to certified French-Canadian skills. The expansion of the state in this context 
came as a miracle. It provided job outlets to university – and technically 
1 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, Trudeau and the French Canadians, Toronto, Macmillan, 
1968, p. 193.
2 Renaud, Marc, “Quebec New Middle Class in Search of Social Hegemony” in Alain-G. 
Gagnon (ed.), Quebec: State and Society, Scarborough, Methuen, 1984, p. 160.
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trained French Canadians, thus securing the survival of that class within 
Quebec3.
The implementation of such overwhelming changes helped to 
give Quebec’s state actors legitimacy as they were viewed as being 
responsible for the upward mobility of francophone Quebeckers. In turn, 
state nationalism was advanced as the main mechanism for transforming 
economic and political conditions, and for providing francophone 
Quebeckers with equal job opportunities. The task was gargantuan 
considering that, in 1959, fewer than fifty specialists in the human and 
social sciences (including economists, urban planners and social workers) 
were employed by the Quebec government, and that almost a third of all 
public sector employees had less than five years of formal education. At 
the same time, more than half of the public sector employees worked 
in the administration of justice, highways, Hydro-Québec, or the Liquor 
Commission4. It is in this context that the Parent commission in the area 
of education was set up to bring about a major reform.
The 1961 commission was set up to bring the key field of education 
under state control. Its report, tabled in 1966, found that the state 
must see to social and economic progress, provide for the general welfare, 
protect the community, correct injustice, help the weak. In view of this, it 
may be said that the modern state can no longer leave a part of its people in 
ignorance without jeopardizing the progress and peace of society and without 
complicity in inequities which it has a mission to redress. Thus it is obligated 
to provide, directly or indirectly, for the education of all, and this is one of its 
essential functions, of which it will never again be able to divest itself5.
The work of the Parent commission corresponds to a period in 
Quebec politics when state nationalism was also on the ascent in public 
consciousness. For many Francophone Quebeckers the only way for them 
to reverse the power structure was to call upon the state to tame forces of 
private capital.
Most francophone Quebecers also saw state nationalism as a potent 
instrument for advancing democratic practices, for developing solidarity 
and social cohesion, for attenuating discrimination, for increasing social 
inclusion, for stimulating public investment, for advancing privatization 
or for undermining liberal economic practices. Within this context, I would 
3 Ibid., p. 169.
4 Brooks, Stephen and Alain-G. Gagnon, Social Scientists and Politics in Canada: 
Between Clerisy and Vanguard, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1988.
5 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec, 
Quebec City, Department of Education, Pierre de Marois Printer, 1966, pp. 13-14.
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submit that all political parties within the Quebec National Assembly 
have defended, from the 1960s onwards, some form of state nationalism.
Francophone Quebecers have been spared from the dark side of 
nationalism; instead they have focused on its potential for a transformative 
and emancipative politics. I remember very well the unfettered excitement 
of Québécois youth when René Lévesque was first elected Premier on 
15 November 1976. There was a feeling in the air that things had begun 
to change for the better. A sense of confidence had been imprinted in the 
public consciousness. 
Let’s clarify the Québécois enthusiasm for state nationalism. To be 
clear, nationalism is a polysemic concept. For some, nationalism is a 
reactionary movement that seeks to advance an ethnic project based on 
primordial ties and opposition to liberal values. For others, nationalism 
is the expression of a social movement that seeks to transform power 
relations and redress past injustices. Still, for others, it is a quest for identity 
in a world that is caught between forces of integration and disintegration6. 
So, both Canadian majority nationalism and Quebec minority nationalism 
have at times adopted different postures with respect to culture, economy, 
and identity politics. That being said, my general understanding of these 
two forms of nationalisms in Canada is that, over the last thirty years, they 
have overwhelmingly tended to push for liberal values in their respective 
nationalist projects.
So nationalism is not always an ugly thing. American political scientist 
Craig Calhoun invites us to avoid discussing nationalism simply
through instances of passionate excess or successful manipulation by 
demagogues. For nationalism is equally a discursive formation that facilitates 
mutual recognition among polities that mediate different histories, institutional 
arrangements, material conditions, cultures, and political projects in the 
context of intensifying globalisation. Nationalism offers both a mode of access 
to global affairs and a mode of resistance to aspects of globalization. To wish 
it away is more likely to invite the dominance of neoliberal capitalism than to 
usher in an era of world citizenship7.
The main point then is simply to underline that we should not 
jump too quickly to conclusions when we are addressing nationalism 
as a socio-political project. The requirement of national solidarity has 
been particularly well illustrated by pacifists such as Mohandas Gandhi 
(1869-1948) in the case of India, Martin Buber (1878-1948) in the case 
6 Laforest, Guy and Douglas Brown (eds.), Integration and Fragmentation. The Paradox 
of the Late Twentieth Century, Kingston, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 
1994.
7 Calhoun, Craig, Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 
London and New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 166.
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of Israel, as well as by protestant theologian Paul Tillich in Europe 
and catholic theologian Jacques Grand’Maison in Quebec8. In other 
words, nationalism can help to empower communities that have been 
ignored, neglected or taken for granted. This brings us to our discussion 
of federalism as a potent tool for recognition and the empowerment of 
communities and societal cultures in a pluralist context.
2. Empowerment through Multinational  
Federalist Mobilisation
In addition to nationalism, federalism can be understood as an 
instrument for empowering communities. Federalism facilitates inter-state 
relations, intra-state linkages and inter-community relations. Elsewhere 
I have identified five main uses of federalism in divided political 
settings9. These were federalism as a conflict management mechanism, 
as a shield for minorities and territorial interests, as a device to search 
for an equilibrium between forces of unity and forces of diversity, as a 
system of representation in dual if not multiple expressions of democratic 
practices, and as a social laboratory propitious for developing innovative 
socio-political programmes. What has been lacking in most accounts of 
federalism is an understanding that it can also serve as a mechanism for 
empowering minority cultures and nations in complex political settings. I 
have tried to address this oversight in some recent writings among which 
are included Multinational Democracies, The Case for Multinational 
Federalism: Beyond the All-Encompassing State and, recently, L’Âge des 
incertitudes: essais sur le fédéralisme et la diversité nationale.
In Multinational Democracies, my colleague James Tully introduces 
this new distinctive type of political association in the following manner: 
First and foremost, multinational democracies, in contrast to single-nation 
democracies (which are often presumed to be the norm), are constitutional 
associations that contain two or more nations or peoples. […] Since the 
nations of a multinational democracy are nations, their members aspire to 
recognition not only in the larger multinational association of which they are 
a unit, but also to some degree in international law and other, supranational 
legal regimes (as for example, the four nations of the United Kingdom). 
Accordingly, multinational democracies are not traditional, single-nation 
democracies with internal, sub-national minorities, seeking group rights 
8 For a detailed account of these personalities and their position with respect to 
nationalism, refer to Baum, Gregory, Nationalism, Religion and Ethics, Montreal and 
Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press. 2001.
9 Gagnon, Alain-G., “The Political Uses of Federalism” in Michael Burgess and Alain-G. 
Gagnon (eds.), Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and 
Future Directions, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, pp. 15-44.
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within, but societies of two or more, often overlapping nations that are more 
or less equal in status.
Second, multinational democracies are not confederations of independent 
nation-states, plural societies of separate peoples or multinational empires. 
[…] The jurisdictions, modes of participation and representation, and the 
national and multinational identities of citizens overlap and are subject to 
negotiation. […]
Third, the nations and the composite multination are constitutional 
democracies. That is, the legitimacy of both the nations and the multinational 
associations rests on their adherence to the legal and political values, 
principles and rights of constitutional democracy and international law. […]
Fourth, multinational democracies are also multicultural. Both the nations 
and the multinational association as a whole are composed of individuals and 
cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic minorities who struggle for and against 
distinctive forms of representation and accommodation of their cultural 
diversity. In response, the nations and the multinational association develop 
procedures and institutions for the democratic discussion and reconciliation 
of these forms of diversity […]10.
Tully has done a superb job in depicting and seeing the potential of 
this distinctive type of political association for the advancement of justice 
and political stability in advanced democracies.
Pierre Trudeau’s writings, prior to his entry into federal politics in 1965, 
have much in common with Tully’s perceptive account of multinational 
democracies. Trudeau, in fact, once argued in favour of a political project 
known as the multinational option in which federalism and democracy 
could be advanced simultaneously. In these writings, Trudeau argued that 
the classic Westphalian model of the state could not provide a satisfying 
response to minority claims or contribute to the advancement of plural 
communities. Tully has recently revisited some of Trudeau’s earlier 
writings on multinational federalism and found it deserving of high 
praise as it is based on “grass-roots democratization, local and regional 
experiments in socialism, and a plurality of national, ethnic, democratic, 
regional and economic associations” and in which “English-Canadian 
and French-Canadian nationalisms would co-exist within the federation 
and be civic and plural rather than ethnically homogeneous”11.
However, following his entry into federal politics, Pierre Trudeau chose 
not to pursue his own conceptualization of the “multinational option”. 
10 Tully, James, “Introduction” in Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (eds.), Multinational 
Democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 3-4.
11 Tully, James, “Federations, Communities and their Transformations” in André Lecours 
and Geneviève Nootens (eds.), Dominant Nationalism, Dominant Ethnicity, Brussels, 
PIE Peter Lang, 2009, p. 196.
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He showed also a clear discomfort with the idea that Canada could be 
imagined as a “community of communities”12. Rather he defended the 
idea that all Canadians should fall under the scope of undifferentiated 
recognition and that individual rights should prevail over all other forms 
of political recognition. In other words, institutions, culture, identity, 
belonging, history, gender and indigeneity should not interfere with 
concrete political life.
2.1 The Time of Uncertainties13
It is crucial to connect with Trudeau’s earlier writings as we now 
find ourselves in an age of great uncertainty. This age is defined by the 
creation of a global market and economic standardization, by a rising 
tidal wave of cultural Americanization, by the decline of political literacy 
and civic engagement, by a growing uniformity between formerly distinct 
societies and cultures, and by the continuing atomization of the individual. 
Taken together, these phenomena constitute an unprecedented threat to 
the survival of minority cultures, identities, and nations. Thus there is a 
pressing need for minority groups to reassert themselves and to resist the 
homogenizing imperatives of the age of uncertainty.
Within this context, one can identify how multinational polities can 
most effectively attend to the recognition of diversity and respond to the 
claims of minority nations. Since its inception, Canada has had to address 
these issues and, as such, the Canadian case provides an informative 
account of the manner in which minority and majority nations have been 
engaged in an evolving institutional and ideational dialogue. In turn, 
we will attempt to elicit, from this particular context, broader lessons 
that may be applied both to other federal polities and states undergoing 
the process of federalization. We will also link the Canadian case with 
the Spanish case. An examination of these two polities provides a new 
launching point from which one can advance a model for the continuing 
survival and advancement of minority nations. In doing so, let’s sketch 
the principles that are vital to ensure that national minorities and national 
majorities coexist under the auspices of just and equitable intercommunal 
relations and through which minority nations can fulfill their legitimate 
and democratic aspirations.
12 See, Bickerton, James, Stephen Brooks and Alain-G. Gagnon, Freedom, Equality, 
Community: The Political Philosophy of Six Influential Canadians, Montreal and 
Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006.
13 This section borrows in part from my most recent book L’Âge des incertitudes: essais 




The relationship between international organizations and national 
minorities underwent a significant transformation between 1995 and 
2005. Instead of promoting the rights of national minorities, as they 
once did, international organizations now tend to focus on protecting the 
rights of individuals within minority nations. To be clear, the plight of the 
national minorities of Kosovo and East Timor have been brought to public 
attention via the intermediary of international organizations. However, 
these cases represent exceptions to the developing trend that has taken 
hold in the supranational sphere and that has meant a tradeoff between the 
recognition of national minorities for the promulgation of a global society 
constituted of culturally diverse groups. This development is perhaps 
best captured in a 2004 United Nations Development Programme Report 
on Human Development bearing the title: Cultural Liberty in Today’s 
Diverse World.
In order to ensure their long-term survival, national minorities 
must overcome a major hurdle. National majorities have historically 
downplayed or ignored national minority claims-making under the 
pretext that, if this were to be done, it would threaten the state’s position in 
international organizations and/or in international economic competition. 
Confronted with threats emanating from minority groups, representatives 
of the encompassing state have demanded the unquestioned loyalty of 
national minorities. However, within the context of unfettered cultural 
and economic globalization, the dual threat of cultural erosion and 
declining international relevance is potentially far more devastating for 
minority nations.
These nations must not only counteract the homogenizing forces of 
globalization, they must also resist the pressure of cultural uniformity 
generated from within their own state. In Canada, Aboriginal peoples are 
the ones that are arguably most affected by these global phenomena.
The loyalty and unity that national majorities demand of national 
minorities cannot be accepted unless they are also reflected by the 
adoption of commensurate measures meant to ensure the protection of 
liberty, freedom and democracy within the multinational polity. It is an 
issue of conditional trust14.
Here the words of Lord Acton resonate across time. Lord Acton argued 
that modern multinational federalism entailed finding a balance between 
unity and liberty; avoiding the reconciliation of these two ideas would 
have damaging consequences on any state. On the one hand, despotism 
14 For a thorough discussion of conditional trust argument, see the work produced by 
the Research Group on Plurinational Societies (GRSP) and most recently Dimitrios 
Karmis and François Rocher (eds.), La dynamique confiance/méfiance dans les 
démocraties multinationales, Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2012.
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would prove to be the logical outcome if the goals of unity were served 
at the expense of liberty. On the other hand, the entrenchment of liberty 
without attention to unity would lead inevitably to anarchy. For Lord 
Acton, the institutionalization of multinational federalism presented a 
means to avoid both of these paths. Lord Acton made clear that 
The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty […] provides 
against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, 
by balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to the subject the 
restraint and support of a combined opinion. […] Liberty provokes diversity, 
and diversity preserves liberty by supplying the means of organisation. […] 
The coexistence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as 
the best security of its freedom15.
In the last segment of this chapter, I will offer my own take on how 
liberty, diversity and unity can be reconciled in this age of uncertainty. 
In turn, I hope to outline the contours of a new political project for 
multinational states that is rooted in the ideals of liberty, recognition and 
empowerment. I contend that a political project based on these ideals will 
open new vistas for minority and majority nations to engage in frank and 
honest dialogue and will allow for the mutual and compatible coexistence 
of difference, trust, and liberal communitarianism within the context of 
modern democracy. However, the adoption of this new political project is 
not a given. It will require that minority nations follow the path laid before 
them by indigenous movements and, in turn, resist with determination 
those that seek to maintain or promote the status quo.
3. Towards a New Politics in Multinational Polities: 
Moderation, Dignity and Hospitality
The enshrinement of a new political project in favour of multinational 
polities requires cultivating three principles: the principle of moderation, 
the principle of dignity and the principle of hospitality. These three 
principles are the fibers that, when sown together, create the canvas of a 
politics based on liberty, recognition and empowerment.
3.1 The Principle of Moderation
Montesquieu’s excursus on creating “balance” in political societies 
provides the theoretical basis for the first principle. In the nineteenth 
century, Montesquieu argued both for the separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers and for the unrelenting pursuit of diversity. 
The principle of balance, which underlies both of these objectives, is 
15 Acton, John Emerich, “Nationality” in Gertrude Himmelfar (ed.), Essays on Freedom 
and Power, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949, p. 185.
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vital for the enshrinement of a new politics within the context of the 
age of uncertainty. Balance, according to Montesquieu, is a necessary 
buttress against the development of autocratic, totalitarian and tyrannical 
systems of government. As such, the entrenchment of balance and “good 
government” via separation of powers and the pursuit of diversity requires 
that political ambitions and intentions be tempered or “moderated”.
History is, however, rife with countless instances where political 
actors have defied the principle of moderation and, instead, have 
attempted to impose their will on constituents and political subjects. 
The First Nations of the New World have paid the price for the 
unfettered ambition of colonial powers. So too have minority nations 
been subject to the creation of structures of domination. This is most 
readily brought to light, within the Canadian context, by the landmark 
works of Eugénie Brouillet, John Conway, Michel Seymour and James 
Tully which document the process of cultural, religious and linguistic 
homogenization that the Quebec and Acadian nations have had to resist 
since the foundation of the Canadian state.
3.2 The Principle of Dignity
Other great thinkers have focused on human nature and the conditions 
for the creation of a just society. David Hume (1748) and John Rawls 
(1971), in particular, have addressed the need to design rules that lead to 
and sustain justice. In turn, Alain Renault has attempted to apply these 
precepts to the contemporary context. In doing so, Renault has translated 
Hume’s “condition of justice” as the “condition of diversity”. To cite 
Renault: “I define the ‘condition of diversity’ as the totality of factors that 
have led contemporary societies to question the nature of the rules that 
they themselves must adopt in order to recognize that human nature is 
intrinsically differentiated and that it is only by acknowledging this fact 
that it can be treated with dignity16”. This acknowledgement constitutes 
the basis for the second principle that must undergird relations among 
nations in modern democratic societies.
While the rhetoric of dignity is no longer a core component of majority-
minority interaction in Canada, it is central to the persistent inter-national 
conflict in another multinational polity. In recent years, Spain has seen a 
growing conflict between state nationalist forces and sub-state national 
movements in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. The nature of 
this conflict is effectively captured in a comprehensive editorial (signed 
by twelve Catalan newspapers) published on the 26th of November 2009. 
The editorial strikes at the heart of the conflict between Bourbon-style 
16 Renault, Alain, Un humanisme de la diversité. Essai sur la décolonisation des identités, 
Paris, Flammarion, 2009, p. 73.
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nationalists and advocates of multinational federalism. To quote the 
editorial:
The foundational pact that has allowed Spain to prosper over the last thirty 
years is now being questioned. At this time it is best remember one of the 
founding and indispensable principles, drawn from Ancient Rome, that 
underlies our legal system: Pacta sunt servanda. Agreements must be kept.
Catalonia is in the grips of real fear and it is necessary for all of Spain to 
recognize this… Catalans fear, above all, a loss of dignity17.
These quotes reveal that majority-minority relations could very well 
be at a turning point. Whether it is in Catalonia, Scotland, or in contexts 
where national minorities have engaged in similar political projects, the 
idea of dignity has become the rallying cry for the re-entrenchment of 
democracy.
In Spain, demands for the enshrinement of dignity have not fallen on 
deaf ears. Although it is unclear what the future holds for the Catalan 
people, we have nonetheless witnessed a return to national mobilization 
that rivals the power and numbers of those movements that emerged in 
the waning years of the Soviet empire. Within this more recent context, 
dignity is inextricably linked to the recognition of national diversity.
3.3 The Principle of Hospitality
The two first principles require that national majorities embrace 
moderation and respect national dignity. The third principle – and the 
most important of the three principles – that underlies the creation of a 
new political relationship between national groups requires that national 
minorities adopt an ethic of hospitality. The principle of hospitality is 
meant to enlarge contexts of choice and acts as a means to counteract the 
atomizing effects of procedural liberalism.
Philosopher Daniel Innerarity has recently devoted an entire book 
to the idea of an ethic of hospitality. According to Innerarity, adopting 
hospitality as a prime imperative permits one “to appropriate an 
interpretive approach for understanding the rich strangeness of life, the 
ways of others, and the often opaque and hostile cultural context that 
we find ourselves immersed in and that, nonetheless, drives us to seek 
out what is new, to enter into contact with what is different and to seek 
out harmony in the disparity that constitutes our existence18”. This way 
17 “La Dignitat de Catalunya”, Avui, 26 November 2009, editorial published simultaneously 
by 12 newspapers with headquarters in Catalonia.
18 Innerarity, Daniel, Éthique de l’hospitalité, Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 
2009, p. 4. Author’s translation.
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of understanding reality casts new light on the political world and gives 
primacy to a good life rooted in society and inter-communal relations.
The principle of hospitality will undoubtedly lead to deliberation and 
to periods of uncertainty. However, all mature democratic societies must 
embrace a certain degree of uncertainty and, accordingly, must be open 
to the possibility of change. It is only through inter-communal interaction 
(or creative tensions to use Trudeau’s terminology) that a modern society 
can implement a political project that listens to all voices and that 
encourages political participation within and across communities. Minority 
nations, even more so than majority nations, must embrace the ethic of 
hospitality. They must address a series of challenges entailing, inter alia, 
the accommodation and integration of migrant populations, maintaining 
the predominance of majority languages, addressing the disappearance 
of a sense of community, counteracting citizen disengagement, and 
moderating the cultural and economic impact of globalization. When 
confronted with these phenomena, minority nations are at risk. As such, 
they must find new ways of sustaining mobilization and activism both in 
the intra and inter national arenas.
The principle of hospitality requires the adoption of a genuine politics 
of interculturalism. The intercultural model allows for healthy dialogue 
between the constituent members of a diverse society and, in turn, for the 
articulation of an authentic pact between groups. This model also allows, 
on the one hand, for the continued cultural and ideational diversification of 
the national minority and, on the other hand, it provides an opportunity for 
the national minority to exist and thrive over time. While intercommunal 
dialogue may lead to the voicing of profound ideological disagreements, 
interculturalism is a necessary mechanism for ensuring the survival and 
democratic evolution of minority nations. As Daniel Innerarity states: 
“Democratic renewal will not be instigated by the drive for consensus 
but rather under the auspices of reasonable disagreement. Although 
democracy is impossible without a certain degree of consensus, it must 
nonetheless be open to the expression of diversity and to the articulation 
of collective identities rooted in different traditions19”.
By Way of Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have presented the politics of recognition 
and the politics of empowerment as necessary for the deepening of 
democracy. Through the evocation of the notions of regionalism, 
nationalism and federalism, I have sought to question policies that led 
19 Innerarity, Daniel, La démocratie contre l’État: essai sur le gouvernement des sociétés 
complexes, Paris, Flammarion, 2006, p. 129. Author’s translation.
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to uneven development and regional disparities; to challenge policies 
insensitive to national minorities; and to suggest how we might advance 
political autonomy in line with a principle of the non-subordination of 
power in federal regimes.
My argument was developed over a series of four reflections. The first 
reflection explored regional mobilisation as a means to empower citizens 
inhabiting remote areas that are affected by uneven development. The 
second reflection had to do with nationalist mobilization in a politico-
economic context influenced by forces of globalisation, forces that can 
undermine the life of national communities within the world order. The 
third reflection dealt with models for the management of linguistic and 
national diversity, focusing equally on models rooted in communal 
rights and models rooted in individual rights. In that third reflection, I 
was keen to examine multinational states as new institutional forms of 
constitutional association. I contended that political autonomy ought to 
be seen as a form of voluntary and consensual enfranchisement and not as 
a means to exclude the “Other”. The fourth reflection evaluated different 
conceptualizations of “community”, “autonomy”, and “empowerment” 
in nationally diverse states. Multinational federalism was presented as 
the most promising framework for the management of diversity within 
these states. In that reflection, I reassessed paths towards community 
reconciliation by reifying and deepening three federal instruments drawn 
from the past: the need to find a proper balance between forces in tension; 
the urgency to advance a politic of dignity that builds on a continually 
renewed trust; and the need to nourish a politics of hospitality so that no 
one feels excluded from the policy process and the path to democratic 
renewal.
In closing, and to reach beyond the points I have addressed in this 
lecture, if there is one message I have sought to communicate it is that as 
individuals we have a key role to play in advancing principles of fairness 
and justice. Empathy is an essential feature to be emulated at all levels. It 
could be at the level of municipal politics, at the provincial level, or with 
Quebec’s national affirmation and at the multinational level as I have been 
advocating for some time now. Seeking to advance those causes can only 
bring dignity to people and make the “Other” know of the importance of 
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1. The Debate about Collective Rights in Spain
The recognition of collective rights has been one of the most heavily 
debated questions in Spanish political and legal philosophy in the last 
decade. The prominence of this topic is not unique to the Peninsula; there 
has been a good deal of international debate on the same question. One 
can, however, note local characteristics, singling out the authors who 
have led these debates. In this vein, I believe it is only fair to recognize 
the pioneering role of López Calera’s monograph on this subject, while 
also recognizing that texts by Requejo1, De Lucas2, and Cruz Parcero3 
may have provided some preliminary context. The text by López Calera4 
1 See Requejo, Ferrán, “Cultural Pluralism, Nationalism and Federalism: A Revision 
of Democratic Citizenship in Plurinational States”, European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 35, nº 2, 1999, pp. 255-286.
2 De Lucas, Javier (ed.), Derechos de las minorías en una sociedad multicultural, 
Madrid, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 1999, especially pp. 251-312.
3 Parcero, Juan Antonio Cruz, “Sobre el concepto de derechos colectivos”, Revista 
Internacional de Filosofía Política, nº 12, 1998, pp. 95-115. Also see his El lenguaje 
de los derechos. Ensayo para una teoría estructural de los derechos, Madrid, Trotta, 
2007, pp. 101-126.
4 Calera, Nicolás López, ¿Hay derechos colectivos? Individualidad y socialidad en 
la teoría de los derechos, Barcelona, Ariel, 2000. The proposals in this text were 
also addressed in a previous book entitled Yo, el Estado. Bases para una teoría 
sustancializadora (no sustancialista) del Estado, Madrid, Trotta, 1992, and, as I see 
it, reflect some of his older works, especially Hegel y los derechos humanos, Granada, 
Universidad de Granada, 1971.
Negotiating Diversity
62
disseminated the argumentative strategies of Kymlicka, Raz, and Hartney 
in Spain and supported an eminently juridical thesis that linked the 
justification of collective rights to the confirmation of their effective 
juridical recognition. I believe that the anthology published by the 
Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Institute in Madrid5 transformed 
the question into the object of a wide-ranging disciplinary debate. In 
general terms, the debate reproduced the majority view that rejected 
collective rights. That rejection was only tempered by the inclusion 
of moderate philosophical culturalist theses and positive juridical 
perspectives, both at the national and the international level. From that 
point on, a series of monographs have been produced that represent the 
distinct lines of international thought on the question. I believe the work of 
García Inda6 – which also incorporates other critics’ ideas, most notably 
Souza Santo’s – presents a thesis that is openly in favor of recognizing 
collective rights. Cruz Parcero, in the aforementioned work, follows a 
strategy of dismantling or, at least, relativizing criticisms directed at 
the category. Albert Calsamiglia7, in the more specific area of cultural 
collective rights, opts for a justifying approach that is more political than 
juridical. Neus Torbisco8 offers a complete reconstruction of collective 
rights as group rights, clearly following Kymlicka. Rodríguez Abascal9 
presents a systematic critique of the category of collective rights. Much 
of the most forceful doctrine of Spanish human rights (Garzón Valdés, 
Laporta, Peces Barba, Pérez Luño, Eusebio Fernández, Ruiz Miguel, 
Savater, etc.) is behind this thesis.
To my way of understanding, the specificities of the debate have 
revolved around two ideas. On the one hand, its political distinctiveness 
responds to the multinational character of the Kingdom of Spain. Regional 
multilingualism and the centrifugal tendencies of the people from some 
of the historical autonomous communities set the stage for the defense 
or criticism of collective linguistic rights and the eventual right to self-
determination on the part of those peoples. On the other hand, one of 
5 Roig, Francisco Javier Ansuátegui (ed.), Una discusión sobre derechos colectivos, 
Madrid, Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas, Dykinson, 2001.
6 Inda, Andrés García, Materiales para una reflexión sobre los derechos humanos 
colectivos, Madrid, Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas, Dykinson, 
2001.
7 Calsamiglia, Albert, Cuestiones de lealtad. Límites del liberalismo: corrupción, 
nacionalismo y multiculturalismo, Barcelona, Paidós, 2000.
8 Casals, Neus Torbisco, Group Rights as Human Rights. A Liberal Approach to 
Multiculturalism, Dordrechts, Springer, 2006.
9 Abascal, Luis Rodríguez, Las fronteras del nacionalismo, Madrid, Centro de Estudios 
Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000, and also “El debate sobre los derechos de grupo” in 
Elías Díaz and José Luis Colomer (eds.), Estado, justicia, derechos, Madrid, Alianza, 
pp. 409-434.
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the effects of Spain’s constitutional debate at the end of the 1970s and 
the subsequent establishment of democratic institutions has been Spain’s 
very close connection to the doctrine of fundamental rights. From the 
academic point of view, the extensive production of material generated 
during those years is striking. Thus, the starting point for the debates that 
have arisen from the theoretical point of view, both by those who defend 
their conceptualization as moral rights and those who sustain a historical-
positivist thesis10, has been a common proscription of collective rights. 
González Amuchastegui’s work11 may be considered the best expression 
of this general convergence.
In this brief reconstruction of the evolution of the theoretical 
treatment of collective rights in the Spanish academy, we can clearly see 
the influence of Canadian theoretical writings. The majority view that is 
critical of collective rights has discovered one of the most solid arguments 
on which to base their criticism in Hartney’s conceptual treatment. On 
the other hand, minority thinkers who favor acceptance have focused 
on the proposals of important Canadian authors. In addition to the 
significant influence of Kymlicka, contributions by Carignan12, Sumner13, 
McDonald14, Réaume15, Cardinal16, and Karmis17 are worth noting, as 
well as the work included in the highly influential monographic number 
10 See Toubes, Joaquín Rodríguez, La razón de los derechos. Perspectivas actuales sobre 
la fundamentación de los derechos humanos, Madrid, Tecnos, 1995.
11 Amuchastegui, Jesús González, Autonomía, dignidad y ciudadanía. Una teoría de los 
derechos humanos, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2004.
12 Caringan, Linda, “De la notion de droit collectif et de son application en matière 
scolaire au Québec”, Revue juridique Thémis, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 1-103.
13 Sumner, Wayne L., The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1987.
14 McDonald, Michael, “Collective Rights and Tyranny”, Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa, 
vol. 56, nº 2, 1986, pp. 115-139; “Indian Status: Colonialism or Sexism”, Canadian 
Community Law Journal, vol. 9, 1987, pp. 23-48; “The Personless Paradigm”, 
University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 37, nº 1, 1987, pp. 212-226; “The Forest in 
the Trees. Collective Rights as Basic Rights” in Guy Lafrance (ed.), Éthique et droits 
fondamentaux/Ethic and Basic Rights, Ottawa, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, 
1989, pp. 230-241; “Liberalism, Community and Culture”, University of Toronto Law 
Journal, vol. 42, nº 2, 1992, pp. 113-131. 
15 Réaume, Denise, “Individuals, Groups and Rights to Public Goods”, University of 
Toronto Law Journal, vol. 38, nº 1, 1988, pp. 1-27; “Groups Rights and Participatory 
Goods” in Guy Lafrance (ed.), Éthique et droits fondamentaux/Ethic and Basic Rights, 
Ottawa, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1989, pp. 242-249.
16 Cardinal, Linda, Une Langue qui pense: la recherche en milieu minoritaire francophone 
au Canada, Ottawa, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1993.
17 Karmis, Dimitrios, “Cultures autochtones et libéralisme au Canada. Les vertus 
médiatrices du communautarisme libéral de Charles Taylor”, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 26, nº 1, 1993, pp. 69-96.
Negotiating Diversity
64
of the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence in the summer of 
199118.
In the context of the Canadian School of Diversity’s influence19, 
I believe the book by Quebec author Michel Seymour entitled De la 
tolérance à la reconnaissance [From Tolerance to Recognition]20 may 
again become a relevant work for this material. I will spend the rest of 
this study considering that text.
2. De la tolérance à la reconnaissance as a  
General Theory of Collective Rights
Seymour’s book is a generous monograph that exceeds seven hundred 
pages. Its structure consists of three formally differentiated sections that 
are organized hierarchically in such a way that the first two present the 
basic research designed to justify the theses sustained in the third. The first 
section of the book, entitled Legacy of a Concept, addresses a genealogy 
of the concept of recognition starting with Hegel’s phenomenology 
of spirit. The Hegelian readings of Kojève, Habermas, Honneth, and 
Taylor, alongside a multiplicity of complementary works, configure 
the basic conceptual frame of reference. Its reception outside of the 
Hegelian tradition of critical thinking is approached through the analysis 
of works from the liberal tradition (Appiah, Barry, Johnson, Kukathas, 
and Waldron), the democratic liberal tradition (Benhabib, Gutmann, and 
Nussbaum), and particularly, from within the Canadian academy (Taylor, 
always omnipresent, Tully, Kymlicka, Carens, Margaret Moore, Melissa 
Williams, Eisenberg, Blattgerg, Maclure, Nadeau, and Nootens, among 
others). From the last group, Seymour dedicates, in the fifth and last 
chapter of this section of the book, a meticulous study of Will Kymlicka’s 
contributions, viewing them as the most elaborate effort made by a liberal 
theoretician to justify group rights. His central thesis emphasizes that, 
to the extent that Kymlicka maintains his connection to liberalism with 
an individualistic stamp, he is incapable of laying the foundation for 
collective rights, presenting a sugar-coated version of rights through the 
formula of the rights of differentiated groups.
18 I am referring to works by Peter Benson, Leslie Green, Jan Narveson, Nathan Brett, 
Joseph Pestieau, Lesley A. Jacobs, Moshe Berent, and Don Lenihan published in the 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 4 nº 2, 1991, pp. 217-422.
19 See Gagnon, Alain-G., “Reconciling Autonomy, Community and Empowerment. 
The Difficult Birth of a Diversity School in the Western World” in Alain-G. Gagnon 
and Michael Keating (eds.), Political Autonomy and Divided Societies, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 49-59.
20 Seymour, Michel., De la tolérance à la reconnaissance. Une théorie libérale des droits 
collectifs, Québec, Boréal, 2008.
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The second section, entitled Political Liberalism, is central to his 
argumentative strategy and is characterized by the attempt to shift the 
liberal approach’s center of gravity from the concept of individual 
autonomy to the concept of tolerance. This movement is substantiated 
through two impulses that unfold in opposite directions. On the one hand 
is a constructive strategy based on laying the foundations for the moral 
relevance of a type of collective subject whose configuration maintains 
continuity with the justification of what is called the Principle of the 
Value of Cultural Diversity (PVCD). On the other hand is a critical 
strategy that consists of confronting this thesis with the standard liberal 
thinking that is, in different ways, receptive to the acceptance of claims 
of cultural diversity, centering on Appiah, Buchanan, Kukathas, Johnson, 
and Kymlicka.
The third section deals, in the strict sense, with the exposition of the 
theory of collective rights. The challenges of this objective refer, first, 
to the evaluation of the ethical-normative conditions that allow a group 
to be included within the category of rights bearer. In the second place, 
it refers to spelling out the conditions required for the stakeholder to be 
the genuine object of collective rights. In the third place, it refers to the 
determination of subjects obligated by collective rights and, finally, to the 
specification of a typology to describe plausible collective rights. Beyond 
that, the exposition is once again developed in a continuous dialogue with 
the critics or with the theses exposed by eventual critics among whom, in 
addition to those already mentioned, Narverson, Tamir, and particularly 
Hartney stand out.
To conclude this overview of Seymour’s text, I will point out three 
characteristics that I believe summarize the central traits of its nature. In 
the first place, the book is a revolutionary text. This is obvious from its 
style, the persuasive prose, the construction of the argument, and finally, 
the effort to concretize theoretical reflections with specific examples of 
societies, countries, or simply specific political problems. If Margalit’s 
distinction between “e.g. [exemplum gratia] philosophers and i.e. 
[idest] philosophers” is meaningful21, Seymour would, without a doubt, 
fall within the first category.
Nevertheless, the most meaningful revolution is found deep down. 
“The theme of this text [says Seymour] is the multinational State as a 
model of political organization. It deals, equally, with national minorities 
at the heart of the nation state as well as the people as a whole incorporated 
into supranational organizations”22. The connection with the theme of 
21 Margalit, Avishai, The Ethics of Memory, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002, 
p. IX.
22 Seymour, op. cit., p. 11.
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collective rights is found in an implicit nexus between the two questions; 
I am referring to the concept of nationhood. It is the theme of nationalism 
that is profiled as the fundamental substratum of this theory of collective 
rights and infused with the central pulse of its development. “This text 
[he concludes], while based on theoretical questions, participates in the 
political conflict by taking a position that seeks to find a balance between 
minority and majority nations”23.
In the second place, it is a task that could be called interstitial within 
the liberal tradition. Its construction is buttressed by reconstructions and 
the support of collateral elements and, on some occasions, by generally 
accepted arguments in the tradition from which we attempt to garner the 
greatest utility for the defended argument. We can see this interstitial 
character most clearly in the detailed reading that follows Rawls in 
Political Liberalism and very particularly in The Law of Peoples. In 
the latter, the Harvard professor maintained that this vision “conceives 
of liberal democratic peoples (and decent peoples) as the actors in the 
Society of Peoples, just as citizens are the actors in domestic society”24. 
He also equates them to individual agents in the method established in 
A Theory of Justice25. On the basis of this recognition of the quality of 
the subject in the area of a normative theory regarding what constitutes 
a well-organized international society, Seymour articulates an argument 
that crosses the domestic and international spheres. He promotes, on the 
one hand, the competence of individuals, as individual right bearers, to 
act in the international arena and, on the other hand, the competence of 
the people as a whole, as collective rights bearers, to act in the domestic 
realm. His thesis is explicitly presented as a coherent, and to a certain 
extent, natural development of the Rawlsian thesis. Rawls simplified 
that thesis for methodological reasons, reducing the framework of the 
well-organized society to a homogeneous nation state within a single 
timeframe because of the change to identifying cultural components 
that migratory processes generate. A similar strategy is also employed in 
relation to Kymlicka. While the references to discrepancies are frequent, 
one of Kymlicka’s concepts reveals substantial Seymourian influence and 
specifically recognizes him. I am referring to the idea of societal culture 
as a conceptual framework for the definition of the idea of a people26. 
According to Seymour, the whole construction of the reflection of the idea 
23 Ibid., p. 668.
24 Rawls, John, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Opinion Revisited”, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 23.
25 Ibid., p. 55.
26 Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, 
pp. 166-168 and also Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and 
Democracy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 50-66.
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of a people or a nation – whenever the two terms are used interchangeably – 
refers to their determination as a culture that is not substantial, narrative, 
or relative to values, but is an institutional construction of culture. In this 
way, all culture “is a structure of culture, in other words, a language, 
institutions, and a common public history inscribed in a crossroads 
of influences, and it affords a context of choice”27. Incidentally, this 
interstitial note also operates as a description of the liberalizing lectures 
that Seymour develops on other occasions. This approach affords a special 
place for addressing Taylor. We can see it in the following example: 
It is true [recognizes Seymour] that referring to Taylor in the framework of my 
argument was perhaps not very fortunate […] but if the communitarian biases 
that are at the center of Taylor’s thesis are eliminated, liberalism 2 can be 
reformulated without a communitarian perspective. Liberalism 2 will appear, 
however, as an anti-individualist and anti-collectivist version of liberalism 
[and] will recognize the primacy and inalienable character of the individual 
rights of individual persons and the collective rights of the people without 
creating a hierarchy out of the two types of rights28.
Finally, as emphasized in this quote, the third characteristic that 
stands out in Seymour’s work is what could be called explorations of the 
limits of liberalism. Concretely, it assumes the need to configure a profile 
of liberalism close to the idea of tolerance rather than focusing on the 
thesis of autonomy. This last liberalism, which he calls individualistic 
liberalism, is characterized by three central theses from which others can 
be inferred. The first thesis is that “the person is an individual regardless 
of any finality, any value or any project”. This carries four consequences. 
First, the person can be subject to certain socioeconomic determinations 
but can renounce, at the identifying level, any ideological determination 
that refers to beliefs, purposes, values, and projects. Second, the person is 
in a position to be able to distinguish personal identity from any specific 
moral identity. Third, the rational autonomy of the person consists of his 
or her ability to revise individual conceptions of the good and continue 
being the same person. Fourth, the people would be a voluntary grouping 
of individuals.
The second thesis of individualist liberalism is that “the individual 
is the ultimate source of legitimate moral vindication”, which leads to 
two corollaries. On the one hand, any justification of policies applied to 
a group should, ultimately, serve the interests of the individuals, and its 
principal justification should be those individual interests. On the other 
hand, fundamental individual rights have absolute priority over the rights 
of the group.
27 Seymour, op. cit., p. 270.
28 Ibid., pp. 535-536.
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The third thesis consists of affirming that the individual should 
have primacy over the group, which means that autonomy is the liberal 
value par excellence. The final conclusion to these three theses, to say 
it in Dworkin’s words, means affirming that no restriction, limitation, 
or obligation imposed on fundamental rights is acceptable unless it is 
because of another fundamental right29.
The alternative proposal that is called, following Rawls, political 
liberalism is distinguished from the previous one by the three alternative 
theses it offers. Political liberalism’s first thesis is to maintain a political 
conception of the person based on his or her institutional identity. In that 
way, the political person is the citizen at the heart of a society, which in 
Seymour’s terms, is at the heart of an institutionally organized people. 
In this way, the institutional identity of the person corresponds with a 
diversity of metaphysical conceptions of personal identity and, specifically, 
corresponds to a communal conception as much as to an individualist 
conception. To that extent, it aspires to a degree of neutrality in relation 
to the debates between those who think their identity depends on beliefs, 
purposes, values, and projects and those who are defined as indifferent 
to any belief, purpose, value, or project. This institutional person has 
two moral faculties: the sense of justice and the rational ability to act 
according to his or her purpose. For that reason, the person is presented as 
an equal citizen who has a certain degree of rational autonomy, but who 
does not necessarily have significant autonomy.
For their part, the people as a whole, understood in the political 
liberalism sense, can be defined as a society in the sense that Rawls 
develops in his book entitled Political Liberalism or as societal culture 
in Kymlicka’s sense. Rawls’s conception of a society would be “a system 
of social cooperation for mutual benefit”, or a “social union of social 
unions”, or a “base structure” that includes the union of economic, social 
(e.g., education, health), legal, and political institutions. It is sometimes 
understood as an “independent political community” and, on exceptional 
occasions, as the people organized into sovereign states. With all this, it 
is in his The Law of Peoples where he turns to a definition of the people 
beginning with their institutional identity, eliminating all reference 
to comprehensive theories about their identity as a free association of 
individuals, organic community, collective body, or macro-subject where 
individuals share the same beliefs, values, and purposes.
29 Ibid., pp. 265-267. The authors who Seymour has in mind when he reconstructs 
this general framework include Anthony Appiah, Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Allen 
Buchanan, Simon Caney, David Held, Stanley Hoffman, Andrew Kuper, Will 
Kymlicka, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, Amartya Sen, Yael Tamir, Kok-Chor 
Tan, and Jeremy Waldron.
69
The Canadian School of Diversity’s New Influences
The second thesis of political liberalism maintains that both the 
person and the people as a whole are autonomous sources of valid moral 
vindications. They would be joined by legal entities, NGOs, labor unions, 
companies, and supranational organizations.
The third thesis of political liberalism maintains that rather than 
autonomy, tolerance – understood in its political sense as toleration and 
not as an attitude, tolerance – is the liberal value par excellence. 
The equivalent corollary to Dworkin’s aforementioned thesis is that 
reasonable restrictions on individual rights and liberties can be justified30.
In conclusion, Seymour defends his theory as a genuinely liberal 
theory connected to the tradition of the more mature Rawls and places 
his trust in the greater potential it affords to manage the challenges of 
recognition as a central question of a theory of justice. Let me conclude 
with his own words: “Fortunately, recent unexpected changes at the core 
of liberal thought allow us to glimpse a broader opening in the implacable, 
plural diversity of national cultures, the rights of the people, the rights of 
minorities, immigration, and indigenous peoples. For liberalism to grant a 
true place for collective claims, it is necessary to free oneself from moral 
individualism without, however, endorsing communitarianism”31.
3. The Characterization of Collective Rights  
According to Seymour’s Thesis
The starting point of Seymour’s theory on collective rights is found, 
as has already been stated, in the consideration of the moral agent from 
a political perspective. In this way, he sketches some of the limits of the 
problem that leave outside of the field of study all the ontological aspects 
of the category of collective beings and the diverse conditions of their 
existence. Similarly, in a moral sense, it leaves outside of the analysis 
the substantive aspects related to ideas of goodness or the good life, any 
element related to the narrativities that constitute group identity, as well 
as any consideration related to the necessary connection between morality 
and individuality, understood as a metaphysical thesis that exceeds the 
arena of public space.
Building on the foundations of the moral agency of this political 
perspective, he articulates twelve conditions that should be satisfied to 
sustain the plausibility of the justification of collective rights. I believe 
this dodecagon can be condensed into four central aspects. In the first 
place, there is the determination of the subject of collective rights. Second, 
there is the delimitation of the content or object of collective rights. Third 
30 Ibid., pp. 265-267.
31 Ibid., p. 271.
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is the articulation between subject and object of collective rights. Fourth 
is the exposition of the justifying principle of collective rights. Let us take 
a look at each of these issues.
3.1 The Subject of Collective Rights
Subjects who bear collective rights regarding a particular interest 
should be minimally institutionalized groups of individuals who view 
themselves as members of a single group. The links that constitute this 
connection are a language (or languages), an institutional framework, and 
a common public history. Seymour understands that the only collectives 
that meet these requirements are the people or subsets of the people (see 
Pogge32 or Buchanan33 for an opposing view). In this way, groups that do 
not meet these requirements such as religious associations, labor unions, 
corporations, NGOs, and companies can be subject to rights but not to 
collective rights as such. Similarly, women, gay men and lesbians, and 
racial groups can be subject to rights, but they are nothing more than groups 
of individual interests. In order to be accepted as a subject of collective 
rights, a group must guarantee the configuration of a context of choice for 
its members. The only group capable of doing so is a people, or a fragment 
of the same, understood in the previously mentioned institutional sense34.
In addition to the conceptual delimitation of those who bear collective 
rights and on the basis of the collective interest that we will discuss below, 
the particular group must be large enough to represent a sufficiently 
elevated number of individuals. It does not need to specify a methodology 
to estimate the number of individuals necessary to make a group large 
enough to merit the holding of rights, but it appeals to approximate 
strategies of delimitation in which the central references are what unite 
enough individuals to nurture the institutional framework of its own 
collective as well as safeguarding, rebus sic stantibus, the reasonable 
durability of the group. This calculation of a minimum personnel basis 
for the configuration of the group for these purposes does not correspond, 
however, to the introduction of cost/benefit analysis35. Once the minimum 
requirements regarding permanence and the dynamics of the group are 
32 Pogge, Thomas, “Group Rights and Ethnicity” in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, 
Ethnicity and Group Rights, New York, New York University Press, 1997, pp. 187-190.
33 Buchanan, Allen, “What’s So Special about Nations?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. 22, 1998, pp. 283-309.
34 Within this category, he notes seven types of peoples or nations on the basis of 
the criteria regarding the type of connections they share, but they are nothing but 
manifestations of a uniform category (he talks about ethnic, cultural, civic, diasporic, 
sociopolitical, multisocietal, and multiterritorial nations). Seymour, op. cit. p. 35.
35 Ibid., p. 483.
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satisfied, the center of gravity for the recognition of collective rights is 
found in the will of the people to satisfy the desire of living together. 
I do not think it is excessive to believe that Seymour is of a mind here 
to respond affirmatively to the small indigenous communities that are 
attempting, in spite of their demographic limitations, to preserve their 
traditional way of life.
Finally, regarding the question of the subjectivity of collective rights, 
he addresses the determination of the obliged subject by understanding 
that one of the necessary conditions for the existence of the right is the 
reciprocity of being able to identify a subject while being delimited by 
the obligation to satisfy the collective interest that constitutes its objects. 
The subject is, initially, the State in which the group in question is 
located. However, this assertion of obligation operates through citizen 
rearrangement. The individuals in the group, as well as other individuals 
who are members of other State groups, should also be prepared to assume 
certain obligations stemming from the affirmation of collective rights of 
the peoples in question. The strategy of determining the obliged subject is 
once again based on giving examples:
The civic nation has obligations regarding contiguous diasporas and the 
minorities that come from immigration. The multisocial or multinational 
nation also has obligations regarding these same minorities as well as 
the minority or majority nations at the heart of the State. Supranational 
organizations have obligations regarding the aforementioned groups and 
also regarding multiterritorial nations and the nations that constitute States, 
whether they are civic or multisocietal36.
3.2 The Content of Collective Rights
Seymour remains ambivalent about the content or object of collective 
rights, connecting them, on the one hand, to the idea of interest and, on 
the other, to the idea of will. Following the long tradition of Bentham 
and Ihering, the content of collective rights is an interest, and the object 
of that interest should be an institutional, collective, and identifying 
good. Institutional goods are participatory goods that have a constitutive 
character for the group and from which no one can be excluded37. Typical 
examples include language, collective memory, etc. They are characterized 
because some element of one’s own good is the act of participating in the 
process of its production and/or enjoyment. Collective goods are defined 
in contrast to individualizable goods. Thus, it implies the belief that the 
adjective collective signifies that those goods are not limited to a mere 
aggregation of satisfied individual interests.
36 Ibid., pp. 483-484.
37 Réaume, “Groups Rights and Participatory Goods”, op. cit.
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Collective objects [states the author] cannot be reclaimed, possessed, 
produced, and consumed except by a collectivity. Of course, the collectivity 
cannot enjoy these rights unless the members themselves can enjoy them. It 
is absurd to imagine that the interest of the group can be satisfied without the 
members of the group satisfying some of its interests. […] But this need not 
make us conclude that group interest is nothing more than the interest of the 
members38.
Finally, identifying goods are those that are focused on preserving the 
identity of the group understood as an institutional identity. Among all 
the stakeholders in a national group, only a subset can access the status of 
the object of collective rights: this includes groups that attempt to retain 
their ability to create, maintain, develop, or control their own institutions.
Seymour does not resort to an abstract display of categories in the 
development of his argument, but to a strategy of direct definition. In 
this way, collective goods are seen as: the protection of the hunting 
and fishing rights of native peoples as ancestral inhabitants of certain 
territories, thus justifying the individual rights of indigenous peoples to 
hunt or fish in certain reserves; the rights of the Francophone community 
in Canada, which justifies the individual right of Francophone children 
to be taught in their own language if the number of affected people is 
sufficient; the community’s right to provide itself with institutions 
and with representatives of those institutions, which thus presumes 
the individual right to vote; and the right of the people as a whole to 
promote and preserve the institutions that favor economic, cultural, 
social, and political development, that is, the right to self-determination39. 
A paradigmatic example of an institutional, collective, and identifying 
good is language. It is institutional because the language is presented in 
the public space as a practice controlled by constitutive rules. These rules 
are characterized by the fact that they are shared by a collectivity, which 
implies its collective side. It is identifying to the extent that it cannot be 
reduced to its usefulness or instrumental function.
Regarding will, Seymour’s second consideration, he maintains that the 
mere existence of interest is not definitive and should be complemented 
with the existence of a collective volition as a safeguard of that interest. 
Thus he notes that “not all peoples should have political institutions, but 
they have the right to them if the people decide to reclaim them”40. Thus, 
it is necessary for people who reclaim the collective interest, object of the 
collective right, to want to live together and want the protection of their 
people. Without this claim on the part of the people, it does not do any 
38 Seymour, op. cit., p. 478.
39 Ibid., pp. 479-480.
40 Ibid., p. 481.
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good to promote the protection of group identity. Collective rights are only 
predictable in favor of those peoples who endorse their own recognition. 
We cannot allow any paternalism on this question. Democratic will is 
not sufficient reason for the affirmation of collective rights, but it is a 
necessary condition for recognition. The context for this component of 
will is the possibility of sustaining the existence of a moral right to self-
determination that is projected in the aspiration for constitutionalization 
as an element of stability in multinational states, given that the recognition 
of stateless nations is a condition sine qua non of this stability.
Now that we have examined Seymour’s general argument on the 
content of collective rights, I think it would be useful to consider a 
specific problem that I believe is central to the question: the character, 
aggregative or not, of collective interest that shapes collective rights. 
The strategy that the author develops in his discussion continues 
in a debate that focuses on critiques of Michael Hartney41, who has 
probably presented the most complete account of the conception of 
collective interests as individualizable interests42. Hartney’s discussion 
is presented as the standard of the thesis of moral individualism (he uses 
the term value-individualism, following Raz and Sumner’s lead)43. This 
individualism does not imply an ontological thesis because he accepts 
the existence of groups that are ontologically irreducible. In the same 
way, he recognizes that the existence of the group and its development 
can, in a certain sense, be considered a good for the group and that they 
do not clearly afford benefits for individuals considered separately. But 
these theses do not affect the moral question, and those goods are not 
morally pertinent since the existence and development of the group 
are, in his opinion, non-moral goods. Group goods can have moral and 
conditional relevance, but not intrinsic relevance. Goods only become 
morally pertinent if they are placed in relationship with intrinsic goods 
and the only intrinsic goods are individual (moral individualism). The 
dilemma is inescapable. Either there is an instrumental justification 
for collective goods and a liberal thesis is maintained; or there is a 
justification of collective goods as intrinsic goods, in other words, as 
goods not derived from the value that is given them by individuals, and a 
41 Hartney, Michael, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights”, Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 4, nº 2, 1991, pp. 293-314. Also in Kymlicka, 
Will (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
pp. 202-227. Also see Seymour, Michel, “Le concept juridique de droit collectif” 
in Guy Lafrance (ed.), Ethic and Basic Rights, Ottawa, Les Presses de l’Université 
d’Ottawa, 1989, pp. 264-273.
42 See Abascal, op. cit., p. 414; Parcero, op. cit. p. 110.
43 Raz, Joseph, Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 208-209.
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non-liberal thesis is maintained. Tertium non datur44. Thus all collective 
interests are explicable as an aggregate of interests45 and when it is said 
(e.g., by authors such as Réaume46, Waldron47, or Green48) that collective 
interests are not reducible to a group of individual interests, it can mean 
one of these two things: either that it is an interest shared by members of 
a group in such a way that the interest is non-individualizable or that it is 
an interest of a group above and beyond the interests of its members. The 
thesis is that neither of these possibilities is morally plausible49. Seymour 
believes Hartney’s thesis here is founded on an error. On the one hand, 
the understanding that goods are enjoyed individually does not explain 
why members of the group have this good and those who do not belong 
to the group do not. He believes that the reason these individuals have 
the individual right is because they belong to a group that presupposes 
the existence of a right for that group. The typical example is of 
immigrants who do not have an individual right to receive an education 
in their language while the members of an indigenous people do have 
that individual right. This asymmetry is justified not, as Kymlicka50 
says, because immigrants have implicitly renounced their language, 
but because immigrants do not possess collective rights of a cultural 
nature from which to derive their individual right to an education in their 
own language51. The justification of this differentiated treatment is not 
strictly individual, but collective. Furthermore, the eventual intercultural 
linguistic and pedagogical policies would not constitute an obligation 
of the host society but, instead, advocacy measures adopted in order to 
facilitate non-traumatic integration. In short, “if the individual has the 
right to protect his cultural belonging […] it is because he belongs to 
a national community present in the land that can reclaim institutional 
goods of this type. Individual cultural rights are an individual benefit 
that derives from the satisfaction of collective rights that the community 
bears to provide itself with cultural institutions”52.
44 Hartney, “Groups Rights and Participatory Goods”, op. cit., p. 207.
45 Ibid., pp. 207-208.
46 Réaume, “Individuals, Groups and Rights to Public Goods”, op. cit., pp. 10-13; 
“Groups Rights and Participatory Goods”, op. cit., pp. 243-244.
47 Waldron, Jeremy, Liberal Right. Collected Papers 1981-1991, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p. 346.
48 Green, Leslie, “Two Views of Collective Rights”, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, vol. 4, nº 2, 1991, pp. 315-327.
49 Hartney, op. cit., pp. 208-210.
50 Kymlicka Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 76-106.
51 Seymour, op. cit., p. 596.
52 Ibid., p. 598.
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On the other hand, and in line with the example proposed in its day 
by Dworkin and taken up again by Réaume regarding the interest the 
members of an orchestra would have in maintaining and promoting their 
own group, Seymour critiques Hartney who does not grasp the difference 
that exists between the formation of a collective will out of the aggregate 
of individual wills and the formation of a collective will by individual 
wills to the extent that individual wills are formulated as part of a 
collective will. In his own words:
the confusion resides in the fact that the collective will is in a certain sense 
individualizable. The people’s will is in a way dependent on the interpretations 
that individuals make of this collective will. But equally, if individuals 
contribute to the formation of collective will, the opinion regarding the 
formation of collective will, in other words, the opinion regarding collective 
interest is not an aggregate of opinions that rests on individual interests. It 
is, at the most, an aggregate of opinions interpreting collective will. For all 
these reasons, collective interest cannot be reducible to a sum of individual 
interests53.
3.3 Subject-Object Articulation
The group that is presented as the subject of collective rights should 
report a decisively relevant structural qualification. The interest whose 
satisfaction justifies the existence of the collective right should be 
included on the track record of the identifying connections of all agents 
even though it need not constitute a primary social good according to all 
of them. For that reason, only national social cultures are in any position 
to satisfy this requirement: “Nations have the particularity of being the 
only entities that appear on the track record of connections of all the 
citizens of the world”54. The approach is, therefore, clearly objective 
because, correctly or not, it affirms the empirical confirmation that the 
only collective reality that is found in all contemporary individuals – 
including a negative reaction by those who are stateless – is the connection 
with one’s own people. This objective fact is, incidentally, resistant to 
the fact that there are individuals who manifest obvious disinterest for 
this type of identifying connection. What ends up being
without a doubt necessary [maintains Seymour] is that the group in question 
truly plays an important role in maintaining the representation that people 
make of their own person, but it is not necessary for individuals to themselves 
grant the group the statute of principal social good. What is important is, 
however, that the concerned group be present in the self-representation that 
53 Ibid., p. 601.
54 Ibid., p. 485. Italics are mine.
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the agents make of themselves without being concerned about its place on the 
track record of connections55.
This approach ends up considerably reducing the class of groups 
admissible as collective rights bearers. Those who reclaim diverse indi-
vidual interests and express different ideas of the good life or the common 
good (associations, communal groups, corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, etc.) do not “play a role in the imaginary of all citizens, no 
matter the importance that is granted to these groups”56. This objectivism 
lays the foundation for the lack of importance that the characteristics 
of the nation can have for each individual’s self-understanding. Their 
justification is found in that this context of national choice drives the self-
representation of the institutional identity of the individual. Regardless 
their degree of closeness to substantive connections, their configuration as 
citizen is established through that group.
The groups [concludes his argument] that are subject to collective rights do 
not have to be conceived as sources of an involuntary belonging from which 
they [individuals] cannot remove themselves. However, they are not simple 
associations to which we link ourselves by simple acts of will […]. They have 
the characteristic of inviting all members into identifying representation57.
The shadow of anti-individualist arguments by Putnam, Burge, 
Pettit, or Taylor is explicit. This membership is no more than the thought 
experiences that allow us to structure the representation that we make of 
ourselves.
This qualification of the collective-rights bearing group regarding the 
type of interest it protects will be specified by the application of three 
criteria that are implicitly understood in the requirements of its nature 
as a societal culture. In the first place, groups that hold collective rights 
should fulfill the requirements of political qualification. The institutions 
of the interested group should favor or make possible individual freedom 
and equality. This possibility of individual freedom and equality can only 
be realized by the group that affords the individual a context of choice 
within a national societal culture. That is the only thing that can offer 
the range of moral, cultural, and political options that are the condition 
of freedom and equality. There are two types of groups that can give 
the individual this opportunity. In the first place are fully democratic 
societal cultures, understood as liberal societies. In the second place are 
democratic communal societies. This type of society would be based on 
some substantive ideal related to ideas of goodness but, even if they had 
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 487.
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no universalist projection, they would maintain a democratic structure 
to allow for the possibility of transformation. This intense normative 
component in democratic demand attempts, as I understand it, to respond 
to the application of the traditional liberalist criticism of communitari-
anism that stresses its defects when it comes to accepting the moral 
dissent of the individual. However, Seymour estimates that, for pragmatic 
reasons that are not specifically laid out, the recognition of the collective 
rights of decent hierarchical societies can be accepted58.
In the second place, he maintains that the structure of collective-
rights bearing groups must be cultural and not religious. The interested 
group must be characterized by the structure and not the character of 
their culture. This excludes religious communities that are defined by a 
conception of the good life or the common good. They have character 
but not structure. The differentiation attempts to construct a concept of 
acceptable collective rights in a liberal society.
It presumes a distinction between the public and private identity of the group, 
between the structure of the culture and the character of the culture, between 
language conceived as a system of conventions and language conceived as 
a vector of a certain conception of the world, between the group inscribed 
in a context of choice and the group conceived as a community of destiny 
inscribed in a certain teleological objective or in a certain narrativity59.
The exclusion of communitarian perspectives as a consequence of this 
differentiation has, however, one exception: certain cultures that make use 
of ideas about the good life as a basis for adopting democratic structures 
and interiorizing the possibility of change within the community itself. 
Finally, it confronts difficult cases such as the question of orthodox 
Jewish communities that are stably housed within broader societies or 
the conditions under which communities created by immigration can 
reproduce their social culture of origin within their host country. To the 
extent to which they guarantee stability and permanence, they would be 
eligible for official approval as a diaspora and, therefore, eligible to bear 
collective rights.
Finally, collective-rights bearing groups should satisfy a condition of 
permanence. As was mentioned above when discussing the quantitative 
aspect of the subject, it is necessary for groups to have a presumably 
permanent existence that is designated as reinforced stability. Groups that 
have an ephemeral existence without the intervention of an intermediary 
cannot be collective rights holders. This would exclude, for example, 
groups of immigrants until they reproduce their sociocultural conditions 
58 Ibid., p. 474.
59 Ibid., p. 488.
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in a stable manner, probably in an intergenerational fashion. Having 
permanence as a condition of temporality is limited to the demand for a 
likely reproduction of the group in question, barring an action meant to 
dissolve it (even if by the group itself).
3.4 Justifying Principle of Collective Rights
The final or independent justificatory principle that Seymour promotes 
as a justifier of collective rights is what is called the Principle of the Value 
of Cultural Diversity (PVCD). The concrete application of this principle 
is central to the construction of Seymour’s theory of collective rights 
since it, while promoting their recognition, restricts these rights only to 
the people. The starting point, which would be typically liberal, consists 
of clearly affirming that the people are understood as social cultures and 
that their value is not intrinsic, but merely instrumental. In other words, 
they are valuable to the extent that they favor making a system of rights 
and freedoms available. This argumentation would lead to constructing a 
justifying strategy of the recognition of some moral value in one societal 
culture but not my societal culture. In this way, the attempt to justify the 
moral value of the plurality of societal cultures requires supplementary 
support: the PVCD.
I will explain this argument more fully. Seymour begins with the 
idea that the political conception of the people presumes a national 
self-representation at the core of a critical mass of citizens over a 
given territory and a collection of common institutions that cement 
relationships between those citizens60. This political conception of the 
people does not presume either moral individualism or collectivism 
but, in the opinion of the author, it makes it possible to have collective 
claims in the public sphere. The basis of the argument is his repeated 
reading of liberalism:
Political liberalism does not consider people as primitive and undeniable 
entities that should be conceived as ends in themselves. Instead, they are 
entities that have the institutional personality of a citizen. Therefore, nothing 
prevents introducing nations conceived as entities that have an institutional 
identity alongside the people understood in the same fashion61.
However, until this point, this conception does not justify why we 
should promote a double regime of rights, one for people and another for 
the people as a whole. To answer that, Seymour articulates three focal 
points. The first understands that the people, in their role as participants in 
the public sphere, are worthy of respect. The second shows that political 
60 Ibid., p. 343.
61 Ibid., p. 403.
79
The Canadian School of Diversity’s New Influences
liberalism establishes the PVCD. The third affirms that the people today 
continue to be important sources of cultural diversity62.
The first argumentative focal point begins with generally accepting 
that collective entities, even though their undeniable nature in relation to 
individuals is recognized, are only important because they are essential for 
individual wellbeing63. Therefore, why should the people be important? 
From a sociological and psychological point of view, it is because as 
societal cultures (in other words, institutional wholes such as a political, 
economic, educational system and other cultural institutions), they make 
it possible to have a context of choice and a system of rights and freedoms 
that, in turn, condition the possibility of creating other groupings. It would 
be a Rawlsian conception of the nation as a “social union of social unions”.
However, this argument does not justify the granting of rights to all the 
peoples in particular64. The construction of the people operates by recurring 
to the idea of tolerance understood as a mere modus vivendi generator of 
stability. Thus, overcoming eventual violent conflicts between peoples 
on the international level leads to reaffirming the necessity for a modus 
vivendi that serves progressively to generate stability in relationships 
and, in the long run, to transform a mere modus vivendi into tolerance 
understood in the sense of respect. This is the point at which it can be 
affirmed that the dignity of every people is justified.
As a second argumentative focal point, this dignity does not imply 
admitting that the people as a whole are moral agents65 or justifying their 
importance through the considerations that refer to the individual. Instead, 
they are justified because they can have a strictly political, and not a 
metaphysical characterization, with a basis in their institutional identity. 
When we talk about the people here, it signifies a strictly institutional 
entity, not a group of people assembled around a collection of beliefs, 
values, purposes, and projects. Some of their beliefs, values, purposes, 
and projects are eventually flat out rejectable, and this is not the way for 
the people to reclaim respect. Political liberalism establishes tolerance-
respect with regard to all the peoples as institutional political agents.
The third focal point emphasizes transforming respect into active 
policies. Respect is not by itself sufficient to justify policies of difference, 
policies of cultural pluralism, or policies of affirmative action. Respecting 
is not valuing, and we need to attribute value to the existence of the 
62 Ibid., p. 345.
63 Kukathas, Chandran, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?”, Political Theory, nº 20, 1992, 
p. 112. Also in Kymlicka, Will (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995, pp. 228-256.
64 Seymour, op. cit., p. 347.
65 Ibid., p. 350.
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institutional framework to justify these actions. For that, we need to 
establish a connection between the people and cultural diversity: the idea 
is that the people are important sources of cultural diversity. Seymour 
offers two reasons that support a favorable answer. On the one hand, 
the people are a source of external diversity to the extent that they are 
different from other peoples. On the other hand, they are the source of 
internal diversity to the extent that they offer their members a context 
of choice. Thus, a nationalism that restricts diversity, whether external 
or internal, will be, to that same extent, morally unacceptable.
This argumentative strategy challenges the use of arguments that have 
a compressed nature, such as saying that the PVCD creates benefits for 
the individual or that it is intrinsically valuable. This strategy makes it 
clear that political liberalism requires arguments that are not compressed 
but are based exclusively on public reason. The people are, as has been 
said, sources of valid moral claims and important sources of internal 
and external diversity but the justification of this approach requires 
argumentation based on the exercise of public reason. In this sense, there 
are five justifying arguments66 that can be summarized regarding the 
increase of true international consensus in favor of the use of diversity; 
some historical evolution in the same sense; the distinction between the 
political notion of toleration rather than the psychological notion of 
tolerance67; and toleration among different collective moral identities and 
among the institutional identities of the people. In conclusion, his thesis 
is that if cultural diversity is a value that must be defended and promoted, 
and people serve the cause of that diversity, it is then necessary to defend 
and promote the worth of the people. The basic reason underlying the 
PVCD is that it is a demand derived from the equality of all people’s 
worth. It presumes the transition from respect to valuing68.
Finally, because of these connections between subject, content, and 
justifying principle, Seymour concludes that there are four large categories 
of groups capable of bearing collective rights: majority nations, minority 
nations, contiguous diasporas, and the groups resulting from immigration. 
All of them presume populations enjoying varying amounts of institutional 
goods, that is to say, they are more or less complete societal cultures. Each 
type of group corresponds to different kinds of rights. In other words, he 
66 Ibid., pp. 357-360.
67 Ibid., p. 443.
68 Ibid., p. 356. We must also point out that Seymour establishes an analogical argument 
between the principles of cultural diversity and what is called the Principle of the Value 
of the Diversity of the Natural Resources of the people (PVDNR) and the Principle of 
the Value of the Diversity of Individual Talents (PVDT). This last is developed in the 
Rawlsian manner of justice as equity and sustains that “sharing talents is a common 
good for the entire society.” See Seymour, ibid., pp. 364-365 and p. 493.
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distinguishes three different types of collective rights: a) Poly-ethnic rights 
or a politics of cultural pluralism for non-contiguous diasporas (including 
immigrants who have consolidated as a group), b) Institutional rights 
for contiguous diasporas, and c) Rights to self-determination and self-
government for the people69.
In conclusion, for Seymour collective rights are “rights that the 
people possess that affect participative goods, produced and consumed 
in groups. They reference the maintenance, development, or creation of 
institutions that allow us to guarantee the integrity of the people as a 
people”70. In order to justify these rights, we need not subscribe to any 
moral assumptions about social ontology or adopt any comprehensive 
theory or fall victim to essentialism, communitarianism, collectivism, or 
authoritarianism. The alternative is to invent a non-individualist version 
of liberalism capable of gathering the collective entities sympathetically 
and constituting them into moral agents once they are considered in their 
institutional identity71.
4. Critical Evaluation of the Characterization of Collective 
Rights According to Seymour’s Thesis
In this last section, I would like to present some thoughts about the 
dissonances that I find in Seymour’s work. First of all, I must recognize 
the originality of his thesis and the courage needed to seriously and 
systematically confront the important risks that accompany any 
intellectual question that attempts to open new paths that go beyond the 
commonplaces that enjoy – with or without basis – consensuses that are 
stable or becoming consolidated.
I will focus on two questions to organize this discussion: Seymour’s 
proposal for political liberalism and the connection between collective 
rights and nationhood.
On the first question, the construction of political liberalism on the 
basis of the critique of individualist liberalism presupposes a strong 
theoretical commitment whose consequences are far reaching. I will not 
try to evaluate what the prevalence of tolerance can afford in multiple 
cases as its most inclusive nature, the reality of the division and limitation 
of political and social power, or the defense of pluralism, but I believe it 
is a stretch to attempt to build theories in order to unambiguously justify 
the category of collective rights. In short, an eventual consequence of 
this reformulation of the liberal paradigm can be made concrete in the 
69 Ibid., pp. 474-475.
70 Ibid., p. 631.
71 Ibid., p. 636.
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affirmation of collective rights, but I do not believe that the attempt to 
justify them operates as a driving force behind change.
Similarly, I believe that at least four comments are relevant to the 
most singular attempt to anchor the justification of collective rights in the 
contributions of late Rawls. In the first place, it seems plausible to sustain 
a methodological interpretation of Rawls in the sense of understanding 
that the justifying model of his theory of justice is a simplified model 
that presupposes cultural homogeneity of the group and its invariability 
over time. However, increasing the complexity of Rawls’s approach by 
introducing these cultural variables means a variation on liberalism whose 
continuity is not guaranteed. The fundamental reason it is also feasible 
rests on a Rawlsian interpretation such that all cultural aspects belong to 
the private field and are, therefore, beyond the public exercise of reason. 
I consider this last interpretation less suitable, but it is clearly feasible and 
is even the most widely accepted interpretation, so the necessary continuity 
between the ideas put forth by Seymour and Rawls is not guaranteed.
In the second place, I believe Seymour’s reading of The Law of 
Peoples is strained. The recognition of the people’s moral agency on 
the international plane operates as an alternative to the classic formula 
that attributes subjectivity to the states, and it would be truly difficult 
to justify which of the two rights is best suited to acquiring moral 
agency to the detriment of the people when it comes to configuring the 
conditions of a well-ordered international society. In a similar fashion, 
we could claim that the people deserve the presumption of equal respect, 
like individuals and unlike the states, which do not necessarily receive 
that respect. However, Rawls’s thesis does not suggest that the domestic 
space for the exercise of public reason be reformulated to incorporate 
new agents who are not individuals, much less in order to recognize their 
rights on an equal footing. I do not find it foolish to propose an expansion 
of the interests that were considered in the original position in order to 
incorporate questions related to cultural and ethnic rights or the rights of 
group representation. These are aspects that should be kept in mind when 
configuring a well-organized domestic society, especially in the case of 
future generations, but I do not believe they lead to an affirmation of new 
instances of moral agency from the Rawlsian point of view.
In third place, and in the opposite vein, it is complicated to accept 
Seymour’s criticisms of the abandonment of Rawls’s universalist ideal in 
the international field without appealing, in turn, to the adoption of criteria 
of moral individualism, the criticism of which is the basis of Seymour’s 
theoretical construction. The proposed argument supporting the idea of a 
globally based structure72 as a third alternative would correspond, in any 
72 Ibid., p. 318.
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case, more to the exposure of hypothetical alternative empirical processes 
than to maintaining a novel moral principle.
Finally, it is difficult to justify collective rights in the domestic realm 
as derived from the principle of difference as a second principle of 
justice. The problem is double. On the one hand, Rawlsian logic would 
allow analogical justification of the adoption of policies of recognition – 
including those related to the defense of the Principle of the Value of 
Cultural Diversity (PVCD) – in the same way it justifies the logic of 
policies of wealth redistribution, but it does not follow that it establishes 
the justification of rights. On the other hand, and more importantly, 
eventual collective rights would be lexicographically subordinated to the 
rights of the first principle of justice, which would make it difficult to 
maintain the axiological parity between individual and collective rights 
that Seymour defends as one of his theory’s central tenets.
On the second question, which is related to the connection between 
collective rights and nation, I find that there are certain discrepancies that 
merit a more detailed analysis. His central thesis maintains that only the 
people can bear collective rights because only they can be configured as 
societal cultures, that is, as cultural structures that imply a crossroads 
of influences and a context of choice. In this way, all the substantive 
realities, ideals of the good, conceptions of the good life, narrativities in 
the identifying configuration of the group, etc., are removed from the idea 
of the people, and the strategy of a strictly institutional characterization 
of the nation is employed. This demand for a reduction in cultural density 
is justified by two things. On the one hand, there is the liberal demand 
to maintain neutrality in the public space that should not be considered 
constricted by the attribution of moral agency to the people. In this way, 
the recognition of these moral agents in the public sphere leads to taking 
only some of the items that define the people or nation into consideration: 
the ones that are relevant as a context of choice. On the other, the support 
for political liberalism – unavoidable when attributing collective moral 
agency – also implies a reduction of the cultural components of the nation 
in a much more intense way than required by the thesis of individualist 
liberalism since, in the case of individualist liberalism, the justification 
of group rights can be broader because the rights continue to be held 
by an individual and are justified to the extent that they guarantee that 
individuals maintain this collection of cultural elements that afford them 
useful parameters for the determination of their own life plans73. The 
result of this process of the loss of the nation’s cultural density to justify 




its moral agency is the cost of leaving behind what was the first principle 
of the argument, specifically, the defense of cultural diversity.
This problem gravely affects the three basic realities that constitute 
this light version of the concept of the nation as bearer of collective 
rights: common public language, institutional structure, and common 
public history (in some cases, the list is expanded to include up to eight 
characteristics: “Explicit or implicit constitution, language, institutions, 
history, national consciousness, desire for life in common, network of 
influences, and context of choice”74). Regarding language, the process 
is clear. To the extent that it is unburdened of elements related to 
conceptions of the world and is restructured around participatory social 
good, the instrumental side of language continues to be emphasized and 
its cultural components are diluted. To the extent to which the assessment 
of language is confined to the arena of public life, that is, to the exercise 
of public reason, its substantive meaning remains unread. To the extent 
to which it allows the convergence of more than one language as an 
identifying element and that it even affirms that the loss and substitution 
of one language by another dominant language is not decisive for the 
disappearance of the nation, it seems clear that its identity does not come 
from cultural realities. In addition, Seymour’s references to language as a 
manifestation of external plurality do not clarify whether it is a contextual 
defense (for example, the survival of the use of French in North America) 
or whether it operates in absolute terms (for example, the disappearance 
of Cree languages among Aboriginal peoples in Quebec). In relation to 
institutional structure, there are also problems around the possibility that 
a people have suffered an expropriation of their institutional framework 
and that the individuals who constitute the people as a whole conserve a 
certain representation of themselves as members of those peoples. In this 
sense, it seems that Seymour75 continues to recognize something in them 
regarding the holding of rights. Finally, regarding common public history, 
it seems to imply the suppression of the constitutive narrativities of the 
people, as well as the configuration of one’s own historical memory. 
Therefore, if the idea of the people that is needed to sustain the theory 
of collective rights requires a negating of the elements that define it, the 
question we need to ask ourselves becomes obvious: What role does the 
recognition of a collective right play for a collective that does not need its 
signs of identity?
On the other hand, it is useful to note that there are difficulties regarding 
this centrality of the concept of nation when it comes to collective rights. 
Among them, we could emphasize the fact that it artificially rejects the 
74 Seymour, op. cit., p. 589.
75 Ibid., p. 520.
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possibility that other institutions can assume the functions of context of 
choice that are exclusively attributed to the nation. This fragmentation 
can operate in groups smaller that the people as a whole as well as on 
a larger scale. Smaller groups could include religious organizations and 
communities and alternative forms of socialization. Larger groups could 
include broader contexts of choice such as supranational orders, imperial 
territories, or simply, civilizations. In both groups, it is not difficult to 
imagine situations in which these contexts of choice are prioritized over 
the context of nations.
In short, it is not excessive to believe that Seymour’s construction 
of the category of collective rights takes as a central objective the moral 
subjectivization of an institutional framework as a resource, mechanism, 
or technique through which that institutional framework can make the 
decision to establish itself as a new frame of reference of individual rights. 
In this way, collective rights would come together as a right of internal 
cohesion and an affirmation of subjectivity. In the end, the closing clause 
of the universe of collective rights would lead back to the right to self-
determination understood as the jurisdiction of a constitutive collective 
action of new spaces for the exercise of individual rights. This path does 
not resolve the question of whether that collective action is exercised by 
a confluence of individual rights or by a collective agency constituted by 
individuals as well as public agents.
In conclusion, Seymour’s proposal presumes an articulated and 
complex exercise in rereading the foundations of liberalism to recognize the 
collective rights of nations, or fragments of them, that come together under 
the authority of constituting them as legitimate subjects of the decisions 
regarding their own institutionalization, both within international and 
state structures, while understanding the relativity of multinational states. 
The most relevant question that would remain on the table is whether this 
complex collective moral agency is necessary for that objective or if the 
traditional option of the exercise of individual rights complemented by 
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Introduction
The issues surrounding secularism and the management of religious 
diversity in contemporary societies gain from being approached from 
a contextual and comparative perspective. Liberal democracies come 
to these thorny issues from very different historical pathways, but they 
all have to grapple with the challenges raised by moral and religious 
diversity. My own contribution to this comparative research agenda is to 
talk about the Quebec experience with a particular emphasis on Quebec’s 
Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to 
Cultural Differences (CCAPRCD), and its aftermath.
Quebec and Canada are highly stimulating contexts for those who 
study questions related to identity and diversity. The issues that were 
mainly debated until perhaps 2006 were nationalism and the right to self-
determination, federalism, and immigration and integration models such 
as multiculturalism and interculturalism. Since 2006, these issues were 
overshadowed by the debates around secularism and the management 
of religious diversity, including the issue of religious accommodations.
In 2007, a high-profile public commission – the CCAPRCD2 – was put 
together by the Government of Quebec. The Commission was co-chaired 
1 I wish to thank the workshop participants for their very helpful questions and 
comments, as well as Dominic Cliche for his first rate editorial work.
2 Bouchard, Gérard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation: 
Report, Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
Differences, Les Publications du Québec, 2008.
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by the philosopher Charles Taylor and the historian Gérard Bouchard. Its 
mandate was fourfold: first, to take stock of accommodation practices 
in Quebec; second, to analyze the attendant issues, bearing in mind 
the experience of other societies; third, to conduct an extensive public 
consultation on this topic; and fourth, to formulate recommendations to the 
government to ensure that accommodation practices conform to the values 
of Quebec society as a pluralistic, democratic, and egalitarian society.
The co-chairmen quickly decided to opt for a wide interpretation of 
their mandate. Rather than focusing strictly on the legal obligation to 
accommodate as it was defined in the jurisprudence, they chose to tackle 
the related but larger issues raised by citizens, such as the meaning of 
secularism, the place of religion in the public sphere, immigration and 
integration, and the fate of Quebec identity. Addressing all these issues 
in a comprehensive fashion was of course not possible, but it is doubtful, 
however, that the Quebec public would have been satisfied with a narrow 
and legalistic interpretation of the mandate.
In this paper, I will first zero in on the debate over “reasonable 
accommodation”. I will try to define the legal obligation to accommodate 
and specify what are its limits. I will then try to pinpoint the meaning of 
secularism and defend what I will call a liberal and pluralist conception 
of secularism. Finally, I will discuss the main piece of legislation that was 
passed in the aftermath of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, viz. Bill 94.
1. Reasonable Accommodation
1.1  The Definition of a Reasonable Accommodation
The legal norm of “reasonable accommodation” was at the heart 
of the debate in Quebec, as an important number of citizens felt that 
the accommodation of religious diversity was going too far and that 
it was threatening basic public values. The concept of a “reasonable 
accommodation”, though, was not very well understood. One of 
the positive contributions of the CCAPRCD was that the media and 
members of the public came to a better understanding of the legal duty to 
accommodate.
In the Canadian jurisprudence, reasonable accommodation is a rather 
well defined and circumscribed legal norm that stipulates that there is a duty 
on the part of an employer or an institution to offer accommodation measures 
to someone who is adversely affected by a rule or a policy that seems prima 
facie neutral, but that indirectly discriminates against the members of a 
group. The discriminated individual can be a part of a religious group, but 
it can just as well consist of, for instance, people living with disabilities 
or pregnant women. The notion of reasonable accommodation was thus 
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conceived as a way to correct indirect and involuntary discrimination, i.e. 
cases when a norm of general application can be shown to be discriminatory 
against members of a group on the basis of some their attributes, such as 
their physical condition, gender, age, ethnicity, language, or religion. For 
example, there is no explicit discrimination in a rule prohibiting headgear 
at a school, for it does not target any particular group. In its application, 
however, the rule constrains those whose faith requires wearing headgear, 
while those whose conscientious convictions do not include the wearing 
of headgear can more easily harmonize their freedom of religion and their 
right to a public education. This does not mean that the rule itself cannot 
be legitimate. Maybe it would not be a good idea, generally speaking, 
to allow high school students to wear headgear in class. But a religious 
obligation (or any other deeply-held, meaning-giving belief) is not the same 
thing a personal preference3, and this is why accommodation measures are 
sometimes necessary. Similarly, it is easy to understand why prisons or 
hospitals have rules that prevent patients or detainees from choosing their 
meals – this would be too costly and impractical. However, few people 
believe that vegetarians (either for religious or secular reasons) should 
not benefit from an exception4. This is why fairness sometimes requires 
a differential treatment even if the rule does not explicitly discriminate 
against anyone5. 
The duty to accommodate is thus a jurisprudential creation. It 
originates from the interpretive work of the courts rather than from an 
explicit legislative act. it is not explicitly stated in the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms6. But the courts established that the norm of 
3 For a defense of that argument, see the second part of Maclure, Jocelyn and Charles 
Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
2011.
4 See, for instance, the decision by the Federal Court of Canada in the case Maurice v. 
Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 69, [2002] 2 F.C. D-47, 186.
5 The Supreme Court of Canada explicitly formulated the legal obligation of reasonable 
accommodation for the first time in 1985 in the Simpson-Sears ruling. As a member 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the plaintiff had to keep Sabbath, which for 
this Church extends from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. This entailed that 
she could not work on Friday evenings as well as on Saturdays. Arguing that her 
religious obligation was incompatible with the employment policy of the company 
for full-time sales clerks, Simpson-Sears discharged the plaintiff on the basis of her 
refusal to work on Saturday. The Supreme Court claimed that the refusal on the part of 
Simpson-Sears to take “reasonable steps to accommodate the complainant” constituted 
a form of indirect discrimination. See Ontario Human Rights Commission (O’Malley) 
v. Simpson-Sears [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
6 Canadian constitutional culture, I think, partly vindicates Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive 
theory of constitutional adjudication. When it is confronted with hard cases, such as 
claims for accommodations, end of life issues or the right of a province to secede, it 
readily invokes implicit principles of political morality.
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reasonable accommodation is a logical corollary of the equality rights 
and freedom of religion that are enshrined in the Charter7. It stems from 
a material, rather than a purely formal, conception of equality; its purpose 
is generally to enable a member of a minority or a vulnerable individual 
to take advantage of an opportunity or of a public good8. For example, 
accommodation measures can remove the obligation to choose between 
two basic human rights, such as having an equal right to apply for a 
position and practicing one’s religion, or having access to a public good 
(such as education, health care, or all kinds of permits) and respecting the 
prescriptions of one’s faith.
One misunderstanding that the CCAPRCD Report helped correct 
was that the duty to offer reasonable accommodation measures was 
thought by many to apply in all possible cases of accommodation claims. 
What needed to be reminded is that there has to be discrimination for 
the duty to accommodate to apply. As the Report suggested, “reasonable 
accommodation” ought be distinguished from “concerted adjustment”. 
The former is derived from more general human rights, whereas the latter 
is the result of voluntary negotiations between consenting parties who 
wish to cooperate, to live together peacefully as neighbors or to establish 
a business relationship.
In order to illustrate this distinction, consider one of the cases that was 
at the origin of the reasonable accommodation controversy: the so-called 
“YMCA case”. The YMCA is a sport center located in a neighborhood 
of Montreal where an important Hassidic Jewish community lives. The 
YMCA is right next to a Hassidic primary school. The pupils, when they 
were playing in the school’s yard, could see inside the gym where people, 
including women, worked out. The school board asked the YMCA whether 
they would mind frosting the windows so that the young children would 
not see inside, and offered to pay for the new windows. The board of the 
YMCA agreed. But when some clients of the YMCA heard about the deal, 
they expressed their discontent and reported it to the media. The YMCA’s 
decision was widely criticized. Many citizens thought that this was a clear 
demonstration that the accommodation of religious diversity was going too 
far and the norm of reasonable accommodation was in fact unreasonable.
This case, however, had nothing to do with the legal obligation to offer 
accommodation measures. There was no indirect discrimination involved 
7 Woehrling, José, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et l’adaptation de la 
société à la diversité religieuse”, McGill Law Journal, vol. 43, nº 2, 1998, pp. 325-401.
8 Bosset, Pierre, “Les fondements juridiques et l’évolution de l’obligation d’accommodement 
raisonnable” in Myriam Jézéquiel (ed.), Les accommodements raisonnables: quoi, 
comment, jusqu’où? Des outils pour tous, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, pp. 3-28.
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and the YMCA was consequently under no obligation to frost its windows. 
This was a case of “concerted adjustment”. The media were unfortunately 
not quick enough to correct the misperception. Combined with other 
cases, this fueled the public outcry with regard to the accommodation of 
religious diversity.
1.2 The Limits to the Duty to Accommodate
That being said, one of the main concerns expressed by citizens with 
regard to the legal duty to accommodate concerned the limits of such an 
obligation. Many feared that freedom of religion, as interpreted by the 
Court, would end up trumping other fundamental values such as gender 
equality, or the religious neutrality of the State, or fairness among co-
workers. That fear was compounded by the “personal and subjective” 
conception of freedom of religion found in the jurisprudence. Before 
I get back to the question of the limits of the obligation to accommodate, 
I shall say a few words on the subjective conception of freedom of religion 
and, more generally, on how rulings of the Canadian Supreme Court are 
often perceived in Quebec.
In Canada, as well as in the U.S., the claimant requesting an adjustment 
or an exemption is not expected to demonstrate the objectivity of his 
or her belief. In the Canadian Supreme Court 2004 Amselem decision, 
the majority established that the claimants “need not show some sort of 
objective religious obligation, requirement or precept to invoke freedom 
of religion”9. For the Court, the crucial point is that the belief held 
by the claimants has “a nexus with religion”, and that the petitioner 
sincerely believes that his or her faith prescribes a given practice or act. 
No authorized religious representatives or experts need to confirm the 
existence of the precept invoked for a request for an accommodation to 
be taken under advisement. The criterion used by the Supreme Court is 
thus that of the sincerity of belief: the petitioner must demonstrate that 
he or she truly believes he or she is obligated to conform to the religious 
precept in question.
The chief advantage of a personal and subjective conception of 
freedom of religion is that it spares the courts from having to act as 
interpreters of religious dogma and as arbiters of the inevitable theological 
disagreements that divide all religious communities. In relying on 
personal belief, they avoid having to choose between the contradictory 
interpretations of religious doctrines. They also circumvent the danger of 
falling back on the majority opinion within the religious community and 
thereby contributing to the marginalization of minority voices.
9 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 55 at 4, 37.
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The downside, however, is that this very broad conception can end up 
opening the door, first, to an excessive number of accommodations – this is 
the problem of proliferation – and, second, to the strategic or manipulative 
invocation of freedom of conscience and religion and of the legal 
obligation to accommodate – this is the problem of instrumentalization.
At this juncture, and this is probably something relevant in other 
multinational political associations such as Spain, the debate about the 
status of Quebec within the Canadian federation interfered with the debate 
about religious accommodations. Even if the support for the separation of 
Quebec is not particularly strong nowadays, there is a strong subset of 
the Quebec population which believes that some basic federal institutions 
and policies suffer from a legitimacy deficit. This mainly goes back to the 
events of 1981-82 when the new Constitution Act was passed without the 
consent of Quebec, when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
was designed and constitutionalized, and judicial review imported to 
Canada. Many believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Canadian Supreme 
Court cannot or will not properly recognize Quebec’s rights and interests, 
and that many of its rulings prove it10.
For instance, most observers agree that it was the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Multani case in March 2006 that kick-started the 
reasonable accommodation debate in Quebec. In that case, the Court 
allowed the young Multani, a Sikh schoolboy who wanted to bear a 
kirpan – the Sikh ceremonial dagger – at school, to do so under strict 
conditions. Up to this day, even though the Supreme Court said that the 
kirpan had to be worn under the shirt, placed in a case and wrapped and 
sewn in a cloth envelope that itself needed to be sewn to the shirt, more 
than 90% of the Quebec population believes that the Supreme Court was 
wrong. The decision was widely interpreted as another symptom of the 
Supreme Court’s propensity to overrule legitimate laws passed by the 
Quebec legislative assembly (judicial activism), and of the imposition 
of Canadian-style multiculturalism in Quebec, a policy which is seen 
as encouraging ghettoization and fragmentation, and as conflicting with 
Quebec’s own integration policy, that is, “interculturalism”11.
This perception that the Canadian Charter and the Supreme Court, as 
well as the multiculturalism policy, go against the grain of Quebec’s interest 
heightened the crisis. It did not create the crisis, but it amplified it. As I 
10 See Tully, James, “Introduction” in James Tully and Alain-G. Gagnon (eds.), 
Multinational Democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001 pp. 1-34.
11 For a critical discussion of the alleged difference between multiculturalism and 
interculturalism, see Maclure, Jocelyn, “Multiculturalism and Political Morality” 
in Duncan Ivison (ed.), The Research Companion to Multiculturalism, Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2010, pp. 39-56.
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pointed out, many feared that religious accommodations were threatening 
fundamental rights or public values. As a consequence of that fear, the 
idea of institutionalizing a formal hierarchy within fundamental rights 
gained some traction; many thought that gender equality, for instance, 
needed to trump freedom of religion in cases of collision between the two 
rights. But the answer to this fear, as it should become clear, lies not in the 
philosophically and morally unsustainable proposal to hierarchize basic 
human rights but in the notion that the accommodation claims ought to 
be “reasonable”.
Courts have indeed specified that accommodation claims ought to be 
“reasonable”. Courts can assess not only the sincerity of the claimant but 
also the effects of the desired accommodation measure on the rights of 
others and on the capacity of the institution to function efficiently and 
achieve its goals. We are moving here into the terrain of the “undue 
hardship” or, better still, “excessive constraint” (contrainte excessive) set 
of criteria that can be reconstructed from case law. The content of the 
excessive constraint set of criteria is not fixed and immutable, for it must 
always be specified with reference to the facts of the matter. But looking 
at a wide range of cases involving both public and private organizations 
reveals some general and transversal criteria. An accommodation claim 
cannot (1) create excessive functional constraints (in terms of cost and 
functioning), (2) compromise the ends of the institutions (making profits, 
educating, or providing health care or social services), or (3) infringe upon 
the rights and freedoms of coworkers or fellow citizens12. As is well known, 
individual rights were never seen as absolute by liberal philosophers from 
Locke to Kymlicka and through Mill and Dworkin; basic human rights 
can legitimately be restricted in the name of the rights of others or of 
compelling public interests13. Accommodation claims must be reasonable 
because exemptions, compensations, or adaptation measures modify, to 
varying degrees, the prevailing terms of social cooperation. The obligation 
to accommodate is meant to redress an injustice by correcting indirect 
discrimination; logically, it should not do so by creating new situations of 
unfairness. Yet, for an accommodation claim to be turned down, it must 
be shown that its deleterious effects are real and significant. Dissociating 
itself from its US counterpart, the Canadian Supreme Court points out in 
12 Bosset, Pierre, “Limites de l’accommodement: Le droit a-t-il tout dit?”, Éthique 
Publique, vol. 9, nº 1, 2007, pp. 165-168.
13 The “excessive constraint” set of criteria is thus consistent with s. 1 of the 1982 
Constitution and with the Oakes Test, which is applied by Canadian courts to assess 
when a law can legitimately restrict individual rights. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 
103. Since the limits to the duty to accommodate include not only deontological 
reasons (the rights of others must be respected), but also functional considerations, 
“excessive constraints” is more appropriate than the narrower “undue hardship.”
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Central Okanagan School District N° 23 v. Renaud that a minimalist and 
insufficiently demanding notion of excessive constraint would amount 
to a removal altogether of the legal duty to accommodate14. The burden 
of proof, in the Canadian jurisprudence, is placed upon the party who 
claims that a norm is reasonable even if it restricts the religious freedom 
of another party.
Accommodation claims can thus in some cases be legitimately turned 
down. For instance, a Canadian provincial Court of Appeal recently denied 
the right to civil marriage commissioners to decline to solemnize same-sex 
marriages even if doing so would be contrary to their religious beliefs15. 
The majority’s ratio was that, although the freedom of conscience of the 
marriage commissioners was genuinely infringed by the obligation to 
solemnize same-sex marriages, the stakes of allowing them to opt out 
were too high. This would amount, according to the Court, to “perpetuate 
a brand of discrimination which our national community has only recently 
begun to successfully overcome”; this would have “genuinely harmful 
impacts”, the refusal on the part of commissioners being perceived by gays 
and lesbian, as well as by other citizens, as an act as offensive as any racist 
or sexist one; and it would “undercut the basic principle that governmental 
services must be provided on an impartial and non-discriminatory basis”16. 
Consequently, the deleterious effects of the accommodation have been 
judged, in that case, to overweight the positive ones.
As the Canadian jurisprudence testifies, the notion of “reasonableness” 
that delineates the obligation of the accommodation measures is flexible 
enough to adapt to a wide variety of empirical situations but yet 
sufficiently well defined and robust to safeguard basic rights and common 
public values17.
2. Secularism
The management of religious diversity also raises the question of the 
appropriate place of religion in the public sphere and of the relationship 
between public institutions and religious practice. All democracies, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are officially secular such as France 
14 Central Okanagan School District N° 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 R.C.S. 970.
15 The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, [2011] SKCA 3.
16 Ibid., at 17-18 and 40-42.
17 For other cases where accommodation claims were turned down by Canadian courts, 
see Maclure, Jocelyn, “Reasonable Accommodation and the Subjective Conception of 
Freedom of Conscience and Religion” in Avigail Eisenberg and Kymlicka, Will (ed.), 
Identity Politics in the Public Realm, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 
2011, pp. 260-280.
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or Turkey or that they have a “separation” clause enshrined in their 
constitution, such as the U.S., or that some form of official recognition 
is granted to one or more religions, such as Denmark or the U.K., have 
to deal with religion and cope with the challenges raised by religious 
diversity.
France, for instance, is often thought to be the most secular society, 
but we know that 85 percent of the funding for private religious schools 
comes from the state (as opposed to 60% in Quebec); that the French state 
maintains and preserves Catholic and Protestant churches and Jewish 
synagogues built before the 1905 Law on the Separation of the Churches 
and State; that six Catholic holidays (Easter, Ascension, Pentecost, 
Assumption, All Saints’ Day, and Christmas) are legal holidays; and that 
a concordat granting privileges to the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish 
religions is maintained in Alsace-Moselle. Separation and neutrality, as 
the example of France attests, are never fully realized in practice.
Fully excluding religion from the public space is not, even in the 
most secular regimes, a real option. On the one hand, freedom of religion 
includes the freedom to act on the basis of one’s beliefs, within reasonable 
limits. This is what the Americans call the “free-exercise of religion”, 
which cannot be strictly confined to the private sphere. On the other hand, 
we cannot extract a society from its cultural and historical context. We 
will not require that churches stop ringing their bells; that all the villages 
or streets that borrow their names from saints be renamed; or that the cross 
that stands on top of the Mount-Royal in Montreal be taken down. No 
one seriously asks that we eliminate all the statutory Holidays that come 
from Christianity and design a deculturalized calendar like the French 
revolutionaries tried to do. Very few would suggest that spaces such as 
hospitals, prisons and armies stop offering religious or spiritual counseling.
A theory and practice of secularism that allow us to arbitrate the 
dilemma related to the presence of religion in the public sphere are thus 
needed. Elements for such a model were gathered in the CCAPRCD 
Report18, and Charles Taylor and I further developed it in Secularism 
and Freedom of Conscience19. The Commission recommended that the 
government drafts and submits to the Quebec legislative assembly a “white 
paper” or a Policy statement on secularism. This formal recommendation 
was alas disregarded.
18 See Bouchard and Taylor, op. cit., chapter 5.
19 Maclure, Jocelyn and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011. Originally published in French in 2010 
under the title Laïcité et liberté de conscience, Boréal/La Découverte, Montréal/Paris. 




The CCAPRCD Report defended what Taylor and I called a liberal 
and pluralist conception of laïcité. It is liberal because it is a human 
rights-based conception. It primarily seeks to protect the equality and 
freedom of conscience of all. It is pluralist because it does not believe 
that a “difference-blind” conception of liberalism is appropriate under 
conditions of deep moral and religious diversity.
This model is called in the Quebec political culture “laïcité ouverte” 
(or open secularism). It is a model of laïcité that recognizes that strictly 
confining religion to the private sphere is a not real option and that is 
thus “open” to some forms of reasonable presence of religion within the 
public sphere. I now want to go over a few general guidelines that were 
sketched out regarding the place of religion in the public space and in 
public institutions.
2.1 Distinction between Institutions and Individuals
Broadly speaking, secularism requires that there is no organic 
connection between the state and religion. The secular state must take 
its orders from the people through their elected representatives and not 
from religion. But the state’s religious neutrality demands that public 
institutions favor no religion, not that the individuals who find themselves 
in these institutions privatize their religious affiliation. What I mean is 
that there is an important difference between, on the one hand, allowing 
citizens, for instance, to display religious symbols in public institutions 
and, on the other hand, favoring a particular religion through public 
interventions.
For example, we must contrast the act, by a student, of wearing a 
religious symbol in class to parochial teaching or to the recitation of a 
prayer before the beginning of classes in public schools. The essential 
point, if we wish to grant students equal respect and protect their freedom 
of conscience, is not to remove religion in all its manifestations from 
school but rather to ensure that the school does not espouse or favor any 
religion. The same distinction applies to other public institutions such as 
municipalities or courts. 
2.2   Should Public Officials Be Allowed to Wear Visible 
Religious Signs?
At this point, one obvious question that this theory raises is about 
the implications of the state’s religious neutrality for state officials, 
that is, for those who represent it and allow it to perform its functions. 
In some countries, such as France and Turkey, civil servants cannot 
display religious symbols when they are on duty. The reason most often 
mentioned for prohibiting state officials from wearing religious symbols 
97
After the Bouchard-Taylor Commission
is that they represent the state and must consequently embody the values 
it promotes. Since the state is in theory neutral toward citizens’ various 
religious affiliations, its representatives must exemplify that neutrality.
At first sight, that position seems reasonable and legitimate. As 
individuals, citizens are free to display their religious affiliations both in 
the private sphere and in the public sphere, understood in the broad sense. 
But as state officials, they must agree to embody or personify the state’s 
neutrality toward religions. A state employee wearing a visible religious 
symbol might give the impression that he is serving his church before 
serving the state, or that there is an organic link between the state and 
his religious community, whereas a uniform rule prohibiting the wearing 
of such religious symbols avoids the appearance of a conflict of interest.
That being said, it is important to be aware that prohibiting public 
officials from wearing religious symbols bears a cost, namely, either the 
restriction of the freedom of religion or of the equal access to positions 
in the public administration. No right is absolute, but a liberal democracy 
must always have strong reasons for restricting fundamental rights and 
socio-economic opportunities. So the question is: Does the appearance 
of neutrality, which is the objective of the rule prohibiting the wearing of 
visible religious symbols by public officials, constitute a strong reason?
Although the appearance of neutrality is important, the Commissioners 
Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor did not believe that it justifies a 
general rule prohibiting public officials from wearing conspicuous 
religious symbols. What matters above all, according to them, is that such 
officials demonstrate impartiality in the exercise of their duties. State 
employees must seek to perform the mission attributed by lawmakers to 
the institution they serve; their acts must be dictated neither by their faith 
nor by their philosophical beliefs but rather by the will to accomplish the 
tasks associated with the position they hold.
But why think that the person who wears a visible religious symbol 
is less liable to demonstrate impartiality, professionalism, and loyalty to 
the institution than the person who wears none? Why, in that case, stop 
at external manifestations of faith? Logically, should not state employees 
be required to renounce all convictions of conscience, thus instituting a 
modern version of the Ironclad Test Oath that Catholics needed to take in 
order to have a public office after England took New France in 1760?20 
That would obviously be absurd. It is unclear why we should think a priori 
that those who display their religious affiliation are less capable of being 
professional and loyal to their employer than those whose convictions of 
conscience are not externalized or are so in a less conspicuous manner 
20 Milot, Micheline, La laïcité, Ottawa, Novalis, 2008, p. 99.
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(the wearing of a cross, for example). Why deny the presumption of 
impartiality to one and grant it to the other?
Public officials must be evaluated in light of their actions. Do they 
display impartiality in the exercise of their duties? Do their religious 
beliefs interfere with the exercise of their professional judgment? It 
is possible to evaluate the neutrality of the actions performed by state 
officials without systematically restricting their freedom of conscience 
and religion. For example, when an employee wears a visible religious 
symbol and proselytizes at work, what would need to be proscribed is the 
proselytism and not the wearing of the religious symbol, which is not in 
itself an act of proselytism.
The position just outlined does not mean, however, that the wearing 
of all religious symbols by all public officials must be accepted. Rather, 
it implies that wearing a religious symbol ought not to be prohibited 
simply because it is religious. Other reasons may justify the prohibition, 
however. Here, we go back to the reasonable limits on freedom of religion 
that I sketched out in section 1.2. The wearing of a religious symbol must 
not interfere with the performance of one’s duties. A teacher or a nurse, 
for example, could not wear a burqa or niqab at work and still adequately 
discharge her duties since the full veil hinders communication and raises 
security issues.
2.3 Heritage vs. Establishment
Another source of discontent about measures of accommodation for 
religious minorities has to do with the perceived asymmetry between what 
is required of members of the majority and what is required of members of 
minority groups. Some have trouble understanding why accommodations 
must be granted to individuals belonging to minority religious groups 
so that they can practice their religion in the public space, whereas the 
majority must accept, in the name of secularism, the privatization of some 
of their religious symbols and rituals.
Does secularism indeed require the sacrifice of a society’s religious 
heritage? In particular, must public institutions and public places be 
purged of any trace of religion, and especially, that of the majority? 
Would that not amount to obliterating the past, severing ties between the 
past and the present?
An adequate conception of secularism must seek to distinguish 
what constitutes a form of establishment of religion from what belongs 
to a society’s religious heritage. In Canada, the old Lord’s Day Act, 
the privileges granted not long ago to Catholics and Protestants in the 
teaching of religion in public schools, the recitation of a prayer before 
the beginning of sessions of municipal councils, and the obligatory use 
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of the Bible to swear an oath in court constituted forms of establishment 
of the majority religion. In all these cases, practicing Christians were 
favored and non-Christians compelled to respect a law or a norm that was 
at odds with their conscience. To put it differently, Christian beliefs were 
directly turned into positive law. But some practices or symbols that may 
have originated in the religion of the majority do not truly constrain the 
conscience of those who are not part of that majority. Such is the case for 
practices and symbols that have a heritage value rather than a regulatory 
function. The cross on Mount-Royal in Montreal, for example, does not 
signify that the City of Montreal identifies itself as Catholic, and it does 
not compel non-Catholics to act against their conscience. It is simply a 
symbol that attests to an episode in Quebec’s history.
A religious symbol is thus compatible with secularism when it is a 
reminder of the past rather than a sign of religious identification on the 
part of a public institution. As the Quebec Human Rights Commission 
points out, a symbol or ritual stemming from the religion of the majority 
“does not infringe on fundamental liberties if it is not accompanied by 
any constraint on individuals’ behavior”21.
As always, there will be limit cases. Religious symbols in public 
institutions, like crosses in public schools, do not constrain individual 
behavior, but they do entail that there is a special link between the school 
and the religion of the majority; it creates a form of symbolic inequality, 
and for that reason I think they should be removed. It is necessary to keep 
practices that do constitute a form of identification on the state’s part with 
a religion – usually that of the majority – from being preserved on the 
pretext that they now have only a heritage value22.
3. The Aftermath of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission: 
Quebec’s Bill 94
The post Bouchard-Taylor Commission debate was predominantly 
focused on religious signs in the public sphere. Some wished that the 
Quebec legislative assembly would follow Belgium and France and ban 
the burqa and niqab in the public space. This was not really taken up by 
legislators of the different parties. The more heated debate had to do with 
religious signs in the public administration. A majority among the public 
21 Bosset, Pierre, Les symboles et rituels religieux dans les institutions publiques 
[Cat. 2.120-4.6], Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse du Québec, 
Quebec, 1999, p. 10. My translation.
22 The European Court of Human Rights succumbed, I think, to this fallacy in Lautsi and 





thinks that public officials should not be allowed to wear visible religious 
signs, an opinion voiced in parliament by the official opposition.
However, the government decided otherwise. In March 2010, it intro-
duced “Bill n°94: An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation 
requests within the Administration and certain institutions”23, that it saw as 
its main legislative response to the CCAPRCD Report and to the ongoing 
debate on secularism and reasonable accommodations. Despite the political 
rhetoric of the government, the scope of the bill is fairly limited. For the 
main part, the bill gives an explicit legislative status to already existing 
positive legal norms. Articles 1, 4 and 5, for instance, simply reaffirm the 
duty to accommodate within reasonable limits as it was already defined 
in the jurisprudence. In addition, article 4 enunciates the principle of the 
“religious neutrality” of the State, which was until then indirectly inferred 
from the rights and freedoms granted to all citizens. The element of novelty 
in the bill is contained in article 6:
6. The practice whereby a personnel member of the Administration or 
an institution and a person to whom services are being provided by the 
Administration or the institution show their face during the delivery of 
services is a general practice.
If an accommodation involves an adaptation of that practice and reasons of 
security, communication or identification warrant it, the accommodation must 
be denied.
The main target of this norm is to ban the wearing of the burqa 
and the niqab by public officials and to require women who wear such 
kinds of veils to remove them while they are transacting with a civil 
servant. The second paragraph of the article is a restatement that there 
are reasonable limits to freedom of religion, i.e., that motives related 
to security, communication and identification can justify turning down 
accommodation requests. Finally, article 7 stipulates that “the highest 
administrative authority of a department, body or institution is responsible 
for ensuring compliance with this Act”, under the final authority of the 
Minister of Justice.
One of the positive effects of this bill is that all departments and bodies 
now have a legal duty to adopt guidelines related to the management 
of religious diversity and to monitor the practices of accommodation 
and non accommodation that are taking place on the ground. However, 
many, including the official opposition, think this bill does not go far 
enough.
23 National Assembly of Quebec, 2010, Bill n° 94, An Act to establish guidelines governing 
accommodation requests within the Administration and certain institutions, [Online]: 
http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-94-39-1.html.
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Conclusion
The debate in Quebec between the competing models of secularism is 
not settled yet. The Parti Québécois, the sovereignist party which currently 
is the official opposition in the parliament, is now preparing legislation on 
laïcité – that will perhaps take the form of a charter (charte de la laïcité) 
inspired by the Charter of the French Language24. The current liberal 
government maintains that Bill 94 testifies to their endorsement of laïcité 
ouverte. This where we are now in Quebec.
One of the pending issues in the current context is that more coercive 
rules regulating religious practice could easily be challenged before the 
courts and ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada. Going 
back to the intersection between the debate over the status of Quebec 
within the Canadian federation and the debate within Quebec on religious 
diversity, such an outcome could in turn fuel the resentment against 
Canadian federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada in particular. This 
is very speculative but, if the PQ defeats the currently very unpopular 
Liberal Party in the next provincial election, the internal debate over 
secularism and religious accommodation could lead to another round of 
constitutional debate over the future of Canadian federalism.
24 R.S.Q., chapter C-11, April 2011 [2010]. The Parti Québécois formed a minority 
government in September 2012 and embarked on such a project.
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Introduction
What are the interrelations between federalism and the protection 
of human rights? Such a question arises not only in federations in the 
strict sense, but in all “compound” states that consist of two levels of 
government, each having substantial powers and enjoying true autonomy 
in relation to the other (as for example in “regionalized” countries like 
Spain or Italy). Given such a situation, each level of government can take 
positive as well as negative measures in respect to human rights: negative, 
in exercising its powers in ways that restrict the benefit of rights; positive, 
in so far as each level of government is able to adopt constitutional and 
legislative instruments aimed at protecting the enjoyment of rights. 
Thus, we shall examine in turn: (1) The effects that federalism has on the 
protection of rights and freedoms, where we shall see that the division 
of powers that characterizes federalism has mostly, albeit not only, 
beneficial consequences for the protection of the rights of individuals and 
minorities; and (2) The effects of protecting rights and freedoms through 
a national Bill of Rights and judicial review for the balance of powers 
in a federation. As we shall see, judicial review by federal courts under 
a national constitutional instrument can lead to more centralization of 
powers as well as to more legal standardization, both impinging on the 
values of federalism.
1 Reprinted, with revisions, from Requejo Ferran and Miquel Caminal (eds.), Political 
Liberalism and Plurinational Democracies, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 139-156.
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1. The Impact of Federalism on the Protection of Rights
Federalism, and more generally the compound nature of governmental 
power, furthers the protection of rights and freedoms in two different 
ways. First, from an institutional and political point of view, federalism 
divides and diffuses – and consequently limits – power, at the same 
time as it allows people to participate more actively in political affairs 
within smaller political units. In federations with national, ethnic or 
linguistic minorities, those groups large enough to form the majority of 
the population in one or several federated units will be able to attain a 
position of political majority. Secondly, from a legal point of view, by 
superposing two legal systems, federalism also allows for the existence 
of two layers of constitutional or quasi-constitutional instruments for the 
protection of human rights that will complement each other and together 
provide more comprehensive protections. However, in certain aspects the 
functioning of a federal system can also hamper the protection of rights 
and freedoms, especially in creating difficulties for the ratification and 
implementation of international human rights conventions.
A.   Institutional and Political Benefits of Federalism  
for the Protection of Rights
1. The Rights of People in General
In a broad way, the benefits of federalism for the protection of rights 
and freedoms of people in general can be epitomized by two simple 
ideas. First, by dividing power, federalism limits and diminishes power 
and thus helps to prevent its abuse. From this point of view, federalism 
functions like a second form of separation of powers that complements the 
separation between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. This 
concept, which hardly needs further elaboration, has received a classical 
exposition in a famous text by James Madison, in the Federalist Papers: 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is 
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted 
to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will 
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself2.
Secondly, by decentralizing power, federalism enhances political and 
democratic rights inasmuch as citizens can participate more effectively 
in political life within smaller political units where the locus of power 
is situated nearer to them. Federalism confers more influence to smaller 
2 Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, New York, 
New American Library, 1961, p. 323.
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groups by localizing a greater part of political authority at their level. It 
gives individuals the possibility to exercise more influence and control 
at the regional or local level than they can conceivably exercise at the 
national level. As well, by giving people the opportunity to participate in 
political affairs at more numerous levels of government, federalism helps 
to educate them in the practice of citizenship. Finally, in a federation, 
citizens have access to more than one source of governmental services and 
benefits; if one administration fails to provide a certain benefit, they can 
turn to another level of government. Thus, federalism forestalls a situation 
of monopolistic exercise of state power and, instead, creates a competition 
between different governments to the benefit of the electorate3.
However, the localization of a substantial amount of political power 
at a level that is closer to the local population can also bring negative 
consequences for the protection of rights and freedoms, by increasing the 
likelihood of tyranny by sectoral interests. A political majority is easier to 
gain and to conserve at a local rather than at the national level, thus there 
are more risks that it is appropriated by a particular faction. Conversely, 
the localization of political power at the national level is considered to 
avert the tyranny of local majorities. In a larger context, the influence of 
the many pressure groups will be better counterbalanced. The national 
government usually can keep more distance in relation to local quarrels; 
it is often in a better situation to protect regional or local minorities. At the 
same time, the centralization of power can also bring a concentration of 
power that heightens the risks of abuse. A more distant government will 
also be less responsive to the needs and wishes of citizens. In consequence, 
both centralization and decentralization of political power can result in 
negative as well as positive outcomes for the protection of rights and 
freedoms. Federalism allows for a combination of centralization and 
decentralization in proportions that vary with each particular situation.
Finally, in so far as the different governments in a federation act as 
a check upon one another, there will result a supplementary limitation 
of political power to the benefit of the citizens. As Alexander Hamilton 
wrote:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will 
at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, 
and these will have the same disposition toward the general government. 
3 Conversely in so far as federalism divides powers between two levels of government, 
its functioning demands a high degree of coordination between the federation and the 
constituent units. Coordination mechanisms are generally dominated by the executive 
branch and inadequately controlled by elected assemblies and, thus, subject to a certain 
democratic deficit. Furthermore, the complexity of intergovernmental coordination 
mechanisms creates a lack of transparency for citizens, who no longer know which 
level of government is responsible for certain decisions.
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The people by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the 
other as means of redress4.
Nonetheless, in a well-balanced federation each government must 
enjoy a sufficient autonomy in relation to the other in the use of its 
constitutional powers.
2. The Rights of Minorities
In a federal state, it is possible to adjust the political divisions of the 
territory in order to create one or more constituent units in which a group 
that is a minority nationally will form the majority regionally, and thus be 
in position to control the political institutions and power at the regional 
level. Several federal countries, like Canada, Switzerland, Belgium 
or India, have precisely chosen to become federations because it was 
considered a solution to the problems arising from the existence of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities5. Of course, this kind of arrangement is 
only available to national minorities, as distinguished from immigrant 
groups (which in any case do not claim such territorial autonomy), and is 
only possible if the national minority is large enough and concentrated on 
a given territory. Furthermore, when internal federal borders are drawn in 
order to allow a national minority to become a majority in one or more 
constituent states, this will often create new minorities within the regional 
majority6.
Another difficulty in using federalism in order to solve problems 
associated with minorities stems from the fact that the federal principle, as 
it is normally understood, does not easily admit asymmetric arrangements. 
In most multinational federations, only some constituent states, sometimes 
only one, are controlled by a national minority and thus insist on more local 
autonomy. The other constituent states, which are inhabited by the national 
majority, will more easily accept the trend toward a greater centralization 
of power at the level of the federation. A way of accommodating these 
different positions could be to accept more asymmetry in the powers 
allocated to the constituent states inhabited by a national minority, on 
the one hand, and to the states that serve as territorial subdivisions of the 
4 Ibid., paper nº 28.
5 However, in other federations like the United States, there has been a conscious effort 
to avert the possibility of federalism being used in order to allow national minorities to 
form the majority in one or several constituent units.
6 The political division of the State territory in order to create subdivisions in which 
a national minority forms the majority of the local population is also possible in 
“regional” States like Spain or Italy and even in unitary States, where certain regions 
can be given a special status, like Corsica in France or the Aaland Islands in Finland.
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national majority, on the other. However, such an asymmetry is difficult 
to reconcile with the principle of equality between the constituent states 
as well as with equality between all citizens of the federation (as long, at 
least, as equality of treatment is understood as identical treatment rather 
than different treatment according to different situations).
The reluctance to grant territorial autonomy to national minorities is 
often explained by the fear of the national majority that it will nourish 
rather than assuage separatist claims or tendencies. Another concern is 
that an ethnic or religious minority exercising a measure of territorial 
autonomy may adopt policies or rules toward its own members, or 
members of the national majority inhabiting the minority territory, that 
are incompatible with human rights like sexual equality, freedom of 
religion or freedom of opinion, to the extent that such policies might 
be considered necessary to uphold traditional institutions and ways 
of life. Finally, dividing the territory along ethnic lines produces 
more homogenous majorities and, as James Madison argued, the 
more homogenous a majority, the greater the risks that it may become 
tyrannical toward minorities:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and 
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more 
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the 
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass 
within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute 
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority 
of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each 
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there 
is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is 
always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence 
is necessary7.
To protect minorities that cannot benefit from a system of territorial 
autonomy (or “minorities within the minority” that have appeared as 
a result of such arrangements), other methods are required. Minorities 
can be given a guaranteed representation within political bodies like 
legislatures or executives; veto rights and increased or double majority 
rules can provide minorities with a protection against injurious majority 
decisions. Note, however, that such designs are not particular to federal 
systems. It is also possible to design a system of “personal federalism” 
7 Ibid., paper nº 10, pp. 68-69.
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(or “personal autonomy”) in which a minority group will be given the 
power to adopt rules whose applicability is determined by membership in 
the group based on a personal characteristic like religion or language, rather 
than on residence on a particular territory8. Again, such an arrangement is 
not limited to federal systems (even though it can be considered inspired 
by the federal principle) and one of its most interesting contemporary 
implementations is to be found in Lebanon, which is not a federation. The 
18 religious communities existing in Lebanon adopt the rules applying 
to their members in matters of marriage, divorce, adoption and other 
questions of personal and familial status. However, implementation of the 
personal autonomy principle has been quite limited in so far as modern 
democratic systems function under principles of political representation 
and criteria for the application of legal rules that are mainly based on 
considerations of territory.
One way of protecting minorities living within the constituent states 
of a federation is to give federal authorities the power to prevent, stop 
or redress the wrongs inflicted on them by the regional government. 
However, such mechanisms are difficult to reconcile with the autonomy 
that should be guaranteed in a true federation to each level of government 
in relation to the other.
Finally, the mobility and establishment rights guaranteed in the federal 
constitution constitute a last resort protection for minorities against their 
regional government. Members of a minority that are not satisfied with 
their position in their state of residence can move to another constituent 
state where the group they belong to forms the majority or, at least, where 
they can expect to be treated in a better way. It must be noted that in 
the United States this “right of exit”, which allows a change of legal 
status through a change of jurisdiction, is often considered to be one of 
the advantages of federalism for the protection of the rights of people in 
general, not only of the rights of minorities. Such a view has been put 
forward by, amongst others, Robert Bork: 
If another state allows the liberty you value, you can move there, and the 
choice of what freedom you value is yours alone, not dependent on those who 
made the Constitution. In this sense, federalism is the constitutional guarantee 
most protective of the individual’s freedom to make his own choices9.
However, the most effective means for the protection of minorities 
that cannot benefit from territorial autonomy is the use of a constitutional 
8 Kymlicka, Will, “Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance” in David Heyd (ed.), 
Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 81.
9 Bork, Robert, The Tempting of America. The Political Seduction of the Law, New York, 
Simon & Schuster, 1990, p. 53. On this aspect, see also Stewart, Richard B., “Federalism 
and Rights”, Georgia Law Review, 1985, vol. 19, nº 4, pp. 923-927.
111
Federalism and the Protection of Rights and Freedoms 
instrument, applied by the courts, in order to place limits on majority rule. 
In a federation, this protection of rights and freedoms through judicial 
review can be enhanced by superposing two levels of constitutional 
instruments for the protection of rights, be it the rights of people in general 
or the rights of minorities.
At the same time, there exists a certain tension between the protection 
of minorities by systems of territorial autonomy, on the one hand, and 
judicial review on the other. In so far as judicial review based on rights 
and freedoms limits majority rule, it will of course limit the powers, and 
hence the autonomy, of national minorities that form the majority in a 
constituent state of a federation. Such a “minority-majority” will see its 
self-rule limited in favor of its own minorities. The most difficult situation 
appears when the minority living in a unit controlled by a national 
minority belongs to the national majority (for example, Anglophones 
in Quebec, Castillanophones in Catalonia or German-speaking Swiss in 
the French-speaking cantons). Groups that are a majority in a constituent 
state but a minority nationally will often feel culturally threatened and 
thus have a tendency to use their majority position to the fullest, in order, 
for example, to protect their language. Conversely, the majority at the 
national level, whose members are in the minority in a member state, can 
use its power position to force on the regional government very stringent 
obligations toward its minority, which that government will regard as 
unduly restricting its autonomy.
In sum, national minorities forming the majority on a part of the 
federal territory will be served best by a system of territorial autonomy 
that allows them to become a political majority and exercise a partial self-
rule. Minorities too small or too scattered over the territory to be able to 
benefit from such an arrangement must be protected against majority rule 
by a constitutional instrument combined with judicial review.
B.   Legal Benefits of Federalism for the Protection of Rights: 
the Two Layers of Constitutional Instruments and  
Judicial Review
In most federations, there are two layers of constitutional or legislative 
instruments for the protection of rights and freedoms, one at the national 
level, the other at the level of the constituent states. To illustrate this 
situation, we shall use the examples of Canada and the United States. 
In Canada, all provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament have 
adopted, in their respective fields of jurisdiction, human rights statutes 
that are not entrenched through a special amendment procedure, but 
possess nonetheless a “quasi constitutional” character giving them 
a limited kind of primacy over ordinary corresponding provincial or 
federal legislation. In addition, the Canadian Constitution contains, since 
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1982, a fully entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms10. In 
the United States, the situation is similar; along with the Bill of Rights 
entrenched in the American Constitution, one finds a State Bill of Rights 
in each of the State constitutions11.
In these two federations, the state or provincial constitutional or “quasi 
constitutional” instruments often guarantee rights and freedoms that 
are not guaranteed, or not as effectively, by national instruments12. For 
example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, forming part of 
the Canadian federal Constitution, does not guarantee property rights or, 
more generally, social, economic and cultural rights, that are contained 
in some of the provincial Charters or Bills of Rights, most notably the 
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. In the United States, 
rights like the right to education are absent from the federal Constitution, 
but can be found in many of the State Constitutions.
Many other aspects of the complementarity between the Federal 
Constitution and the State constitutions in their role of protecting rights and 
freedoms have been documented in the United States13. In Canada, while the 
Canadian Charter only applies to public authorities (vertical effect), many 
of the provincial instruments apply as well to private relations (horizontal 
10 Woehrling, José, “L’actualité constitutionnelle au Canada: la superposition et la 
complémentarité des instruments constitutionnels et “quasi-constitutionnels” de 
protection des droits et libertés”, Revue française de droit constitutionnel, nº 53, 
2003, pp. 187-203; Woehrling, José, “Superposición y complementariedad de los 
instrumentos nacionales y provinciales de protección de los derechos del hombre en 
Canadá” in Miguel A. Aparicio (ed.), Derechos y libertades en los Estados compuestos, 
Barcelona, Atelier Libros juridicos, 2005, pp. 65-100.
11 Collins, Ronald K. L., “Bills and Declarations of Rights Digest” in The American Bench 
(3rd ed.), Sacramento, Reginald Bishop Forster and Associates, 1985, pp. 2483-2523.
12 In Canada, the federal Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the federal Constitution 
as well as of provincial human rights quasi-constitutional instruments and the Court 
shows a tendency to interpret both sets of instruments in a similar way, even in cases 
where there exist significant differences in their respective wording. Such an attitude 
has both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it simplifies the 
legal situation. The disadvantage is that such an attitude tends in some situations to 
diminish the complementarity of the two sets of instruments. In the United States, 
the distinctive character of the State constitutions is more accented, to the extent that 
the federal Supreme Court does not, in usual circumstances, interpret and apply these 
instruments, whose final interpreters are the State supreme courts. Nonetheless, the 
State courts are of course influenced, when interpreting State constitutions, by the case 
law of the United States Supreme Court.
13 Beasley, Dorothy Toth, “Federalism and the Protection of Individual Rights: The 
American State Constitutional Perspective” in Ellis Katz and George Allan Tarr 
(eds.), Federalism and Rights, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996, 
pp. 101-118; Howard, A. E. Dick, “Protecting Human Rights in a Federal System” in 
Mark V. Tushnet (ed.), Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America, 
New York, Greenwood Press, 1990, pp. 115-137.
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effect). In a more general way, Canadian provinces and American States can 
experiment in the protection of human rights (as in any other area in which 
they have jurisdiction), with successful experimentation often adopted 
by other states or provinces and by the federal government. For example, 
Quebec was the first jurisdiction in Canada to prohibit discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, resulting in the eventual adoption of this initiative by 
the federal government and by the other provinces.
The role of provincial and state instruments in complementing 
national constitutional instruments is enhanced by the fact that the 
former can generally be modified much more easily than the latter, which 
makes them more adaptable to changing social problems and needs. In 
Canada, the provincial quasi-constitutional human rights instruments 
can be amended like ordinary legislation. In the United States, though 
the amendment of State constitutions requires a special procedure, it is 
still much easier than the modification of the Federal constitution14. The 
introduction of new rights by amendments to the Canadian or American 
Constitutions that have failed will sometimes succeed at the level of 
the state and provincial instruments. For example, after the failure of 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the United States, which would 
have added to the Constitution a provision guaranteeing sex equality in a 
more specific way, a similar provision has been adopted by more than half 
the American States in their own constitutions.
Furthermore, if for any reason there appears a deficit in the protection 
of certain rights and freedoms at one level of government, this can be 
compensated for at the other level. Such a phenomenon (which has been 
designated the “New Judicial Federalis”) occurred in the United States in 
the 1970s, when the American Supreme Court adopted a less favorable 
construction of the rights of those accused of criminal offences. State 
courts later developed a more robust defense of these rights under the 
State human rights instruments15 16.
14 May, Janice C., “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited”, Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, vol. 17, nº 1, 1987, pp. 153-179.
15 Tarr, George Allan, “The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism”, Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, vol. 24, nº 2, 1994, pp. 63-79; D’Alemberte, Talbot, “Rights and 
Federalism: An Agenda to Advance the Vision of Justice Brennan” in Ellis Katz and 
George Allan Tarr, Federalism and Rights, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1996, pp. 123-138; Brennan, William, “State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Right”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 90, nº 3, 1997, pp. 489-504.
16 Of course, state level reforms are not necessarily uniformly progressive. For example, 
with respect to same-sex relationships, while some U.S. states provide some level of 
recognition for such relationships, the vast majority of the states have made efforts to 
prohibit the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. See Knauer Nancy J., “Same-
Sex Marriage and Federalism”, Temple Journal of Political and Civil Rights Law Review, 
vol. 17, nº 2, 2008, pp. 101-122.
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It is inevitable that the existence of a double layer of national and 
State instruments will create some fragmentation in the benefits of rights 
and freedoms along state lines. Nevertheless, the federal Constitution 
guarantees a degree of homogeneity, since federal rights apply to the 
whole territory. Of course, the state or provincial instruments must be 
compatible with the federal Constitution, which in some cases means that 
they must provide at least the same protection in their particular field of 
application. For example, the Alberta Human Rights Act, which applies 
both in private relations and to state action but did not prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination, has been declared contrary to the Canadian 
Charter that does prohibit that kind of discrimination but applies only 
to state action and not in private relations. Instead of striking down the 
provincial statute, the Supreme Court of Canada decided to “read in” the 
missing protection, which means that the federal Constitution was used to 
impose upon the Alberta legislature the obligation to protect homosexuals 




Implementation of Human Rights Treaties
Federalism does not only result in positive effects on the protection of 
rights and freedoms. The existence of a double layer of national and state 
or provincial human rights instruments provokes legal complexities that 
burden citizens as well as legal professionals (in particular when it involves 
an assessment of which of the several instruments is applicable). That 
same double layer exacerbates the legalization of politics that is probably 
the most regrettable consequence of the generalization of judicial review 
based on human rights. Social actors have a growing tendency to resort to 
constitutional provisions in order to formulate their political claims in terms 
of rights to be respected or won (i.e. they legalize the issue by formulating 
political claims in legal and constitutional terms). Many special interest 
groups now avoid democratic mechanisms, which they consider too 
unwieldy or costly, and find it easier to submit their requests to the courts 
by reformulating them in the language of rights and freedoms18.
The most important disadvantage of federalism for the protection 
of human rights is that it seriously complicates the ratification and 
17 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S. C. R. 493.
18 Woehrling, José, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its Consequences 
on Political and Democratic Life and the Federal System” in Alain-G. Gagnon (ed.), 
Contemporary Canadian Federalism: Foundations, Traditions, Institutions, Toronto, 
Toronto University Press, 2009, pp. 224-249.
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implementation, by federal states, of international instruments for 
the protection of human rights. By its very nature, federalism divides 
powers between two levels of government. Conversely, international law 
presupposes the unity of state action in international relations and requires 
coherent and uniform conduct by the national government. Therefore, the 
risk is great that if the federation is granted all the needed authority to 
act effectively in the international area, the exercise of these powers will 
threaten to disrupt the internal division of responsibilities (by opening a 
channel for the national government to invade the states’ jurisdictions). 
Most of the matters coming under the jurisdiction of the constituent states, 
in particular those involving human rights, are at the present time subject 
to international treaties.
These difficulties exist in almost all federations, irrespective of the 
particular solutions that have been adopted in regards to the relationship 
between international and domestic law, or to the division of powers 
between the federation and the constituent states in the matter of ratification 
and implementation of treaties. Canada, Belgium and the United States are 
good examples because these three federations cover a good part of all the 
possible situations. The United States and Belgium have adopted a monist 
system and recognize direct application of international conventions by 
domestic courts as well as a certain degree of supremacy of international 
law over domestic law. Canada, on the contrary, is a dualist country, 
where a treaty is only applicable by Canadian courts after it has been 
incorporated in domestic law and can have no higher authority than 
the incorporating statute. In the United States, the central government 
possesses all the powers necessary to ratify and to implement treaties, 
irrespective of their subject matter. In Belgium, the power to ratify as 
well as the power to implement treaties is divided between the federation 
and the constituent states along the internal division of powers. Finally, 
in Canada there is no such alignment between the power to ratify and the 
power to implement, as the federal executive holds the power to ratify any 
treaty, irrespective of the subject matter, while the power to implement, on 
the contrary, is divided between the federal parliament and the provincial 
legislatures along the internal division of powers.
In Canada, the absence of any power of the federal government 
to force provinces to implement a treaty which it has ratified, or to 
substitute for the provinces to this end, explains the risk that a duly 
ratified treaty will not be implemented, with such a situation engaging 
the international responsibility of the Canadian State. In rare cases, 
the Canadian government has simply abstained from ratifying a 
human rights treaty to avoid any complications likely to arise from an 
anticipated negative attitude of the provinces (this has been the case for 
the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education). But in 
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most instances the federal government will conclude a federal-provincial 
agreement before the ratification, in which the provinces agree to fulfill 
their responsibility at the implementation stage. In return, provincial 
governments are associated in various ways in the negotiations. For 
example, such a procedure was followed in 1976 for the ratification and 
implementation of the two United Nations Human Rights Covenants. At 
that time, a more general federal-provincial agreement was also concluded, 
under which there is to be ongoing consultation and cooperation between 
the two levels of government, before as well as after the ratification of 
human rights conventions. Under this agreement, the provinces are able 
to prepare their specific part of the Canadian report to the monitoring 
agencies and are allowed, if they so wish, to have a representative on the 
Canadian delegation when the report is examined. Moreover, they can 
also defend their policies when these are attacked before an international 
body like the United Nations Human Rights Committee. However, some 
difficulties remain. If a province is found by the Committee to have 
adopted a policy contrary to the Pact and refuses to amend it, the federal 
government has no recourse to compel it to act or to substitute its own 
policy over that of the provincial authorities19.
In Belgium, the power to ratify as well as the power to implement 
treaties has been divided between the federation and the constituent units 
along the internal division of powers. In the case of a “mixed” treaty, 
whose subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of both levels, agreement 
by both is necessary. Such a requirement will of course cause difficulties 
when the interests of the federated entities diverge, as is presently the case 
with the attempted ratification by Belgium of the Framework Convention 
on the Protection of National Minorities prepared by the Council of 
Europe. At the implementation stage, the Belgian Constitution provides 
for a power of temporary substitution of the constituent units by the 
federation when such an action is needed to implement a ratified treaty. 
However, in order to respect the units’ autonomy, rigorous conditions 
have to be fulfilled before this power can be used. The Belgian situation 
thus illustrates the fact that the existence of a power of the federation to 
compel the constituent states to implement a treaty or to substitute for 
them does not remove all difficulties, nor does it dispense the two levels 
of government from the necessity to cooperate20. 
Finally, in the United States there appear to be no legal difficulties 
in the field of international treaty relations, since the Constitution, as 
19 Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, Scarborough, Thomson-Carswell, 
2003, pp. 285 and ff.
20 Lejeune, Yves, “La conduite des relations internationales” in Francis Delpérée (ed.), 
La Belgique fédérale, Brussels, Bruylant, 1994, pp. 313-355.
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interpreted by the Supreme Court, gives the federal authorities the power 
to ratify as well as to implement all treaties, irrespective of their subject 
matter. However, serious problems have appeared on a political level21. 
For many complex reasons, including the fear that the treaty power 
could be used by the federal government to invade the jurisdiction of the 
States, the Senate, whose approbation is necessary for the ratification of 
treaties by the President, has blocked or delayed the ratification of many 
important human rights conventions or has approved such a ratification 
only after having imposed reservations, understandings and declarations 
(“RUD’s”) that diminish considerably the importance of the treaty in its 
application to the United States. One of the most striking examples of 
such a situation has been the ratification of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, for which the Senate has imposed a set of 
restrictive clauses, in particular a “federal understanding” under which 
the Covenant “shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the 
extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments, to the 
extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such 
matters […]”. Of course, this clause does not diminish the international 
obligations of the United States under the Covenant, but it conveys the 
concern that the exercise by the federal government of its treaty powers 
should not disturb the internal division of powers nor diminish the 
autonomy of the States in exercising their jurisdictions. It is striking to 
note that actual practice in Canada and the United States is comparable 
even if the legal situation is very different, partly because federalism 
concerns are the same in the two countries.
One can thus conclude that federalism inevitably entails some com-
plications for the ratification and implementation of treaties in general 
and human rights treaties in particular. However, like other problems 
deriving from the division of powers in a federation, these difficulties can 
be overcome by negotiation and cooperation between the federation and 
the constituent states and, in any case, are not an excuse for not respecting 
the mutual autonomy of the two levels of government. Respect for human 
rights should not justify a lack of respect for federalism.
21 Bradley, Curtis A. and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional 
Consent”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 149, nº 2, 2000, pp. 399-468; 
Henkin, Louis, “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 89, nº 2, 1995, pp. 341-350; 
Buergenthal, Thomas, “Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 36, nº 1-2, 1997, pp. 211-223.
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2. The Impact of the Protection of Rights on Federalism
Judicial review by federal courts under a national Charter of rights 
can lead to more centralization of powers as well as to more legal 
uniformity or standardization, with both contradicting some of the 
objectives pursued through federalism. Centralization consists in a 
transfer of powers from the federated states towards a federal body; it 
is antagonistic to the autonomy of the federated states. Standardization 
involves imposition, by the courts, of uniform values that limit the ability 
of the federated states to adopt differing policies; it compromises federal 
diversity.
A. Centralizing Effect of the Protection of Rights
The centralizing consequences of the protection of rights take three 
main forms.
1. Transfer of Some Decisional Power from Representative 
Bodies of the Federated States to Federal Judicial Bodies
Protection of rights by the federal courts implies a transfer of 
decision-making power over social, economic and political issues from 
representative provincial bodies to a federal judicial body. This implies 
a double deficit, first in terms of democracy, secondly in terms of 
federalism. As a federal body, the Supreme Court (or the Constitutional 
Court) is more sensitive to the priorities and concerns of the federal 
political class and elites than to those of the federated states. Natural 
and institutional links exist between the members of the Supreme 
Court and federal political office holders; they share the same political 
culture. This is even truer in Canada than in the United States and other 
federations. The Canadian federal executive has complete discretion to 
appoint members of the Supreme Court without any real input from 
the provincial governments. In contrast, in the United States as well 
as in most other federations, the federated states can exercise such 
influence through the Senate (or Federal Chamber), which participates 
in the appointment of members of the Supreme or Constitutional court. 
Studies show that in federated or regionalized states, Supreme and 
Constitutional Courts almost always exercise a centralizing influence, 
and foster a long-term increase in the political legitimacy and powers of 
the national government22.
22 Bzedra, André, “Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of 
Judicial Review”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 26, nº 1, 1993, pp. 3-29; 
Shapiro, Martin, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 20.
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2. Consolidation of National Identity to the Detriment of 
Regional Identities
Protection of rights through the federal constitution and the federal 
courts helps to create and consolidate a shared national identity or, in 
other words, a feeling of common citizenship. Such nation-building 
is almost necessarily at the expense of identification with the regional 
community in the constituent state. Systems for the protection of rights 
through a national constitution and the federal courts are thus powerful 
tools for unifying mentalities and loyalties. This then facilitates the 
centralization of power. It is in this perspective that there is a relatively 
widely shared opinion that in 1982 one of the primary objectives of 
the Canadian Charter was nation-building: the establishment of an 
institution that would help to consolidate Canadian identity and the 
legitimacy of the central government, and thus foster centralization of 
power23. 
It is generally agreed that the Canadian Charter created new civic 
awareness, among Canadians, based on rights entitlement claims and 
expression of identity articulated at the national level rather than regionally 
or provincially24. This role of the federal constitution as an instrument of 
nation-building has also been noted in the United States, where it can be 
argued “that, rather than the American nation’s creating the Constitution, 
the Constitution created the nation”25.
3. Economic and Social Rights as Justification for Federal 
Intervention in Jurisdictions of the Federated States
In many federations, economic and social rights (i.e., primarily health 
care, social services and education rights) are used to justify federal 
intervention in areas under the jurisdiction of the federated states. Federal 
intervention is presented as necessary to redistribute resources among 
regions with different levels of wealth and to ensure a degree of uniformity 
in the way states deliver social services. Although economic and social 
rights are not formally guaranteed in many federal constitutions, like 
those of Canada and the United States, the need to implement such rights 
23 Russell, Peter H., “The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms”, Canadian Bar Review, vol. 16, nº 1, 1983, pp. 30-54; Cairns, Alan C., 
Charter versus Federalism, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1992.
24 Morton, F. L., “The Effects of the Charter of Rights on Canadian Federalism”, Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism, vol. 25, nº 3, 1995, pp. 173-188.
25 Howard, A. E. Dick, “Does Federalism Secure or Undermine Rights?” in Ellis Katz and 




effectively and consistently is an argument used in political discourse to 
justify the redistributive, harmonizing role of federal authorities. In other 
words, individual rights discourse has been transposed into the domain of 
collective social rights and redistribution to provide legitimacy for federal 
intervention.
The vehicle for federal intervention is the spending power, which 
refers to the ability of federal authorities to employ financial resources 
for purposes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federated states. 
The federal government has greater capacity than the states to raise and 
spend funds. By offering to provide all or part of the funding of programs 
under the jurisdiction of the states, and by attaching conditions on the 
receipt of such money, the federal government is able to intervene in 
areas under constitutionally exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Federal 
funding is generally conditional on compliance with certain national 
standards set by the central government. In many federations, like the 
United States and Canada, the federal spending power has thus been used 
to encourage constituent states to create or expand major shared-cost 
programs in the fields of education, health care and social assistance. 
On the positive side, the spending power has allowed the federal 
government to persuade the states or provinces to provide important 
services to the population and to secure nation-wide standards of health, 
education, income-security and other public services. On the negative 
side, the use of the spending power can be viewed as disturbing the 
priorities of the states or provinces and undermining their autonomy. 
An additional criticism of this system is that it creates confusion with 
respect to accountability for budgetary and political decisions: the real 
decisions are no longer made by the local political authorities who 
answer to their constituencies.
To summarize, in this area the problem stems from the opposition 
between protecting the autonomy of the federated states and the 




One of the objectives of federalism is to promote legal, social and 
cultural diversity. In their areas of jurisdiction, federated states should 
be allowed to create different solutions to societal problems by taking 
into account the cultural values specific to each regional political 
community. Yet protecting rights through national constitutional 
instruments and the courts has standardizing effects that are obstacles 
to such diversity.
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1. Why Rights Protection Results in Standardization:  
a Transcendental and Pre-Political Conception of Rights
The reason rights result in standardization is the way their philosophical 
nature is perceived: they are considered universal and transcendental 
(pre-political), particularly in the case of liberal individual rights. The 
very concept of “fundamental” rights implies that they have to apply to 
everyone in the same way, with no or very few exceptions. Construed in 
this way, all variations look like unacceptable forms of relativism26. Yet 
this vision corresponds to only one aspect of the real nature of human 
rights. In many respects, human rights necessarily result from weighing 
and balancing interests, which is a process that is largely contingent on 
context and can legitimately vary over time and from one country or 
regional context to the next. The logic of a fundamental right is partly 
dictated by the community’s social, cultural and political values.
If we define rights as resulting from balancing interests through a 
democratic process in a concrete social and political situation, it seems 
advantageous to be able to adjust the solution to the specific context. 
Federalism promotes this kind of diversity. On the contrary, if we tend 
to define rights as intangible universals, they have to be applied in a 
uniform way by the courts. In this case, federalism is an obstacle because 
it necessarily results in different legal regimes and some fragmentation of 
the system of rights.
2. Legal and Political Aspects of Standardization  
Resulting From Rights Protection
On the legal level, the standardizing consequences of rights 
protection take well-known forms. The courts, in particular the Supreme 
or Constitutional Court, impose uniform norms and standards on 
the federated states, which limit their choices when exercising their 
constitutional jurisdictions. Every time a legislation of a federated state 
is declared unconstitutional, the same automatically applies to the other 
states. We can thus speak of negative standardization. Standardization can 
26 “The idea of justice connotes consistency in the law, the notion that all citizens should 
envoy the same rights” (Howard, ibid., p. 11). “Proponents of federalism who suppose 
that rights should be permitted to vary among the units of a federal system must be 
prepared to reckon with the power of this concept of justice” (Howard, ibid., p. 23).
 “What counts as fundamental rights may differ, and what is deemed the appropriate 
agent for enforcement of rights may also differ. But to the extent that our rights are 
portrayed in transcendent, universal terms, they demand a consistency that can only 
be satisfied by constitutional nationalism” (Jacobsohn, Gary Jeffrey, “Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory, Federalism, and the Protection of Rights” in Ellis Katz and 




also be more invasive. It is well known that Supreme and Constitutional 
Courts often hand down “constructive” decisions in which they set out 
in great detail how the legislature should amend legislation to make 
it consistent with the Constitution. Sometimes courts go so far as to 
write new legislation themselves by judicially rephrasing the impugned 
legislative provision (adding to it or deleting part of it). In such cases, 
the courts impose positive uniform standards, sometimes down to minute 
details, on all the federated states27.
The standardizing consequences of rights protection can exist even 
without any court intervention, through state governments adjusting their 
policies to be compatible with rights and freedoms in an anticipated and 
preventive way. Observations in Canada show that, at the drafting stage, 
primary or delegated legislation is often modified or outright abandoned 
because it is considered as possibly incompatible with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms28. The same phenomenon has been 
observed in the United States29. This kind of internal constitutional 
scrutiny being subject to circulation and imitation among the federated 
states has also standardizing consequences.
3. Means of Attenuating the Standardizing Consequences  
of Rights Protection
Courts are aware of the potential standardizing effect of human 
rights protection and in some cases try to reduce those effects in order 
to protect the diversity goals pursued through federalism. For example, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has established that the very diversity of 
provincial legal regimes, originating from the fact that provinces exercise 
their constitutional powers in different ways, cannot be considered to be 
discrimination based on place of residence, unless the federal system is to 
be abandoned altogether. The Court also accepts geographical variations 
27 A well-known illustration is to be found in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the 
United States Supreme Court not only invalidated, directly or indirectly, the abortion 
statutes of a majority of states, but imposed upon all the states a very detailed judge-
made regime. In this case, intervention by the Court had the effect of “federalizing” 
a problem that was traditionally legislated by the states (criminal law being a state 
responsibility in the United States). Conversely, in Canada the decision of the Supreme 
Court in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 R.C.S. 30, in striking down the abortion section 
of the federal Criminal Code (criminal law being a federal responsibility in Canada), 
had the effect of “provincializing” the field, which is now legislated by the provinces 
as relating to medical care.
28 Monahan, Patrick J. and Marie Finkelstein, “The Charter of Rights and Public Policy 
in Canada”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 30, nº 3, 1992, pp. 501-546.
29 Tushnet, Mark, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumi-
nation of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty”, Michigan Law Review, vol. 94, nº 2, 1995, 
pp. 245-301.
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in the application of federal laws, as long as these can be justified by 
the interaction between federal and provincial powers and the necessity 
for the federal Parliament to take into account the diversity of provincial 
legislation.
There are further ways to attenuate the standardizing consequences 
of rights and freedom protection. However, in order to use them, one has 
to be persuaded that a degree of relativism is acceptable in human rights.
First, adopting a less demanding interpretation of a right or freedom 
leaves greater leeway with respect to how the right is ensured. For example, 
it might be accepted that the principle of state religious neutrality could 
be complied with either by total absence of state support for religions 
or by perfectly equal support for all religions. If this interpretation were 
accepted, the federated states would have a choice between two policies 
that would both be equally in compliance with the Constitution; a degree 
of diversity would remain possible. However, if the neutrality principle 
were interpreted as requiring total absence of state support in all cases, 
only one solution would be possible and, consequently, standardization 
would be imposed on the constituent states. Thus some partisans of 
maximum protection for rights and freedoms distrust federalism because 
defence of diversity leads those in favour of federalism to request flexible 
application of rights and freedoms. The same consideration appears in the 
case law under the European Convention on Human Rights. The European 
Court recognizes a “margin of appreciation” to the member-states so as to 
allow a diversity of national solutions. Critics of this concept consider it 
to diminish the protection of rights30.
Second, the standardizing effects of rights protection can be attenuated 
through the criteria applied when limitations to rights are examined 
for justification purposes. The primary criterion for justification is the 
concept of proportionality: a limitation is justifiable if it is proportional 
to important goals of social interest. Yet, the proportionality criterion is 
normally applied in a “context-dependent” way, in other words, by taking 
into account the variables of the specific spatial and temporal context. 
A limitation that would be unreasonable in a normal situation could 
appear reasonable under exceptional circumstances; a limit could be 
considered reasonable in circumstances specific to one federated state, 
but nowhere else in the federation. Thus, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled in a well-known case that the vulnerability of 
the French language in Quebec justified some limitations on freedom of 
commercial expression31. Without saying so explicitly, it implied that the 
30 Mahoney, Paul, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?”, 
Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 5-6.
31 Ford v. Québec (A.G.) [1988], 2 S.C.R. 712.
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same measures would not be justified with respect to English in the rest 
of Canada. This approach thus makes it possible for the scope of rights 
to vary in accordance with the limitations that can be imposed on them 
in certain specific contexts. Theoretically, this is a technique that could 
make it possible to reconcile a degree of universality in rights content 
with a degree of diversity in concrete application. However, it seems 
likely that the courts will accept variations in the scope of rights only 
in exceptional cases. This is because the implementation of criteria for 
justifying rights infringements inevitably results in a comparison between 
the challenged policy and policies adopted in the same area by other free 
and democratic societies. When the challenged policy is federal, the 
criteria for comparison will be sought mainly in comparative law and 
international human rights instruments, since they are considered a kind 
of synthesis of national rights protection systems. When the challenged 
policy is that of a federated state, the comparison will most often be 
with the law of other states in the federation. The greater the consistency 
among the various state legislations, the more difficult it will be to justify 
the challenged measure if it deviates from the common denominator 
among the states.
In summary, despite the fact that constitutional law contains a number 
of techniques that make it possible to introduce a degree of relativism 
into the scope of rights and freedoms, protection of such rights through 
the constitutional and judicial process will inevitably have standardizing 
results. The universal, individualistic logic of rights is too powerful 
for concerns related to federalism and diversity to be able to oppose it 
effectively.
Conclusion
Federalism’s greatest merit is that it promotes community values. 
Yet, just as community values regress before individualism and personal 
autonomy, federalism loses strength when faced with individual rights. 
The “rights consumer” takes the place of the deliberating citizen. When 
rights are seen as resulting from a process in which interests are weighed 
and opposing claims adjusted in a democratic manner, federalism is 
an advantage because it promotes participation and thus rights can be 
expressed, made concrete and adjusted in accordance with the political 
communities sharing a geographic area. However, when rights are seen as 
resulting from restriction of the democratic process through anti-majority 
mechanisms, federalism appears threatening in some respects, for it is at 
the local level that majorities seem most dangerous. Moreover, if rights are 
pre-political and transcendental, they will be by definition universal and 
it will be very difficult for them to vary from one jurisdiction to another.
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Rights Beyond the State
The European Union  
and the European Court of Human Rights
Ascensión elvira
Professor of Constitutional Law, Carlos III University  
of Madrid, Madrid
Introduction
In internal law, Spain has two catalogues of rights: one derived 
from the Spanish Constitution and the other from various “Estatutos de 
Autonomía”1. The Constitution defines rights as “fundamental rights”, 
whereas rights in the “Estatutos” are not referred to as fundamental. 
However, among the seventeen Autonomous Communities, only those 
that have amended their “Estatutos” over the last few years have actually 
formulated such a category of rights. Like other Member States of the 
European Union, Spain is also subject to a single international system for 
the protection of rights – the European Convention for the protection of 
Human Rights (ECHR) – as well as supranational protection represented 
by European Union legislation2.
The ECHR is an international instrument, which was created to protect 
human rights in European democratic states following World War II; it 
differs from other international instruments due to its judicial arm – the 
1 The “Estatutos de Autonomía” outline the “basic institutional rule” of each Autonomous 
Community (Art. 147.1 Spanish Constitution). These rules hold a unique position in the 
hierarchy of legal sources, due to their role in implementing constitutional provisions, 
with the formal particularity of combining both the will of the State, manifested 
through approval by Parliament, and the will of the Assembly of each Autonomous 
Community, with the possibility of consulting the local population in certain cases.
2 There is abundant bibliography on the European Convention and European Union rights, 
including the bibliographical references made herein. See also Elvira Perales, Ascensión, 
“Los relaciones entre Tribunales en la Unión Europea”, in F. Javier Matia Portilla (ed.), 
Pluralidad territorial, nuevos derechos y garantias, Granada Comores, 2012, pp. 57-78.
Negotiating Diversity
126
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – which acts as a guarantee 
against the state’s breach of individual human rights3. Despite its minimal 
content, the ECHR has been complemented with various Protocols and, 
most importantly, with the ECtHR’s judgments. This case law has not 
only provided protection for individuals against a State’s infringement of 
rights, but has also served to reinterpret many rights.
All Member States undertake to abide by the final judgment of the 
Court in any litigation involving them, and the Committee of Ministers 
ensures enforcement (Art. 46 ECHR)4. The ECtHR’s decisions have 
a double effect: a direct one, where the State in breach must repair the 
damage and adopt the necessary measures to avoid future infringements 
in similar cases; and a general hermeneutic effect, which is valid for the 
States and the EU (see below). 
Spain ratified the Convention in 1979 soon after the democratic 
Constitution of 1978 was approved, consolidating Spain’s status as 
a democratic State that guaranteed the rule of law. By the year 2009, 
78 cases had been decided by the ECtHR (5,603 cases were declared 
inadmissible) and the State was found guilty in 50 cases, most of them 
related to Article 6 (due process of law), as used to be the case in many 
Western European countries. A positive balance may be concluded from 
the foregoing.
The European Union represents the other supranational system. At 
the time Spain joined the European Community (January 1986)5, the 
Court of Justice had developed a long-standing practice of establishing 
fundamental rights as a general principle of Community law, based on 
3 “The Strasbourg Regime, as construed by the ECtHR, constitutes the most advanced 
and effective regional human rights regime in the world” (Harpaz, Guy, “The European 
Court of Justice and its relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The quest 
for enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy”, Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 46, 2009, p. 106).
4 Protocol number 14 aimed at achieving better enforceability: “3. If the Committee 
of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a final judgment is 
hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the 
Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral decision shall require 
a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. 
4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to 
abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal 
notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two thirds of the 
representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, refer to the Court the question whether 
that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph 1. 5. If the Court finds 
an infringement of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers 
for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no infringement of 
paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, which shall close its 
examination of the case.”
5 Act of Adhesion of Spain and Portugal (August 1985).
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the common constitutional traditions of the Member States. Right after, it 
established protection under the ECHR, to which all the Member States 
of the European Community were signatories. It is a well-known fact 
that the original European Treaties omitted a catalogue of human rights, 
due to their prevailing economic purpose and the difficulties in reaching 
a consensus. Nevertheless, between the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Stauder, 1969; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970; Nold, 1974), 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) began to uphold the rights involved 
in these cases, mainly as a way of preserving the primacy of Community 
law (one of the principles, together with the principle of direct effect, 
created by the Court of Luxembourg as one of the grounds of European 
law). It would have been difficult to preserve the supremacy of European 
law before domestic courts (particularly the Constitutional Courts6 or 
Supreme Courts) without upholding the human rights already protected 
by internal laws. By the time Spain had joined the European Community 
the Court had guaranteed various rights, some of which seemed unrelated 
to the purpose of European law: property rights or non-discrimination, 
though also including due process of law, freedom of expression, religious 
rights, etc7.
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU 1992, Art. 6) enshrined the 
European Union’s commitment to human rights, albeit with a generic 
reference, but expressly recognised the protection granted by the Court 
of Justice. The TEU also created European citizenship and its inherent 
rights: freedom of movement and residence, etc., suggesting the creation 
of a new class of rights for the nationals of Member States. This reference 
6 The Italian Constitutional Court (183/76 and 232/94) and German Constitutional 
Court had proclaimed the supremacy of internal law in relation to the protection of 
fundamental rights. Of significance are the German Constitutional Court’s decisions 
in the Solange I (1974) and II (1986) cases, Maastricht (1993), Banana (2000) 
and Lisbon (2009), indicating the limits or conformity of German law with EU 
Law and the protection of rights granted by the ECJ. All these decisions indicated 
the discussions being held between EU Member States. For a good analysis of the 
relationship between the ECJ and Constitutional or Supreme Courts, see Mayer, Franz 
C., “Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction” in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast 
(eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd ed.), Oxford, München, Hart 
Publishing, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2010, pp. 399-439; Baquero Cruz, Julio, “Cooperación, 
competencia, deferencia: La interacción entre el Tribunal de Justicia y los Tribunales 
constitucionales en el ámbito de los derechos fundamentales” in José María Beneyto 
Pérez (ed.), Tratado de Derecho y Políticas de la Unión Europea. Tomo II. Derechos 
Fundamentales, Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters, Cizur Minor, 2009, pp. 119-160.
7 Property: Nold, C-4/73, J. 14 May 1974; Hauer, C-44/79, J. 13 December 1979; 
Wachauf, C-5/88, J. 13 July 1989; non-discrimination: Defrenne, C-149/77, J. 15 June 
1977; Hayes, C-323/94, J. 20 March 1997; due process: Johnston, C-222/1984, J. 15 
May 1986; freedom of expression: Familiapress, C-368/95, J. 26 July 1997; freedom 
of religion: Prais, C-130/75, J. 27 October 1976.
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to guaranteed rights was followed by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties8. 
In December 2000, during the summit of Nice, the European Charter of 
Rights was solemnly proclaimed, a European catalogue of rights drawn 
up by a “Convention” consisting of representatives from European and 
State institutions9. Although the Charter was not binding, it would 
eventually become a reference for European Institutions. Some authors 
have even indicated that since 2000 the ECJ has taken a more serious 
approach towards fundamental rights10. Advocate General Kokott 
pointed out that “[w]hile the Charter still does not produce binding legal 
effects comparable to primary law, it does, as a material legal source, shed 
light on the fundamental rights which are protected by the Community 
legal order”11. The Advocates General were the ones who first referred 
to the Charter, then came the First Instance Court and, finally, the Court 
of Justice itself12. The Charter has also served as a reference for state 
8 The current wording of Art. 6 TEU provides as follows:
 “1.  The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.
 The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the 
Union as defined in the Treaties.
 The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance 
with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation 
and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, 
that set out the sources of those provisions.
 2.  The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s 
competences as defined in the Treaties.
 3.  Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law.”
9 Two issues are usually highlighted with respect to the Convention: (i) the significant 
participation of members of both the European and national parliaments, reinforcing its 
democratic nature; and (ii) the transparent nature of its activity, permanently updated 
on a website, and feedback meetings with individuals or NGOs.
10 Cartabia, Marta, “‘Taking Dialogue Seriously’. The Renewed Need for a Judicial 
Dialogue at the Time of Constitutional Activism in the European Union”, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper, 12/07, pp. 13-14.
11 Advocate General Kokott in case C-540/03, para. 108.
12 GA Tizzano, Bectu, C-173/99; GA Jacobs, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA), 
C-50/00. CFI: max.mobil Telekommunikation/Commission, 30 January 2002, T-54/99; 
Jégo Quere, J. 3 May 2002, T-177/01; ECJ: Parlement/Conseil, J. 27 June 2006, 
C-540/03; Unibet C-432/05, J. 13 March 2005, right of judicial appeal; Advocate voor 
de Wereld, J. 3 May 2007, C-303/05, rule of law and principle of non-discrimination; 
Laval un Partneri, J. 18 December 2007, C-341/05, collective bargaining agreement.
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institutions. In Spain, the Charter was invoked by the Constitutional Court 
(even before its proclamation13) and by ordinary courts14. 
The Treaty of Lisbon15, which came into force on 1 December 2009, 
turned the Charter into a binding instrument. In this new scenario, only 
a conjecture is possible. The Charter “provides the Court with both a 
more solid and complete fundamental rights framework and a reinforced 
legitimacy in addressing the action of the Council”16 and it becomes “a 
basic element from the body of Union ‘primary’ norms, meaning Union 
constitutional norms”17. We agree with Cartabia, when she states that 
the Charter is “undoubtedly a turning point”18, despite the fact that, in 
terms of its content, the Charter merely collects rights already protected 
by the case-law further to the constitutional traditions shared by Member 
States and principles of Community law. In turn, the new Charter entails 
“a substantial upgrade in the status of human rights in Union law. If 
Art. 47 of the Charter is taken seriously, it will be much more difficult 
to tolerate gaps in the EU system of protection of any rights, including 
human rights”19.
The Charter does not attribute any new competences to the European 
Union. The States have been reassured that the Charter is not an indirect 
measure towards Union federalization, nor does it enable the Court of 
Justice to assume more power or to become a supra-constitutional Court. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice can strengthen its role as a rights 
guarantor.
The Charter affects European institutions, bodies and their agents, and 
State authorities and their agents, in the application of European law.
13 Constitutional Court Judgment 292/2000, of 30 November.
14 Andrés Sáenz de Santa María, Paz, “La Carta Europea de los Derechos Fundamentales 
en la Práctica Española”, Revista de Derecho de la Unión Europea, nº 15, 2008, 
pp. 233-254; Alonso García, Ricardo and Daniel Sarmiento, La Carta de los derechos 
fundamentales de la Unión Europea, Thomson-Civitas, Cizur Minor, 2006.
15 The current version of the Charter reflects the update that followed the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007, OJ C303/1. 
Reissued in 2010, OJ C/83/2.
16 Poiares Maduro, Miguel, “The double constitutional life of the Charter or Fundamental 
Rights” in Natividad Fernández Sola, Unión Europea y derechos fundamentales en 
perspectiva constitucional, Madrid, Dykinson, 2004, p. 303.
17 Grossot, Xavier and Laurent Pech, “La protection des droits fondamentaux dans 
l’Union européenne après le traité de Lisbonne”, Questions d’Europe, Fondation 
Robert Schuman, nº 173, p. 4.
18 Cartabia, op. cit., p. 6.
19 Leczykiewicz, Dorota, “Effective judicial protection of human rights after Lisbon: 
Should national courts be empowered to review EU secondary Law?”, European Law 
Review, vol. 35, 2010, p. 334.
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The Charter is a comprehensive instrument20: it contains the standard 
rights of a modern catalogue, albeit closely related to the European 
Union’s purposes and freedoms (e.g. freedom of property, circulation and 
residence), including others that can potentially be affected by European 
law or institutions (e.g. freedom of expression, due process of law, etc.
et). However, it also contains rights that are apparently far removed from 
the scope of European Union action, such as the prohibition of the death 
penalty or inhumane punishment. There are two reasons why these rights 
have been introduced: (i) to prohibit this type of punishment or to protect 
the relevant rights when the States apply European law; and (ii) the 
Charter will act as a parameter for the obligatory fulfilment of European 
rights, and any non-fulfilment may trigger the mechanism foreseen in Art. 
7 TEU21.
Nevertheless, please note that Art. 6 TEU does not merely endow the 
Charter with legal value but continues to refer to constitutional traditions, 
shared by Member States, that are treated as general principles of Union 
20 Rights are divided into six chapters: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizen’s 
rights and Justice
21 1.  On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European 
Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of 
four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, 
may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of 
the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council 
shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, 
acting in accordance with the same procedure.
 The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination 
was made continue to apply.
 2.  The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the 
Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach 
by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the Member 
State in question to submit its observations.
 3.  Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by 
a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the 
application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting 
rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. 
In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a 
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons.
 The obligations of the Member State in question under this Treaty shall in any case 
continue to be binding on that State.
 4.  The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or 
revoke measures taken under paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation 
which led to their being imposed.
 5.  The voting arrangements applying to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council for the purposes of this Article are laid down in Article 354 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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law. Although these references are given a mere interpretative value22, 
now that the Charter is considered to hold “primary” status as opposed to 
the subsidiary nature of general legal principles, the latter may be used to 
cover potential gaps in the Charter23 and also as a way of recognising other 
rights or allowing a broader interpretation of already existing rights24.
As in nearly all catalogues of rights, the rights do not actually represent 
the entire content; there are also principles that are not directly enforceable, 
without prejudice to their informative value and the obligations imposed 
on EU and national public powers. On the other hand, throughout the TEU 
and TFEU specific references are made to certain rights also included in 
the Charter, such as rights related to European citizenship (Art. 20 and ff.), 
personal data protection (Art. 16 TFEU and Art. 39 TEU) or various mani-
festations of the principle of equality (Arts. 18, 19 and 45 TFEU25).
The qualitative jump triggered by the implementation of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, with the consequent attribution of legal value to the Charter of 
rights, has been immediate, making the enforcement of rights a standard 
procedure and encouraging the ECJ to give these rights the same status 
as other rights under primary EU law. This rapid acceptance of the full 
validity of Charter rights is a logical consequence of the evolution of 
EU rights26. The recognition of the Charter’s full legal value is merely 
a further step towards this evolution, whilst we await the next step (the 
European Union’s adhesion of the ECHR, the significance and scope of 
which are still undetermined).
After the Charter was endowed with new meaning, many different 
rights have been invoked in all types of cases, e.g. principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of age (Kücükdeveci, ECJ (Grand 
Chamber), Judgment 19 January 2010, C-555/2007); freedom of 
movement for persons and right of permanent residence as fundamental 
rights (Lassal, J. 7 October 1010, C-162/09); right of access to documents 
of the institutions (Kingdom of Sweden and Association de la presse 
22 According to Art. 52.4 of the Charter: “Insofar as this Charter recognises fundamental 
rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions”.
23 See Groussot and Pech, op. cit., p. 6.
24 As is the case with extensive ECtHR doctrine regarding certain rights, such as the right 
to private family life (see below).
25 Although TEU or TFEU rights would be treated as special law, the ECJ tends to widen 
the scope of these rights due to their inclusion in the Charter, as will be seen in this 
article.
26 Despite the significance of the Charter, its full recognition represents a smaller step 
for Spain than, for instance, the approval of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, with a 
catalogue and guarantee of rights, which forced all legal operators to conform to this 
new direct recognition of fundamental rights.
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internationale ASBL (API) ECJ – Grand Chamber – J. 21 September 
2010, Appeals C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P)27; linguistic 
pluralism (Spain v. Commission case, GC J. 13 September 2010, T-156/07 
and T-232/07); ensuring judicial protection (Winner Wetten GMBH 
case, J. 8 September 2010, C-409/0628); fundamental rights of children 
(Doris Povse and Mauro Alpag case, J. 1 July 2010, C-211/10 PPU29); 
and protection of human health related to the freedom of establishment 
(Blasco Pérez and Chao Gómez case, ECJ (Grand Chamber) J. 1 July 
2010, C-570/07 and C-571/07).
The meaning of the Charter has already been made clear in the 
interpretation of European citizenship-based rights. In fact, the Treaty of 
Maastricht created the idea of a European citizenship for the nationals of 
Member States, and a series of derivative rights (freedom of circulation 
and residence; right to vote for the European Parliament and at municipal 
elections in the country of residence; right to diplomatic and consular 
protection; as well as the right of access to the European Ombudsman and, 
later on, the right to address EU institutions), albeit linked to traditional 
Community freedoms (freedom of movement for workers and suppliers 
or recipients of services and freedom of establishment). In any case, 
further to this citizenship, the ECJ interpreted the rights in question in 
a much more favourable manner30. Due to the full applicability of the 
Charter, some of these rights, particularly the freedom of circulation and 
residence, have been acknowledged as such, without any association to the 
traditional freedom of circulation for workers and the limitations it imposed 
(see, for example, the Lassal case cited above31). The arguments provided 
by Advocate General Sharpston in the Ruiz Zambrano case are clear:
from the moment that the Member States decided to add, to existing concepts 
of nationality, a new and complementary status of ‘citizen of the Union’, 
it became impossible to regard such individuals as mere economic factors 
of production. Citizens are not ‘resources’ employed to produce goods and 
27 The ECJ was examining the right of access to procedural documents. The claim was 
rejected on the grounds that it was not a generally accepted right, although this was 
in fact so in some EU States. Furthermore, although the right is foreseen in relation to 
documentation presented to the ECtHR, it is excluded in ECJ proceedings; moreover, 
the reasons alleged by the parties were insufficient to justify the distribution of the 
disputed documents.
28 “According to reiterated case law, the principle of effective court protection is a general 
principle of EU Law, derived from constitutional traditions shared by the Member 
States”.
29 The case examined the issue of judicial cooperation in civil matters related to parental 
responsibility and the illegal transfer of a minor.
30 Czerlick, Bidar or Martínez Sala cases.
31 Although the foregoing decisions were along these lines, it was the Lassal case where 
the ECJ make a clear pronouncement.
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services, but individuals bound to a political community and protected by 
fundamental rights (para. 127)32.
Finally, we should refer to the exceptions foreseen for the ECJ’s 
control: Arts. 275 and 276 TFEU. The first provides an exception in 
relation to foreign policy and common security, the former “second pillar” 
created by the Treaty of Maastricht, still contained in the TEU following 
the amendments brought by the Treaty of Lisbon and of a strongly inter-
governmental nature33. Nevertheless, of interest is the fact that in this 
field control has already been applied when upholding fundamental 
rights, in a series of decisions that began with the Kadi34 case and which 
discussed EU35 regulations further to Resolution 1267 (1999) of the UN 
Security Council, highlighting the ECJ’s strong wish to defend human 
rights. In the Kadi case, the ECJ stated that “the review by the Court of 
the validity of any Community measure in the light of fundamental rights 
must be considered to be the expression, in a community based on the rule 
of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an 
autonomous legal system”(para. 316).
Specifically, Art. 276 TFEU provides that “In exercising its powers 
regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three 
relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity 
32 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 30 September 2010, Case 
C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano. J. 8 March 2011 stated that “Article 20 TFEU is 
to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from refusing a third 
country national upon whom his minor children, who are European Union citizens, 
are dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and nationality 
of those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third country 
national, in so far as such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen” 
(para. 45).
33 Art. 275:
 The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to 
the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to 
acts adopted on the basis of those provisions.
 However, the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 
of the Treaty on European Union and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance 
with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, 
reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or 
legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty 
on European Union.
34 C-402 and 415/05, Judgment 3 September 2008.
35 Common Position 1999/727/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Taliban 
(OJ 1999 L 294, at 1), whose Article 2 prescribes the freezing of funds and other 
financial resources held abroad by the Taliban under the conditions set out in Security 
Council Resolution 1267 (1999).
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or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other 
law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. 
Consequently, in these matters, internal jurisdictional bodies will be the 
ones in charge of ensuring that rights are upheld, and the ECtHR will be 
addressed if necessary. Nevertheless, it would be possible for the ECJ to 
ascertain their compliance with European law, particularly with respect to 
the values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU and respect for the rights of Art. 6 TEU 
(in the same way as the ECJ pronounced itself in relation to the traditional 
“third pillar” in the Pupino case36).
It is clear that ongoing developments in the European Union and 
European law are changing the way rights and rights competences are 
handled throughout the EU. This chapter will thus examine the interaction 
of rights competences between Spain’s internal courts and autonomous 
communities and those of the regimes of the ECJ and ECtHR, in addition 
to tracing the evolution of EU rights and discussing the potential changes 
a binding Charter might bring.
1. Spain: EU Law and the ECtHR
In Spain, Art. 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution (SC) establishes that: 
“Provisions related to fundamental rights and liberties recognized by 
the Constitution shall be construed in conformity with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and agreements 
thereon ratified by Spain”.
As such, the institutions and particularly the courts are subject to 
this obligation. One of the main international treaties on human rights 
is the ECHR, with its significant provisions and protocols, as well as the 
case-law laid down by the ECtHR, given that the Spanish Constitution, 
amongst others, contains a longer and more protective list of rights than 
the ECHR. The decisions adopted by the ECtHR have contributed a 
new meaning to traditional rights: an example is Art. 8 ECHR, with its 
equivalent in Art. 18.1 SC – respect for privacy and family life –, which 
imposes a prohibition on the emission of foul smells or loud noise37 and 
is interpreted more broadly than its original definition. Furthermore, the 
ECtHR has also defended certain rights more strictly, in cases that directly 
36 Maria Pupino case, C-105/2003, Judgment 16 June 2005.
37 López Ostra (Judgment 9 December 1994) and Moreno Gómez (Judgment 16 November 
2004) cases.
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affected Spain38, and other times because it was a way of consolidating 
case-law that improved or upheld internal doctrine39.
There is also an outstanding problem with regard to the ECHR: 
the Parliament has not yet adopted a mechanism to allow the direct 
enforceability of ECtHR judgments in cases where there is a final 
judgment from an internal court. It would be appropriate to have a system 
to resolve these issues, as other European countries have done, in order to 
allow for a review of these cases by internal courts40.
In any case, of significance is the fact that Spain has received very 
few sanctions from the ECJ, especially when compared to neighbouring 
countries. This clearly confirms Spain’s commitment to respect the 
parameters of the protection of rights guaranteed by the Convention41.
It is a different issue when we consider EU law; in this case there is 
a double binding effect: one, the obligation to directly apply EU law, as 
internal law, even in a prevailing manner; two, the obligation to interpret 
internal human rights according EU law, further to Art. 10.2 SC. Both 
Spain’s ordinary courts and Constitutional Court42 apply EU law in both 
ways; this has been useful, for example, in relation to the principle of 
equal treatment, basically as regards reverse discrimination. We could 
challenge the foregoing on the grounds that occasionally the courts 
38 Valenzuela Contreras (30 July 1998) or Prado Bugallo (Judgment 18 February 2003) 
cases in relation to the secrecy of communications; Castillo Algar (28 October 1998) 
or Perote Pellón (5 July 2002) cases in relation to the right to an impartial hearing.
39 Queralt, Argelia, La interpretación de los derechos: del Tribunal de Estrasburgo 
al Tribunal Constitucional, Madrid, CEPC, 2008; Elvira, Ascensión, “Tribunal 
Constitucional y Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos” in Pablo Pérez Tremps (ed.), 
La reforma del Tribunal Constitucional, Valencia, Tirant lo blanch, 2007, pp. 513-524.
40 El informe del Consejo de Estado sobre la inserción del Derecho europeo en 
el ordenamiento español, Consejo de Estado-Centro de Estudios Políticos y 
Constitucionales, Madrid, 2008.
41 As stated, the total number of judgments in which Spain was the defendant State, until 
2009, was 78; in 50 of these cases the infringement of a right was upheld, whereas in 
24 no such violation was found. For a comparative table of the various Member States, 
see [Online]: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E26094FC-46E7-41F4-91D2-
32B1EC143721/0/Tableau_de_violations_19592009_ENG.pdf.
 Only in relation to 2009, there were 17 judgments in which Spain was the defendant, 
entailing 11 sanctions, and 6 cases in which the absence of the infringement alleged 
was declared. These figures may be compared with France which, in the same period, 
was the object of 33 judgments and 20 sanctions; or Italy, with 69 judgments and 67 
sanctions. [Online]: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401-
BC9B-F58D015E4D54/0/Annual_Report_2009_Final.pdf.
42 Elvira, Ascensión, “Tribunal Constitucional y Derecho Comunitario en los recursos de 
amparo” in Miguel Revenga Sánchez et al., 50 años de Corte Constitucional italiana. 




fail to use preliminary rulings, when they should do so, or when this 
would be useful. The Constitutional Court has refused to acknowledge 
any obligation to apply for a preliminary ruling, as its task is restricted 
to interpreting the Constitution or deciding on the constitutionality of 
internal rules. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court did recognise an 
infringement of the right to due process, on the grounds that the ordinary 
court had failed to apply for a preliminary ruling before the ECJ43.
In other matters, the Constitutional Court issued its decision on certain 
provisions of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe44. One of the 
matters presented to the Constitutional Court was the government’s doubt 
as regards “the compatibility with the Constitution of a system of rights 
which, further to the reference contained in Art. 10.2 SC, would become, 
after its integration, a determining parameter in the configuration of rights 
and freedoms, not only within the scope of European law itself, but also 
in purely internal terms, due to its inherent capacity for growth”. The 
Constitutional Court considered that it could not deliver an abstract decision 
in an anticipatory manner, and that solutions had to be found on a case-by-
case basis according to established procedures. It also pointed out that an 
interpretation of the European Charter in light of Art. 10.2 SC would entail 
no further issues than those raised by the ECHR, particularly as both the 
Charter and the Spanish Constitution “ultimately designate the case-law of 
the ECtHR as a common denominator to establish common interpretation 
criteria of a minimum content”45. Consequently, the Constitutional Court 
43 Constitutional Court Judgments 58/2004, 194/2006 and 78/2010.
44 Declaration 1/2004, of 13 December, further to the Government’s application for a 
pronouncement on a potential conflict between certain provisions of Treaty establishing 
a constitution for Europe and the Spanish Constitution. Please note that this Treaty 
was not eventually applied following the negative outcomes of the referendums 
respectively held in France and Holland (in addition to the reluctance of other States). 
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon was applied, which gathers a large part of the content of 
the so-called European Constitution, removing or restricting the most controversial 
issues, such as a reference to the primacy of Union Law or including the Charter of 
Rights in the Treaty provisions. The Treaty of Lisbon continues with this division in 
two treaties: the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (former European Community Treaty). When the Treaty of Lisbon 
was approved, an opinion was not requested from the Constitutional Court.
45 Spain has not undergone any constitutional reform, unlike most other European 
countries, as a result of amendments implemented by European Treaties following the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Only on this occasion was an amendment introduced in the 
Spanish Constitution to include the right of foreigners to stand for election, in addition to 
the right to vote in municipal elections that was initially established (Art. 13.2 SC). Both 
the ratification that enabled Spain’s adhesion at the time to the European Communities 
(1985), and the ratification of subsequent treaties of amendment, are a result of Art. 93 SC, 
which allows the assignment of “the exercise of rights to an international organization, 
with the sole requirement of obtaining its approval in an organic act, i.e. with the absolute 
majority of the lower house of Parliament (“Congreso de los Diputados”).
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finds it difficult to handle conflicts involving rights, precisely due to this 
interpretative uniformity.
2. Autonomous Community Rights and European Rights
The relationship between internal fundamental rights and European 
protection not only involves constitutional (State) fundamental rights46, 
but also autonomous community rights or principles47. Generally speaking, 
these cases will require a regulatory implementation in autonomous 
community laws. The issue is whether or not these rights are connected to 
European guarantees. 
When the Autonomous Communities implement European law, they 
must guarantee the Charter (and Europe’s values for the protection of 
rights) and implement these rights further to European law. 
On the other hand, when autonomous community rights have an 
equivalent in the ECHR, they are still entitled to address the ECtHR 
if internal protection has failed and internal procedures have been 
exhausted.
46 Rights acknowledged in “Estatutos de Autonomía”, defined by the Constitution 
as a basic institutional rule of each Autonomous Community (Art. 147 SC); these 
“Estatutos” require an approval both from the Autonomous Community Assembly and 
the upper house of Parliament (“Cortes Generales”). The possibility of including rights 
in the “Estatutos” was disputed and eventually settled by Constitutional Court Judgment 
31/2010, of 28 June, which resolved one of the appeals lodged against the Catalonian 
“Estatuto”; before then, the issue was anticipated, albeit in more restricted terms, in 
Constitutional Court Judgment 247/2007, of 12 December, in relation to reform of the 
“Estatuto” of the Autonomous Community of Valencia. Nevertheless, Constitutional 
Court Judgment 31/2010 reaffirms that fundamental rights will only be those that the 
Constitution acknowledges as such. Regarding the debate as to whether “Estatutos” 
may or may not acknowledge rights, see, amongst others: Díez-Picazo, Luis María, 
“¿Pueden los Estatutos de Autonomía declarar derechos, deberes y principios?, Revista 
Española de Derecho Constitucional, nº 78, 2006, pp. 63-75; Caamaño, Francisco, 
“Sí, pueden (Declaraciones de derechos y Estatutos de Autonomía)”, Revista Española 
de Derecho Constitucional, nº 79, 2007, pp. 33-46; Díez-Picazo, Luis Maria, “De 
nuevo sobre las declaraciones estatutarias de derechos”, Revista Española de Derecho 
Constitucional, nº 81, 2007, pp. 63-70; Ferreres Comella, Víctor, “Derechos, deberes 
y principios en el nuevo Estatuto de autonomía de Cataluña”, in the book of the same 
title published by CEPC, Madrid, 2006; Ortega Álvarez, Luis, “Los derechos de los 
ciudadanos en los nuevos estatutos de autonomía”, Estado compuesto y derechos de 
los ciudadanos, Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Autonómics, 2007, pp. 55-81. Although 
Constitutional Court Judgment 31/2010 effectively upholds the constitutionality of 
these catalogues of rights, this does not settle the doubts of legal scholars regarding 
their suitability and scope.
47 Said Constitutional Court Judgment 31/2010 states that, in general, rights are in fact 
“orders to act entrusted to public powers, whether expressly referred to as “governing 
principles” or literally defined as rights that the autonomous legislator must materialize 
and all other autonomous public powers must uphold” (para. 16).
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In relation to jurisdictional guarantees and to what is required to file 
a claim before the ECtHR, the judicial system is national, there are no 
autonomous courts separate from national courts. Each and every judge 
and court belong to the State judiciary, although its structure is linked to 
the Autonomous Communities (“The principle of jurisdictional unity is 
the basis of the organization and operation of the courts”) (Art. 117.5 SC), 
and “The Supreme Court, with jurisdiction over the whole of Spain, is 
the highest judicial body in all branches of justice, except with regard to 
provisions concerning constitutional guarantees” (Art. 123 SC); although 
“A High Court of Justice, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, shall be the head of the Judiciary in the territory of a self-
governing Community” (Art. 152.1 SC)48. 
As a result, in most cases, proceedings will eventually reach the High 
Courts of Justice of the Autonomous Communities. Subsequently, the 
European Court of Human Rights could examine the claim if the right in 
breach is protected by the Convention49.
The problem we would face in these cases is similar to the one 
encountered in relation to the application of European Union law by the 
Member States. In fact, in this case, a breach would be attributed to the 
State regardless of the internal party responsible for the breach (the State, 
Autonomous Communities or municipalities). A similar situation would 
arise with respect to the ECHR: if the ECtHR were to affirm the existence 
of a breach, it would be attributed to the State, irrespective of whether 
the right was infringed by a body or agent belonging to an Autonomous 
Community.
A potential breach of fundamental rights by Autonomous Communities 
and the subsequent liability of the State are not new. Although 
fundamental rights, to a large extent, were a competence of the state50 
before the reform of the “estatutos de autonomía”, there were already 
precedents that indicated a breach of a right on the part of Autonomous 
48 Constitutional Court Judgment 31/2010 has reaffirmed this principle.
49 If the right in question, in turn, is linked to any fundamental rights that are constitutionally 
recognised and protected by the “recurso de amparo”, the Constitutional Court must 
first be addressed. As an example, the infringement of an autonomous community right 
may entail a breach of the principle of equal treatment.
50 Please note that some Autonomous Communities had already assumed competences in 
relation to rights without involving their strict implementation. Such is the case of the 
right of association, for which the Basque Country and Catalonia assumed competence 
and led to the necessary regulatory implementation. After the applicable laws were 
challenged, the Constitutional Court defined the boundaries of these competences. 
See Constitutional Court Judgments 173/1998, of 23 July, and 133 to 135/2006, of 
27 April. For comments on these judgments, see Elvira, Ascensión, “A vueltas con 
el derecho de asociación”, Revista española de Derecho Constitucional, 2008, nº 83, 
pp. 301-323.
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Community bodies or agents. Occasionally, the issue has even entailed 
an appeal before the ECtHR, as in the Riera Blume et al. vs. Spain case51, 
where the appellants (members of a sect) were led to a hotel and kept 
there for ten days as part of a “de-programming” treatment, against 
their will. According to the ECtHR: “While it is true that it was the 
applicants’ families and the Pro Juventud association that bore the direct 
and immediate responsibility for the supervision of the applicants during 
their ten days’ loss of liberty, it is equally true that without the active 
cooperation of the Catalan authorities the deprivation of liberty could not 
have taken place”, given that the autonomous police force was the one 
that led the appellants to the hotel and interrogated them in the course of 
their deprivation of liberty. As a result of the conduct of the Catalonian 
authorities, Spain was found guilty.
This possibility would likewise arise with respect to the European 
Union in cases where Autonomous Community bodies or agents were to 
breach EU rights, thus rendering mandatory the devices for cooperation 
and supervision in relations between the State and Autonomous 
Communities52. Thus, the State should provide the necessary devices to 
avoid a potential breach. 
The issue in either case is rendered more complex when handling 
autonomous community rights, as this will not involve competences that 
formerly belonged to the State and were attributed to the Autonomous 
Community but, rather, competences that the Autonomous Community 
has directly assumed through its “Estatuto”. It would therefore be difficult 
to apply devices that are in fact useful in other situations, such as the 
State’s vicarious liability53.
Nevertheless, there is often not a total separation between constitu-
tional and autonomous community rights, as they are interrelated to a 
certain extent.
Occasionally competences are distributed between the State and 
Autonomous Communities, e.g. the right of association, a fundamental 
right under Section 1, Chapter 2, Title 1 of the Constitution; this right would 
enjoy the maximum protection54 and would require its implementation by 
51 Judgment of the ECtHR of 14 October 1999.
52 Cooperation between Autonomous Communities and the State has been disclosed 
as one of the flaws of Spain’s “Estado de las Autonomías” [State of Autonomous 
Communities].
53 See Constitutional Court Judgments 79/92, 28 May 1992; 80/93, 8 March 1993, or 
148/98, 2 July 1998.
54 Art. 53 Spanish Constitution:
 1.  The rights and freedoms recognized in Chapter 2 of the present Part are binding on 
all public authorities. Only by an act which in any case must respect their essential 
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the autonomous community as part of its competences (an issue excluded 
from the scope of organic regulations).
In other cases, autonomous community rights are linked to consti-
tutional rights: most autonomous community rights implement the “right 
to life” (Art. 15 SC), the right to privacy (Art. 18 SC), child protection 
(Art. 39 SC) or many “principles” foreseen in Chapter III, Title I, of 
the Spanish Constitution55. Many autonomous community rights are a 
development of these “principles”, though obviously these social claims 
depend on political decisions and the availability of resources, as opposed 
to fundamental rights, whose essential content is guaranteed regardless of 
economic and social circumstances.
And finally, there are cases which could be indirectly linked to consti-
tutional rights, e.g. the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination, 
as a way of protecting other rights. 
Also significant is Art. 149.1.1 SC: “The regulation of basic conditions 
guaranteeing the equal treatment of Spanish citizens in the exercise of 
their rights and when fulfilling their constitutional duties”. This means that 
the State can establish the grounds of various rights (without interfering 
with autonomous community competences) as a way of guaranteeing a 
common regime.
In either case, it must be highlighted that the national jurisdictional 
bodies are in charge of remedying any infringed rights, involving both 
the ordinary jurisdictional bodies and the Constitutional Court, as the case 
may be56. This is clear in the case of national rights, whether of a state 
or autonomous community nature. With respect to European Union law, 
the national jurisdictional bodies are also in charge of ensuring that these 
content, could the exercise of such rights and freedoms be regulated, which shall be 
protected in accordance with the provisions of section 161(1) a).
 2.  Any citizen may assert a claim to protect the freedoms and rights recognized in 
section 14 and in division 1 of Chapter 2, by means of a preferential and summary 
procedure before the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by lodging an individual 
appeal for protection (“recurso de amparo”) to the Constitutional Court. This latter 
procedure shall be applicable to conscientious objection as recognized in section 30.
55 Art. 53.3 Spanish Constitution:
 Recognition, respect and protection of the principles recognized in Chapter 3 shall 
guide legislation, judicial practice and actions by the public authorities. They may 
only be invoked before the ordinary courts in accordance with the legal provisions 
implementing them.
56 Please note that the proceedings surrounding a “recurso de amparo”, introduced 
through an amendment of Organic Act 6/2007 by the Organic Act on the Constitutional 
Court, have strengthened the role of the ordinary courts by reducing the number of 
matters that may be forwarded to the Constitutional Court. It is to be seen whether 
this will entail a lesser internal control and, consequently, a greater number of matters 
eventually reaching the ECtHR.
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rights are upheld, without prejudice to the possibility of a preliminary 
ruling and the interpretation and control conducted by the ECJ.
We may thus affirm that the protection of rights, regardless of the 
reason for their breach, will be entrusted to national jurisdictional bodies. 
Consequently, an appeal to the ECtHR will only possible in those cases 
where ordinary protection (and the “recurso de amparo”, if applicable) 
has failed, whereas an appeal to the ECJ, in most cases, will usually 
follow a preliminary ruling57. Therefore, although the ECJ’s assistance 
is very valuable, effective protection of the right in question will still be 
entrusted to the national courts. An exception would arise in those cases 
where European law is directly questioned, in which case the ECJ would 
issue a decision on the validity of the challenged rule58.
Clearly, all of this requires a strengthening of internal protective 
devices, which will depend on the level of knowledge and application 
of European regulations by national jurisdictional bodies. Consequently, 
not only would infringements be avoided due to a non-application or 
misapplication of European law, but also those classified as “convenient”, 
i.e. when a more favourable interpretation is possible or future doubts 
may be cleared, particularly if these doubts arise from the particularities 
of internal law vis-à-vis European law or the ECJ’s interpretations as 
regards other jurisdictions59.
57 Although the interpretation given by the ECJ refers to European Union law, it is in fact 
also pronouncing itself on the compatibility of internal and European Union law and 
on any interpretations of internal regulations that are compatible with European law. 
We will not examine the issues raised by the obligation to “cleanse” an internal legal 
system further to a breach of European law, which is a matter excluded from the object 
of this article.
58 This challenge could also arise from a preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU), an action 
for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU) or an exception of illegality. Nevertheless, an action 
for annulment brought by individuals is restricted to those cases where they are the 
object of the challenged act “or are directly or individually affected, and against any 
regulatory acts with a direct effect, excluding measures of enforcement”. Although 
the new wording brought by the Treaty of Lisbon is more open-ended, it does not 
generally attribute standing to individuals. This limitation has been occasionally 
considered to hinder the ECJ in exercising a full protection of rights. See, for example, 
Marciali, Sébastien, “Les rapports entre les systèmes européennes de protection de 
droits fondamentaux” in Joel Rideau (ed.), Les droits fondamentaux dans l’Union 
européenne. Bruylant, 2009, pp. 345-377. On the scope of individual standing, see 
Alonso, Ricardo, Sistema jurídico de la Unión Europea (2nd ed.), Cizur Menor, Civitas-
Thomson Reuters, 2010, pp. 182 and ff.; Craig, Paul, The Lisbon Treaty. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp 129-132.




3. The ECJ and ECtHR
Over the last few years, the co-existence of the ECJ and ECtHR has 
been the focus of much inquiry, even though the latter’s supervision 
of EU law is not new. Control of the EU is not possible in law, but the 
ECtHR has devices to control state conduct when executing EU law (e.g. 
Hornsby v. Greece60; Dangeville S.A. v. France61; Aristimuño v. France62), 
and claims brought against Member States are also a way of controlling 
EU law (e.g. Matthews v. United Kingdom63). At other times, EU law has 
been treated as a parameter to examine the legitimacy of an expulsion 
order (Maslov v. Austria64). The European Charter and ECJ case-law has 
became a usual parameter as we can see e.g. in VilhoEskelinen65, Demir 
and Baykara66, Aigner67, or Schalk and Kopf68 cases.
This relationship, not only with EU law but with the ECJ itself, 
was examined in the Bosphorus v. Ireland69 case, in which the ECtHR 
declared its approval of the ECJ’s protection of rights. It could be said 
that this judgment represents the mutual respect held by both courts and a 
recognition of the efforts made by the ECJ to defend fundamental rights.
Under EU law, given that EU Member States are bound by the ECHR, 
the ECJ had to apply it when resolving a case that involved a human right 
protected by the ECHR. Ultimately, it resorted both to general principles 
of (European) law and constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States.
The ECJ must use the ECHR as a parameter in its defence of human 
rights. Use of the ECHR dates back to the mid 1970s, after France ratified 
60 Judgment 19 March 1997.
61 Judgment 4 April 2002.
62 Judgment 13 December 2005.
63 Judgment 18 February 1999.
64 Judgment 23 June 2008. The ECtHR took EU law into account, although the facts of 
the case referred to a period (late 1990s and early 2000s) when Bulgaria (of which 
Mr. Maslov was a national) was not yet a member of the European Union. It recalled 
two Community Directives (Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, concerning 
the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, and Directive 
2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of Member States) and ECJ case law (Orfanopoulos and Oliveri; 
Commision v. Spain) in order to examine to what extent the expulsion measure decreed 
against the applicant was in line with EU law.
65 Judgment 19 April 2007.
66 Judgment 12 November 2008.
67 Judgment 10 May 2012.
68 Judgment 24 June 2010.
69 Judgment 30 June 2005.
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the Convention (1974). The ECJ had to prove its strong defence of human 
rights in order to uphold the primacy of EU Law, even in this sphere, as 
a way of avoiding the national constitutional courts’ invocation of their 
own constitutions against EU law that offered no protection of human 
rights70. The first time the ECJ expressly invoked the ECHR was in the 
Rutili case (1975)71.
Thereafter, from the Wachauf (1989)72 case onwards, the ECJ declared 
that Member States were obliged to uphold human rights as protected 
by European law. This protection was required in any application of 
European law, e.g. when implementing a Directive or when assisting the 
Commission in the execution of administrative procedures, and also if a 
Member State invoked its exemption from European law73.
The ECJ has used case-law on the ECtHR as an interpretative tool, with 
an increased influence in its own right. Nevertheless, legal scholars have 
suggested that ECJ case-law occasionally exceeds the ECtHR’s protection 
of certain rights (e.g. the rights of transsexuals (P. v. S.74/Goodwin75 
case) and at other times it is the ECtHR which offers better protection 
(e.g. limitation on a company’s registered address (Hoechst76/Niemietz77)). 
The influence of Strasbourg case-law continues after Lisbon Treaty as we 
can appreciate with Aladzhov78, N.S. and M.E. and others79, or McCarthy 
and Dereci and others cases80.
However, both Courts have very different tasks. Of interest is the fact 
that, once internal resources are exhausted, anybody may bring a claim 
before the ECtHR, specifically entrusted with the defence of human rights. 
70 Supra note 6.
71 Case 36/75.
72 Case 5/88, J. 13 July 1989. See also Bostock, C-2/92, Judgment 24 March 1994; Booker 
Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood, C-20/00 and C-64/00, J. 10 July 2003; Rodríguez 
Caballero, C-442/00, J. 12 December 2002.
73 C-260/89, ERT, and C-62/90, Commission v. Germany.
74 P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, Judgment 30 April 1996.
75 Christine Goodwin v. U.K., 11 July 2002, which cited the ECJ’s decision in P. v. S., and 
Art. 9 European Charter.
76 C-46/87 and C-227/88, Judgment 21 September 1989.
77 Judgment 16 December 1992. For some examples of various possible relationships 
between both European Courts see Ripol Carulla, Santiago, “Las interacciones entre 
el sistema europeo de protección de los derechos humanos y el sistema comunitario de 
protección de los derechos fundamentales”, in José María Beneyto Pérez (ed.), Tratado 
de Derecho y Políticas de la Unión Europea. Tomo II. Derechos Fundamentales. 
Aranzadi-Thomson Reuters, Cizur Minor, 2009, pp. 59-118.
78 C-434/10, J. 17 November 2011, para 17.
79 J. 21 December 2011, cases N.S. C-411/10, and M.E. and others C-493/10.
80 McCarthy, C-434/09, J. 5 May 2011: Dereci and others C-256/11, J. 15 November.
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Nevertheless, the possibility of an individual reaching the ECJ is small81 
and most cases brought by individuals involve “preliminary rulings” 
as regards interpretation82. This guarantees a uniform interpretation 
throughout the EU and implements the European legal order: the ECJ 
interprets EU law, or shows how internal law must be interpreted according 
to EU law. The ECJ does not hold an independent duty to defend human 
rights. It may only do so in the execution of its tasks (although domestic 
courts have the last word).
Some authors have suggested the possibility of creating an appeal 
before the ECJ to defend human rights, similar to Spain’s “recurso de 
amparo” or Germany’s “Verfassungsbeschwerde”83. We do not believe 
that this is an adequate option, at least for the moment, given that the 
ECJ only handles human rights on an incidental basis. Furthermore, the 
existence of a special remedy could in fact transform the role of the ECJ84. 
In addition, depending on the matter at hand, States have the necessary 
devices to protect rights, albeit provisionally and, on the other hand, there 
is already a preference as regards the ECJ to examine preliminary issues 
affecting individual freedoms (Art. 267 TFEU).
81 Supra note 57.
82 Preliminary rulings ensure that there is an authoritative source of interpretation, 
guaranteeing the supremacy of European law (see Article 267 TEU (ex Article 234 TEC)):
 “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings concerning:
 (a) the interpretation of the Treaties;
 (b)  the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 
of the Union;
 Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that 
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to 
enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.
 Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.
 If such a question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall act with the minimum of delay”.
83 Andriantsimbazovina, Joël, “À qui appartient le contrôle des droits fondamentaux en 
Europe?” in Bertrand Favreau (ed.), La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux de l’Union 
Européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010, p. 59; Craig, Paul, 
The Lisbon Treaty. Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 2010, p. 242; Kokott, Juliane 
and Christoph Sobotta, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union 
after Lisbon. EUI Working Paper AEL 2010/6, p. 11, [Online]: http://cadmus.eui.eu/
bitstream/handle/1814/15208/AEL_WP_2010_06.pdf?sequence=3.
84 Nevertheless, according to Craig, the greater relevance of the European Parliament in 
decision-making including, in particular, ordinary legislative proceedings, raises the 
issues already manifested in various countries in relation to the legitimacy of judicial 
review. Craig, op. cit., pp. 244-245.
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The relationship between the ECJ and ECtHR may change when the 
EU adheres to the ECHR85. Art. 59 ECHR, as changed by Protocol 14, 
provides that “2. The European Union may accede to this Convention”. 
And Art. 6.2 TEU says: “The Union shall accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms”86. Nevertheless, the ECJ has not only used ECtHR case-law 
as a parameter in its own doctrine, but has also recognized the value of its 
judgments: in Spain v. United Kingdom, the ECJ upheld the obligation to 
enforce the decision reached in the Matthews87 case.
The adhesion will enable a better integration between both systems of 
rights protection, as well as between European and national protection, 
both in formal and material terms.
4. Who Will Be the Supreme Interpreter of Human Rights?
This issue is not incipient: background dialogue between the courts 
has increased over recent years and is expected to progress.
But who will be the supreme guardian of fundamental rights? This will 
depend on each particular case. Surely, in the event of a breach, the last 
resort would be an application to the ECtHR. In ordinary circumstances, 
85 On 7 July 2010, on the basis of a mandate from the Council, The Commission initiated 
negotiations with the Council of Europe for this purpose. See General Report on 
the activities of the European Union 2010, [Online]: http://europa.eu/generalreport/
index_en.htm. The first document: CDDH(2011)009, Strasbourg, 14 October 2011 
can be found on http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/
CDDH-UE_documents_en.asp. The «Explanatory report»: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/CDDH-UE_MeetingReports/CDDH_2011_009_
en.pdf. For a commentary, see Groussot, Xavier, Tobias Lock and Laurent Pech, 
“Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme: 
analyse juridique du projet d’accord d’adhésion du 14 octobre 2011” in Question 
d’Europe, n° 218, Fondation Robert Schuman, 7 novembre 2011. http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/question_europe.
 Also “Joint communication from the Presidents of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, further to the meeting 




86 This possibility was rejected by the ECJ-Rapport 2/94 because it exceeded EU 
competences and was not contemplated in the Treaties.
87 Spain v. United Kingdom, C-145/04, Judgment 12 September 2006; Matthews v. United 
Kingdom, ECtHR Judgment 18 February 1999. In this case, Mrs. Matthews alleged 
that the United Kingdom had denied her right to vote in the European Parliament 




rights would be upheld by the internal courts or by the ECJ, if possible in 
procedural terms. And, in any case, the best and most effective guarantee 
for citizens is the one that is most easily available88.
Moreover, the ECJ “is not, as such, a ‘human rights court’”, but, “[a]s 
the supreme interpreter of EU law, the Court nevertheless has a permanent 
responsibility to ensure respect for such rights within the sphere of the 
Union’s competence”89.
A reply would be easier to find if we first decide who provides a 
general interpretation of fundamental rights. This will depend on the task 
in question, and on the type and degree of protection. There are cases 
where constitutional fundamental rights have not been protected by a 
“recurso de amparo” but are in fact protected by the ECHR (e.g. right to 
private property: Charter, Art. 33, and 1st Protocol, Art. 1). Other rights 
have taken on a more comprehensive meaning through the ECtHR’s 
interpretation (namely, the right to family life, Art. 8 ECHR), and new 
rights or new meanings have been created by the European Charter 
(e.g. biomedicine, Art. 3). Furthermore, some rights seem out of the 
competences interpreted by the ECJ (the right to life or ban of torture). 
Certainly, some rights may be interpreted by the ECJ and others by the 
ECtHR, but the increase of European Union competences will allow 
many rights to enter its sphere, subject to the fact that “The Charter does 
not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of 
the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties” (Art. 51.2).
The provisions of the Charter will not resolve these issues. According 
to Art. 52:
3. Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those 
laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.
4. Insofar as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be 
interpreted in harmony with those traditions.
Paragraph 3 in fact reaffirms the usual practice of the ECJ since the 
1970s. However, until now the ECJ only had indirect tools (the ECHR) 
to defend human rights, but now it has a proper tool, a full catalogue of 
88 Art. 51.1: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity”.
89 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 30 September 2010, Case 
C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano, para. 155.
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rights, more specific and updated than the ECHR; this tool is the outcome 
of a convention involving the participation of representatives (though not 
direct representatives of the people), approved by the Member States, and 
with the same binding power as European Treaties. So it could be said that 
the ECJ now has a better, closer, master tool. The ECJ has to count on the 
ECtHR’s experience and expertise, but fundamental rights in the EU are 
no longer “stone guests”. Furthermore, there are indications of the ECJ 
defending fundamental rights even stronger than the classical Community 
freedoms90 (see the well-known Omega or Schmidberger91 cases).
The Charter specifies that greater protection of rights will be 
encouraged, but this may raise difficulties in cases where Union law 
imposes an obligation that may be contrary to national protection of 
rights. Situations of this kind have been previously raised, including a 
significant one involving the European arrest warrant (EAW92), which 
obliges a country to hand over individuals found guilty in another 
country, even in breach of the guarantees existing in the country where 
the individual surrendered, which gave rise to various constitutional 
disputes93. Specifically in relation to Spain, the ordinary courts allowed 
the EAW in cases where the individual had been judged without a hearing, 
contrary to the interpretation of the right to effective judicial protection, 
upheld and confirmed by the Constitutional Court94. The system was 
actually based on what was known until the Treaty of Lisbon as the 
“third pillar” (cooperation in criminal matters), governed by framework 
decisions, which request regulatory implementation by the State and are 
not effective until implemented, but which nonetheless prevent a State 
from adopting measures to the contrary95. This type of dispute could also 
90 Free movement of persons, services, goods and capital.
91 Omega, C-36/02, Judgment 14 October 2004. Schmidberger, C-112/00, Judgment 
12 June 2003.
92 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 13 June, and Framework Decision 2009/299/
JHA, 26 February, aimed at reinforcing individual procedural rights and to encourage 
the application of a principle of mutual recognition of resolutions, issued in response 
to trials held without a hearing of the accused party. The second Decision was in fact 
aimed at resolving disputes raised by the greater protection offered by Member States.
93 One case, amongst others, is the Judgment issued by the Federal Constitutional Court 
in Germany on 18 July 2005. Regarding the European Arrest Warrant and the issues 
involved, see Guild, Elspeth (ed.), Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest 
Warrant, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006.
94 Judgments 177/2006, of 5 May, and 199/2009, of 28 September. Later, on the same 
subject the Constitutional Court raised a preliminary ruling by Auto 86/2011, 9 June 
2011 (C-399/11).
95 Regarding this issue, see Izquierdo Sans, Cristina, “Conflictos entre la jurisdicción 
comunitaria y la jurisdicción constitucional española (en materia de derechos 
fundamentales)” Revista Española de Derecho Europeo, nº 34, 2010, pp. 193-233.
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arise in the future with respect to other types of provisions; if so, there 
would probably be an obligation to apply for a preliminary ruling to 
clarify the scope and interpretation of European law in relation to each 
Member State’s jurisdiction, and the ECJ’s interpretation would bind the 
national courts.
The State Council stated its opinion in the Report on the incorporation 
of European law into the Spanish legal system; given a potential 
contradiction between a Directive and the Convention, it stated that: “In 
any case and unless there is a blatant contradiction between one and the 
other, national rules will in principle follow Community law, without 
prejudice to the fact that, if a breach of the European Convention is 
alleged, the former may be cleansed by the national judge or, through 
an application for a preliminary ruling, by the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg. The constant case-law of this Court has reiterated that “the 
rights and freedoms acknowledged in said Convention are part of the 
general principles of Community law”96.
If a breach of a right is alleged, due to an interpretation made by the 
national courts, and once the relevant internal remedies are exhausted97, 
an action may be brought before the ECtHR, as long as the right is 
covered by the ECHR. A decision from the ECtHR could end the dispute 
and the affected State (and the European Union, if applicable) would have 
to adopt the relevant measures. It could also happen that the ECtHR, as is 
often the case, may decide to grant the State a margin of discretion and, 
even if the conflict is resolved, the maximum protection of the disputed 
right would not be guaranteed.
Furthermore, the last word in resolving a conflict does not mean that 
the right will be fully protected. Consequently, we will wait and see how 
the ECtHR interprets EU law in relation to the law of Member States and 
to the Convention itself.
Another issue, despite the leading role acquired by the Charter, is the 
fact that the EU has another instrument to defend fundamental rights: 
“the common constitutional traditions to the Member States”. This was 
the initial force and argumentation to defend human rights within the EU, 
but Europe at the time was more homogenous – with just 27 States it 
was easier to protect rights with a single instrument. However, it is a 
96 Rubio Llorente, Francisco, El Informe del Consejo de Estado sobre la inserción del 
Derecho Europeo en el ordenamiento español. Texto del informe, estudios y ponencias. 
Consejo de Estado-Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2008, 
p. 246.
97 With respect to the exhaustion of the remedies available, once the European Union 
ratifies the ECHR the ECtHR may also require, if advisable in each case, that a 
preliminary reference be made to the ECJ.
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difficult task to keep a balance between European law, as a jus commune 
europium, and the particularities of State Constitutions, and between 
the ECJ’s interpretation and the one made by each State’s constitutional 
and domestic courts. The role played by the ECJ will be crucial here, 
particularly its decision to apply either self-restraint or adopt a more pro-
active role, for which it is often criticised. Although Member States share 
common values and principles, they still have many particularities98 and, 
at least theoretically, a margin of discretion.
In this complicated mesh and regardless of how wide the scope 
of European Union rights, they play a limited role in EU activity. 
Consequently, although the Union and Member States have to purge 
traditional economical criteria in favour of accepting a new scenario 
(frequently referred to as “moving on from a merchant Europe to a Europe 
of rights”), Europe is not a federal state; Union competences are attributed 
or assigned by the Member States in order to enable the achievement of 
common objectives. With the Treaty of Lisbon these competences were 
determined according to a list, following standard techniques for the 
98 Some States have tried to guarantee their individuality through protocols attached to 
the Treaties, such as the case of Ireland (Protocol nº 35: “Nothing in the Treaties, or 
in the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, or in the Treaties 
or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in 
Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland”, Article which bans abortion), 
or the “opting-out” of the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic as certain 
provisions of the Charter (Protocol nº 30):
 “Article 1
 1.  The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or 
of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and 
principles that it reaffirms.
 2.  In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter 
creates justifiable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far 
as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law”.
 “Article 2:
 To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, 
it shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or 
principles that it contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the 
United Kingdom)”.
 Kühling considers that “Apart from the undermining of fundamental rights in the 
Charter itself, this shall ensure that case law does not create any protection exceeding 
the national status quo” (“Fundamental Rights” in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen 
Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd ed.), Oxford, München, Hart 
Publishing, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2010, p. 488).
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distribution of competences99. It is further to these competences that the 
EU must protect fundamental rights; in all other fields, the protection of 
rights will still be entrusted to the States (with a possibility of ultimately 
addressing the ECtHR). Of interest in this respect are the conclusions 
reached by Advocate General Sharpston:
The desire to promote appropriate protection of fundamental rights must not 
lead to usurpation of competence. As long as the European Union’s powers 
remain based on the principle of conferral, EU fundamental rights must 
respect the limits of that conferral.
Transparency and clarity require that one be able to identify with certainty 
what ‘the scope of Union law’ means for the purposes of EU fundamental 
rights protection. It seems to me that, in the long run, the clearest rule would be 
one that made the availability of EU fundamental rights protection dependent 
neither on whether a Treaty provision was directly applicable nor on whether 
secondary legislation had been enacted, but rather on the existence and scope 
of a material EU competence. To put the point another way: the rule would be 
that, provided that the EU had competence (whether exclusive or shared) in a 
particular area of law, EU fundamental rights should protect the citizen of the 
EU even if such competence has not yet been exercised100.
This adequate proposal could in fact clarify the limits of the ECJ’s 
activity in order to avoid the Union’s federalization, one of the fears 
maintained by the States that voted against the Charter and claimed a 
guarantee of their national independence. This clarification is even more 
necessary now, when fundamental rights are becoming commonplace in 
almost every case brought before the ECJ.
In the relationship between internal courts and the ECJ, it would be 
better to have more fluent communications between Constitutional or 
Supreme Courts and the ECJ, through references for preliminary rulings. 
Historically, both Constitutional and Supreme Courts in Member States 
have been very reluctant to encourage preliminary rulings from the ECJ, 
at times claiming that it was not their role (which was limited to the 
application and interpretation of internal law and the Constitution), and 
other times upholding the “acte clair”101 theory as a way of avoiding the 
99 Also, Art. 352 TFEU allows competences to be extended if necessary to fulfil the 
objectives pursued. Nevertheless, the method used to achieve this (Council unanimity 
and prior approval from the European Parliament) represents a guarantee against the 
Union’s ultra vires conduct.
100 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 30 September 2010, Case 
C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano, paras. 162-163.
101 “The correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for 
any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved. 
Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court or tribunal 
must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other member 
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reference. In most cases, this merely indicated their wish to assert their 
independence and supremacy within the State102.
In other cases, the conflict arises from the duality between an issue of 
unconstitutionality and a preliminary ruling, and what instrument should 
be used by internal jurisdictional bodies (or which has priority) in the event 
of a conflict between internal and European law103. However, a dialogue 
or relationship between the Courts is currently more important in order to 
secure a common understanding about the interpretation of rights, whilst 
preserving individual constitutional traditions; a more comprehensive 
common interpretation is provided, but some deeply-rooted constitutional 
traditions may be swept away: “Only over time, as more conversations 
take place, will it be possible to reach a broad consensus. Dialogue cannot 
determine the substantive outcome in advance. It will always depend on 
the particular community in which it takes place”104.
Occasionally these traditions have been interpreted as remains of 
former prejudices, with European law being contemplated as a way of 
overcoming this105; at other times, national peculiarities are interpreted 
differently and may reaffirm the protection of rights or, at least, an 
alternative approach106. The enforcement by the ECJ must surpass any 
“margin of appreciation” (also claimed by the ECHR and the Strasbourg 
Court) and not consist of a “concession” to Member States. Rather, it 
should be used to create a common instrument for the protection of rights, 
states and to the Court of Justice. Only if those conditions are satisfied may the national 
court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take 
upon itself the responsibility for resolving it” (para. 16, Cilfit, Judgment 6 October 
1982, C-283/81).
102 Supra note 5 and Cartabia, op. cit., where it was accurately pointed out that “the 
constitutional courts are under the influence of the European Court of Justice even 
though they refuse to ask for preliminary rulings” (p. 29).
103 The primacy of EU law or the nature of the doubt does not prevent a conflict from 
arising. The ECJ’s position on the matter is made clear in the Melki case (C-188/10 and 
C-189/10, Judgment 22 June 2010), which resolved an application for a preliminary 
ruling filed by the Cour de Cassation (France), when the question of constitutionality 
(question prioritaire de constitutionnalité) was still new, before the Constitutional 
Council. In particular, see paras. 45, 49 and 57. Spanish Constitutional Court Judgments 
58/2004, 194/2006 and 78/2010 also examined the unconstitutionality-preliminary 
ruling duality.
104 Torres Pérez, Aida, Conflicts of rights in the European Union. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, p. 111. The ECJ counts on many sources to find out various 
opinions and legal systems: General Advocate opinions, national courts, European 
institutions, Member States, parties to the suit (all of whom may file references to the 
ECJ), as well as its own research service (Ibid., pp. 162 and ff).





though allowing other points of view and diversity, insofar as not contrary 
to European law and common values.
Furthermore, not only may a catalogue of rights and its specific 
protective devices affect the relationship between various forms of 
protection, but of consideration also is the country’s judicial structure 
itself. Of relevance here are the already stated “confrontations” between 
constitutional courts and the ECJ – in which there is a greater tendency to 
raise a conflict in the case of constitutional courts, due to their presumed 
role as guarantors of constitutionally recognised rights and their 
protection – but there is also a wish for a better integration of European 
law or more fluent relations between internal courts and the ECJ107. 
A fluent relationship between the various parties would, in turn, enable a 
more comprehensive interpretation of fundamental rights. 
As illustrated above, we know how the ECJ and ECtHR interact. 
However, we have to wait and see what role will now be played by the 
ECJ with a binding Charter and the entitlement that this Charter would 
offer the Court. It is likely that the ECJ will become more active and try 
and avoid the European Union receiving a sanction from the ECtHR.
In the case of Spain, the Charter will not entail any significant change 
since the Spanish Constitution already includes a long catalogue of rights 
and has proven to provide sufficient internal protection. However, it may 
offer more security in the implementation of EU law and, perhaps, a 
harmonization or reaffirmation of certain fundamental rights. In any case, 
it would be useful to procure a more active role by the ordinary courts 
and the Spanish Constitutional Court, by using preliminary references as 
a way of allowing the ECJ to have a better understanding of how Spain 
protects its fundamental rights and establishing a true dialogue between 
the courts.
107 The number of preliminary rulings varies considerably between one State and another 
and, within a State, between one jurisdictional body and another. Of interest is the 
possibility of bringing an action due to a breach on the part of the State, if the breach is 
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Introduction: Aim and Subject
This paper focuses on controversial aspects of the right to self-
determination. Its context is a general debate on the dialectic between 
internal and external self-determination within a framework of plurality 
and identity management. With this in mind, the paper seeks to provide 
insight into the basic theoretical aspects of the right to self-determination 
while also considering the political implications of these challenges.
The right to self-determination is an important topic when reflecting 
on the nature and legal accommodations of pluralist societies. Following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, collective identities and national 
conflicts re-emerged in different parts of the European continent. 
References to self-determination in several of these situations have 
varied from rhetorical to substantial. The main hypothesis of this paper 
is that prevailing theories on self-determination lack a significant degree 
of consistency, particularly in terms of the characterisation of self-
determination as a human right.
Such a topic cannot be studied solely from a juridical standpoint; it 
is an area in which politics and the law are interdependent. It is obvious 
that collective identities revealed through political choices, opinions and 
strategies are closely related not only to ideologies but also to a sense 
of belonging and subjective identification. In this context, law must be 
approached from a global perspective, with contributions from the fields 
of politics, anthropology, sociology, history and geography. As Falk 
noted, the right to self-determination has matured along three distinct but 
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often overlapping and sometimes uneven and confusing paths: morality, 
politics and law1.
Furthermore, any discussion of the idea of self-determination is not 
only complex, but also extremely sensitive. Even when discussed within 
academic and intellectual realms, there is a high level of sensitivity to 
any political or legal debate related to collective identities, deep fears 
and perceived threats. One of the most difficult aspects of reflecting on 
this topic is that it may challenge the assumptions of the status quo. It 
may also create a deep sense of insecurity and instability, which appears 
incompatible with the essence of law2. The rational management of these 
emotional reactions appears to be a difficult task, but it is a necessary step 
in the process of creating a more democratic culture.
The goal of this study is to identify the concrete aspects of the theory 
and practice of self-determination that may be challenged and to offer 
possible criteria for interpretation. This study does not refer to particular 
cases where a reference to self-determination is at the centre of the 
debate; rather, it seeks a more coherent (and, consequently, more useful) 
approach to this right. The establishment of some general criteria may 
aid in eliminating the fears and threats that arise in particular debates. 
Identifying the problematic aspects of this right that need further reflection 
makes sense from the perspective of self-determination as a legal and 
political instrument of conflict prevention and management aiming to 
foster peaceful and democratic solutions for today’s governance.
1. The Right to Self-determination as a Human Right
The right to self-determination means the right of peoples to 
determine “in full freedom when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as 
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development”3. 
As a right, it can be understood formally as a legally protected interest. 
1 Falk, Richard, “Self-Determination under International Law: The Coherence of 
Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience” in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber (ed.), 
The Self-Determination of Peoples. Community, Nation and State in an Interdependent 
World, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 42.
2 Again, following Falk, “what makes the right to self-determination so difficult to 
clarify is that its exercise involves a clash of fundamental world order principles. On 
the one side is the basic geopolitical norm that the existing array of states is close to the 
maximum that can be accommodated within existing diplomatic frameworks. […] On 
the other side of self-determination is the sense that peoples should be treated equally 
and that since some peoples have the benefit of statehood, others should be entitled as 
well” (Ibid., p. 31).
3 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Helsinki Final 
Act), 14 ILM 1292, Part VIII.
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From a material point of view, however, it is obvious that the context 
determines the effective degree of liberty with which this right can be 
exerted by its holder. In practice, no collective entity may enjoy an 
unlimited right to decide its own status. Nevertheless, the fact that a 
formal reading of the right does not correspond to the material or real 
capacity of its exercise is not exclusive of this particular right, nor of 
any other human right.
The human right of peoples to self-determination is firmly established 
in contemporary international law. Using a diachronic perspective, 
Obieta distinguishes four steps in the evolution of self-determination in 
international law. The idea of self-determination was already consolidated 
in the first decades of the twentieth century, evolving partially from the 
previous principle of nationalities. During the interwar period, self-
determination was not incorporated into the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, although it was partially implemented and was regarded as 
a political principle, not a rule of international law4. The second phase 
began in 1945 with the approval of the Charter of the United Nations, 
in which self-determination is expressly mentioned in articles 1, 2 and 
55. Thus, it can already be seen as a legal principle and not merely as 
a political idea. The third significant step was taken when the General 
Assembly approved Resolution 1514 in 19605. In this document, self-
determination was considered not only as a legal principle, but also as a 
right of colonised peoples. Finally, the signing in 1966 of the International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the enforcement of these ten years later, represented 
the final step toward recognising the right to self-determination for all 
peoples6.
Thus, from its beginning as a political principle, self-determination 
evolved in a short period of time to the much higher rank of a human 
right, providing this idea with a completely different understanding 
in international law. The right has been incorporated into the most 
prominent instruments protecting human rights and, through these, into 
various domestic legal systems. Furthermore, attaining the status of a 
human right elevates the importance of this inalienable right7. Its nature 
4 The League of Nations Commission of Jurists did not consider the relevant practice 
sufficient to consider the principle of self-determination a positive rule of the Law of 
Nations (League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement nº 3, 1920, p. 5).
5 UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Granting of Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
6 Obieta Chalbaud, Jose Antonio, El derecho humano de la autodeterminación de los 
pueblos, Madrid, Tecnos, 1985, pp. 103-104.




is clearly collective because its holder (all peoples) must be a collective 
entity. In fact, it is probably the only right for which its collective nature 
can be defended with no possible challenge. This collective element, 
however, when compared to individual human rights, implies that its 
legal application will be much more challenging to enforce.
Theoretically, as a human right, self-determination did not even need 
to be incorporated into the Covenants to become legally binding for 
all actors. However, its placement as the first article of both Covenants 
reinforces its importance in the system of human protection. Self-
determination has thus been defined as an integral component of human 
dignity. According to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
Its realization is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and 
observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and 
strengthening of those rights. It is for that reason that States set forth the right 
of self-determination in a provision of positive law in both Covenants and 
placed this provision as article 1 apart from and before all of the other rights 
in the two Covenants8.
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrim-
ination reaffirms that “the right to self-determination of peoples is a 
fundamental principle of international law”9. Furthermore, the human 
right to self-determination of all peoples is part of the so-called ius 
cogens in international law. This means that it cannot be disposed of by 
the States. At the same time, this right generates obligations erga omnes, 
as the International Court of Justice has stated10. Of course, this creates 
obligations for the members of the international community. Thus, States 
have the duty to “promote the right to self-determination of peoples”, 
and the promotion of self-determination “requires every State to promote, 
through joint and separate action, universal respect for and observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations”11. States are also obliged to report on this active 
promotion to the Human Rights Committee through constitutional and 
political processes12 because “the realization of and respect for the right 
of self-determination of peoples contributes to the establishment of 
8 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment N° 12, The right to self-
determination of peoples (Art. 1), 13 March 1984, para. 1.
9 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
General Recommendation Nº 21, Right to self-determination, 23 August 1996, Doc. 
A/51/18, para. 2.
10 International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgement of 
30-06-1995, ICJ Reports (1995), p. 102.
11 UN CERD, op. cit., para. 3.
12 UN Human Rights Committee, op. cit., para. 4.
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friendly relations and cooperation between States and to strengthening 
international peace and understanding”13.
While the existence and validity of the (human) right to self-
determination have been established in international law, bitter debates 
arise when it is used as a means of legitimating different (or even 
contradictory) political aspirations. International practice in recent 
decades has shown that the decolonisation process was not the final point 
of territorial distribution of political entities. Although the international 
community tends to reject any further aspirations to statehood, through 
self-determination or any other means, the generous recognition of this 
(human) right carries within it seeds for radical – and even revolutionary – 
change. The main concern regarding self-determination is, of course, 
that it can lead to the erosion, division or fragmentation of existing 
states. Nevertheless, as a human right, self-determination should be 
fundamentally regarded as an instrument for conflict prevention and for 
the democratic management of diversity. This leads the discussion of self-
determination to a focus on the concrete elements of the right.
As the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights states, 
“All peoples have the right to self-determination. There may, however, be 
controversy as to the definition of peoples and the content of the right”14. 
Indeed, the entitlement of the right and its scope are the two elements 
on which the current debates on self-determination are focused. These 
controversies about the definition of peoples and the content of the right 
will be dealt with in the subsequent subchapters.
2. Questions about the Holder of the Right
Article 1 of both international covenants on human rights is clear in 
outlining that all peoples possess the right to self-determination. However, 
the legal notion of peoples’ actual entitlement to self-determination is 
ambiguous. To date, the practice of States has been to avoid conclusively 
defining the notion of a people15, and the same can be said with respect 
to international organisations. Therefore, we lack a legal definition of 
people, just as we lack definitions of a (national) minority, ethnic group, 
nationality, nation and other related concepts. The contemporary reality 
13 UN Human Rights Committee, ibid., para. 8.
14 African Commission on Human and People`s Rights, Katangese People’s Congress v. 
Zaire (communication 75/92), document ACHPR/RPT/8th Annex VI (1995), para. 3 
(hereinafter Kantangese People case).
15 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, p. 18, para. 70.
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of these entities may be too complicated to be shaped into a satisfactory 
literary definition. This results in uncertainty as to who is not entitled 
to this particular human right. This problem derives from the collective 
nature of this right as we do not face the same question with respect to 
individual human rights.
The concept of people is variable and contested in scope. The 
sociological use of the term is imprecise and not always consistent; thus, 
we hear references to the “Scottish people”, the “Andalusian people” or 
the “Roma people”. The term “people” can thus correspond to an ethno-
cultural conception of people or can merely refer to an administrative 
idea. At the same time, expressions such as “Spanish people” or “the 
people of Belgium” are also commonly used without clarifying whether 
they refer to the cultural or the legal (civic) definition of those peoples. 
Indeed, as is the case with the controversial concept of nations, either 
approach can be defended: a legal (civic) approach in which the people 
correspond to the entire population of a (democratic) state or a cultural 
approach in which several peoples live within the same state16.
In any case, state practices are not consistent, nor are the practices of 
international organisations. For instance, the United Nations Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, when commenting on the 
right to self-determination, included ambiguous references to other 
related entities, such as nationality or ethnicity, religious and linguistic 
minorities, and ethnic or linguistic groups17. Related cases like those of 
Bangladesh, Eritrea, Katanga or Biafra have led to different solutions by 
the United Nations General Assembly.
In fact, the differentiated sets of rights that the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights assigns to peoples (art. 1) and minorities 
(art. 27) would play in favour of a legal interpretation of the term peoples. 
This was, for instance, the position defended by New Zealand in the Apirana 
Mahuika case, arguing that “the rights in Article 1 attach to “peoples” of a 
state in their entirety, not to minorities, whether indigenous or not, within 
16 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has acknowledged the plural 
meaning of the concept of “nation” as it is used by European legal and political 
documents, recognising above all the two classic civic and cultural approaches. See 
Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1735 (2006), The concept of “nation”, 
adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2006 (7th Sitting). See Aurescu, Bogdan, 
“Cultural Nation versus Civic Nation: Which Concept for the Future Europe? 
A Critical Analysis of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1735 (2006) 
on The Concept of Nation”, European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Leiden-Boston, 
ECMI-Eurac Research, Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 2005/6, vol. 5, pp. 147-159.
17 UN CERD, op. cit., paras. 3 and 5.
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the borders of an independent and democratic state”18. This position has 
also been held by countries such as Serbia, Argentina or Russia19 in the 
proceedings of the International Court of Justice in relation to the legality 
of the unilateral declaration of independence for Kosovo. Thus, the whole 
population of a State constitutes a people, as does the whole population 
of each non-autonomous territory (i.e., colony), as defined in conformity 
with the principles enshrined in the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 1541. According to Pentassuglia, in general terms, this “whole 
people approach” is the dominant position20 and provides a high degree 
of certainty21.
In contrast, Obieta maintains that there has been a progressive and 
intentional confusion of the concepts of people and population in the 
international community. The latter corresponds to the group of persons 
who are subject to the personal jurisdiction of the state, while the former 
refers to any ethnic group having a territorial reference where the majority 
of its constituents live22. Obviously, the problem with this alternative 
approach to the idea of peoples is its uncertainty and the difficulties of 
delimiting the different possible peoples that may live in the same state. In 
any case, there may be other arguments in favour of this second position. 
One argument may be based on the correspondence between the 
object of the right (self-determination) and its holder. Thus, because self-
determination is characterised as a human right, it follows that when the 
process of self-determination is recognised and protected through law, the 
holders of such a right must be categorised as a people. In other words, 
no other holders of the right may exist. As Crawford notes, “At the root, 
the question of defining people concerns identifying the categories of 
territory to which the principle of self-determination applies as a matter 
of right”23. This reasoning suggests that European minorities (i.e., those 
not corresponding to the whole population of a state) enjoying an explicit 
or implicit right to self-determination must be recognised as peoples. This 
would be the case for Northern Ireland, according to the Good Friday 
18 UN Human Rights Committee, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand (Communication 
Nº 547/1993), decision of 25-7-2001; Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999, para. 7.6.
19 Although the Russian position leaves the door open for other interpretations.
20 Pentassuglia, Gaetano, Minorities in International Law, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 
2002, p. 163.
21 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009, para. 81.
22 Obieta Chalbaud, op. cit., p. 47.
23 Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed.), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 126.
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Agreement of 1998, or for the Gagauzian people in Moldova. More 
implicit formulations of this right could be appreciated in cases like the 
Faroe Islands, the Aland Islands, South Tyrol or Quebec.
A second argument in favour of the pluralist solution is the fact 
that some (European) legal systems recognise, in different terms and 
through relevant constitutional dispositions, the presence of peoples 
not corresponding to the whole population of the respective State. The 
point can be challenged in those cases where plurality is admitted for 
the concept of nation and not for the concept of people. For instance, 
the national plurality of the United Kingdom is widely accepted (“one 
country, four nations”), the Parliament of Canada has recognised Quebec 
as a distinct nation (within a united Canada), and the Russian Constitution 
enshrines the sovereignty of the “multinational people” of the Russian 
Federation (art. 1). Clearer legal recognitions of the existence of various 
peoples within the same State can be found in other legal documents, such 
as the Constitutions of the Russian Federation (arts. 68 and 69), Ukraine 
(art. 11), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Preamble), Norway (art. 110a) and Finland 
(art. 17). This is also the case in some relevant subnational constitutions 
and acts delineating autonomy, like the Autonomy Act of the Aland Islands 
of 1991, the Act on the Home Rule of the Faroe Islands of 1948 and some 
acts on autonomy (estatutos) of different Spanish regions, particularly the 
Basque Country and Valencia24 (in line with the reference to the “peoples 
of Spain” included in the Preamble of the 1978 Constitution). 
Insofar as these countries have not made any reservation or 
interpretation of the international covenants on human rights, the legal 
recognition of different peoples can easily be linked with the same term, 
as included in Article 1 of both international covenants25. Obviously, we 
could add to the list constitutional or legal references to the presence of 
indigenous peoples in other non-European countries.
In addition to the cases that may fit into the two previous arguments, 
the pluralist solution to the definition of people seems to have gained 
24 The mention of a particular people is also included in the Acts on Autonomy of Aragón, 
the Canary Islands and Andalusia.
25 The Netherlands opposes reservations or declarations formulated in response to the 
1966 Covenants with the aim of limiting the scope of the right to self-determination: 
“The Kingdom of the Netherlands has objected to such reservations or declarations, 
pointing out that any attempt to limit the scope of this right or to attach conditions 
not provided for in the relevant instruments undermines the concept of SD itself 
and thereby seriously weakens its universally acceptable character. Other States 
have entered similar objections”. International Court of Justice, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written 
Statement of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 17 April 2009, p. 12, para. 3.18.
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much ground. Thus, in its general recommendation on the right to self-
determination, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination refers to “all peoples within a State”, reflecting a 
position that clearly goes against the whole people approach26. Similarly, 
in the Katangese People’s Congress v. Zaire, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that there is a people of Katanga 
entitled to self-determination (although it is obliged to exercise it in a 
way compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire27). 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Canada’s well-known Quebec case 
recognised that “as the right to self-determination has developed by 
virtue of a combination of international agreements and conventions 
coupled with state practice, with little formal elaboration of the 
definition of ‘peoples’, the result has been that the precise meaning of 
the term ‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain”28. However, the Court 
concludes, “It is clear that ‘a people’ may include only a portion of the 
population of an existing state […]. The reference to ‘people’ does not 
necessarily mean the entirety of a state’s population”29. Moreover, the 
Court refers to “a common language and culture” as “characteristics 
that would be considered in determining whether a specific group is a 
‘people’”30.
Finally, the statement submitted by the Swiss government to the 
International Court of Justice in relation to Kosovo’s independence is 
noteworthy:
The right to self-determination applies to a collective that goes beyond a 
mere group of individuals. What binds a people is a shared consciousness 
or a common political will. This results from the exact nature of the right 
of peoples to self-determination which is a fundamental standard of the 
democratic State. Thus any effort to define the notion of a people entitled 
to self-determination in a conclusive, objective and scientifically observable 
manner is intrinsically contradictory31.
26 UN CERD, op. cit., para. 5.
27 Kantangese People case, para. 6.
28 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998), 2 SCR 217 
(Can), para.123 (hereinafter Quebec case).
29 Ibid., para. 124.
30 Ibid., para. 125.
31 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, p. 19, para. 71.
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3. Questions about the Scope of the Right:  
Internal and External Aspects
The extent of the right to self-determination also remains a matter 
of dispute. As in the case of the issue of rights holders, this may be due 
to the lack of peaceful theoretical development regarding the exercise 
of this right, which has been subjected to excessive political debate and 
contradictory aspirations.
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, held in Helsinki in 1975, recognised the right of peoples to 
self-determination. It explained its content as the right of peoples to 
determine, when and as they wish, in full freedom, “their internal and 
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as 
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development”32 
(emphasis added). 
This reference to the external and internal aspects of the right is 
common within international references pertaining to the scope of this 
controversial right, although the descriptions of these aspects are not 
homogenous. Thus, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination maintains:
The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, that is to say, 
the rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural 
development without outside interference. In that respect there exists a link 
with the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs 
at any level, as referred to in article 5 (c) of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In consequence, 
Governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to 
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.
On the other hand, “the external aspect of self-determination implies 
that all peoples have the right to determine freely their political status and 
their place in the international community based upon the principle of 
equal rights and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from colonialism 
and by the prohibition to subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination 
and exploitation”33.
In the European institutional framework, the Venice Commission also 
distinguishes between internal and external aspects of self-determination. 
According to this advisory body, “[t]he internal aspect defines the right 
of peoples freely to determine their political status and to pursue their 
cultural, social and economic development. The external status refers to 
32 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, op. cit.
33 UN CERD, op. cit., para. 4.
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the right of peoples freely to determine their place in the international 
community of states”34.
The Supreme Court of Canada also referred to this division in its 
Quebec case, defining internal self-determination as “a people’s pursuit 
of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the 
framework of an existing state” and external self-determination as “the 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association 
or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other 
political status freely determined by a people”35.
In fact, this last reference reflects the possibilities foreseen in United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 262536 as possible outcomes of 
the exercise of self-determination37, although the resolution does not 
establish whether they correspond to the external or internal elements 
of the right. Similarly, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights asserts: “Self-determination can be exercised giving path to 
different results like independence, self-government, local government, 
federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations 
that accords with the wishes of the people (but fully cognizant of other 
recognized principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity)”38.
The distinction between an internal and an external aspect of the right to 
self-determination is also present in many analyses of doctrine. The most 
exhaustive description of the content of the right to self-determination is 
the one offered by Obieta some decades ago. Following this author39, the 
self-determination right includes the following faculties or aspects:
1.  Self-affirmation or self-qualification: the group expresses itself as 
a people. 
2.  Self-definition, or a personal element: the people determines who 
its members are. 
34 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), “Self-
determination and secession on constitutional law”, 10-11 December 1999, Doc. 
CDL-INF (2000) 2.
35 Quebec case, para. 126.
36 UN General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 (Declaration on Friendly 
Relations).
37 These three possibilities had already been included in the previous UN General 
Assembly’s Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not 
an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under article 73e of the 
Charter, GA Res. 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960, but restricted to the decolonization 
process.
38 Kantangese People case, para. 4.
39 Obieta Chalbaud, op. cit., pp. 64-78.
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3.  Self-delimitation, or a territorial element: the people determines 
the limits of its own territory, if necessary, through referenda.
4.  Self-disposition, or a formal element: the political power of the 
people. It has two sides corresponding to its internal organisation 
and its relations with the outside world: 
  a.  Internal: the ability to provide the people with the government 
it desires.
  b.  External: the ability to determine the people’s status in relation to 
other peoples. According to General Assembly Resolution 2625, 
in international law this can lead to three possible outcomes:
   i. Integration within an existing State.
      ii.   Association/union with other peoples to create a common 
State.
        iii.  Secession to create a new independent State.
When describing the content of the right to self-determination, most 
analysts focus on what Obieta calls “self-disposition”. There seems to be 
a consensus on the possibility of distinguishing an internal and an external 
element within the right of self-determination. However, it cannot be said 
that there is consensus about the meaning of this division.
For most authors, the distinction between internal and external 
self-determination refers to the outcome of the exercise of this right. 
In this sense, Raic states, “[e]xternal self-determination is a mode of 
implementation of the right to self-determination through the formation 
of an independent state, the integration in or association with a third 
state […] It is this feature of external self-determination which forms an 
important distinction with respect to internal self-determination”40.
Cassese also refers to secession as “the most radical form of external 
self-determination”41, which implies that there may be other forms of 
external self-determination that differ from secession. However, in other 
cases, the external aspect of self-determination seems to be restricted 
to access to independence. Hannum makes a distinction between the 
possibility of achieving freedom from a former colonial power (external 
self-determination) and the independence of the whole state’s population 
from foreign intervention or influence (internal self-determination)42. 
40 Raic, David, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination‎, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
international, 2002, p. 289.
41 Cassese, Antonio, Self Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 120.
42 Hannum, Hurst, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: the Accommodation 
of Conflicting Rights, revised edition, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1996, p. 49.
165
On the (Human) Rights to Self-Determination and National Conflicts 
This also seems to be the opinion of Beaufort, for whom internal 
self-determination is the right of a nation, already constituted as a state, to 
choose its own form of government and to determine according to its own 
views the course of its policies without interference by others. However, 
for this author, external self-determination means the right of a group 
that considers itself a nation to form a state on its own. A third possibility 
is cited by Roethof: regional self-determination, the right of a nation in 
a multinational state or part of a nation to obtain an autonomous status 
within that state. According to this tripartite division, both the internal and 
external aspects constitute international relations and would be regulated 
by international law, whereas regional self-determination is a matter of 
domestic affairs regulated by constitutional law43.
In other cases, the scope or focus of the internal/external distinction 
is not clearly linked with the outcomes of the exercise of the right. 
Pentassuglia emphasises, “The internal dimension to self-determination 
is concerned with the relationship between a people and its own state or 
government”44. Rosas contends that the internal aspect is composed of 
three layers:
1.  The right of the people to constitute its own political system 
(constituent power).
2.  The right of the people to have a say in amending the Constitution, 
including the right to resistance against tyranny and oppression.
3.  The right of the people to govern and to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, including participation in elections, referenda and 
so on.
Moreover, for Rosas, “The idea of internal self-determination as a 
principle of public international law is a challenge to the traditional inter-
state paradigm, as it may imply a collective human right enjoyed by the 
population of a state against the sovereign state”45.
This division between the internal and external aspects of self-
determination has also been challenged. Jamilah Koné criticises Cassese’s 
assertion that the problem of territorial integrity comes into play only in 
cases of “external” self-determination, whereas disputes over “internal” 
self-determination merely threaten public order. According to Koné, 
“The difference between the two types of self-determination may not 
43 Belfort and Roethof as quoted in Haro F. Van Panhuys (ed.), International Law in The 
Netherlands, vol. 3, The Hague, Sijthoff and Noordhoff Oceana, 1980, pp. 151-152.
44 Pentassuglia, op. cit., p. 161.
45 Rosas, Allan, “Internal self-determination” in Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law 
of Self-Determination, Dordrecht, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 227.
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be as clear-cut as Cassese seems to believe”46. Another critical author is 
James Anaya, who challenges this internal/external distinction because 
it is based in a Western conception of the international community as 
a Westphalian order of exclusive domains. Anaya prefers to speak of a 
“constitutive element” of self-determination, referring to the moments 
at which the institutions of a people are constituted or modified, and 
an “ongoing element”, which refers to the shape and function of these 
institutions47.
In any case, the internal/external dichotomy has failed to achieve 
enduring and consistent success. During the 1980s, the idea of limiting self-
determination to its internal aspect to exclude the possibility of changing 
internationally established borders gained support. However, this does 
not mean that the international community has adopted proactive policies 
in favour of internal self-determination processes or a clear definition of 
other possible outcomes of this right.
As Falk recognises, “There is no assured or necessary link between 
exercising the right to self-determination and a particular outcome”48. If 
the idea is to divide the content of the right to exclude the possibility of 
secession as a legitimate outcome (at least under “normal” circumstances), 
then it would be necessary to link any other political solution to internal 
self-determination. However, some analyses include other options (such 
as integration or free association) within the external aspect because they 
focus on the exercise and not on the outcome.
This reflects a duality in the criteria used to construct the two 
dimensions of self-determination. On the one hand, the division can 
refer to what Obieta calls “self-disposition”, in other words, the level 
of political relations (ad intra or ad extra) effected on each side. On the 
other hand, it can refer to the outcome of the right in terms of international 
versus domestic consequences. Thus, if a given people exercises its 
right to self-determination by freely deciding on its integration (e.g., 
permanence) in the State through a territorial autonomy system, those 
following the first criterion would consider this a manifestation of the 
external element (i.e., the relation between the people holding the right 
and other peoples living in the same state). In contrast, those following 
the criterion of the outcome would see the result as an example of internal 
self-determination.
46 Jamilah Kone, Elizabeth, “The Right of Self-Determination in the Angolan Enclave of 
Cabinda”, Paper presented at the Sixth Annual African Studies Consortium Workshop, 
October 1998, [Online]: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/kone98.html.
47 Anaya, James, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, pp. 78-81.
48 Falk, op cit., p. 50.
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In summary, it is necessary to clarify the meaning and legitimacy of 
the distinction between internal and external self-determination. From 
the point of view of the final political outcome of a self-determination 
process, it may be relevant to differentiate between the exercise of the 
right in a manner that preserves international boundaries and those cases 
that involve a change of international boundaries. However, from another 
perspective, a given right should be structured based on its object or its 
constituting faculties. Seen from this perspective, the internal aspect can 
only refer to the way a given community organises itself ad intra and 
among its members. On the contrary, the ability to decide its political 
status in relation to other peoples composes the external element of 
the right, regardless of the particular outcome chosen in each case 
(integration, limited autonomy or secession, among others). In the first 
perspective, there is a risk of confusing the content of the right with a 
de facto situation derived from its exercise, particularly if no progress is 
made in defining standards of internal self-determination. For this reason, 
the second option can be seen as more correct from a methodological 
perspective.
4. Prevailing Interpretations and Problematic Issues
It is not surprising that the most sensitive aspect of the right to self-
determination is the possible effect on the territorial integrity of the state, 
including the hypothetical redefinition of borders. The main concern 
for many states, and consequently for international organisations, is to 
limit secession as a legitimate outcome of the right to self-determination. 
Potential cases of secession and the redefinition of boundaries are normally 
regarded as elements affecting the necessary stability of the international 
order. This is the main argument raised by international documents and 
qualified opinions in favour of severely reducing the likelihood of these 
outcomes. Once self-determination is internationally recognised as a 
human right of all peoples, this aim may be achieved in two different 
ways: on the one hand, by restricting the definition of people to exclude 
as much as possible this condition of “less-than-total-population-of-the-
state groups”; on the other hand, by restricting the content of the right by 
limiting its exercise or the possible outcomes of its exercise.
In this context, a general but diffuse approach to the right to self-
determination prevails, in which there are certain restrictive conditions 
that may legitimate the external aspect of the exercise of self-determination 
and even more restrictive conditions to justify secession as a legitimate 
outcome. In parallel, the people, as the holder of this right, are normally 
restricted to the total population of the state, the remaining colonised 
peoples and a very limited number of specific situations. Nevertheless, 
the existing interpretations of the right to self-determination are not 
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consistent, even among those provided by European states. Therefore, 
further clarification of the different aspects of self-determination remains 
necessary to move toward a more solid theory of this collective human 
right. This paper will try to identify some of these controversies using a 
systematic approach.
4.1. Issues concerning the Holder of the Right
4.1.1. The “Whole People” Approach
The first option considered holds that only the total population of an 
existing state may qualify as a people under international law. It is well 
established in international law that colonised units, defined in conformity 
with the principles enshrined in General Assembly Resolution 1541, 
constitute peoples and holders of the right to self-determination. This 
complements the whole people approach. Given the fact that almost all 
formerly colonised peoples have gained independence, in practical terms, 
this affirms the argument that only the population of an independent state 
can be considered a people in the sense of the International Covenants on 
Human Rights49.
However, this position contradicts other logical stands. First, it means 
denying the legal existence of indigenous peoples, who would be treated, 
at best, as indigenous populations; this is a tendency that is not consistent 
with the latest developments in this field. Second, this position would 
make it easy to identify the list of peoples existing at a given moment 
because it would be equivalent to a list of states or colonised territories. In 
this case, it would not make sense to distinguish the content of the right to 
self-determination depending on the outcome of its exercise. Those who 
restrict external self-determination to particular circumstances would 
find no cause to deny this possibility because all holders would already 
be independent or would be entitled to independence following General 
Assembly Resolutions 1514, 1541 and 2625. This would make the right 
to self-determination duplicative and superfluous. 
Finally, if a remedial consideration of the exercise of self-determination 
(see below) for groups that do not correspond to the total population of 
the state is considered, it must be clarified that the entitlement to a human 
right cannot be determined by the violation of the same right or other 
human rights. This means that the condition of people as a holder of a 
49 This narrow sense of the term people in international law is defended by the Republic 
of Argentina: International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Comments of the 
Argentine Republic, 17 July 2009, p. 27, para. 61.
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human right cannot “appear and disappear” depending on the behaviour 
of external actors. Human rights must be held continuously as long as the 
holder of the right exists. In other words, the exercise of a human right 
does not create the right or the holder of the right. Even if we favour 
the remedial approach, it cannot be defended logically that a particular 
kind of people arises suddenly when massive human rights violations 
take place against such an entity50. By the same logic, the existence of 
that people would disappear upon reaching a satisfactory situation. As 
this does not happen in other human rights categories, when taking a 
remedial approach, the holder of the right(s) must be previously defined 
and recognised.
The strict “whole people” approach does not convincingly address 
these objections and therefore must be rejected at the current stage. 
There is a growing consensus that “the right to self-determination does 
not apply exclusively in the context of decolonization”51. In accordance 
with the correspondence between the right and its holder, this implies that 
there are holders other than colonised peoples and state populations. As 
the Supreme Court of Canada state:
It is clear that “a people” may include only a portion of the population of 
an existing state. […] The reference to “people” does not necessarily mean 
the entirety of a state’s population. To restrict the definition of the term to 
the population of existing states would render the granting of a right to 
self-determination largely duplicative […] and would frustrate its remedial 
purpose52.
4.1.2. The “Plurality of Peoples” Approach
If the previous position is shown to be contradictory for the current 
state of international law, then it is necessary to invoke the opposite 
opinion: that it is possible to find different kinds of peoples in the 
international community apart from the existing states’ populations and 
colonised peoples. First, it must be admitted that in several cases the 
50 In this respect, the position expressed by the Argentine Republic in the Kosovo 
consultative opinion makes sense when it states, “Argentina has asserted that […] 
grave violations of human rights do not transform a group of individuals into a people 
entitled to self-determination, although other important rights are granted to minorities 
and other groups”, International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Comments of the 
Argentine Republic, 17 July 2009, p. 26, para. 59.
51 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion of 9-7-2004); Separate Opinion of 
Judge Higgings, ICJ reports 2004, at 214, paras. 29-30.
52 Quebec case paras. 113 and 124.
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legal system, either international or domestic, recognises the existence 
of differentiated peoples within a given state. Indigenous peoples can be 
added to the list of generally recognised groups without much difficulty 
under the plurality of peoples approach.
Problems arise, however, because these previously enumerated 
groups do not represent the entirety of possible peoples existing in the 
international community. This ambiguity makes it difficult to establish 
guiding principles to aid in identifying additional peoples. International 
and constitutional comparative law should attempt to define these criteria 
along democratic lines. I will return to this point later when reflecting on 
the concept of “national conflicts”. 
At this point, it is appropriate to move forward in the critical analysis 
of the positions expressed by different actors, specifically addressing the 
correspondence between the consideration of a people and the entitlement 
to, or exercise of, the right in itself. In this respect, the following possible 
opinions arise:
A) The right to self-determination only corresponds to some peoples, 
and excludes others. In other words, only some peoples (i.e., those 
corresponding to the total population of the state or to colonised units) 
are entitled to the right to self-determination.
This position must be discouraged from the very beginning because it 
is in manifest violation of Article 1 of both Covenants on Human Rights, 
which clearly refer to “all peoples”. Including the term “all” in the article 
eliminates any possibility of developing an interpretation by which only 
some peoples should enjoy that right. The same can be said regarding the 
creation of different categories of peoples with respect to the entitlement 
to this (human) right. Any contrary position would constitute a violation 
of the covenants and of a basic principle of international law. Once the 
existence of a people is recognised, the human nature of this right requires 
that all holders of this right be considered equal. This position is backed 
by the Swiss government’s statement, “The right to self-determination 
is closely linked with the principle of equality. All peoples possess this 
right to the same extent. It cannot be granted to one people but denied to 
another in a selective manner on subjective grounds”53.
Nevertheless, an international legal document, the International Labour 
Organization Convention nº 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries, subscribes to this position when it states in 
53 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, p. 19, para. 71.1.
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Article 1.3, “The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be 
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach 
to the term under international law”. The clause is intended to avoid any 
implications with respect to the right to self-determination, but, as has been 
said, it is logically inconsistent and contrary to the law in force, since in 
any legal system, the use of a technical term having legal implications and 
the simultaneous denial of these same implications should be avoided. In 
addition to being confusing, this creates a legal problem. In any case, having 
characterised self-determination as a human right, the clause can also 
be considered void insofar as these rights are inalienable and not subject 
to disposition. Finally, it must be argued that with respect to indigenous 
peoples, this clause must be considered outdated by the approval of Article 
3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
which was adopted in September 2007. 
B) The right to self-determination only corresponds to some peoples 
according to particular circumstances. This position entails a remedial 
consideration of the right to self-determination in the case of some 
categories of peoples.
In fact, this position is similar to the previous one. It adds the 
possibility of recognising new holders of the right given some particular 
circumstances. Unlike case 1.1., this implies a recognition that the 
holders of the rights existed as recognised peoples before the violations 
occurred. Nevertheless, refusal to extend the right of self-determination 
to all peoples again violates Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants, as 
in the previous hypothesis.
C) The right to self-determination attaches to all peoples, but its 
content may be different for different categories of peoples according to 
particular circumstances; or its exercise may be limited for peoples in 
particular contexts.
In a general overview of the institutional and academic positions on the 
right to self-determination, this is the most commonly defended position. 
The main concern about self-determination is the potential political 
consequences of the exercise of this right. We know that “the right to 
self-determination is sufficiently broad to include a multitude of choices, 
including but not limited to independence, depending on the particular 
circumstances of each case”54. According to United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions 1541 and 2625, the possible outcomes of self-
determination are emergence as a sovereign independent State; the free 
association of a people with an independent State; or the integration of 
54 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion of 16-10-1975), 
ICJ Reports 1975, at 33.
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the people with an independent State. Similarly, the African Commission 
on Human and People’s Rights points out that self-determination can 
lead to “independence, self-government, local government, federalism, 
confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords with 
the wishes of the people”55.
However, there are many opinions in agreement on limiting some of 
these possible outcomes for specific holders and concrete circumstances. 
In very general terms, this prevailing position suggests that the possibility 
of secession (which some positions fully identify with external self-
determination) is an option limited to the peoples of former colonies, 
peoples submitted to foreign occupation or oppressed peoples who 
are denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, 
economic, social and cultural development56.
Indeed, during the 1980s, the idea of limiting self-determination to 
internal outcomes and thus excluding the possibility of secession gained 
support. This has been broadly identified with the distinction between 
internal and external elements of the right to self-determination. However, 
the dichotomy focuses on the consequences of its exercise more than 
on the real elements of the right itself, distinguishing those affecting 
previous international boundaries from other solutions at the domestic 
level. In any case, this “internal” interpretation of self-determination 
prevails57, although others state that this approach cannot be considered 
fully accepted58. This prevailing approach must be analysed from the 
point of view of the content of the right to self-determination rather than 
from the point of view of the entitlement of this right.
4.2. Issues concerning the Content or Exercise of the Right
4.2.1. “All-Possible-Outcomes” Self-Determination Cases
For some categories of holders of the right to self-determination, all 
possible outcomes are legitimately recognised. These holders enjoy what 
could be considered a “full” or “unlimited” right to self-determination.
55 Kantangese People case, para. 4.
56 See, for instance, Quebec case, para. 138.
57 Narrow interpretation according to Cardenas, Emilio and Maria Fernanda Cañas, 
“The Limits of Self-Determination” in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber (ed.), The Self-
Determination of Peoples. Community, Nation and State in an Interdependent World, 
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 111.
58 Tomuschat, Christian, “Democratic Pluralism: the Right to Political Opposition” in 
Allan Rosas and Jan Hegelsen (eds.), The Strength of Diversity: Human Rights and 
Pluralist Democracy, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 39.
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A) Peoples corresponding to the total population of the State
Peoples that already have their own independent and internationally 
recognised state enjoy their right to self-determination with no restrictions. 
Doubts may arise concerning the peoples of states that are not widely 
recognised, such as Kosovo, Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus and South 
Ossetia, among others. 
B)  Peoples for whom the right to self-determination  
is expressly recognised
No problem arises when the right to self-determination is legally 
recognised without clear restrictions on other peoples. This possibility 
can be foreseen in international treaties or in domestic legal documents. 
It implies the consent of the states concerned. Thus, for instance, the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
established that discouraging any self-determination outcome that may 
“dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States […] does not, however, exclude 
the possibility of arrangements reached by free agreements of all parties 
concerned”59. Cases like Northern Ireland, Gagauzia, New Caledonia or 
the different Ethiopian peoples would fit into this category.
C) Peoples under colonial domination
Colonised peoples, as defined in conformity with the principles 
of General Assembly Resolution 1541, are recognised as having the 
right to self-determination, including all possible outcomes foreseen in 
Resolution 2625. In fact, it must be admitted that it was decolonisation 
that enshrined the right to self-determination in international law because, 
based on the strict version of the whole people approach, the formulation 
of self-determination could have been regarded as duplicative.
However, it must also be clarified that decolonisation and self-
determination do not correspond to one another in all cases. On the one 
hand, self-determination is not the only way that decolonisation may 
proceed; territorial retrocession is another option that applies in specific 
circumstances. On the other hand, the exercise of self-determination 
cannot be restricted to the colonial context60. As Obieta argues, reducing 
self-determination to the colonial liberation process denaturalises this 
right, transforming it from a right of the people to freely decide their 
political status to a right of the states to their own territory61.
59 UN CERD, op. cit., para. 6.
60 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Document A/CONF.157/23, 
12 July 1993; Spilipoulou Akermark, Athanasia, Justification of Minority Protection in 
International Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, p. 30.
61 Obieta Chalbaud, op. cit., p. 56.
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D) Occupied peoples or peoples subjected to alien domination
People subjected to alien domination are entitled to exercise self-
determination, including all of its possible outcomes, with the aim of 
removing the illegitimate domination. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
says, “The other clear case where a right to external self-determination 
accrues is where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation outside a colonial context. This recognition finds its roots 
in the Declaration on Friendly Relations” (United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 2625)62.
This category implicitly refers to peoples subjected to alien domination 
(excluding those under colonial domination, who fit into the previous 
category). Similarly, we do not include here peoples subjugated by the 
same state where they have traditionally lived, as this group comprises 
the majority of the following category.
E) Oppressed or unrepresented peoples
Justices Wildhaber and Ryssdal from the European Court of Human 
Rights stated:
Until recently in international practice the right to self-determination was in 
practical terms identical to, and indeed restricted to, a right to decolonization. 
In recent years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also 
exercise a right to self-determination if their human rights are consistently 
and flagrantly violated or if they are without representation at all or are 
massively under-represented in an undemocratic and discriminatory way. If 
this description is correct, then the right to self-determination is a tool which 
may be used to re-establish international standards of human rights and 
democracy63.
This position is also expressed in a different way by Crawford, 
who recognises an additional category of people with the right to self-
determination: “Entities part of a metropolitan State but that have been 
governed in such a way as to make them in effect non-self-governing 
territories”, expressly quoting the cases of Bangladesh, Kosovo and 
Eritrea64.
In the aforementioned opinions, the right to self-determination is 
attached to peoples in these particular circumstances. This makes self-
determination in itself a remedial right, something that is difficult to admit 
from a human rights perspective. The prevailing position today is that 
62 Quebec case, para. 133.
63 European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey (judgement of 18-12-1996), 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Wildhaber, joined by Judge Ryssdal.
64 Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed.), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 126.
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peoples living in a context of oppression within their states may exercise 
their right to self-determination with no restriction in terms of possible 
outcomes. The Supreme Court of Canada reflects this widely accepted 
opinion when it states, “[t]he right to self-determination generates, at best, 
a right to external self-determination (i.e., independence) in situations 
[…] where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government 
to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development”65.
In this sense, the remedial element is not the right to self-determination, 
but a part of its content, or, even less than that, some possible outcomes 
of the external self-disposition. Those who identify external self-
determination with modification of international boundaries will consider 
this external aspect the remedial element. In attempting to gain a broader 
understanding of the external dimension of the right, we could restrict 
this remedial content to secession. The general formulation would be 
that “the right to self-determination does not amount to a general rule 
legitimising secession from an independent State. However, under 
exceptional circumstances, the right to self-determination gives rise to 
secession”66. However, it is true that the international community is not 
always consistent in dealing with the situations of peoples that may fit into 
this category. The cases of Bangladesh, Katanga, Biafra, Tibet, Kosovo 
and Chechnya have led to different considerations and solutions.
Finally, it should be clarified whether we are really admitting a full 
right to self-determination in favour of repressed peoples or, from another 
perspective, only a remedial right to secession arising in these critical 
situations67. The first option would imply the recognition of a human 
right in its entirety and, obviously, the recognition of a holder of this 
right. The second option would use secession as a remedy for specific 
political circumstances without linking it to a self-determination process. 
Although practical outcomes in particular cases may coincide with both 
possibilities, other kinds of consequences may diverge considerably.
F) Peoples belonging to a dismembering state
In the case of the disintegration of a state, the peoples living within 
the boundaries of that state may exercise their right to self-determination 
65 Quebec case, para. 138.
66 Musgrave, Thomas D., Self-Determination and National Minorities, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 76. Also, International Court of Justice, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Reply of 
the Government of the Republic of Albania, July 2009, p. 31, para. 55.
67 Okafor, Obiora Chinedu., “Entitlement, Process, and Legitimacy in the Emergent 
International Law of Secession”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 
vol. 9, nº 1, 2002, pp. 60 and ff.
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without restriction, leading to independence if that is the wish of 
the respective population. This rule may be derived from the recent 
experiences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. However, it is not clear if this rule can be applied to 
any country as the three given examples adopted a federal structure and 
included clearly established federated units.
It may also be disputed that, unlike secession, integration into 
another state may be a legitimate option in a dismembering state. From 
international practice, it seems clear that only previously adopted internal 
boundaries of federal units are admitted as new international boundaries. 
The application to the case of the principle of uti possidetis iuris makes it 
doubtful that one of the federal units could join a neighbour state instead 
of gaining independence. The Arbitration Commission of the Conference 
on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission) found that “it is well established 
that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must 
not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence 
(uti possidetis iuris) except where the States concerned agree otherwise”68. 
From that perspective, not all possible external outcomes would be 
admitted. 
International practice has shown reluctance to admit any alteration of 
the boundaries of the former federated units. It is also reluctant to extend 
this solution to other peoples living within second-level administrative 
units. This restrictive solution can be challenged because the former units 
accede to the first internal territorial level once the federated entity has 
gained independence, as the Kosovo case clearly shows69.
4.2.2. Limited Self-Determination Cases
According to the prevailing opinion, in the case of other peoples 
not included in the previous categories, the right to self-determination 
cannot be exercised in a manner that leads to secession or that affects 
international boundaries. This seems to be the dominant opinion in current 
international law, although there is still a significant degree of confusion 
around the problem of identifying the holder of the right and its material 
scope. Furthermore, there may be confusion between the right to self-
determination and a hypothetical remedial right to secession.
In any case, accepting the prevailing opinion as it has been 
described, a different set of theoretical and practical questions arise. To 
progressively build a solid and consistent theory of the human right to 
68 Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission), 
Opinion No.2 of 11 January 1992, 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1497.
69 Falk, op. cit., p. 35.
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self-determination, it would be necessary to seek a higher degree of legal 
certainty by addressing the following three remaining issues:
1. The justification of the distinction between unlimited and limited 
self-determination.
2. The identification of peoples entitled to (limited) self-determination.
3. The (substantial) content of the limited version of the right.
4.3.   The Justification of the Distinction between Unlimited and 
Limited Self-Determination
The idea of limiting the possible outcomes of the exercise of self-
determination in some cases is widely assumed in the international 
community. It is true that Article 1 of both Covenants establishes no 
restriction in this respect, but it is not unprecedented to fix limits and 
conditions for the exercise of a human right. Obviously, the exercise of 
self-determination can be limited, restricted or reduced to a given number 
of possible outcomes or options, but as with any other human right, this 
decision will consider the global context of the holder of the right. This 
does not mean that external self-determination is erased from the content 
of the right, but only that its exercise comes to be qualified. However, 
in the case of human rights, these limits or conditions should be clearly 
prescribed by law and justified as necessary to achieve a legitimate 
aim in a democratic society. In this respect, some countries have made 
reservations or declarations with regards to the 1966 Covenants with the 
aim of limiting the scope and holders of the right to self-determination. 
However, as the government of The Netherlands stated, “Any attempt to 
limit the scope of this right or to attach conditions not provided for in the 
relevant instruments undermines the concept of self-determination itself 
and thereby seriously weakens its universally acceptable character”70.
The main basis on which to justify the restriction of what some 
authors call “external self-determination” is respect for other principles 
of international law, such as the territorial integrity and political unity 
of independent states. This idea is contained in the so-called safeguard 
clause of General Assembly Resolution 2625, which states “Nothing in 
the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights 
70 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 17 April 2009, p. 12, para. 3.18.
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and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed 
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour”71.
The main justification for denying the possibility of affecting 
international borders in the exercise of the right to self-determination 
is the need for stability in the international order, which relates to the 
conservative nature of international law. From this viewpoint, any 
secession process (or even a partial modification of international borders) 
is regarded as an ultima ratio solution to problematic circumstances 
affecting other human rights or the right to self-determination. Thus, it 
is submitted that “the separation of a minority from the State of which it 
forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as 
an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either 
the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees”72. 
This last resort approach would also mean that external consequences 
of self-determination may be accrued only after “the exhaustion of all 
possible avenues aiming to restore a situation in which human rights are 
respected, including the right to internal self-determination”73. To defend 
a consistent position, it must be understood that it is not the right itself, or 
even the substantial content of the right, that is in question, but the way 
this right may be exercised by peoples living in circumstances other than 
those specified in the previous chapter.
4.4.   The Identification of Peoples Entitled to (Limited)  
Self-Determination
This second question is far more problematic than the previous one. 
Consistent with the previous findings, the concept of people in current 
international law corresponds to the total population of an independent 
state. However, clearly established criteria for a legal identification of other 
peoples are still lacking. If other peoples are entitled to self-determination 
in addition to indigenous peoples, it is necessary to establish a set of 
criteria or elements of interpretation to facilitate their identification. The 
idea of drafting commonly accepted criteria for identification of other 
71 Similar provisions were also foreseen in the World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993 (A/CONF.157/23, article 
I.2) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, General 
Assembly Resolution 61/295, 13 September 2007, article 46(1).
72 Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921), Official 
Journal, 1921, Suppl. nº 5, at 24.
73 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Comments addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, at 2, para. 7.
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peoples, similar to the attempt by General Assembly Resolution 1541 to 
identify colonised units, would clarify and facilitate the search for a more 
stable understanding of self-determination.
Furthermore, whether the concept of people should be static or 
dynamic must be determined. The possibility also exists that peoples may 
overlap in their composition and that the contemporary postmodern world 
may give rise to identities comprising multiple peoples. 
4.5.  The Scope of the Limited Version of the Right
We have already concluded that the exercise of the right by a self-
determination unit usually does not include the creation of a new State74. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in its case on 
Katanga, established that “in the absence of concrete evidence of violations 
of human rights […], the Commission holds the view that Katanga is 
obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire”75. The government of the Swiss 
Confederation noted, “The right to self-determination cannot be exercised 
externally until after the exhaustion of all possible avenues aiming to restore 
a situation in which human rights are respected, including the right to 
internal self-determination”76 (emphasis added). The subsequent question is 
about the content or scope of this limited version of the right. For those who 
identify secession with external self-determination, the question pertains 
to the content of internal self-determination. For those who use a different 
criterion for distinction, the question is simply about the remaining possible 
outcomes of the right and the ways it can be exercised by its holder.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
adopted by the General Assembly in September 2007, develops the right 
to self-determination of indigenous peoples (recognised in Article 3). 
It states that indigenous peoples, “in exercising their right to self- 
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions”77. However, there are no other 
74 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Further Written Contribution of the Republic 
of Kosovo, 17 July 2009, at 78.
75 Kantangese People case, para. 6.
76 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Comments addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, at 2, para. 7.
77 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007, art. 4.
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legal or political references clarifying the content of the “internal aspects” 
of self-determination or the minimum content of the right, even when 
secession is out of consideration. 
Precisely because secession is considered a last resort in the exercise 
of self-determination, it is necessary to establish alternative ways for other 
peoples to exercise this right. The lack of development in this respect 
shows that self-determination has been avoided due to its identification 
with secession. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
statement on autonomy or self-government may be considered a guideline 
in this respect, but it is far from a hallmark in the description of the content 
of the right to self-determination of other peoples. Other statements refer 
to additional possible outcomes of the right, such as integration, free 
association, “local government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or 
any other form of relations that accords with the wishes of the people”78. 
However, apart from an open list of possible outcomes, we lack a 
systematic description of the content of this human right before reaching 
the ultima ratio solution.
Some approaches to the idea of internal self-determination refer 
solely to the democratic political organisation of a given people. 
However, this ad intra element can be distinguished from the external 
outcomes of the right regardless of whether all or only some are 
considered external self-determination. Thus, recognition of the right 
to political participation by all members of the people and subsequent 
democratic representation of all members of the political community 
in the government bodies of the state does not exhaust the right to 
self-determination, as can be easily understood from a reading of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The right to 
political participation is not part of the content of the right to self-
determination but a specific individual human right enshrined in 
Article 25 of the Covenant and therefore different in terms of holder 
and content. The latter must show content intrinsically different from 
the participatory one, which may be exercised by the collective holder 
of the right and not only by its individual members.
On the contrary, developments of territorial or personal autonomy, 
local or national self-government, or other possible constitutional 
arrangements may complete the content of the right to self-determination 
of those peoples whose conditions do not justify access to the ultima ratio 
solutions.
An important issue arises at this point in the discussion: the question 
of the substantial content of the right that should be respected and 
78 Kantangese People case, para. 4.
181
On the (Human) Rights to Self-Determination and National Conflicts 
guaranteed in every case. As mentioned previously, it is not incompatible 
with human rights theory to admit restrictions in the exercise of the 
rights or limitations according to legal proceedings in previously defined 
circumstances. However, these limitations by no means diminish the 
substantial content of any human right such that the right becomes 
unrecognisable. For instance, in the Spanish legal system, the expression 
“essential content” is used in Article 53 of the Constitution as a limit 
that cannot be unheeded by the legislator when regulating constitutionally 
recognised rights. In terms of internationally recognised human rights, a 
parallel theory can be defended to secure the substantial content of this 
right and establish its minimum parameters.
A relevant question is whether, in the case of peoples showing a clear 
political will to secede from their current state (either to constitute their 
own state or to join another independent state), the restriction of some 
external outcomes of the right to self-determination undermines this 
substantial content of a collective human right. In this respect, Seymour 
proposes an extremely interesting distinction between three levels or 
degrees of the political dimension of internal self-determination: “weak”, 
“canonical” and “strong”79. This question requires further research and 
clarification as it seems to reside on the border between law, politics and 
philosophy.
5. Self-Determination and Democratic Management  
of National Conflicts
The right to self-determination must be regarded not only as a human 
right, but also as a useful instrument to prevent conflicts and pave the 
way for democratic solutions in conflict situations. These situations set 
up what I call “national conflicts”, contexts where further clarification of 
the right to self-determination may be beneficial in reducing unnecessary 
tensions. A more robust theory of the right to self-determination, including 
identification of its potential holders and means of implementation, 
would facilitate a less dramatic approach to this right by states and would 
provide more legal certainty.
It is obvious that the main concern over the implementation of this 
particular right in the context of some national conflicts is that it may 
affect the territorial integrity of the state or the relations between two 
or more states. However, it is necessary at the outset to address fears of 
79 The French words used by Seymour are “faible”, “canonique” and “robuste”. Seymour, 
Michel, “L’autodétermination interne du Québec dans la fédération canadienne”, Paper 
presented at the international seminar “Le féderalisme multinational en perspective: un 




a stronger regulation of this right by emphasising that there are a very 
limited number of real cases where self-determination implies major 
political consequences. The number of national conflicts in Europe, 
where secession is the aspiration of a significant sector of the population 
involved, is extremely low. In fact, most States are not affected by 
these types of conflicts. Therefore, fears of creating general anarchical 
chaos by recognising self-determination in generous terms do not seem 
proportionate to the real state of affairs. Only a very limited number 
of states face specific problems of accommodating national or ethnic 
diversity to this extent. 
In any case, when sovereignty is the issue at stake, debating the legitimacy 
of self-determination has limited effects because the whole issue tends to be 
located in the political arena instead of in the legal sphere. In some cases, 
the role played by international law is that of recognising the new factual 
situation80. As the government of the United Kingdom recognises:
The constitutional authority of the seceding entity to proclaim independence 
within the predecessor State is not determinative as a matter of international 
law. In most if not all the cases, provincial or regional authorities will lack 
the constitutional authority to secede. The act of secession is not thereby 
excluded. Moreover, representative institutions may legitimately act, and 
seek to reflect the views of their constituents, beyond the scope of already 
conferred power […]81. 
Of course attempts at secession may well (as already noted) be contrary to 
the municipal law of the State concerned. The Declaration of Independence of 
4 July 1776 was at the time considered an act of treason under British law. 
But from the standpoint of international law there was, and is, no prohibition 
per se of secession82.
It would be beneficial to build a more precise theory of the right to 
self-determination that could be applied to different situations, including 
contexts in which a national conflict arises. National conflict implies 
a situation in which a minority group (as defined, for instance, in the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1201 
(1993)) expresses, more or less directly, its aspiration to enjoy a certain 
level of self-government that may significantly affect the sovereignty 
80 Pentassuglia, Gaetano, “State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A 
Comprehensive Legal View”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 
vol. 9, nº 4, 2002, p. 312.
81 International Court of Justice, Request for an Advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the question “Is the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law?”, Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 17 April 2009, at 86 
para. 5.7 and at 87 para. 5.13.
82 Ibid., at 87, para. 5.13.
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of the host state. These situations raise the issue not only of democratic 
management of different types of diversity (religious, linguistic, ethnic, 
cultural or national) but also of potential conflict regarding the distribution 
of political power. From this perspective, national conflicts can be 
considered part of the more general concept of diversity conflicts83.
A problematic aspect of national conflicts is defining them in relation to 
other less problematic cases. Kymlicka refers to protagonist collectives as 
“national minorities” (an overly broad name when it is used in the European 
legal context). Others have proposed the term “minority nations”84. 
These groups may correspond to other possible peoples in legal terms, 
and therefore they may be entitled to claim a right to self-determination. 
The determination of these cases must be made methodologically based 
on empirical data and not on subjective perceptions.
How can these cases be differentiated from other minority contexts? 
Following Requejo’s proposal, I suggest taking into consideration the 
following facts:
a)  The existence of a significant degree of affiliation to those political 
or social entities that claim a substantial modification of the 
legal order in the name of the corresponding minority (people). 
Fifteen percent of the total census in the territory concerned can be 
considered a significant level of affiliation.
b)  The fact that “pro-sovereignty” political forces (those calling for 
a significant modification of the legal status quo) obtain a relevant 
percentage of votes in elections held in the territory concerned. A 
“significant percentage” in this respect can be considered 20% of 
all valid votes cast in that territorial scope.
c)  The fact that the legal order in force has a significantly lower 
degree of democratic legitimation in comparison with other parts 
of the state. This element may be observed, for instance, in the 
refusal of a particular territory to ratify the national constitution 
or in a significantly different result obtained in referenda held 
to legitimate or adopt the constitutional order. In this respect, a 
significant difference can be appreciated when the social support 
differs by more than 25% from that of the state as a whole.
These empirical data may serve as guidelines to identify the existence 
of a “minority nation” or a potentially different self-determination unit. 
83 Ruiz Vieytez, Eduardo, “Estudio comparado de otros conflictos nacionales” in Xabier 
Etxeberria Mauleon et al., Derecho de autodeterminación y realidad vasca, Vitoria-
Gasteiz, Gobierno Vasco, 2002, pp. 193-210.
84 Requejo, Ferran, “Justicia cosmopolita y minorías nacionales”, Claves de la razón 
práctica, nº 171, 2007, p. 36.
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Obviously, the criteria must be consistent in the sense that they must be 
maintained for a minimum period of time. In any case, they must be evaluated 
case by case by all parties concerned (including the state authorities) in 
good faith. Guiding principles like those mentioned may be useful in deter-
mining other possible holders of the right to self-determination without 
prejudicing the conditions for the exercise of this right.
It is clear that a minimum territorial basis is required to determine 
the territorial scope in which these principles must be analysed85. 
Following the spirit of the uti possidetis iuris principle, internally existing 
administrative or political divisions must be taken into consideration 
as the territorial references through which peoples may be identified86. 
The need to consider a minimum extent of this territorial basis leads 
us to exclude the local-level divisions. However, units like provinces, 
departments, cantons, regions or other similar territorial units can serve 
as the reference framework for the analysis of electoral or political data.
When any of the previously mentioned elements is certified as 
consistent in territorial and temporal terms, we can admit the existence of 
a national conflict and of a self-determination unit. Thus, the recognition 
of different peoples cannot take place according to subjective or voluntary 
criteria but must be based on existing political expressions that reflect 
the existence of a collective will in a particular territory. Obviously, this 
can be supplemented with additional evidence, but the correspondence 
between democratic expression and entitlement to self-determination 
must be clearly stated. Thus, as the Swiss government states, “The fact 
that close ties exist between the right of peoples to self-determination and 
the fundamental rights of a democratic society sets at the same time the 
condition that the demand for self-determination can only be considered 
if the majority of the population within the territory concerned declare 
that they are in favour of self-determination”87.
85 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, at 19, para. 71.
86 “To what unit does the concept of self-determination apply? If the international order 
is not to be reduced to a fragmented chaos, then some answer must be provided to 
this question […]. Self determination refers to the right of the majority within a 
generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power: It is necessary to start with 
stable boundaries and to permit political change within them” (Higgins, Rosalyn, The 
Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the UNO, London, 
1963, at 104 (para. 72)).
87 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Request for Advisory opinion), Written Statement addressed to the 
International Court of Justice by the Swiss Confederation, at 20, para. 78.
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When this kind of internal conflict appears, the reference to self-
determination usually leads to bitter debates between those in favour 
and those opposed to recognising the rights of the “minority nation”. 
Frequently, the debate focuses on an inaccurate idea of what self-
determination may mean, with a tendency to identify this right with the 
possible outcome of secession.
It would be beneficial to establish a set of commonly accepted 
standards to manage these (potentially conflictive) situations in a more 
democratic and inclusive way. In a previous work, I suggested dealing 
with these sensitive contexts using a set of basic ideas:
1. It is necessary to admit national conflicts as inherent to political 
and social life. It is not the conflict in itself that is positive or 
negative, but its management. In this sense, the worst possible 
management of a national conflict is refusal to recognise the 
conflict or denial of political or ethical legitimacy to the unofficial 
or alternative aspirants. It is necessary to assume the differences 
and the legitimacy of conflicting political aspirations and to focus 
the debate in the political or legal arena instead of the moral arena.
2. Any potential distribution of political power in personal or 
territorial terms is contingent, and it cannot be considered 
intrinsically illegitimate without adopting a dogmatic approach. 
In any democratic framework where individual human rights are 
the basis for all political projects, any hope of totally or partially 
modifying the set of holders entitled to sovereignty is as legitimate 
as those willing to maintain the status quo.
3. Any political and legal system, to a greater or lesser degree, is 
based on elements of identity that work as (dominant) references 
for the construction or regulation of the public space or the legal 
order. Linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic or national identity 
references may be more or less expansive in each case, but so far 
it has not been possible to build a neutral political community in 
terms of identity. It is necessary to recognise this factor to debate 
the political accommodation of different nations or peoples. Any 
alternative solution relevant to political sovereignty will be based, 
to some extent, in particular identity elements, as is already the 
case with the status quo.
4. Due to the regular process of law making, so-called national 
conflicts tend to be unbalanced from a political perspective. In 
general terms, those proponents of maintaining the status quo are 
in favour of the system and may be tempted to deny the existence 
of a conflict or a new subjectivity. Nevertheless, in this kind of 
conflict, the status quo is one of the dividing factors.
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5. It must be admitted that in some situations, there may be no 
common solution acceptable to all parties involved. When 
political aspirations are contradictory, it is best to look for the most 
comprehensive and inclusive resolution while acknowledging its 
enactment will not always be possible. In this respect, to suspend 
basic political decisions by asking qualified majorities for their 
revision may lead to the use of a veto power by those sectors that 
are satisfied with the status quo. This would not be encouraged in 
the interest of facilitating a negotiated alternative solution.
6. As has been mentioned, the very nature of this kind of conflict is 
more political than legal. Law must be an instrument to facilitate 
democratic solutions, give legal force to political consensus or 
pave the way to democratic processes. Nevertheless, a basic 
assumption of any democratic solution must be that a people 
cannot legitimately be governed without that people’s consent. Law 
cannot become an obstacle when seeking a democratic solution 
in controversial situations. Constitutional law must be reread in 
terms of a continuously evolving system of basic agreements. It 
must be an open framework of political consensus that continues 
to be updated as long as the political community evolves in its 
composition and in its aspirations. Pluralist societies require a 
more flexible understanding of constitutional law that can admit 
new realities through participatory proceedings and democratic 
expressions.
With these guidelines as a procedural reference, the so-called national 
conflicts may be dealt with through a more democratic perspective using 
the right to self-determination as a useful tool for conflict prevention. 
Once we have provided some interpretive elements by which to recognise 
other possible holders of the right, it is necessary to develop a more 
consistent theory on the content of the right and the exercisable elements 
of that right, thus eventually putting an end to such conflicts.
In this sense, the exercise of the right to self-determination is 
conditioned according to the particular circumstances of the case, leading 
the way to a set of possible outcomes related to self-government, political 
collective participation, recognition of identity elements, or constitutional 
accommodations like consociationalism, federal arrangements, free 
association and other possible intermediate solutions88. In this respect, the 
Lund Recommendations drafted by the High Commissioner for National 
88 I offer a systematization of political and legal accommodation of minority realities 
following the criteria in Ruiz Vieytez, Eduardo, Minorías, inmigración y democracia 
en Europa. Una lectura multicultural de los derechos humanos, Valencia, Tirant lo 
blanch, 2006, Chapter 3.
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Minorities of the OSCE, although directed toward national minorities 
(and not necessarily toward peoples), offer interesting guidelines89.
Nevertheless, a final issue has yet to be resolved. When a people, 
defined in conformity with the aforementioned criteria, expresses its will 
to accede to the last resort outcome of the right to self-determination 
(i.e., secession), should that possibility be legally denied unless there is 
a pattern of human rights violations? In other words, may this concrete 
aspiration only be invoked as a remedy and not as a legitimate aspiration 
in the case of peoples who do not correspond to the whole state? 
Obviously, if the host state agrees to that possibility (e.g., Northern 
Ireland, Gagauzia), no problem would arise. However, when the state is 
reluctant to agree to that possibility and the democratic will of the people 
is clearly and repeatedly manifested in favour of secession, it is doubtful 
that a total denial of those outcomes is in accordance with the right to 
self-determination.
According to the current development of international law, it seems 
that the possibility of secession is excluded in non-colonial and non-
remedial cases. However, following the path opened by the Quebec 
case, it seems reasonable that when a majority of an interested people 
democratically expresses a desire for secession, then their desire should 
be politically considered. If this is not currently part of the content of 
the right, the normal evolution from a democratic perspective should 
proceed in the direction of incorporating this option according to 
empirical criteria. The discussion can also be linked to a recognition that 
the substantial content of any human right must be ensured, probably 
on a case-by-case basis. As the Quebec case shows, such a political 
situation may not be in accordance with current law but cannot be 
ignored politically. From this perspective, it is reasonable to consider 
the possibility of adapting the substantial content of the right to each 
concrete situation. Thus, consistently repeated political expressions of a 
majority of interested voters could be incorporated into the substantial 
options of a self-determination process.
Conclusion
The need for stability and security at both the internal and international 
levels presides over and conditions the development of the right to self-
determination as understood by the international community. Because 
the issue is extremely sensitive and potentially affects the sovereignty of 
States, the debate on the nature of self-determination as a human right is 
89 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public 




complex. In fact, legal and political aspects of self-determination interact 
on an uneven playing field. The consequence is a significant degree of 
inconsistency in the definition and exercise of the right. Nevertheless, 
from a human rights perspective, a coherent interpretation must be 
achieved and shared through a possible reformulation of some legal and 
political concepts. 
To put it briefly, self-determination is not only a human right, but 
also an instrument to prevent conflict and enhance democracy. This 
instrument can be reinforced if a wider but more concrete recognition and 
implementation of this important right is agreed upon. In today’s pluralist 
societies, the democratic management of political (and national) diversity 
requires a new constitutional theory that understands law as a dynamic 
and evolving product based on an inclusive political consensus. The 
stability of the legal system can only be realised through legal flexibility. 
There is still significant work to be done, from an academic perspective, 
to transform the right to self-determination from a source of conflict into 
a possible solution.
Part Iv
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Introduction
The responsible management of ethnocultural diversity is an 
unprecedented challenge for most democratic nations. The debate in 
Quebec on this subject is an old one, marked by its dynamism and original-
ity – we should celebrate that. As it does elsewhere, for the majority culture 
the debate stems largely from an insecurity over the future of the identity 
and heritage from which it draws its strength. Inevitably, emotionalism and 
symbolism occupy a large part of the debate, as do divergent visions and, 
quite often, incompatible aspirations. All this makes for difficult 
arbitration based on a delicate balance between competing imperatives, 
requiring all the precautions and all the modesty that must accompany the 
search for a general model of integration.
Keeping these concerns in mind, I would like to use this essay primarily 
to present my vision of interculturalism as a model for integration and the 
management of ethnocultural diversity. I draw inspiration for this goal 
from the path taken by Quebec since the 1960s and 1970s1, but also from 
personal reflection and from experiments conducted in Europe, where 
interculturalism, as a formula for coexistence in the context of diversity, 
1 For an excellent reconstruction of the approach in Quebec, see Rocher, François et al., 
“Le concept d’interculturalisme en contexte québécois: généalogie d’un néologisme”, 
Report presented to the Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodements 
reliées aux différences culturelles (CCPARDC), Montreal, 21 December 2007.
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has significant roots2. In Quebec itself, interculturalism currently benefits 
from widespread popular support (as the public hearings of the Bouchard-
Taylor Commission demonstrated)3, but it is also the object of significant 
criticism. It is certain that there is significant work left to do in terms of 
clarification, promotion, and applications for this model.
A second goal is to repudiate a number of the misunderstandings and 
distortions that have entered the public debate, especially in Quebec. I 
plan to show or remind that:
1. collective integration is a global process affecting all the citizens 
and constituents of a society, not simply immigrants; 
2. interculturalism is not a disguised (or “underhanded”, as has been 
said) form of multiculturalism4;
3. integration is based on a principle of reciprocity – newcomers and 
members of the host society share an important responsibility; 
4. when applied with discretion and rigour, pluralism (an attitude 
advocating respect for diversity) and especially the principle of 
recognition, do not lead to fragmentation (or “communitarianism”) 
and do not put the basic values of the host society into question; 
5. pluralism is a general option with various applications correspond-
ing to as many models, including multiculturalism – it is thus 
inaccurate to establish an exclusive relationship between these two 
concepts and to present them as synonymous; 
6. the type of pluralism advocated by interculturalism could be 
described as integrational in that it takes into account the context 
and future of the majority culture; 
2 The interculturalist approach found strong sites for promotion and study in Europe, 
particularly within the European Union and the Council of Europe. A complete review 
of this past history would require another paper.
3 This refers to the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related 
to Cultural Differences (CCAPRCD), created in February 2007 by the government 
of Quebec. This committee was co-chaired by the philosopher Charles Taylor and 
myself. The report was made public in May 2008. See Bouchard, Gérard and Charles 
Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Report of the Consultation 
Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, Québec, 
Gouvernement du Québec, 2008. The vast majority of the memoranda and testimonies 
submitted to the committee favoured interculturalism as the path for Quebec, even if 
the definitions they proposed were generally rather brief. Three elements of consensus 
recurred throughout – the rejection of Canadian multiculturalism, the rejection of 
assimilation, and the importance of integration on the basis of the fundamental values 
of Quebec society (gender equality, secularism, and the French language).




7. accommodations (or concerted adjustments) are not privileges, 
they are not designed solely for immigrants and they should not 
give free rein to values, beliefs, and practices that are contrary to 
the basic norms of society – they simply aim to allow all citizens 
to benefit from the same rights, no matter their cultural affiliation; 
8. as a pluralist model, interculturalism concerns itself with the 
interests of the majority culture, whose desire to perpetuate and 
maintain itself is perfectly legitimate, as much as it does with the 
interests of minorities and immigrants – we thus find no reason 
to oppose either the defenders of the identity and traditions of 
the majority culture on one side, or the defenders of the rights of 
minorities and immigrants on the other; it is both possible and 
necessary to combine the majority’s aspirations for identity with 
a pluralist mindset, making for a single process of belonging and 
development; and
9. except in extreme cases, radical solutions rarely meet the needs of 
the problems posed by ethnocultural diversity.
My presentation will use the description provided in the Bouchard-
Taylor Report5 as a point of departure but will also clarify and add a 
number of elements. I will also rely on the important contributions of 
a number of authors from Quebec who have a long history of reflecting on 
this topic6. Finally, I should note that the Aboriginal experience will not 
5 Bouchard and Taylor, Report, op. cit., pp. 116-118.
6 See especially Gagnon, Alain-G., “Plaidoyer pour l’interculturalisme”, Possibles, 
vol. 24, nº 4, 2000, pp. 11-25; Gagnon, Alain-G. and Raffaele Iacovino, “Le projet 
interculturel québécois et l’élargissement des frontières de la citoyenneté” in Alain-G. 
Gagnon (ed.), Québec: État et société, tome II, Montréal, Québec Amérique, 2003, 
pp. 413-436; Rocher, op. cit.; Labelle, Micheline, “La politique de la citoyenneté et 
de l’interculturalisme au Québec: défis et enjeux” in Hélène Greven-Borde and Jean 
Tournon (eds.), Les identités en débat: Intégration ou multiculturalisme?, Paris, 
Montréal, L’Harmattan, 2000, pp. 269-293; McAndrew, Marie, “Multiculturalisme 
canadien et interculturalisme québécois: mythes et réalités” in Marie McAndrew 
et al., Pluralisme et éducation. Politiques et pratiques au Canada, en Europe et dans 
les pays du Sud. L’apport de l’éducation comparée, Montréal, Paris, Les publications 
de la Faculté des sciences de l’éducation, Association francophone d’éducation 
comparée, 1995, pp. 33-51; McAndrew, Marie, “Quebec’s Interculturalism Policy: 
An Alternative Vision. Commentary” in Keith Banting et al. (eds.), Belonging? 
Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada, Montreal, Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 2007, pp. 143-154; Juteau, Danielle, “Multiculturalisme, 
interculturalisme et production de la nation” in Martine Fourier and Geneviève Vermès 
(eds.), Ethnicisation des rapports sociaux: Racismes, nationalismes, ethnicismes et 
culturalismes, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994, pp. 55-72; A Pluralistic Quebec in the 
Light of an Intercultural Practice: Memorandum to the Consultative Commission 
on “Reasonable Accommodation” of Cultural Differences in Quebec, Intercultural 
Institute of Montreal, 2007, unpublished, archived at [Online]: http://www.iim.qc.ca.
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be taken into account here. This is because the government of Quebec, in 
accordance with demands made by Aboriginal peoples, has resolved that 
relations with these communities should be treated as “nation to nation”7 
affairs. From their perspective, the populations concerned do not wish to 
be seen as cultural minorities within the nation of Quebec. For the moment 
this issue would require a different line of thought than interculturalism as 
defined here, since our model aims at integration within a single nation.
1. Interculturalism: Some Basic Principles
First, interculturalism incorporates a number of elements that are 
not exclusive to it. For example, it endorses the rather widely accepted 
idea that an official language, legal framework, and territorial unity are 
not sufficient to make a cohesive nation – they must be combined with 
a symbolic element that helps foster identity, collective memory, and 
belonging8. What we term the principle of recognition (in the sense used 
by Charles Taylor and others) is also part of interculturalism9. It is also 
found at the heart of multiculturalism and in a few other models. Another 
element of interculturalism found in the majority of Western democracies 
is a pluralist mindset, meaning sensitivity to ethnocultural diversity and 
the rejection of all discrimination based on difference10. Inherited from 
the moral awakening following the two World Wars, fascism, totalitarian 
regimes, and decolonization, this mindset came into being in the 1950s 
and 1960s as a new sensitivity towards minorities of all kinds.
7 This is in accordance with the two resolutions passed by the National Assembly of Quebec, 
one on 20 March 1985 (see Quebec, National Assembly, Motion for the recognition of 
aboriginal rights in Québec, Journal Débats, 32nd Leg., 5th Sess., vol. 28, Nº 39 (20 March 
1985) at 2570, the other on 30 May 1989 (see Quebec, National Assembly, Resolution of 
the Quebec National Assembly on the recognition of the Maliseet nation, Journal Débats, 
32nd Leg., 2nd Sess., vol. 30, Nº 117 (30 May 1989) at 6079.
8 I will allow myself to insist on this point. Certain critics of interculturalism credit me 
with a strictly civic (“legalist”) conception of nationhood, a conception that I have 
always rejected in my writing. See especially Bouchard, Gérard, La Nation québécoise 
au futur et au passé, Montréal, VLB, 1999, pp. 10-20 and 22-23. Identity and national 
memory are central elements of nationhood and must always be taken into account.
9 According to the current conception, the principle of recognition refers to the status 
or to the condition of minorities in a given society. It calls for the respect of different 
cultures, and the people or groups that embody them, in accordance with the dignity 
to which all people have a right. In effect, the principle postulates that any individual 
or group’s sentiment of self-worth or dignity requires that, in the spirit of equality, 
its differences be recognized, especially by members of the majority culture. For an 
account and critical discussion of this topic, see Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism and 
“The Politics of Recognition”, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992.
10 Pluralism should not be confused with plurality, which is synonymous with diversity. 
Pluralism advocates a specific attitude towards ethnocultural plurality, which is in 
itself a simple state of fact.
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That said, it is important to note that these components (national symbols, 
recognition, and pluralism) are susceptible to a variety of interpretations 
and applications that open the door to a number of possible models. 
Thus, contrary to widespread perception, a pluralist mindset, as with all 
recognition principles, does not necessarily lead to multiculturalism.
Likewise, reasonable accommodation is a very widespread practice in 
the United States, anglophone Canada, Australia, and several European 
countries, including England. We can define these accommodations as 
adjustments made to the administration of certain norms or rules for 
certain individuals or groups (immigrants or not) possessing some sort 
of distinctive characteristic that places them outside of the mainstream 
culture. These adjustments aim to encourage the integration of these 
groups and to shield them from precisely the kind of discrimination that 
could result from their distinctive characteristics. Once again, and contrary 
to current perceptions, this does not mean awarding certain people 
exclusive rights or privileges. In the spirit of equity (or equality), the goal 
is always to more fully implement the fundamental rights granted to all 
citizens11. When referring to recognition, pluralism, or accommodations, 
it is important to distinguish between their founding principles and the 
specific criteria and methods of their administration.
Accommodation is not unique to interculturalism and can be enacted 
in accordance with a variety of philosophies, sensitivities, and policies. 
Consequently again, we must prevent ourselves from associating 
accommodation exclusively with multiculturalism. Certain adjustments 
can seem perfectly admissible in one society and cause problems in 
another, even if both adhere to pluralism.
In light of this discussion, we see that in the particular case of Quebec 
it is necessary to develop a form of pluralism that acknowledges that the 
francophone majority is itself a precarious minority that needs protection 
in order to ensure its survival and development in the North American 
environment and in the context of globalization.
2. Paradigms and Levels of Analysis
Before going further, and in order to properly distinguish 
interculturalism from the other models of management of ethnocultural 
diversity, it is useful to review the five major paradigms these models 
tend to follow. These paradigms are large schemas that will help situate 
11 For example, denying a young girl the right to wear a certain kind of bathing suit to a 
swimming class or a gymnastics class might deprive her of her right to learn. Refusing 




the primary intention, or defining outlook, of each model. They structure 
the public debate of a nation, determine the parameters and the basic 
issues, inspire the policies and programs of the state and, finally, fuel the 
perceptions citizens hold of each other.
A first paradigm is that of diversity. In particular, we find this in 
English Canada, the United States, Sweden, Australia, and India. 
The guiding premise in these cases is that the nation is composed of 
a collection of individuals and ethnocultural groups placed on equal 
footing and protected by the same laws – there is no recognition of a 
majority culture and, in consequence, no minorities per se. Under the 
official banner of diversity, all assert themselves and express themselves 
as they see fit, within the limits prescribed by law. Secondly, we can 
speak of a paradigm of homogeneity (i.e., a unitary paradigm), which 
fundamentally asserts an ethnocultural similarity in public life and 
sometimes also in private life – included here are nations such as France 
(at least in the public space), Italy, Japan, and Russia. Thirdly, there is 
the paradigm I call bi- or multipolarity. This refers to societies composed 
of two or more national groups or subgroups, sometimes officially 
recognized as such and granted a kind of permanence. Nation-states 
such as Malaysia, Bolivia, Belgium, Switzerland, and Northern Ireland 
(i.e., all the pluri-national states that recognize themselves as such)12 
operate under this paradigm.
The fourth paradigm is that of duality. We see this where diversity 
is conceived and managed as a relationship between minorities from a 
recent or distant period of immigration, and a cultural majority that could 
be described as foundational. Let us pause for a moment to examine this 
last concept. I include as foundational any culture resulting from the 
history of a community that has occupied a single area for a long period 
(one century, several centuries, or several millennia); that has formed 
a territory or settlement (what certain geographers call “territoriality”) 
with which it identifies; that has developed an identity and a collective 
imagination expressed through language, traditions, and institutions; 
that has developed solidarity and belonging; and that shares a sense of 
continuity based in memory. In such societies, long-established minorities 
can also hold the status of foundational cultures. In Quebec, examples 
include the Aboriginal communities, which were founded before the 
majority culture, in addition to the anglophone population13.
12 See especially Gagnon, Alain-G., The Case for Multinational Federalism: Beyond the 
All-Encompassing Nation, London, New York, Routledge, 2010.
13 It should be noted that the qualifier “foundational” refers less to a moment of settlement 
or a founding act than to a process spread out over time. This process is inevitably 
accompanied by a structuring effect on the culture of a society.
197
What Is Interculturalism?
With certain exceptions, majority cultures are foundational cultures, 
although they never stop incorporating important new contributions 
that blend with the existing cultural fabric and ultimately transform it. 
Through the effects of migration and intercultural relations, the reality 
underlying these concepts is fundamentally shifting and dynamic, even if 
the dominant discourse tends to erase this characteristic. As we will see 
later on, other factors make it so that the concept of a majority culture can 
accommodate diverse and malleable realities.
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that I avoid using the term “ethnic 
group” or “cultural community”. These concepts presuppose a degree of 
structuring that seldom exists in reality. With this in mind, the idea of 
a minority must be understood, in a very general sense, to designate a 
cultural nexus or community life that carries on in coexistence with the 
majority culture and the borders of which are often quite fluid.
The majority/minorities duality thus acquires the status of a 
paradigm so that it can structure discussion and debates over diversity 
in a given nation. It appears as a dichotomy or an us/them divide that 
is more or less pronounced. I maintain that the duality paradigm does 
not create this divide – rather, this is its point of departure, its anchor. 
Rather than challenging the paradigm on this ground, one would be best 
advised to tackle the factors that have created the duality and contribute 
to perpetuate it. I will add that the vast majority of Western nations 
(including Quebec) currently seem to be operating under or shifting 
towards this paradigm.
The fifth paradigm is that of mixité. It is founded on the idea that, 
through miscegenation, the ethnocultural diversity of a nation will be 
progressively reduced, eventually creating a new culture separate from its 
constituent elements. We find this paradigm primarily in Latin America, 
notably in Brazil and Mexico.
I will add three further details on this subject. Paradigms are the first 
level of analysis for ethnocultural diversity. The different models associated 
with them (such as multiculturalism, interculturalism, the melting pot, 
hyphenation, republicanism, assimilationism, consociationalism, etc.)14, 
are the second level. The third is the concrete ethnocultural structure 
of populations as revealed by empirical data (census statistics and 
monographs) on ethnic origin, language, religion, and spatialization 
(geographic concentrations, ghettos, and clustering).
14 I do not mention federalism because this notion seems to refer primarily to a method 
of distributing political power between diverse national or other entities rather than a 
model for managing or dealing with ethnocultural reality.
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I will also point out that, as with all models, these paradigms are the 
result of a collective choice often codified in official documents. Thus, 
we see many examples of nations that have changed their paradigms over 
the last decades. Between 1960 and 1970, Canada and Australia moved 
from a homogeneity paradigm to a diversity paradigm while Quebec 
abandoned homogeneity for duality. Similarly, it seems that England 
is currently distancing itself from the diversity paradigm15 and that we 
are currently witnessing in Quebec some attempts to introduce elements 
of republican-style non-differentiation (against accommodation and 
expression of religion in state institutions).
Finally, it is worth noting that a paradigm can accommodate more 
than one model – and sometimes very different models – as seen 
particularly in Canada and the United States (diversity), and France 
and Italy (homogeneity). The simplest example is that of a nation that 
adheres to a single paradigm (or to a predominant paradigm). However, 
we should not write off nations where public debate is more animated and 
might simultaneously subscribe to two or three competing paradigms. 
The United States comes to mind. The diversity paradigm is markedly 
dominant throughout, since the nation was (at least officially) founded on 
universal ideals capable of accommodating the greatest possible diversity. 
Yet we are currently seeing the manifestation of two other paradigms, 
namely duality (“mainstream” culture versus minorities perceived as 
resistant to integration) and assimilation (a radical version of the “melting 
pot”). In this vein, Brazil also deserves attention to the degree that the 
dominant schema of racial mixing (supported by the great myth of racial 
democracy) makes space for the diversity as well as the homogeneity 
paradigms. In this case, official discourse and public debate often reveal 
how this nation does not define itself by race, but at the same time remains 
very aware of ethnocultural diversity.
Furthermore, we should note that there is not a linear relationship 
between these three levels of analysis. One should not assume that what 
happens at one level is determined by what happens at the other two. 
Certainly it is difficult to imagine countries like Belgium or Switzerland 
adhering to the homogeneity paradigm. Nevertheless, there can sometimes 
be important disparities between the ethnocultural reality of a nation and 
the general schema it uses to imagine itself (the examples of France and 
Italy again come to mind).
15 Here, an important new strain of ideas is currently creating a dualist vision of the 
nation. See e.g. Goodhart, David, Progressive Nationalism: Citizenship and the Left, 




3. Characteristics of Interculturalism
I will mention seven main points that characterize interculturalism 
with respect to other models of management of diversity. But it should 
be mentioned in the first place that the model operates at two levels. 
One is the societal or macrosocial level where the challenge is to define 
principles and general guidelines for integration. The second level is 
interculturality. It refers to the microsocial scale of neighbourhoods, 
community relations, and the daily life of institutions (schools, hospitals, 
workplaces, etc.). However, focus will be given primarily to the first 
dimension, with priority placed on defining the principles and basic 
philosophy of the model.
A. Majority/Minorities Duality
First and foremost, as a global model for social integration, 
interculturalism takes shape principally within the duality paradigm16. 
One of the inherent traits of this paradigm is a keen awareness of the 
majority/minorities relationship and the tension associated with it. More 
precisely, I am referring to the anxiety that the majority culture can feel in 
the face of cultural minorities. Indeed, they can create a more or less acute 
sense of threat within the majority culture not only in terms of its rights, 
but also in terms of its values, traditions, language, memory, and identity 
(not to mention its security). This feeling can be fuelled by a number 
of different sources. For example, in England, the United States, and 
many other countries, terrorism is currently a major concern. In Quebec, 
a significant source of anxiety comes from the fact that the francophone 
cultural majority is a fragile minority in the North American environment 
(representing less than two percent of the total population). Also, this 
anxiety is often supplemented by the presence of a demographically 
significant ethnocultural minority perceived as hostile to the traditions 
and values of the majority group and resistant to integration (which can 
happen when this minority fears for its own values and culture). This 
unease can also occur in countries where the foundational culture is 
experiencing a period of instability or undergoing some kind of crisis. 
Be that as it may, it follows that the duality thus risks being experienced 
as the intersection of two sets of anxieties since minority groups often, 
and for obvious reasons, fuel their own feelings of uncertainty about 
their future. Finally, there are nations in which duality is the result of a 
sustainable agreement forged in the history between two groups, one a 
majority, the other a minority.
16 As indicated earlier, this model can also apply to the (bi)pluri-polarity paradigm. 
However, I will limit my discussion to the duality paradigm.
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Regardless of its sources, this insecurity and the reciprocal mistrust it 
produces can help perpetuate the us/them duality. And yet, as mentioned 
previously, interculturalism seeks to care for the future of the majority 
culture as much as that of minority cultures. From this perspective, it 
is essentially a search for conciliation. Under the arbitration of the law, 
it seeks to articulate the tension between continuity and diversity, i.e., 
the continuity of the foundational culture and the diversity brought 
in by past or recent immigration17. In this sense, I would say that 
interculturalism intends to connect cultures as much through their roots 
as through encounters. That said, the tension underlying this duality can 
be corrosive and give birth to stereotypes, exclusionary or reactionary 
behaviour, and various forms of discrimination from the majority group. 
It can also be positive, experienced as a constant reminder for vigilance, 
dialogue, and necessary concerted adjustments. The central challenge of 
interculturalism is to smooth over and to alleviate the us/them relation 
rather than inflame it.
The preceding remarks require a few warnings:
1. We should avoid a reductive vision that represents the majority/
minorities divide as an opposition between a homogeneous 
majority and heterogeneous minorities. When we look closely, we 
see that beyond a common language and shared symbols, important 
elements of diversity almost always extend to the very core of the 
majority (differences of morality and belief, ideological divisions, 
generation gaps, social divisions, regional identities, etc.). For 
this reason, it seems better to talk about a cleavage between two 
different kinds of diversity. The fact remains that, when faced with 
a perceived threat, the majority group is likely to erase important 
aspects of its own diversity. This phenomenon is apparent in 
debates in Quebec and elsewhere in the West. 
2. We must also avoid conceiving of the majority/minorities duality 
as a fixed set. If this dual structure is durable, the contents of its 
two components, as well as the context and modalities of their 
connection, are in constant flux (hence the danger of too rigid 
a conception of the majority/minorities duality). Again, this 
dynamic character does not always come through in public debate. 
The majority culture can contract, expand, and reconstruct itself 
to meet the mood and challenges of the hour and as a function 
17 Note that this tension is found throughout all of Quebec’s history, from the second half 
of the eighteenth century onwards beginning with the British regime. On one side, 
there was the reproduction of francophone culture and resistance to assimilation, on 
the other, the integration of immigrants who were nevertheless subject to various forms 
of ethnocultural exclusion (e.g., Aboriginal peoples, Jews, Blacks, etc.).
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of its discursive strategies. If we refer to the current debate and 
perceptions in Quebec, we might say that the “cultural majority” 
covers a quite large territory. In its narrowest meaning, it coincides 
with the most militant fragment of the “old stock” French-
speakers18. Yet in its widest acceptance, the majority includes all 
French-speakers and even the entire host society, especially when 
the core values held by most Quebecois (gender equality, separation 
of church and state, etc.) contrast with the values associated 
with some immigrants. In this last case, the cultural majority is 
larger than the francophone majority19. These considerations are 
a reminder of the need for vigilance when analyzing public debate 
in duality nations.
3. It can also happen that the “majority” evoked in debates is rather 
theoretical or even imaginary. Whatever the case, the duality paradigm 
remains with its majority/minorities dichotomy (at least until the 
public debate eventually shifts to embrace another paradigm).
4. The threat or insecurity felt by the majority in the face of 
minorities must always be considered with a critical eye. We know 
of too many examples of majorities who made their minorities into 
scapegoats because they saw themselves as powerless to act against 
the real causes of their adversity. For Western nations currently 
under attack on many fronts (the numerous uncertainties linked 
to globalization, the rise of a new individualism, the erosion of 
social bonds, deficits and the growing weakness of the state, aging 
populations, precarious employment, etc.), it can be tempting to 
blame immigrants or minorities for problems that actually stem 
from fundamental changes on a global scale.
  In the context of Quebec, feelings of insecurity are also fueled by 
the growing presence of immigrants and cultural minorities, largely 
concentrated in the area surrounding Montreal. This feeling is 
justified since it is an expression of the fragility of francophone 
Quebec in America, a condition accentuated by globalization and by 
uncertainty over the francization of immigrants. It is also justified to 
the extent that it affirms the importance of preserving fundamental 
values like gender equality and the separation of church and state. 
Finally, it is accentuated by the fact that the national question remains 
18 During the hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor commission, it was principally this group 
that expressed deep concern for the survival of what was termed “our culture” and 
“our values”. That said, other groups also expressed unease, particularly in regard to 
reasonable accommodations.




unresolved and even seems to be sliding towards an impasse. That 
said, it is undeniably conflated by some participants in the public 
debate with a desire to formally consecrate the dominant status 
of the foundational culture and to give legal recognition to this 
precedence. The (incontestable) fragility of francophone Quebec 
does not seem to me to justify measures so radical that they would 
institute a regime of a priori inequality between citizens20.
5.  Here again we see a potential risk associated with the duality 
paradigm. By recognizing the legitimate interests of a majority, 
this paradigm could exacerbate rather than smooth over us/them 
divisions because it allows space for the dominating trends of 
majority groups, the results of which are visible throughout the 
history of the West and other continents (xenophobia, exclusion, 
discrimination, etc.). Thus, it is important to instill a pluralist mindset 
and protective mechanisms at the highest levels of the duality 
paradigm in order to avoid falling into ethnicism (impingements 
on the rights of others for inadmissible reasons)21. In summary, 
interculturalism recognizes the status of the majority culture (its 
legitimacy, its right to perpetuate its traditions, its heritage, and its 
right to mobilize around developmental goals) within a framework 
designed to reduce the excesses that all majorities are capable of 
enacting on minorities – as ancient and recent history has taught us.
B.  A Process of Interaction
The second original attribute of interculturalism is that, while 
fostering respect for diversity, the model favours interactions, exchanges, 
connections, and intercommunity initiatives. It thus privileges a path 
of negotiations and mutual adjustments, but with strict respect for the 
values of the host society as inscribed in law or constitutional texts and all 
while taking into account the so-called shared values of a common public 
culture. A spirit of conciliation, balance, and reciprocity presides over the 
process of interaction at the heart of interculturalism.
20 Advocates of this idea seem to forget, for example, that the francophone majority 
currently controls most large public and private institutions, which manifests most 
notably in a marked under-representation of other citizens in public or semi-public 
jobs. Furthermore, because Quebec is not politically sovereign, its capacity to act 
collectively remains limited, although it still has a large margin for manoeuvre when it 
comes to legislating on cultural matters.
21 See Bouchard, La Nation québécoise au futur et au passé, op. cit., p. 30. On this subject, 
other authors speak of “ethnocracy” or of “majoritarianism”. See respectively Yiftachel, 
Oren, “Ethnicity: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine”, Constellations, vol. 6, 1999, 
pp. 364-391; Pathak, Pathik, “The Rise of the Majority”, The [Edinburgh] Journal, 
2 October 2008. The idea of “majoritarianism”, which comes from political philosophy, is 
an old one – it traditionally refers to a system that grants majorities excessive privileges.
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C. The Principles of Harmonization: A Civic Responsibility
The preceding makes a case for a culture of genuine interaction 
and mutual adjustments as a condition for integration. This is why 
interculturalism makes all citizens responsible for maintaining 
intercultural relations in daily life, especially when facing the inevitable 
incompatibilities that surface at the levels of institutions and communities. 
It is the duty of each citizen placed in an intercultural situation to contribute 
to mutual adjustments and accommodations. The courts obviously retain 
their indispensable function, though only as a last recourse after citizen 
action has failed to resolve disagreements. It also follows that beyond state 
policy, interculturalism encourages creative initiatives from individuals 
and groups working on a microsocial level. In total, we can identify four 
avenues for action corresponding with as many categories of actors: 
(a) the judicial system, (b) the state and its subsidiaries, (c) civil institutions 
and organizations, (d) individuals and groups in their living and work 
environments.
This view presupposes the existence of a culture or ethic of exchange 
and negotiation, which might seem idealistic. However, and this was an 
important finding of the Commission I co-chaired, such a culture already 
exists within a large part of the population of Quebec. We saw it in 
action in the daily life of institutions (notably in the spheres of education 
and healthcare), as well as in the hundreds of groups that have been 
formed primarily in metropolitan areas in the last few years to foster the 
socioeconomic integration of immigrants. Many municipal councils, even 
in rural areas, have also enacted policies designed to attract and integrate 
newcomers. In any case, these efforts must obviously be extended and 
expanded with support from the State, which should work to put in place 
a whole network of officials, locations, and communication channels that 
encourage connection, mutual recognition, and integration.
D. Integration and Identity
Contrary to the so-called communitarian mindset and for the sake 
of countering the risks of fragmentation ordinarily associated with 
multiculturalism, interculturalism aims for a strong integration of diverse 
coexisting traditions and cultures. According to the most commonly 
accepted sociological view, the term integration designates the totality of 
mechanisms and processes of insertion (or assimilation) that constitute 
the social bond, which is further cemented by its symbolic and functional 
foundations. These processes and mechanisms engage all citizens (new and 
long-standing), operate on many levels (individual, community, institutional, 
and state), and work in multiple dimensions (economic, social, cultural, and 
so forth). On a cultural level, the concept of integration is devoid of any 
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assimilationist connotations. Nevertheless, during the recent controversies 
in Europe, it sometimes came to acquire this kind of connotation. To avoid 
any confusion, we could use the term “integrationism” to refer to those 
forms of integration that are not respectful of diversity.
In keeping with these ideas, interculturalism advocates a particular 
type of pluralism that I would define as integrationary. This is its third 
defining trait. A majority culture that feels threatened by its minorities 
will feel the need to either assimilate them (which predicts the end of 
duality) or to integrate them (the road that Quebec has thus far taken). 
It instinctively fears all kinds of fragmentation, ghettoization, or 
marginalization. This is even truer when this majority is a minority on 
the continental level, as is the case with francophone Quebec. This state 
of affairs becomes an imperative that frames the discussion on how to 
approach the intercultural reality of Quebec. It highlights the importance 
that must be given to the integration of minorities and immigrants in 
order to strengthen this francophonie and ensure its future. Measures that 
run counter to pluralism (such as those currently proposed by republican 
secularists) tend to increase the risk of marginalization and fragmentation – 
two phenomena precisely associated with multiculturalism that have 
contributed to its rejection. The central idea here is that francophone 
Quebec is itself in a difficult situation and must avoid fostering costly 
long-term divisions – it would do much better to create the allies it needs 
within immigrants and cultural minorities. All attempts at a general model 
must incorporate this basic concern22.
Furthermore, when speaking about Quebec one cannot ignore its more 
than two centuries of struggle for survival in a context marked by an 
unfavourable population imbalance, unequal power relations, and by the 
various assimilation policies of the colonial authorities. Memories of this 
period naturally feed present-day anxieties. They also provide a constant 
reminder for vigilance. The current advocates of a francophone Quebecois 
identity (although sometimes in opposition to the supposed “excesses” of 
pluralism) are one manifestation of this. They cannot be ignored.
Interculturalism therefore advocates in favour of integration, thus 
emphasizing the need for interactions and connections. Boiled down to its 
essence, the argument is simple – the best way to counter the unease we 
sometimes feel towards foreigners is not to keep them at a distance, but to 
approach them in a way that breaks down stereotypes and facilitates their 
22 What do the opponents of interculturalism propose to do about this issue? How, for 
example, do they intend to resolve the antinomy that would result from the rejection of 
pluralism (as defined here) and the necessity for integration? What measures do they 
envision to ensure that immigrants and members of cultural minorities become allies, 
or even standard bearers, of francophone Quebec?
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integration in the host society. In other words, exclusion is reprehensible 
not only on a moral or legal level, but from a sociological and pragmatic 
standpoint as well.
And yet interculturalism is not a straitjacket. It acknowledges the right 
of ethnoreligious groups to organize themselves in small communities 
that, while respecting the law, maintain a rather distant relationship 
from the rest of society. In the opposite direction, it gives great latitude 
to individuals who wish to identify themselves first and foremost as 
Quebecois by relegating their identification with their group or culture of 
origin to the background, or by renegotiating this belonging.
On another, often-neglected level, it is of course true that social and 
economic incorporation must accompany cultural integration. It may even 
be a necessary precondition23. Thus, it is through access to large social 
networks that interactions and cultural diffusion (values, norms, and so 
forth) can take place. For this reason and for others having to do with 
basic social justice, we must lament that current debates on integration do 
not give this fact the attention it deserves. In Quebec as elsewhere, access 
to employment is the area most likely to be affected by discriminatory 
practices. Prolonged negligence on this front has important social costs, 
as we have seen recently in various European countries.
E. Elements of Ad Hoc Precedence for the Majority Culture
Cultural integration contains a fifth characteristic that deserves greater 
attention. While seeking an equitable interaction between continuity and 
diversity, interculturalism allows for the recognition of certain elements 
of ad hoc (or contextual) precedence for the majority culture. I say ad hoc 
because it is out of the question to formalize or establish this idea as a 
general legal principle, which would lead to the creation of two classes 
of citizens. In this way, interculturalism distinguishes itself from radical 
republicanism that, whether directly or not, uses the pretext of universalism 
to bestow a systematic, a priori precedence on what I term the majority 
or foundational culture. This kind of arrangement, which establishes a 
formal hierarchy, opens the door to abuses of power. That said, I think 
that as long as the nature and the reach of ad hoc precedence are carefully 
circumscribed it can avoid the excesses of ethnicism while giving some 
advantages (or the needed protections) to the majority culture.
This principle is justified on several levels. The first stems from what 
I term the identity argument. In order for the majority group to preserve the 
cultural and symbolic heritage that serves as the foundation of its identity 
23 On this subject, which is worth further investigation, see Bouchard and Taylor, 
op. cit., chapter XI. See also Weber, Serge, “Comprendre la mobilité, réinterroger 
l’intégration”, Projet, nº 311, 2009, pp. 58-67.
Negotiating Diversity
206
and helps to ensure its continuity, it can legitimately claim some elements 
of contextual precedence based on its seniority or history. This claim is, 
as already mentioned, even more grounded when the cultural majority 
is itself a minority in the continental environment. As we will see, it is 
always difficult to establish in the abstract the full extent of this concept, 
which should take shape in specific situations conditioned by democratic 
debate and through negotiations mediated by the Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms24. In certain situations it could happen that elements 
of precedence are established as rights or laws, but then the reasoning 
must invoke higher motives – think of Bill 101 on the French language 
in Quebec25, which was necessary for the survival of francophone culture 
and whose central objectives and measures were declared legitimate by 
the Supreme Court of Canada.
In any case, I maintain that to varying degrees, these elements of 
precedence are present in all societies, even the most liberal (or the most 
“civic-oriented”) by virtue of forces that are difficult to control. This is a 
second argument, based on history and custom. Many intellectuals, liberal 
and otherwise, have in effect demonstrated or recognized that while the 
cultural neutrality of nation-states (or more precisely, the majorities 
that control them) is sought-after and proclaimed in principle, it does 
not exist in reality – some authors even maintain that it is impossible. 
They see the margin of non-neutrality as an unfortunate inevitability. For 
others, it proves even useful and necessary. For example, it allows for the 
consolidation of national identity, which is at once a source of solidarity 
and a foundation for responsible citizen participation and social justice26.
24 RSQ c C-12 [Quebec Charter].
25 Charter of the French language, RSQ c C-11.
26 Of course this subject merits further development. I must, however, limit myself to 
giving the reader a few relevant references. See especially Dieckhoff, Alain, La nation 
dans tous ses États: Les identités nationales en mouvement, Paris, Flammarion, 
2000, chapter 3; Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1990; Kymlicka, Will, “Nation-Building and Minority 
Rights: Comparing West and East”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Stuies, vol. 26, 
nº 2, 2000, pp. 183-212; Lecours, André and Geneviève Nootens, “Comprendre le 
nationalisme majoritaire” in Alain-G. Gagnon, Geneviève Nootens and André Lecours 
(eds.), Les Nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, pouvoir, 
Montréal, Québec Amérique, 2007, pp. 19-45; Yack, Bernard, “The Myth of the Civil 
Nation” in Ronald Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Nationalism, Albany, State University of 
New York Press, 1999, pp. 103-118; Modood, Tariq, “Multiculturalism, Securalism 
and the State”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, vol. 1, 
nº 3, 1998, pp. 79-97; Miller, David, On Nationality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995; 
Miller, David, “Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots”, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, vol. 8, nº 1, 2005, pp. 63-81; Van Parijs, Philippe (ed.), Cultural Diversity 
versus Economic Solidarity, Proceeding of the Seventh Francqui Colloquium, Brussels, 
28 February – 1 March 2003, Brussels, De Boeck, 2004; Spencer, Vicki, “Language, 
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What is involved here are some initiatives or policies that aim to preserve 
a so-called national culture, which we know to be in large part the culture 
of the majority. These initiatives usually have the effect of supporting 
the religion of the majority, its language, and some of its institutions and 
traditions, all in the name of history, identity or continuity27. I include 
in this list the possibility that a majority culture might express a special 
sensitivity to one or a few universal values amongst those it endorses. 
Think of gender equality in Quebec, individual liberty in the United 
States, racial equality in places formerly rife with segregation, familial 
solidarity in Mediterranean societies, social equality in Scandinavian 
countries, and so forth. It was precisely in this spirit that the report of the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission stated that “[i]n the health care sector as in 
all public services, [the gender equality value] disqualifies, in principle, 
all requests that have the effect of granting a woman an inferior status to 
that of a man”28.
In fact, although it is never put in a theoretical, normative or even 
explicit form, the principle behind elements of ad hoc precedence occupies 
an important place in the functioning of democratic societies. Secular 
states in particular make for an eloquent example. Beyond their founding 
principles, values, norms, and laws, these states typically incorporate a 
number of contextual and historic elements as well as political and social 
choices befitting the majority. We could claim that all secular regimes 
are an arrangement of four constitutive principles or values: the freedom 
of conscience and religion, the moral equality of citizens, the separation 
of church and state, and the neutrality of the state in matters of belief, 
religion, or worldviews29. But another component could be added to these 
four, namely the traditional values and customs of the majority culture. 
Seldom formalized, this component is nevertheless powerful enough to 
sometimes take precedence over the others, which occurs notably when it 
is in conflict with the neutrality of the state and/or the moral freedom of 
individuals. For example, it is in the name of traditional values (and more 
precisely “historical heritage”) that in May 2008 the National Assembly 
History and the Nation: An Historical Approach to Evaluating Language and Cultural 
Claims”, 2008, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 14, nº 2, 2008, pp. 241-259. See also 
Daniel Weinstock’s remarks advocating for a state that is “as culturally neutral as 
possible” (“La neutralité de l’État en matière culturelle est-elle possible?” in Ronan Le 
Coadic (ed.), Identités et démocratie. Diversité culturelle et mondialisation: repenser la 
démocratie, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2003, pp. 365-380).
27 Remember that even Canada, which is held up as a model democratic and “civic” 
nation, celebrates the symbols of monarchy and included a reference to the supremacy 
of God in the 1982 preamble to its constitution.
28 Bouchard and Taylor, op. cit., p. 21.
29 See ibid., chapter VIII.
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of Quebec unanimously declared itself in favour of keeping a crucifix 
above the chair of the President of the Assembly, in spite of the rule of 
religious neutrality on the part of the state and the rule of separation 
between church and state.
Actually, there is little new in my proposition. What I add is a 
willingness to acknowledge these forms of ad hoc precedence and to 
consider them head-on in order to clarify their status, reach, and limits, 
rather than pushing them to the margins as though they were accidental or 
non-existent. So, this second argument relies on a wisely institutionalized 
and unavoidable practice that is seen as useful, if not necessary, to even 
the most democratic of societies, even if it is dealt with as a blind spot30.
From a general perspective, and this is the third argument, this practice 
can be considered a kind of accommodation that minorities accord to 
majorities, under certain conditions subject to debate. This is very much 
in the spirit of interculturalism, which seeks harmonization through 
mutual adjustments according to a principle of reciprocity. In this respect, 
an important lesson can be drawn from recent experience in Quebec. The 
principal criticism levelled against the Bouchard-Taylor Commission 
Report came from members of the francophone majority. According to 
them the Report granted a great deal to minorities and immigrants but 
very little to the majority – a forceful reminder that because francophone 
Quebec was also a minority, it too needed protections; so, there was a 
need for balance. The elements of ad hoc precedence are conceived in 
this spirit.
A fourth argument, which calls for closer examination, is a legal 
one. The law has always recognized the value of antecedence. Think of 
birth rights (primogeniture) and all the advantages conferred by virtue 
of seniority. The most eloquent example in this regard is the ancestral 
rights recognized for Aboriginal populations as first occupants. On what 
grounds and to what extent can this logic be transposed to the world of 
intercultural relations as the basis for an ad hoc precedence in favour 
30 For many (myself included) this was, however, an abusive use of the historic argu-
ment – that if the government of Quebec is secular, as we like to say it is, we should 
expect that this character would be reflected at the heart of the government itself. 
We can cite a number of other reasonable examples of this kind – national funerals 
of secular heads of state held in Catholic churches, symbols of Christian holidays 
(Christmas in particular) in public squares or buildings, the biased schedule of public 
holidays, the cross on the Quebec flag, the recitations of prayers before municipal 
council meetings, crosses erected along rural roads, and so forth. It is in this same 
spirit that in Italy a majority of citizens favour keeping crucifixes on the walls of public 
schools. For a more detailed analysis of this subject, see Gérard Bouchard, “Laïcité: 
la voie québécoise de l’interculturalisme” dans Jean-François Plamondon and Anne 
de Vaucher (ed.), Les enjeux du pluralisme; l’actualité du modèle québécois, Centro 
interuniversitario di studi quebecchesi, Bologna: Édizioni Pendragon, 2010.
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of foundational majorities? First of all, we must avoid easy and abusive 
conclusions; the situation of francophone Quebec is obviously not the 
same as that of Aboriginal cultures. The idea does, however, deserve our 
attention, even if only to articulate the required nuances.
A fifth argument relates to the diversity of cultures and identities 
on a planetary level, which is celebrated by UNESCO as a source of 
innovation and creativity at the same level as biodiversity. In November 
2001 the organization made diversity one of its chief priorities, receiving 
the support of 185 member states31. But if we agree to maintain cultural 
plurality on this scale, then will not majority groups – the main staples of 
national cultures – see themselves as invested with specific responsibility 
in the struggle against the powerful currents of uniformity brought about 
by globalization?
Contextual precedence justifies itself in a sixth way, this time from 
a sociological perspective. As I indicated above, all societies need a 
symbolic foundation (identity, memory, belonging, and so forth) to 
sustain their equilibrium, reproduction, and development, since the legal 
framework alone (or so-called civic principles) does not adequately fulfill 
this function. Especially in situations of tension, change, or crisis, only 
widely shared common reference points – that is to say, a culture or an 
identity – provide for the solidarity that forms the basis of any kind of 
collective mobilization towards the pursuit of a common good. This 
process is a prime engine in the struggle against inequalities, and this is 
where the ideal of liberal individualism reveals what is likely its greatest 
weakness.
All these conditions require a continuity that is guaranteed to a large 
extent by the majority culture and the values forged in its history32. In 
addition, this is not only about social cohesion. In order for a society to 
take hold of its destiny, it must devote itself to principles and ideals that 
encompass both its heritage and its future. If the former is the responsibility 
of all citizens, the latter is primarily the work of the foundational majority.
A final argument, this one more pragmatic, makes the case for this 
thesis. Ancient and recent history has taught us to fear minorities that are 
terrorized or fanaticized in some way. But it has also taught us to be equally, 
if not more, afraid of cultural majorities that take on aggressive behaviour 
when they feel profoundly humiliated, unjustly treated, and victimized. 
Wisdom demands that we take this into account. The principles behind 
31 See the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCOR, 31st Sess, 20th Plen. 
Mtg, 2001. The first article states that cultural diversity is “the common heritage of 
humanity”.
32 This remark should reassure those who accuse interculturalism of neglecting the past 
and even erasing the memory of the majority culture.
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ad hoc precedence can soothe majority anxieties that could easily turn 
into hostility – especially when there are social or political actors who 
readily stand to profit. However, the principle of contextual precedence 
might be unacceptable to advocates of an absolute legalism or liberalism. 
This is the place to remember that in aiming for the perfect society, we 
sometimes sow the opposite seeds.
To conclude this point, it would be an error to believe that all majority 
cultures are basically menacing or harmful. Some have a remarkable 
history of openness and generosity towards minorities, while others, 
despite difficult circumstances, have managed to maintain their liberal 
leanings. Often dominant cultures are helpful agents in advancing 
democracy and individual rights33. In this regard, Quebec of the 1960s 
and 1970s is an eloquent example – the period was marked by both intense 
neonationalism on the part of the francophone majority, and spectacular 
advances in liberal values culminating in the 1975 adoption of the Quebec 
Charter. Nineteenth-century Europe also provides a number of examples 
of national majorities that promoted democratic and liberal values.
Again, the above argument may in a certain light run counter to the 
principle of formal equality between individuals, groups, and cultures. 
In its defence, one can say that it does nothing more than reflect and 
conform to a state of universal reality, namely the impossibility of 
cultural neutrality of nation-states. Likewise, it somewhat detracts from 
the ideal and abstract vision of a society formed of a group of perfectly 
autonomous, rational, and self-made citizens. However, it brings us closer 
to the complex, shifting, unpredictable, and omnipresent reality of identity 
dynamics and the vagaries of political life. The argument for elements of 
contextual precedence thus proceeds from a more sociological and realist 
vision of liberalism.
It would be a grave mistake to underestimate the weight or deny the 
legitimacy of collective identities. It is often said, and rightly so, that 
they are arbitrarily constructed or even invented, but that does not prevent 
them from being lived as profoundly authentic by the large majority of 
individuals who need them to make sense of their life and to ground 
themselves. Finally, they come to acquire a level of substance that 
keeps them from being entirely arbitrary or artificial. Largely driven by 
emotion, they arouse suspicion in the consummate rationalists. And like 
all myths that they feed on34, they partake in a universal mechanism that 
33 On this topic, see Brown, David, “The Ethnic Majority: Benign or Malign?”, Nations 
and Nationalism, vol. 14, nº 4, 2008, pp. 768-788.
34 I use this word in its non-normative, sociological sense to designate a particular kind of 
collective representation carrying values, ideals, and beliefs, which can be true or false, 
beneficial or harmful to a community, and which act similarly on all societies due to the 
211
What Is Interculturalism?
is acting in the history of all societies and weighs strongly on the direction 
of their future. Unpredictable and irrepressible, they can be linked both to 
the most noble and the most vile endeavours. In any case, they fulfill an 
essential function of unification, stabilization, and mobilization.
In this vein, democracies may have an important lesson to learn from 
what happened in Russia after the fall of the USSR. In short, during the 
transition liberal elites sought to instill new values and imprint a new 
direction on their society. However, out of either negligence or too much 
concern for rationalism, they failed at reshaping Russian identity – in other 
words, at inscribing their ideals into a new identity dynamic; drawing 
on a modern set of myths. For a variety of reasons, it was the ancient 
myths stemming from Russian tradition that prevailed and, because 
they were unsympathetic to democracy and freedom, contributed to the 
failure of the liberal agenda. This resulted in the regime we know today – 
an authoritarian government with minimal respect for individual rights 
and democracy35. In other words, advocacy for integrational pluralism 
and interculturalism must necessarily take into account the emotional 
aspect and the non-rational element that permeates all societies, more 
specifically the powerful myths36 that support collective and national 
identities.
It would certainly take a lack of wisdom not to cultivate wariness 
towards identity dynamics that can give birth to “tyrannies of the 
majority”, but it would be just as crucial an error to ignore their useful 
functions or to condemn them a priori. All of this speaks in favour of 
the effort to foster a conjunction of identity and pluralism. And this kind 
of alliance is possible, as Quebec has shown over the course of the last 
decades – there is no intrinsic incompatibility between the continuity and 
growth of majority cultures (or national cultures) and the law.
In the Quebec debate over ethnocultural relations in recent years, 
several interlocutors have tried to foster extreme polarization in order to 
discredit pluralism. According to their vision, on one side there are the 
defenders of the majority and on the other, the defenders of minority rights 
who give little thought to the majority’s concerns. This harmful opposition 
is groundless and must be rejected. In the spirit of interculturalism, these 
quasi-sacred quality with which they are imbued. On this subject see Bouchard, Gérard, 
“Le mythe: Essai de définition” in Gérard Bouchard and Bernard Andrès (eds.), Mythes 
et sociétés des Amériques, Montréal, Québec Amérique, 2007, pp. 409-426.
35 See Brudny, Ytzak, “Myths and National Identity Choices in Post-Communist Russia” 
in Gérard Bouchard (ed.), National Myths: Constructed Pasts, Contested Presents, 
2013, pp. 133-156.
36 Again, I use the word “myth” in its sociological sense, stripped of its normative 
connotations. On this subject, see text accompanying note 34.
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two imperatives are not competitive but complementary – it must be 
reminded that interculturalism does not operate only for the benefit of 
minorities and immigrants, but that it must also take into account the 
interests of the majority, whose desire for affirmation and development 
is perfectly legitimate.
That said, we realize that the criteria for ad hoc precedence must be 
carefully mapped out. Otherwise it may simply jeopardize the practice of 
accommodations designed, as outlined above, to protect minorities from 
the majority’s often involuntary or unconscious excesses37. Here too, there 
is a delicate balance to be negotiated with prudence and moderation. In 
this respect, remember that important responsibilities fall to all majority 
groups because they largely control the institutions of the host society. 
They must embrace the general principle of equal rights for all citizens 
and fight all forms of discrimination. Due to the institutions under their 
control, it is also their duty to facilitate the integration of newcomers 
and minority groups into society. Except in extraordinary circumstances, 
contextual precedence must therefore operate within the limits of basic 
rights. If it must act against these rights, it can do so only to an extent that 
is proportional to the threat or peril incurred against the cultural majority – 
failing which it simply slips into ethnicism.
Minority groups are required to adapt to their host society, adhere to its 
basic values, and respect its institutions, but due to the double obligation 
just explained, the majority group must also sometimes amend its ways. 
That is why it is important to encourage the reasonable promotion 
of accommodations or concerted adjustments: (a) as a mechanism of 
inter-cultural harmonization that prevents or defuses tensions, (b) as a 
facilitating measure to encourage the integration of immigrants and 
reduce the risk of fragmentation, and (c) as a protection against the forms 
of discrimination that often arise from majorities. Contrary to the current 
perception, these adjustments are not privileges; they are arrangements 
that are at once useful (in favour of integration) and necessary (for the 
preservation of rights, including equality and dignity). This being said, 
it is well understood that their implementation must be subject to strict 
guidelines in order to prevent a slip into a laissez-faire mentality that 
would compromise the basic values of the host society38.
37 Some examples of excesses are: (a) a single public holiday regime modelled on the 
dominant religion, (b) textbooks that ignore minority experiences, and (c) uniform 
menus in the cafeterias of public institutions, and so forth.
38 See the Bouchard-Taylor Commission Report for suggestions on the kind of 
counterweights necessary to discipline the implementation of accommodations 
(Bouchard and Taylor, op. cit. chapter VIII). It is regrettable that a few poorly thought-




Finally, here too, the rule of reciprocity applies. For example, the 
report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission clearly established that 
“[a]pplicants who are intransigent, reject negotiation and go against the rule 
of reciprocity will seriously compromise their approach”39. Courtrooms 
adopt the same rule for examining requests for accommodations.
As we may guess, it is difficult to precisely set up in the abstract the 
limits of ad hoc precedence and the terms of its application. But is it not the 
same with several basic values and rights, which creates the necessity of 
interactions, negotiations, and debate? In this context, and for the purpose 
of the present discussion, it can be useful to turn to a few examples, 
relevant to the Canadian and Quebec context. Some of them, as we will 
see, are rather superficial, while others strike at the heart of fundamental 
issues – but each illustrates an aspect of contextual precedence.
The following could, to my thinking, be considered legitimate 
according to the criteria for ad hoc precedence:
1. the institution of French as the common public language;
2. allocating a prominent place to the teaching of the francophone 
past in history courses, or in other words, a national memory that is 
inclusive but gives predominance to the majority narrative;
3. the current priority position given to the presentation of Christian 
religions in the new course on ethics and religious culture;
4. the official burials of heads of state in Catholic churches; 
5. keeping the cross on the Quebec flag (which has already been 
subject to challenges)40;
6. laying Christmas decorations in public squares or buildings; and
7. the sounding of bells in Catholic churches at various moments 
throughout the day41.
On the other hand, I consider the following examples to be abusive 
extensions of the principle of ad hoc precedence:
1. keeping a cross on the wall of the National Assembly and in public 
courtrooms;
2. the recitation of prayers at municipal council meetings; 
39 Ibid., p. 21.
40 See e.g. Macpherson, Don, “A Symbol of France: If Quebec is Serious about 
Inclusiveness, it Should Adopt a New Flag”, The [Montreal] Gazette, 7 August 2001, 
B3; Macpherson, Don, “Raising a Flag: Montreal and Quebec Flags are Outdated 
Symbols of the People They Are Supposed to Represent”, The [Montreal] Gazette, 
22 January 2002, B3.
41 Note that all of these examples contain elements of ad hoc or contextual precedence, 
including the protection of historic heritage or the identity of the cultural majority.
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3. the funding of chaplain or Catholic pastoral care positions in public 
hospitals with state funds, to the exclusion of other religions42;
4. the general prohibition against wearing religious signs for all 
employees in the public and semi-public sectors;
5. the reference to the supremacy of God in the preamble of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms43;
6. including articles or clauses in a charter that establish a formal 
hierarchy between the cultural majority and minorities; and 
7. the prohibition against wearing a burka in streets and public places 
(except for security or other compelling reasons).
F.  A Common Culture
A sixth facet of interculturalism that stems from the preceding ones is 
the idea that beyond and separate from ethnocultural diversity, elements of 
a common culture (or a national culture) begin to take shape, giving birth 
to a belonging and an identity that grafts itself onto initial belongings and 
identities44. This is a logical, predictable, and welcome consequence of the 
goals of integration and the dynamic of interactions that are at the heart of 
interculturalism. In the long-term, both the majority culture and minority 
cultures will find themselves changed to varying degrees45. As indicated 
earlier, it is also inevitable that in the course of continued exchanges and 
informal transactions in daily life, the impact of the majority culture will 
be proportional to its demographic and sociological weight, giving it 
a de facto advantage in ensuring its continuity. On the other hand, the 
formation of a new, truly “pan-Quebecois” culture provides a guarantee 
to minorities and newcomers of full citizenship and protects them from 
exclusion. This outlook also offers cultural minorities an exit strategy 
from what some of their members can perceive as imprisonment in ethnic 
ghettos.
42 This example is becoming more and more theoretical as the law now stipulates that 
pastoral care providers, as givers of spiritual support, must serve all faiths.
43 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11 [Canadian Charter].
44 This conception is similar to what many in Quebec refer to as common public culture. 
The two concepts, however, differ to the extent that I see no objection to the idea 
that the common culture should incorporate elements beyond laws, procedures, and 
citizenship per se.
45 The idea that interaction with immigrants and minority cultures inevitably leads to 
changes within the majority culture sometimes inspires reluctance. It is, however, 
one of the clearest lessons taught by social and historical sciences. As we are seeing 
currently, cultures change primarily through the effects of contact with each other. It 
would be easy to show that the history of Quebec is an eloquent example of this.
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In other words, the cultural evolution of Quebec is already the result 
of three threads weaving together in subtle and complex ways, stemming 
from their sociological influence and their dynamism – the culture of the 
foundational majority, the culture of immigrants and minorities, and the 
culture resulting from the mixture of the two. It would certainly be quite 
difficult to disentangle the contributions of each, but what good would 
that do?
G. The Search for Equilibriums
Fundamentally, interculturalism is a search for balance and mediation 
between often-competing principles, values, and expectations. In this 
sense, it is a sustained effort aimed at connecting majorities and minorities, 
continuity and diversity, identity and rights, reminders of the past and 
visions of the future. It calls for new ways of coexisting within and beyond 
differences at all levels of collective life.
Furthermore, the majority/minorities dichotomy is not immutable. 
Through the prolonged dynamic of interactions, it is not unrealistic to 
think that it may one day dissolve. Here we see two possibilities – either 
the two basic components of the dynamic will melt together completely, 
or that one of them will disappear. Both scenarios would mean a departure 
from the interculturalist model and the duality paradigm. In the case of 
Quebec, however, this eventuality remains largely theoretical. It would 
require that immigration – which tends to renew the duality – diminish 
substantially, and that cultural minorities (or the majority itself) choose 
not to perpetuate themselves. This is at once a consequence and a paradox 
of a pluralist philosophy within a duality paradigm: to the extent that 
this presupposes a respect for diversity, it tends to diminish the us/them 
relationship and defuse the tension it fuels, but at the same time it 
contributes indirectly to perpetuating the duality.
Whatever the case may be, these scenarios remain unpredictable and 
somewhat arbitrary for another reason. As indicated earlier, paradigms and 
models are ultimately a matter of choice. There is not, therefore, necessarily 
a correspondence between the evolution of a nation’s ethnocultural reality 
and the form or the voices that frame the public discourse.
The preceding paragraphs highlight the issue of common values, 
which are already (or are becoming) subject to a very large consensus, 
and the necessity for their protection under the law. On this front, we 
know that over the course of the last few years some judgments by the 
Supreme Court of Canada have been met with sharp objections in Quebec. 
Some clarification is needed here. If we get to a point where the Supreme 
Court repeatedly and systematically contradicts or threatens the basic 
and consensual values of Quebec, such as gender equality, the French 
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language, or the institutional separation of church and state, then Quebec 
would be perfectly justified in resisting these judgments, either through 
recourse to the notwithstanding clause in the Canadian Constitution46 or 
through other legal and political means.
4. Interculturalism and Multiculturalism
I am opening a parenthetical discussion to situate Quebec intercul-
turalism in relation to Canadian multiculturalism. I will first remind that, 
for political reasons, all Quebec governments (federalist or not) have 
rejected multiculturalism since its adoption by the federal government in 
1971. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, francophones in Quebec 
have fought to gain acceptance of the idea that Canada is composed of 
two nations (anglophone and francophone). This vision of the country 
was undermined by the introduction of multiculturalism, which made 
francophones in Quebec simply one ethnic group among many others 
throughout Canada. In this sense, multiculturalism weakened Quebec and 
for this reason it is the source of keen opposition from the francophone 
population.
On a more theoretical or sociological level, researchers have often 
extrapolated in order to bring to fore the difference between these two 
models. For many reasons, this question does not lend itself to an easy 
answer. One is that Canadian multiculturalism has evolved a great deal 
since 1971. This is an important fact that we do not always take into account. 
In the 1970s, for example, the promotion of a diversity of languages and 
cultures was a central element of the Canadian model. Beginning in the 
1980s, a social dimension (the struggle against inequalities and exclusion) 
emerged at the same time as the rights dimension was primarily being 
heard through the struggle against discrimination. In the 1990s and over 
the course of the 2000s there was a growing concern for social cohesion, 
integration and common values, and for the formation (or consolidation) 
of a Canadian belonging and identity. More recently still, the model has 
made more room for ideas of interactions, cultural exchanges, Canadian 
values, and participation47.
We therefore note with interest that, in so doing, Canadian multicul-
turalism has slowly grown closer to Quebec interculturalism and that 
this is a source of persistent confusion in Quebec. Indeed, a number of 
interlocutors in the public debate argue for the similarity of the two models, 
but for opposite reasons. One group, on behalf of Quebec nationalism, 
46 Canadian Charter, supra note 43, art. 33. 
47 If we add the increasingly vocal criticisms expressed by English-speaking Canadians 
against multiculturalism, we come to ask ourselves whether Canada is in the process 
of questioning its diversity paradigm.
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aims to discredit interculturalism by associating it with Canadian 
multiculturalism and blaming it for the drawbacks usually associated with 
that model (fragmentation, relativism, and so forth), although in reality, one 
suspects that it is pluralism that is targeted. The other group, working from 
a Canadian or federalist perspective, downplays or denies the differences 
that exist between the two models by claiming that interculturalism is 
simply a variant of Canadian multiculturalism.
It seems to me, however, that these two models remain quite different 
for the following reasons:
1. The most defining and obvious difference is that interculturalism 
pertains to the nation of Quebec, the existence of which was 
officially recognized by the federal government itself (through a 
motion adopted by the House of Commons on 27 November 2006)48.
2. The two models are rooted in opposite paradigms. The federal 
government still adheres to the idea that there is no majority culture 
in Canada, that diversity defines the country, and that this idea 
must guide all discussion of ethnocultural reality49. For its part, 
Quebec continues to embrace the duality paradigm, emphasizing 
the majority/minorities structure. This choice conforms to the 
minority status of this French-speaking people on the North 
American continent and the anxieties that it inevitably entails. The 
crucial point here is that there really is a majority culture within the 
nation of Quebec whose fragility is a permanent fact of life. This 
results in a specific vision of nationhood, identity, and national 
belonging.
3. Since francophone Quebecers constitute a minority, they instinctively 
fear all forms of socio-cultural fragmentation, marginalization, and 
ghettoization. This is where interculturalism draws its particular 
conception of integration, namely the emphasis on interactions, 
connections between cultures, the development of feelings of 
belonging, and the emergence of a common culture. Traditionally, 
multiculturalism does not cultivate these concerns to the same 
degree – it puts more emphasis on the validation and promotion of 
“ethnic” groups.
4. Paradoxically, an extension of these arguments reveals the strong 
collective dimension (unity, interaction, integration, and common 
48 House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, vol. 141, nº 87 (27 November 2006).
49 I will not go into a critique of this premise and will limit myself to noting that in many 
regions of Canada the anglophone population retains the feeling that there is a genuine 
Canadian culture inherited from the past and that this culture does not have sufficient 
space to express itself within the framework of multiculturalism. According to some, 
this culture is threatened by the diversification brought by immigration.
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culture) permeating interculturalism, which distances it from the 
liberal individualism that is also inherent in multiculturalism50.
5. Another distinctive trait comes from the fact that Canadian 
multiculturalism has little to say on the issue of protecting 
languages. Sooner or later, immigrants to English-speaking 
Canada will inevitably want to learn the dominant language of 
the continent in order to eke out a decent living. The case is very 
different for the French language in Quebec, where there is a 
constant struggle to find new linguistic protections. This anxiety is 
obviously culturally motivated, but it also comes from the fact that 
language is an important factor in civic integration and collective 
cohesion. Multiculturalism does not echo this anxiety over a 
common language because English is in no way threatened.
6. In a more general sense, all the rights and accommodations 
granted to immigrants in Western democracies are accompanied 
by a preoccupation with the values and even the future of the host 
culture. This concern is understandably stronger in small nations 
that are anxious about their survival. Here, respect for diversity 
takes an additional dimension. In other words, the challenges 
linked to pluralism in small nations have an impact and spark a 
level of tension seldom experienced by more powerful nations. 
These pressures lie at the heart of interculturalism.
7. Another difference has to do with collective memory. Due to the 
battles that Quebec francophones have waged over the course 
of their history, an intense collective memory of their small, 
combative nation has taken hold. For many French-speakers, this 
memory carries a message of loyalty, or even duty, towards past 
and future generations. References to this past lie at the heart of the 
francophone culture, which can be another source of tension: how 
to transmit the memory of the majority without diluting its symbolic 
content in a context of increasing diversity, and all the while making 
room for minority narratives?51 This line of questioning clearly does 
not have the same resonance from a multiculturalist perspective, 
where the issue of a majority culture is simply absent.
50 In this sense, some have seen in this collective bend a French and/or Republican 
influence on interculturalism. I rather see it as the result of a continuity strongly rooted 
in the past of a dominated minority that has learned to band together in order to better 
survive and grow.
51 I am referring to a tension, not an impasse. It would be wrong to believe that this 
problem, as difficult as it is, lacks any solution. See, for instance, a proposition I made 
on this issue: Bouchard, La Nation québécoise au futur et au passé, op. cit., pp. 81-137; 
Bouchard, Gérard, “Promouvoir ce qu’il y a de plus universel dans notre passé”, 
Le Devoir, 30 January 2003, A9.
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8. The specific elements that have been noted here are concretely 
translated in different ways, particularly in the practice of 
recognition and of accommodations. In this last case, one expects 
that requests for accommodations in Quebec are often evaluated 
in terms of integration – that is, a request is more likely to be met 
if it can be positively connected to this issue. Thus, permitting 
the wearing of the hijab in class encourages Muslim students to 
continue attending public school and to open themselves up more 
easily to the values of Quebec society. The same is true for the 
offering of special menus in school cafeterias, a flexible policy 
towards certain pedagogical activities that do not interfere with the 
Education Act52, and so forth. 
9. As we have seen, interculturalism is on the whole very sensitive 
to the problems and needs of the majority culture, which 
multiculturalism cannot provide since, once again, it does not 
recognize the existence of such a culture.
These remarks bring to light the contrasting visions of these two 
models. Nevertheless, if we compare the policies relating to interethnic 
matters actually put in place by the Canadian and Quebec governments 
over the last several decades, we see numerous similarities53. How to 
explain this paradox? Besides the already discussed recent shift of 
multiculturalism towards interculturalism, I think that these similarities 
are due in part to the fact that both models share a pluralist orientation. 
But it mostly stems from the fact that the government of Quebec has not 
adequately aligned its policies with the interculturalist model. A gap has 
developed between the official philosophy and the policies actually in 
place. A much greater effort should be made on this ground. It is urgent 
to conceive of projects and policies that give real body to the spirit and 
objectives of interculturalism. It is also important to mobilize the Quebec 
society towards this end – not only the state, but also semi-public and 
private institutions, the business sector, the major unions, the media, and 
advocacy groups.
To give an example of one measure among many others that the 
state might put in place, why not give interculturalism a level of official 
recognition equivalent to what multiculturalism has received in Canada? 
By virtue of article 27 of the Canadian Charter, multiculturalism enjoys 
52 RSQ c I-13.3.
53 See McAndrew, “Multiculturalisme canadien et interculturalisme québécois: mythes 
et réalités”, op. cit.; Juteau, Danielle, Marie McAndrew and Linda Pietrantonio, 
“Multiculturalisme à la Canadian and Intégration à la Québécoise: Transcending their 
Limits” in Rainer Bauböck and John Rundell (eds.), Blurred Boundaries: Migration, 
Ethnicity, Citizenship, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998, pp. 95-110.
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the status of an interpretative clause. Why not do the same thing for 
interculturalism in the Quebec Charter?54
Conclusion: A Future for Interculturalism and  
French-speaking Quebec
Like all democracies worldwide currently questioning or even shaken 
in their cultural foundations, Quebec is confronted with a dilemma that 
it cannot overcome except through debates, negotiations, and the search 
for new ways of integration. These concerns lie at the very heart of the 
model proposed here. Needless to say, interculturalism calls for a complex 
dynamic made up of interactions, continuity, and change that is constantly 
negotiated and renegotiated on all levels of society, within a framework of 
respect for basic values and in a spirit that can be summarized in a single 
maxim – firmness in principles, flexibility in their application. This seems 
to be the best recipe for fostering integration as far as Quebec is concerned. 
Within the framework of Quebec, I maintain that radical solutions must 
be avoided – solutions that would, for example, lead to a total ban of 
religious symbols in public institutions. Republican models along the lines 
of France or Turkey are not well matched to the context of Quebec55 and 
do not correspond to the objectives and philosophy of interculturalism. 
Total prohibition, which entails the violation of a basic right, does not 
seem justified, at least at present, by any of the arguments made in its 
favour. Some of them draw on erroneous principles (e.g., equality of rights 
precludes difference of treatment, and the ban of religious signs is dictated 
by the separation of state and church). Others rely on suppositions and 
hypotheses that have not been tested enough empirically (the existence 
of an Islamist threat in Montreal, the belief that state officials wearing 
religious signs are biased in the course of their duties, the idea that the 
hidjab is the sign of female oppression (true in many cases, but the 
generalization is certainly abusive)56, and so forth.
The spirit of interculturalism invites us to recognize the diversity 
of situations in order to provide a diversity of solutions within a clear 
normative framework. In some cases, prohibition is in order – for instance 
54 This proposition recently received the support of a jurist at the University of Laval 
in Quebec. See Lampron, Louis-Philippe, “Comment déroger à la Charte canadienne 
sans déroger à la liberté de religion”, Le Devoir, 8 March 2010, A7.
55 A weak state, decentralized society, liberal tradition, long-standing and well established 
recognition of minority cultures, strong North American influence in institutions and in 
public culture, and so forth.
56 The hearings (public and private) of the Commission that Charles Taylor and I 
co-chaired in 2007-2008 clearly demonstrated this. And where there is oppression, are 
we sure that prohibition is the most effective way to help those women?
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with officials who embody the neutrality of the state and its autonomy 
from religion; for officials endowed with coercive power; and in the 
case of the burka or niqab, which should be banned in state employment 
locations and even in public spaces if it can be shown to pose a security 
threat; and so forth57.
Interculturalism is built on the basic wager of democracy, that is, a 
capacity to reach consensus on forms of peaceful coexistence that pre-
serve basic values and make room for the future of all citizens, regardless 
of their origins or nationalities. This path is certainly not the easiest. For 
the Quebec majority culture, the simplest thing would be to try to protect 
the old francophone identity to the point of isolating it, to freeze it – as it 
were – and thus to impoverish it, which would be another way of putting 
it at risk. The more promising but also the more difficult option is the one 
which offers a wider horizon to this identity and to its underlying values 
by sharing them with immigrants and minority groups. This last option, 
contrary to what is sometimes said, does not involve withdrawal or self-
renunciation, but real affirmation. It means the expansion and enrichment 
of heritage. It also includes the important advantage of providing 
inspiration for all Quebec’s citizens.
Finally, it must be restated that these propositions befit the new realities 
of francophone Quebec, which has entered a phase of demographic 
decrease, of diversification due to immigration, and of globalization. As 
a minority, the French-speaking majority cannot afford to be weakened 
by creating lasting divisions. It needs all its strength. To a large extent, its 
future lies in the respectful integration of diversity.
For Quebec, the key is to rely on a model of integration that preserves 
the rich achievements of this nation, while expanding the sphere in which 
they can be unfurled and extended. Until there is proof to the contrary, 
interculturalism appears to be the best way for effectively combining 
these objectives. I have tried to show, in particular, that it can ensure 
a future for the majority as well as for minorities. Thus, it is wrong to 
claim that interculturalism (or integrational pluralism) forces the majority 
culture to “renounce” itself (that is to say, its memory, its identity, and its 
aspirations) and deprives it of the means for self-assertion58.
57 I tried to summarize my conception of a secular regime in terms of interculturalism 
(see Bouchard, “Laïcité: la voie québécoise de l’interculturalisme”, op. cit., which, 
following Jean Baubérot, we can call inter-cultural secularism (see Baubérot, Jean, 
Une laïcité interculturelle: Le Québec, avenir de la France?, La Tour D’Aigues, 
Éditions de l’Aube, 2008). In any case, I easily admit that the interculturalist model 
can welcome many different conceptions.
58 It would be easy to show that the real obstacles to assertion and development in 
francophone Quebec are primarily political in nature and that, as with the national 
question, it is in this sphere especially that they must be addressed.
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This brief presentation of the interculturalist model has devoted much 
space to the specifics of Quebec and, more particularly, to the minority 
and majority double-status of this French-speaking people. It also brought 
into light the potential of interculturalism for transposition and expansion 
to all nations, Western and otherwise, that have chosen to adopt the 
duality paradigm in their dealings with diversity and integration. There 
is proof of this in the results of a broad survey conducted by the Council 
of Europe among its forty-seven member states (following the Warsaw 
Summit in 2005)59. They were asked about the best model for managing 
interethnic or intercultural relations. All these countries arrived at a 
consensus on three points: (a) the rejection of multiculturalism, which 
was associated with fragmentation and seen as harmful to social cohesion; 
(b) the rejection of assimilation due to the violation of individual rights 
that it entails; and (c) the choice of interculturalism as a middle path, as 
a model of balance and equity. Interestingly, the survey also brought out 
that this model maintained the best parts of multiculturalism (sensitivity 
to diversity) and of republicanism (sensitivity to universal rights)60.
Interculturalism thus opens a large horizon for thought and action, 
at the same time that it presents Quebec with the opportunity to make a 
significant contribution to one of the fundamental problems of our time.
59 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 118th Sess., Living Together as Equals in 
Dignity, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, 2008.
60 See Battaini-Dragoni, Gabrielle, “La voie de l’avenir: Vivre ensemble dans le respect 
de la diversité”, Speech presented as part of a workshop, in Les droits de l’Homme dans 
des sociétés culturellement diverses: Défis et perspectives. Actes de la conférence de 
La Haye, 12-13 novembre 2008, Strasbourg, Direction générale des droits de l’Homme 
et des affaires juridiques, Conseil de l’Europe, 2009, pp. 141-145.
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Joxerramon BenGoetxea
Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of the Basque Country, 
(San Sebastian)
Introduction: Analytical Remarks
Cultural plurality is a sociological fact concerning the (co-)existence 
of different cultures in one society2. It can adopt different expressions in 
politics, in the economy, in social relations, in symbolic universe, in the 
cultural products and references created, produced and consumed in our 
societies, and also in law. Pluri-culturality or multi-culturality, can also, 
although it need not, be related to a sociological or a political theory: 
multiculturalism or its more recent spin-offs like the more hybrid inter-
culturalism or “management of cultural diversity”. As a sociological fact, 
cultural plurality is always interpreted from a sociological theory (in a 
spectre that spans from monist to pluralist poles).
1 This work has been produced within the framework of (i) project DER2010-19715 
of the juri subprogram of the Spanish Ministry of Science and (ii) the Consolidated 
Research Group (GIC07/86-IT-448-07) led by Prof Gurutz Jauregi, with the financial 
assistance of the Education, Universities and Research Department of the Basque 
Autonomous Government.
2 The definition of “society” is obviously problematic: I use an intuitive concept, where 
the social grouping – involving population, communities (not only individuals and 
families), institutions, social (inter)action, symbols, artifacts – is territorially and 
jurisdictionally circumscribed, yet still elastic. There is a Basque society but also a 
Spanish society, even a European society. Their features and components differ because 
the networks formed by individuals occur in different contexts. On the other hand, 
so-called “civil society”, even “transnational civil society” is out with this intuitive or 
pre-interpretative notion of society. My view is largely influenced by Geertz, Clifford, 
The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973.
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Still, regardless of the interpretative framework, one can always ask 
how and in what manner the law, the institutional normative order3 of 
a society, deals with this fact of cultural plurality especially as regards 
the normative expressions of such plurality: recognition, accommodation, 
regulation, avoidance, limitation, denial strategies. From the modern 
standpoint of Human Rights, this fact of plurality and diversity is often 
regarded as an asset. But this does not mean that in any given society or 
community where a dominant, majoritarian normative framework exists 
and impregnates the official law, the different identifiable cultures (or 
rather all cultural practices and their normative claims), commensurable 
or not, will be or even should be catered for, supported or accommodated 
(this claim of cultural pluralism or multiculturalism can be related to 
ethical relativism).
At the same time, there can be plurality within law, so-called legal 
pluralism or variants and versions of it. This can be a consequence of the 
sociological fact of cultural plurality or it can be a consequence of a diversity 
of recognised and co-official institutional normative systems within the 
same territory, a plurality of legal systems, which can also be related 
to constitutional plurality and integrated into a theory of constitutional 
pluralism4 and law. This plurality of laws in the same territory can, again, 
be seen as a sociological or socio-legal fact – legal plurality or diversity – 
or as a theory of law and state where they translate into legal pluralism 
versus monism to incorporate useful categories from international law. 
Much will turn around the contemporary notion of the Nation-State as the 
dominant but no longer exclusive normative framework in the European 
context. Statist views stress the special, central and predominant place of 
the state in the definition of law, understood as positive law. According to 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “the general trend 
of the nation-state’s evolution is towards its transformation depending on 
the case, from a purely ethnic or ethnocentric state into a civic state and 
from a purely civic state into a multicultural state where specific rights are 
recognised with regard not only to physical persons but also to cultural or 
national communities”5. But in this picture, the state and its official law 
3 For the definition of law as institutional normative order see MacCormick, Neil, 
Institutions of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007.
4 On constitutional pluralism see MacCormick, ibid., and MacCormick, Questioning 
Sovereignty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. This concept was taken up by 
Neil Walker in The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, and has since become the subject 
of heated debates in the European legal scholarship (Weiler, Kumm, Maduro, Baquero, 
Menéndez, Tuori, Komarek).
5 Resolution 1735 (2006) on the concept of nation, Assembly debate on 26 January 2006 
(7th Sitting) (see Doc. 10762, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, rapporteur: Mr Frunda).
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is still the focal point of such recognition and legal plurality is brought 
under the general supervision of state law.
To the extent that state and law are thought to be conceptually 
connected, legal pluralism will be denied and some version or variant of 
monism will be adopted as the interpretative framework where plurality 
or diversity is explained away. This need not lead to a denial of cultural 
rights and indeed the aforementioned resolution in its point 16.4 invites the 
member states to bring into line their constitutions with the contemporary 
democratic European standards which call on each state to integrate all 
its citizens, irrespective of their ethno-cultural background, within a civic 
and multicultural entity, and to stop defining and organising themselves 
as exclusively ethnic or exclusively civic states. Indeed the risk in both 
extremes is to become ethnically exclusive (of those who do not share the 
same ethnic or religious identities) or civically exclusive (of those who 
do not have the nationality, the culture of laïcité or the national language).
When facing plurality, the major law-makers – the Constitution-
makers, amendment-makers, constitution interpreters, and the legislators, 
but also lawyers and judges generally – develop different strategies. 
Democratic legislators, at the level of sources of law, tend to accept 
cultural plurality and diversity within the confines of democratic 
constitutions and Human Rights Bills and International Human Rights 
instruments. This cultural plurality can even become a major feature of 
modern constitution-states. However this acceptance of cultural plurality 
does not amount to recognition of legal plurality, of the normative claims 
made from the different cultures, at the more fundamental level of the rule 
of recognition of the sources of law.
Such plurality and diversity of laws, which is denied at the level 
of sources, might nevertheless be recognised in the interpretation and 
application of the law, through the mediation of cultural plurality. The 
contrast here is between universal norms adopted by the legislator 
and particular norms of judicial decisions. Judges and legislators can 
recognise some relevance and effect to cultural plurality, this recognition 
being facilitated by theories of Human Rights-conforming interpretations. 
Notions and theories concerning the cultural exceptions, or reasonable 
accommodation are then developed in the context of legal discourse – 
law-application, legal argumentation and judicial reasoning – in order to 
achieve results that reconcile cultural diversity and non-discrimination 
with the denial of legal pluralism at a more foundational, conceptual 
level. Human Rights-conforming application and interpretation can then 
take different forms; one of these is equity.
The theoretical claim of this paper is that reasonable accommodation 
or cultural sensitivity (exception), related to the concept of equity, has 
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the potential to integrate normative claims that can be interpreted as 
coherent with the higher normative principles of a society – tolerance 
and equality, freedom and autonomy of the person comprising respect 
for (cultural) difference, and solidarity towards others. A key contention 
I would like to make in relation to legal pluralism in European societies 
is that such pluralism refers not to competing, not even co-existing legal 
orders but rather to specific norms and practices like those concerning 
family law, marriage and weddings. Family law is an area where such 
pluralistic norms and practices coexist and can be accommodated in some 
cases within the dominant normative framework, even by judges. Legal 
pluralism would then relate to the coexistence, in one jurisdiction, of 
different (individual) norms having their origin, their source in normative 
orders, that are different from official law. This is perhaps more workable 
a concept than the classical definition of legal pluralism as the existence of 
different legal systems, assuming one can isolate norms from the systems 
where they belong, as one does in private international law with choice of 
law6, by treating the norm as a sociological normative fact or quasi-fact, 
but not as a valid norm of the system into which it is incorporated. The 
analogy with choice of law or collision norms also applies in that some 
of those “imported norms” might not satisfy the test of the public policy/
public order exception.
Family law, excluding those rules that would be considered against 
the basic principles of public order, like polygamy, is a proper area for 
the expression of plurality in contemporary European societies. Marriage 
is a social institution and a legal institution as well: it comprises social 
arrangements and prohibitions; it channels sexual taboos; it generates 
social relationships; it is the way to create a family and to ensure 
reproduction; it encompasses a property regime, an inheritance regime and 
a set of economic relationships; it is the locus for cultural transmission; 
it arranges relations between groups, sometimes in confrontation; and 
it generates loyalties and solidarities that go beyond the two spouses. 
Of course, in modern societies some or many of these social functions 
are only latent, and marriage is not the only institution serving those 
functions, but it is a crucial institution all the same.
These complex issues will be examined through two cases originating 
in the European context, in the EU and in the Council of Europe. The cases 
have to do with different forms of marriage, in one case, the wedding 
rites and customs followed by the Rom people that are not registered 
6 An interesting application of choice of law techniques to multicultural challenges to 
the law in context of the feminist post-essentialist cultural debate can be found in 
Knop, Karen, Ralf Michaels and Annelise Riles, “From Multiculturalism to Technique: 
Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of Laws Style”, Stanford Law Review, vol. 64, 
nº 3, 2012, pp. 589-656.
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and therefore not recognised by official Spanish law. In the other case 
is the legal treatment given by the European Commission applying the 
EU Staff Regulations to special forms of union between two people who 
have adopted a “convention for living together”, an institute recognised in 
Dutch family law and which could in theory be entered into by more than 
two people. The law does not prejudge or predetermine the social functions 
of the different forms of marriage, but it allows a normative framework 
for their expression, either through the legislation contemplating these 
different forms or through the reasonable accommodation expected from 
judges and law-applying authorities taking into account the different 
cultural and normative situations and frameworks of persons belonging 
to cultural minorities.
1. Two Cases from the European Context
1.1  Rom Marriage and the Spanish Civil Law:  
The Muñoz Díaz Case7
Spain refused to recognise the Applicant’s widower’s pension on 
the ground that she had not legally contracted marriage. The European 
Court of Human Rights found that Spain had breached Article 14 of the 
Convention in relation to Article 1 of Protocol Nº 1 concerning the Right 
to Property. The Court ordered Spain to pay the Applicant 70 000 euros 
plus defence legal costs.
The Applicant and M.D. “married” in 1971 following the gypsy rite 
recognised by the Rom community. At the time the Spanish Civil Code 
(Art. 42) provided that when one of the spouses is Catholic, the wedding 
was to follow the Catholic rite and form. Civil wedding was recognised 
when neither of the spouses was Catholic. The only possibility for a 
Catholic to marry through the civil wedding was to abandon the Catholic 
faith by an act of apostasy performed before the local priest (Art. 245 of 
the Law regulating the Civil Registry).
The couple had six children. The children were registered in 1983 in the 
Civil Registry and, although Spanish law required a formally registered 
marriage, a Family Book was issued to them though the wedding was 
not officially recognised or registered. They were given recognition of 
the status of a large family (familia numerosa) in 1986. The new Civil 
Code was adopted in 1981 and provided for civil marriage. Spain has 
entered into agreements with several confessions providing for the civil 
7 European Court of Human Rights (3rd Chamber), case Muñoz Díaz v Kingdom of 




recognition of the weddings performed according to their own rites 
following the model of the Concordat with the Catholic Church. No such 
agreement has been entered into with the Rom community concerning the 
Rom wedding or marriage, which has no specific formality other than the 
mutual expression of the will to live together and set up a family.
M.D. died in 2000. He had worked and contributed to Social Security 
for over 19 years. The Applicant then applied for a widower’s pension and 
this was refused by the INSS (Spanish Social Security Authority) on the 
ground that there was no formal marriage and the law regulating the INSS 
(law of 7 July 1981, 7th additional provision and legislative degree 1/1994 
establishing the General Law of Social Security, article 174, requiring 
officially recognised marriage) did not apply. The Applicant appealed 
before the Labour Court of Madrid (Nº 12). This Court recognised civil 
effects of the marriage and ordered the INSS to award the pension. The 
judgment was based on several legal arguments drawn from the 1966 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights prohibiting all forms 
of discrimination from, indirectly by analogy, Directive 2000/43/CE 
prohibiting all forms of discrimination outside the workplace, and from 
Art. 14 of the Spanish Constitution prohibiting ethnic discrimination, 
amongst other forms. The State could not forgo its duty of protection 
even if it did not recognise the gypsy marriage. This judgment is very 
important and indicates a special sensitivity developed by the Labour 
Court. Labour Courts are often more advanced in their interpretations8.
However, on Appeal, the Higher Court of Justice of Madrid upheld 
the INSS decision giving priority to Art. 49 of the Civil Code, which 
provides for civil effects of religious marriages when the State has so 
provided. Gypsy marriage was not contemplated and could be considered, 
at best, as a custom that would only apply in the absence of a statutory 
norm (Art. 1.3 of the Civil Code). It would have no erga omnes effect. 
The concept of spouse used by the General Law of Social Security has to 
be interpreted strictly as excluding concubines and similar cases.
Amparo or special protection appeal before the Constitutional Court 
was denied by judgment of 16-04-2007, on the argument that there was 
no discrimination in the fact that the law restricted pensions to lawful 
marriages excluding other unions more uxorio. The legislator has 
discretion to make such choices, especially in the context of limited 
resources. The basis for the widower’s pension is not the need of the 
widower but her legally recognised marriage with the deceased worker 
who had contributed to the Social Security pension fund. There would 
be no right of the Applicant to a differentiated treatment. A dissenting 
8 See Pallín, José Antonio Martín and Jesús Peces Morate, La Justicia en España, 
Madrid, Ediciones Catarata, 2008.
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vote was cast by judge Rz Zapata relying on a previous judgment of the 
Constitutional Court 199/2004 where a catholic marriage had not been 
civilly registered and yet had been considered valid for the purposes 
of awarding pension rights. It would be disproportionate for the State 
to grant a Family Book, to recognise the status of a large family and to 
receive over 19 years of contributions from the deceased partner but to 
refuse the pension.
The 40/2007 Law on measures of Social Security finally changed the 
law in Spain. The third additional provision provides for pension rights 
in cases of six years of concubine status (living together) and children 
in common. The Applicant, Muñoz Díaz, was awarded her widower’s 
pension.
The Reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights
The Applicant invoked the violation of Art. 14 of the Convention 
prohibiting all forms of discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of any 
of the rights of the Convention or its Protocols, in this case the right to 
property protected by Art. 1 of Protocol 1 and the right to marriage and 
family life protected by Art. 12 of the Convention. The main argument 
of the Defendant State, Spain, is that there is no discrimination in this 
case since the pension was denied simply because there was no marriage 
at all, only a more uxorio relationship, with no legal effects. After the 
entry into force of the Spanish Constitution, the Applicant could have 
contracted a civil marriage, perfectly in line with the Convention9. The 
refusal to award a pension is clearly in prejudice of the Applicant’s 
property interests and the main question for the Court is to decide whether 
the pension was refused because the Applicant is a member of the Rom 
minority, taking into consideration the decisions the defendant State has 
made in like situations such as the one mentioned in the dissenting vote 
of the Constitutional Court where a registered Catholic marriage was 
recognised for the purposes of pension rights.
The Applicant believed in good faith that her gypsy marriage was 
lawful and produced effects like an ordinary marriage. The State officials 
had awarded some form of recognition by granting the “Family Book” or 
the status of large family and had thus generated some expectations on 
the Applicant. The beliefs of the member of a well-defined cultural group 
cannot be ignored or neglected, and cultural pluralism is beneficial to 
the whole of society. It is true that belonging to a minority can afford no 
9 The Court did not find a violation of Article 12 since the State has the right to regulate 
marriage and the effects it recognises to marriages. In this case it could decide, as it 
did, that only marriages contemplated in special Conventions between the State and 
Religious Institutions or Confessions would be given erga omnes effect.
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excuse not to respect the law but it can have an effect on the way the laws 
are applied. The Court is here relying on Chapman v. UK, paragraphs 
61 and 96, a case concerning the right to a home of the Rom in the light 
of licensing and land management (caravan sites). Living in caravans is 
there identified with gypsy ethnic identity and measures limiting this right 
to dwell in caravans would also affect the right to privacy, private and 
family life. The decision of the UK authorities to refuse the right to camp 
in the particular site under the circumstances was however considered 
proportionate and thus compatible with the Convention.
In the current case the Applicant had legitimate expectation to be 
considered the lawful wife of M.D. The refusal of the pension by the 
State somehow contradicted the recognition that the very State had 
expressed towards the Applicant concerning her family condition. The 
State should have taken into account the Applicant’s good faith and her 
cultural and social conditions, in line with the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities10, which Spain had ratified in 1995. 
There was therefore an unjustified different treatment.
Judge Myjer gave a dissenting vote on the ground that the precedents 
cited by the Court concerning the Rom (Chapman v. UK11, Buckley v. 
UK12, and Connors v. UK13) were in the field of land management and 
building or camping licenses, not family law. In the case of Connors, 
the statutory scheme which permitted the summary eviction placed 
“considerable obstacles in the way of gypsies pursuing an actively 
nomadic lifestyle while at the same time excluding from procedural 
protection those who decide to take up a more settled lifestyle” (para. 94); 
the delicate situation of gypsies required providing sites for parking the 
10 For a summary of The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
refer to: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf. Page 
consulted on 12 February 2014.
11 Five cases were joined: besides Chapman, Beard v. UK, Coster v. UK, Lee v. UK and 
Jane Smith v. UK, see para. 96: “although the fact of being a member of a minority 
with a traditional lifestyle different from that of the majority of a society does not 
confer an immunity from general laws intended to safeguard assets common to the 
whole society such as the environment, it may have an incidence on the manner in 
which such laws are to be implemented. […] [t]he vulnerable position of gypsies as 
a minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and 
their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in 
arriving at decisions in particular cases. To this extent there is thus a positive obligation 
imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of 
life”. These judgments were very split, seven judges gave separate dissenting opinions 
considering there were very few realistic alternatives to carry out the gypsy lifestyle.
12 ECHR Eur Commission, 25 Sep 1995. See also Turner v. UK, Eur Commission 26 Feb 
1997.
13 Judgment of 27 May 2004.
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caravans. In a statement that came very close to the concept of reasonable 
accommodation the Court said, in paragraph 84:
The vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority means that some special 
consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both 
in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular 
cases (Buckley judgment cited above, at 1292-95, paras. 76, 80 and 84). To 
this extent, there is thus a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting 
States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of life (see Chapman, 
op. cit., para. 96 and the authorities cited, mutatis mutandis, therein).
This case concerning the Rom has been chosen because of the special 
features of the Rom in Europe, suffering discrimination in many European 
countries (Italy, Hungary, Kosovo, Check Republic, Slovakia, Romania, 
Serbia; the UK and Spain are not amongst the least respectful) and deprived 
of basic rights like education, employment, home, and health. According 
to Joke Kusters, the Rom are the genuine European minority: they lack a 
country of their own; the 10 million Roms are scattered throughout Europe in 
lands that are not their own, often with nomadic practices or lifestyles. They 
cannot be considered a national minority, not even a linguistic minority, nor 
a religious minority14. Perhaps they are a true European minority15.
The EU is now contemplating special action plans to combat 
discrimination against the Rom, following the steps of the Council of 
Europe16. If the initial approaches focused on integration as absorption 
into the dominant culture (e.g. seeing nomadic lifestyle and the lack 
of a permanent residence as an obstacle to e.g. education), the later 
developments have stressed the need to recognise and respect such 
nomadic culture and lifestyle as an essential part of their identity. Of 
14 Kusters, Joke, “Criminalising Romani Culture through Law” in Marie-Claire Foblets 
and Alison Dudes Renteln (eds.), Multicultural Jurisprudence, Oxford, Hart, 2009, 
pp. 199-227.
15 Capotorti’s definition is useful but still relates to the State as the stage where minorities 
operate: “A group inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-dominant 
position, whose numbers – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, 
if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religions or language” (Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, United Nations, New York, 1991, para. 568.).
16 See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendations, “On the situation of 
Gypsies and other Travellers in Europe”, nº 563, 1969; “On Gypsies in Europe”, 1993, 
nº 1203; “Concerning the Plight of the Roma in Europe”, nº 1557, 2002. The European 
Commission has adopted on 7 April 2010 a Communication on social and economic 
integration of the Rom in Europe. Also, Amnesty International has produced special 
reports on the issue (EUR 71/004/2009, EUR 30/001/2010 and EUR 39/001/2010, 
see at [Online]: www.amnesty.org/es/library). See also the European Committee on 
Migration: Report on the Situation of Gypsies and Other Travellers in Europe (1995).
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course, this case is only a tiny example of the way cultural plurality can 
lead to situations resembling legal pluralism.
1.2   Different Forms of Marriage in Dutch Law and their 
Relevance in the EU Staff Regulations
Case T-58/08P Commission v. AP Roodhuijzen, Court of First Instance 
(now General Court) judgment of 5 October 2009, Court of Justice of the 
EC (Now of the EU) is a different type of case also concerning marriage 
but, apparently, devoid of ethnic or cultural minority components. The 
Staff Regulations of the EC provide for a general regime of social security 
coverage “RCAM” for the spouses of civil servants of the EU. The 
unmarried partners will be considered as spouses for the purposes of the 
Regulation if three conditions are met: (1) the partner produces a certificate 
given by the relevant Member State to the effect of a non-matrimonial 
partnership (2) the unmarried partners are not already married or linked 
to other persons by any other form of non-matrimonial partnerships, and 
(3) there is no close parenthood between the two partners.
Mr Roodhuijzen is a Dutch national working for Eurostat. He applied 
to the Commission to give social security coverage of the RCAM to his 
partner, with whom he has a samenlevingsovereenkomst or living-together 
convention recognised before a Notary Public. Dutch law recognises two 
types of union besides ordinary civil marriage: a registered partnership or 
geregistreerd partnerschap which has similar effects to marriage, and the 
convention for living together, samenlevingsovereenkomst, which has the 
effects the contracting parties wish to give it and can be entered into by 
more than two persons and also between close relatives. When registered 
before a Public Authority, it can give rise to pension rights and other 
social advantages. The Commission examined this institute and decided 
it was not comparable to the non-matrimonial partnership provided for by 
the Staff Regulations.
Mr Roodhuijen brought an action against this decision before the 
Civil Service Tribunal who proceeded to interpret this notion of non-
matrimonial partnership in an autonomous manner. Autonomous 
interpretation, the view that concepts used by EU law have an autonomous 
meaning and not necessarily the meaning they have in the domestic legal 
orders, is of course one of the distinguishing features of EU law17. The 
problem is that the Tribunal further went on to analyse and compare 
the specific convention for living together entered into by the Applicant 
and his partner, considering that the conditions agreed by them were 
comparable to a marriage. The Commission appealed before the Court of 
17 On these issues of interpretation in EU law I refer the reader to my The Legal Reasoning 
of the European Court of Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.
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First Instance (now General Court), invoking, amongst other arguments, 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights:
un samenlevingsovereenkomst pourrait être conclu entre plusieurs personnes 
et entre parents proches. La Commission rappelle à cet égard que la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme a rejeté l’allégation de discrimination, en 
ce qui concerne les droits de succession, avancée par deux sœurs engagées 
dans une “relation stable, solide et mutuellement solidaire” (voir Cour eur. 
D.H., arrêt Burden c. Royaume-Uni du 29 avril 2008, para. 10), par rapport 
aux partenaires engagés dans un partenariat civil organisé par la loi du 
Royaume-Uni, notamment au motif que “l’une des caractéristiques définissant 
le mariage ou l’union fondée sur la loi sur le partenariat civil tient à ce que 
les formes d’union sont interdites aux personnes qui ont des liens proches de 
parenté” (para. 62 de l’arrêt)18.
The General Court interpreted the notion of non-matrimonial 
partnership by stressing that it need not be equated with marriage nor 
regulated by law or subject to a registry condition. A stable partner is the 
term used by the exposition des motifs in the Staff Regulations. All that is 
required is that the three conditions be met. The Tribunal should not have 
looked into any comparison of the concrete convention for living together 
with any form of marriage:
En effet, eu égard à la grande hétérogénéité des législations nationales en ce 
qui concerne la mise en place de régimes légaux accordant une reconnaissance 
juridique à diverses formes d’union autres que le mariage, la notion de 
“fonctionnaire enregistré comme partenaire stable non matrimonial”, visée 
dans la première phrase de l’article 1er, paragraphe 2, sous c), de l’annexe 
VII du statut, ne saurait en tant que telle être interprétée comme se référant à 
un régime de “partenariat enregistré” clairement identifié dans l’ensemble des 
États membres, lequel correspondrait en l’occurrence, en droit néerlandais, au 
geregistreerd partnerschap. Sous cet aspect, et à ce stade de l’évolution des 
divers systèmes juridiques nationaux, la notion de “partenariat enregistré” se 
distingue ainsi de celle de “mariage”, dont le contour est clairement déterminé 
dans l’ensemble des États membres, ce qui a permis au juge communautaire 
de définir la notion de mariage visée dans le statut comme désignant 
exclusivement un rapport fondé sur le mariage civil au sens traditionnel du 
terme (arrêt du Tribunal du 28 janvier 1999, D/Conseil, T-264/97, Rec. FP 
p. I-A-1 et II-1, point 26)19.
This concept is found to be compatible with the notion developed by 
the ECHR in the mentioned Burden case because the Staff Regulations 
rule out any close parenthood between the partners. And it is telling in 
itself that the General Court should be aware of the need to reach an 
18 Paragraph 55 of the judgment, not available in English yet.
19 Paragraph 75 of the judgment, not available in English at the time of writing.
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interpretation cohering with that of the Strasbourg Court. It is true that 
the convention for living together can cover other forms of union which 
do not fulfil the three conditions of the Staff Regulations and that would 
not satisfy the Burden principle, but that is for the Commission to control 
in each case by looking not at the terms or definitions or qualifications 
given by the laws of the Member States but rather at the three conditions 
imposed by EU law. In other words, the law-applying and law-interpreting 
authority need not look beyond the notions and concepts used by the Staff 
Regulations which have expressly contemplated the plurality or diversity 
of forms of union or partnerships between persons. In other words, 
to paraphrase the view of the Court, formalism would be the correct 
approach for the judge when the legislator has already incorporated 
pluralism or reasonable recognition, but flexibility and accommodation 
can be an acceptable approach when the legislator has not thought of the 
diversity of forms of union.
Conclusion: Legal Pluralism vs. Reasonable 
Accommodation
While being fully aware of the impossibility to infer any, even 
provisional non-falsified statements from only two cases, I would still 
argue that the European approach to cultural diversity is systemic, 
combining the levels of legislation and application. The Courts do not, 
indeed cannot, impose any specific version of legal pluralism; that would 
be something, if at all, for the legislator to do at the level of the sources 
or of their recognition. The Strasbourg Court does not tell Spain that it 
should recognise gypsy marriages.
In the strict sense of the term, or the focal meaning, legal pluralism 
implies two claims: (1) the existence of different institutional normative 
orders applying simultaneously in the same territory or jurisdiction and to 
the same society and (2) possibly offering different normative solutions 
to the same type of problems20. The first claim is arguable and plausible 
within law. At most, it would involve different legal orders coordinated by 
shared, albeit permanently contested, meta-principles. It is hotly debated 
within internal legal culture – from constitutional scholars to judges and 
administrators – whether such situations of contested claims necessarily 
require a final answer and who should provide it. Constitutional pluralism 
of the type predicated of a post-national legal constellation like the EU 
would postulate the desirability of not deciding, once and for all, on 
20 On legal pluralism see Wolkmer, Antonio Carlos, Pluralismo Jurídico. Fundamentos 
de una nueva cultura del Derecho, Sevilla, Mad-Eduforma, 2006, and the preliminary 
study by Sánchez Rubio, David, “Estudio preliminar”.
235
Multiculturalism and Legal Pluralism
the issue of ultimate authority, but rather leaving it open21. One can 
discuss whether these co-existing legal orders are then to be grouped 
and subjected into a higher legal system of EU law, itself perhaps part 
of the more universal system of international law, in Kelsenian vein, or 
whether it is the state legal systems that having created the supra-national 
and international legal orders that would retain original authority and 
sovereignty. This pluralist debate can be extended, perhaps even more 
convincingly, to the European Convention of Human Rights22.
The debate is mostly academic. Rather than instances of this 
constitutional pluralism of co-ordinated legal orders competing for 
primacy and ultimate authority in practice one tends to find more 
concrete manifestations of pluralism in areas like family law, more 
generally in the law of persons and the law of things, or commercial law 
and other fields23. The second claim of legal pluralism seems to rule 
out any possibility of coordination between incompatible norms. Such 
coordination would require accepting different personal status depending 
on the fact of belonging to one ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, social 
minority or another. Many non-Western systems accept or recognise such 
pluralism24. But this pluralism of personal status will not be considered a 
valid concept of law in contemporary Western societies characterised by 
cultural plurality25.
In my opinion, the interesting question for contemporary European 
socio-legal studies of Legal Pluralism is not so much to enquire what 
are the attitudes of the legal actors in the face of different legal orders 
competing in pluralism – an aspect which can be worth pursuing, if at 
all, from a constitutional point of view – but rather what are the attitudes 
to these concrete manifestations or expressions or pluralistic phenomena 
in a context where official state law still dominates the elaboration and 
application of law and the internal legal cultures. Such specific expressions 
21 Thus, Aida Torres (Conflicts of Rights in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009), passim, favours a constitutional pluralist framework of 
interdependent legal orders with no hierarchy between the foundational texts of 
national and supranational norms.
22 Cormac MacAmlaigh holds that domestic courts can claim that they are upholding the 
values of the Convention while disagreeing with the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation 
thereof (“Questioning Constitutional Pluralism”, University of Edinburgh School of 
Law Working Paper Series, nº 17, 2011, p. 30).
23 See Neil MacCormick’s fantastic work Institutions of Law, op. cit., for a modern 
definition of the law of persons, of things, of wrongs, etc.
24 Werner Menski, in his many interesting works, hints at this personal status pluralism 
as a viable solution for some multicultural conflicts. See e.g. “Flying Kites in a Global 
Sky: New Models of Jurisprudence”, Socio-Legal Review, vol. 7, 2011, pp. 1-22
25 It was expressly ruled out by the ECHR in Refah Partisi, cases Nº 41340/98, 41342/98, 
41343/98, Judgment of 13-02-2003.
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of pluralistic phenomena are linked to cultural plurality or diversity and 
the results in the law deliver results such as accommodation formulae: e.g. 
when the EU legislator adopts the Staff Regulations recognising a variety 
of forms of partnerships or unions. But when the legislator fails or decides 
not to accommodate26, then the interpreter will have a second chance 
to apply (reasonable) accommodation, cultural defences as developed in 
cultural jurisprudence, sensitivity, empathy, or equity. In either case, the 
accommodation is performed into or unto official law.
If Spanish authorities – Social Security officials, Madrid’s Higher 
Court of Justice and Constitutional Court – had been coherent with or 
sensitive to the European Framework Convention for the Protection 
of Minorities27 they would have taken into account applicant Muñoz 
Diaz’s good faith and considered the importance of gypsy weddings 
in her community, as a social norm to which other authorities of that 
State – civil registry, social services – had given due consideration and 
effects for other legally relevant purposes like issuing the Family Book 
or recognising the large family status. Menski reports on a similar case 
in the UK28 where an unregistered religious Sikh marriage in the UK in 
the 1950s created a legal status equivalent to marriage under English law 
entitling the widow to pension rights. For Menski, in this decision, the 
Court of Appeal “ultimately achieved a just and fair outcome by applying 
principles of equity, certainly not uniformising equality”29.
26  “It is widely felt that a regime allowing specific religious/cultural minorities to follow 
their specific proper personal law, like family law, and on that basis to be recognized as 
married, divorced, etc. in the Dutch legal order on a par with the dominant family law 
should not be introduced in the Netherlands, partly for a host of practical reasons, but 
more fundamentally because then the state would have to define what groups qualify 
as religious/cultural communities which it is not the function of the secular state to 
determine. As is clear, in individual cases and within the boundaries of fundamental 
principles, legal pluralism is not principally rejected” (Van Rossum, Wibo, “Dutch 
Judges Deciding Multicultural Cases” in Fred Bruinsma and David Nelken (eds.), 
Explorations in Legal Culture, The Hague, Elsevier, 2007, p. 62).
27 See the article by the former Deputy President of the Framework Convention’s Advisory 
Committee, Lidija R. Basta Fleiner, “Participation Rights under the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: towards a legal framework 
against social and economic discrimination” in Institutional accommodation and the 
citizen: legal and political interaction in a pluralist society, Strasburg, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2009, pp. 67-83.
28 Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath 2000 (1) FLR 8.
29 Menski, Werner, “Asking for the Moon: Legal Uniformity in India from a Kerala 
perspective”, Paper presented at the Max Plank Institut in Halle on 13 September 2012. 
Cited by permission of the author.
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Equity30, empathy31, sensitivity or reasonable accommodation32 here 
require going beyond the formalism of State official law monism and 
to an awareness of legal pluralist phenomena that may have a bearing 
on equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination. A certain 
attitude is expected from the law-interpreters and from officials to be 
able to modulate the formalism of legal decision-making in the making 
of administrative and judicial individual norms in order to take into 
account the particulars of the situation, especially in hard cases: respect 
for cultural norms; awareness to cultural, social and personal differences; 
and preserving the dignity and autonomy of the person throughout.
Similarly, all institutions of democratic states must ensure all persons 
take part in the life of the community (equal and active citizenship), while 
taking due account (recognition) of their diversity and difference. Equity in 
some way departs from equality because it involves sensitivity to difference. 
Religious, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and social differences may sometimes 
require different treatment but it may not always be possible to identify 
those situations beforehand in the making of universal norms33. This is the 
30 We cannot here develop this concept introduced by the Roman law pretors and authors 
(Cicero, “summum ius, summa iniuria”, De oficiis, I. p. 33) and by the Middle Ages 
scholastics, cannonists and glosastors inspired by the rediscovery of Aristotle, and 
to some extent by the English Common lawyers to distinguish it from the Common 
Law, but not the way it later developed in the Chancery Courts. See Aquinas, Thomas, 
Summa Theologiae, 2a 2ae 60.5. See generally Kelly, John Maurice, A Short History of 
Western Legal Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, Chapter on “Greek Philosophy 
and Roman Equity”.
31 When nominating Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, President Obama suggested 
that a sense of empathy might make for a better judge. See Stone, Geoffrey, “Our 
Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution”, The New York Times, April 14 2010: “empathy helps 
judges understand the aspirations of the framers, who were themselves determined to 
protect the rights of political, religious, racial and other minorities. Second, it helps 
judges understand the effects of the law on the real world. Think of judicial decisions 
that have invalidated laws prohibiting interracial marriage, granted hearings to welfare 
recipients before their benefits could be terminated, forbidden forced sterilization of 
people accused of crime, protected the rights of political dissenters and members of 
minority religious faiths, guaranteed a right to counsel for indigent defendants and 
invalidated laws denying women equal rights under the law. In each of these situations, 
in order to give full and proper meaning to the Constitution it was necessary and 
appropriate for the justices to comprehend the effect that the laws under consideration 
had, or could have, on the lives of real people”.
32 See the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (www.accommodements.qc.ca) and the first case 
Ontario Commission of Human Rights and Theresa O’Malley (Vincent) v. Simpsons-
Sears Ltd., [1985] 2. SCR 536 although similar developments had taken place in the 
USA in the field of labour relations.
33 Bossset, Pierre and Marie-Claire Foblets, “Accommodating diversity in Quebec and 
Europe: different legal concepts, similar results?” in Institutional accommodation and 
the citizen: legal and political interaction in a pluralist society, Strasburg, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2009, pp. 37-65.
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rationale behind equity: if the legislative were to face the particular situation, 
the hard case the judge is facing, it would have modulated the law in a 
special way to take account of the particulars. But the legislative has only 
given general norms and principles and general criteria for guidance. These 
general norms have to be applied in the instant cases by administrators and 
ultimately by judges. The judge would then become a sensitive, interstitial 
legislator and would modulate the rigid interpretation of the law.
This special accommodating attitude facilitates the adoption of a monist 
standpoint by the legal system and the respect for the cherished unity of the 
rule of recognition and the sources, while still striving to achieve equity 
and justice in the individual hard cases34. This seems to be the message 
sent by the Strasbourg Court in some, not all35, of its judgments concerning 
cultural pluralism. In our discussed case, Muñoz Díaz, the Court did not 
require the recognition of gypsy weddings as a valid form of marriage in 
Spanish law. It imposed no legal pluralism on the legislator36, but called 
special awareness to the attitudes of the actors in the legal field. This will 
require special practical argumentation, reasoning and specialised legal 
techniques but furthermore it requires a special attitude on the part of the 
judges37. As the former President of the Human Rights Court of Quebec, 
Michèle Rivet, has put it, courts must assume this idea of diversity and 
social change in their reasoning, seeking a balance between the values 
of autonomy, dignity, equality, and security and this requires the judge to 
cultivate the virtue of openness and readiness to listen38.
34 “Even in the attenuated form of a simple dialogue between state and religious systems 
of rules, the issues raised by legal pluralism are quite distinct from those connected 
with the duty to accommodate, which in principle simply requires institutions’ 
rules and practices to be adjusted in individual cases to redress established forms of 
discrimination. This does not imply the incorporation of the principles of religious law 
into the law of the land” (Bosset and Foblets, op. cit., p. 41).
35 Comp with, e.g. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI ECtHR 173.
36 Indeed, the ECtHR is not keen on legal pluralism at all; see Refah Partisi, cases 
Nº 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, Judgment of 13-02-2003.
37 An idea also expressed by Tariq Ramadan: “[…] we also have to have a positive state 
of mind vis-à-vis pluralism in our societies: the same text read by a legal professional 
(a lawyer or judge, or even by a parliament) having a positive and confident view of 
diversity will tend to be interpreted in a receptive and inclusive way whereas if it is read 
through the prism of mistrust of the new citizens, their religion and/or their culture, it will 
be interpreted in a restrictive way as a means of protection, and on occasion exclusion. 
These phenomena […] are not always intentional” (“Accommodations for minorities or 
accommodations for all. Bringing about harmonious coexistence in pluralist societies” 
in Institutional accommodation and the citizen: legal and political interaction in a 
pluralist society, Strasburg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2009, p. 163).
38 Rivet, Michèle, “Introduction” in Myriam Jézéquiel (ed.), La justice à l’épreuve de la 
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Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to explore possible paths toward convergence 
between a particular type of republicanism – inclusive pluralistic 
republicanism – and the Quebec model of integrating and managing 
cultural diversity known as interculturalism. The prospects for finding 
points of convergence through dialogue trace back, on the one hand, to 
characteristics such as liberty as non-domination or non-dependence, 
civic virtue, cooperative behavior, a commitment to the common good, 
and the vindication of politics and deliberative ideals, which are typical 
of republicanism; on the other hand, they may be found in characteristics 
such as pluralism and the resulting respect for diversity, integration based 
on reciprocity and deliberation, recognition of and respect for difference, 
the doctrine of reasonable accommodation and practice of intercultural 
reconciliation and the emphasis on social cohesion. In addition to this 
first level of analysis which attempts to make connections between 
two political theories, there is a secondary level that is of an empirical 
nature; this focuses on the consultation of citizens realized within the 
framework of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission2, since it allows us to 
1 This chapter was produced under the auspices of the I+D+i Research and Development 
Project, “The Law and Social Construction of Identity,” financed by the Ministry of 
Science and Innovation within National Plan I+D, file number DER2009-12683. The 
author would like to thank Alain-G. Gagnon for assistance given during her Summer 
2012 research residency at the Chaire de recherche du Canada en études québécoises 
et canadiennes (CREQC), Université du Québec in Montreal (UQAM).
2 The Bouchard-Taylor Commission was set up in 2007 by the Quebec government 
to examine how to accommodate requests for religious and cultural adjustments 
emanating from minority groups in the province.
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observe, in a specific sociopolitical context, how a process of searching 
for ways to manage cultural diversity crystallizes into the proposal for an 
interculturalism that, from my point of view, carries implicit republican 
connotations.
1. What Republicanism? What Interculturalism?
Republicanism is a long-established tradition of political thought, 
developed in various cultural and political contexts with multiple 
interpretations. Considering the possible models of republicanism, the 
one that interests me here is the republicanism that is pluralistic, from 
the cultural point of view, and democratic, from the political perspective. 
These axes, cultural and political, shape different modalities of 
republicanism. According to Andrés de Francisco, regarding the cultural 
axis, republicanism ranges from pluralist to communitarian extremes. 
The political axis of republicanism situates oligarchy on one extreme and 
democracy on the other. On the oligarchic side, the citizenry is civically 
weak, while on the democratic side, it is robust and strong. De Francisco 
combines these two axes and obtains the following modalities: (a) pluralist 
oligarchic republicanism; (b) communitarian oligarchic republicanism; 
(c) communitarian democratic republicanism; and (d) pluralist democratic 
republicanism3. This last modality, with some nuances I will specify below, 
is the one that can, in my opinion, establish a productive dialogue with 
the interculturalism with which it will find special points of convergence, 
while maintaining difference in other arenas.
Pluralist republicanism feels “comfortable in culturally open societies”; 
it accept the plurality of conceptions about goodness and the good life, 
without that signifying that it advocates neutrality. It accepts difference 
and dissent without fear, which makes it inclusive. In other words, the 
republicanism that is of interest here, in addition to being pluralist, 
distances itself from assimilationism and opens its doors to diversity. 
In contrast, communitarian republicanism is static and clearly inclined 
toward a “more homogenous, culturally closed and self-referencing 
republic”4. Inclusive pluralist republicanism shares with its republican 
family the commitment to political equality, public deliberation, the 
3 Republicanism is democratic, De Francisco affirms, when it attempts to fully 
incorporate the less powerful and more vulnerable in civil society with the goal of 
making them free; it is pluralist when it attempts “to incorporate the greatest number 
of ideas of the good society into the public sphere of political deliberation and to 
incorporate different forms of private life into a reasonably well integrated framework 
of social coexistence” (De Francisco, Andrés, La mirada republicana, Madrid, 
Catarata, 2012, p. 48).
4 Ibid., p. 46.
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need for virtue and the vindication of politics. But unlike some members 
of the family, it is dynamic, it recognizes that diversity is an inherent 
factor in our societies, and it does not resist cultural change. As a result, 
it places into question the model of the indivisible republic and endemic 
uniformity. Following this logic, the republicanism that is inclusive and 
pluralist does not believe there are justifiable reasons that some cultures, 
such as subnational or minority cultures, are more or less relevant than the 
national or majority culture, such as the culture of French republicanism5.
Therefore, the republicanism I refer to in this chapter does not represent 
a singular, hegemonic vision; neither am I referring to the French model 
where “beneath the brilliant surface of the republican universalism of 
rights, the nationalist particularism of cultural assimilationism operated 
in the shadows”6.
The term “Interculturalism”, whether referring to a political project or a 
theoretical assumption, is being used here to signify a model for integrating 
and managing ethnocultural diversity based on the pluralist ideal. These 
two attributes, integration and diversity, are essential and converge through 
a dynamic of respectful interaction with the Other and a rejection of all 
discrimination based on difference. When we talk about integration, it is 
useful to have a very clear understanding of its meaning in order to avoid 
mistaken interpretations. The integration that interests us here has an 
inclusive dimension and is accompanied by two key points. On the one 
hand, it maintains that everyone must have equal conditions for debate 
in the public sphere, which means rejecting the idea that the majority 
group determines the playing field, establishes the rules of the game and 
adopts final decisions. On the other, integration should not be confused 
with providing all community members with identical points of reference, 
which would mark it as exclusive. Instead, it advocates for the recognition 
of minorities. This would mean that care must be taken when defending the 
supposed neutrality of the state since it conceals in most cases, beneath the 
umbrella of a series of policies, the hegemony of the majority group.
Both factors, integration and diversity, are found at the heart of the 
proposal for interculturalism in Quebec that “fosters the edification of 
a common identity through interaction between citizens of all origins”7. 
5 Laborde, Cécile, “The Culture(s) of the Republic. Nationalism and Multiculturalism in 
French Republican Thought”, Political Theory, vol. 29, nº 5, 2001, pp. 716-735.
6 Máiz, Ramón, “Nacionalismo e inmigración en Francia: La république une et 
indivisible y el affaire du foulard,” Revista de estudios políticos (nueva época), nº 129, 
2005, p. 25.
7 Bouchard, Gérard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation: 
Report, Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
Differences, Les Publications du Québec, 2008, p. 88. The full report in English can be 
consulted at [Online]: http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/bs1565996.
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For Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, this interculturalism – also 
called integration through pluralism, since it supports the respect for 
diversity – cultivates a pluralistic focus that is deeply sensitive to the 
protection of rights. It preserves the tension between diversity, on the one 
hand, and the continuity of the French-speaking core and social cohesion 
on the other. It places particular emphasis on integration, celebrating 
interactive practices and encouraging the development of a feeling of 
belonging. To the extent that this process has been developing, cultural 
difference survives through respectful interaction with the Other and the 
recognition of diversity as a right that establishes a balance, which must 
always be dynamic, between integration, inclusion and diversity8. As 
a consequence of the interaction between distinct cultural groups, it is 
assumed that cultural identity will be transformed.
This model attempts to offer solutions to the challenge of reconciling 
an identity, with French as its linguistic base, while maintaining high 
respect for minorities and the diversity that comes from immigration. 
The ultimate goal is to develop a framework that assures social cohesion. 
In order to achieve this, common values should be promoted, individual 
liberties and respect for equality between men and women should be 
guaranteed, pluralism should be accepted, inclusion should be encouraged 
and the democratic mechanism of participation and public deliberation 
should be consolidated.
From the political point of view, interculturalism has not been 
officially adopted – by law or by constitutional recognition, for example – 
by the government of Quebec, which sometimes generates confusion 
as to its significance and scope9. However, we should not forget that 
Quebec has, with varied degrees of success, been equipping itself over 
time with policies to manage diversity, similar to the policies we have 
previously discussed. This distances them, in a normative fashion, from 
the traditional assimilationist model of the United States’ familiar melting-
pot, from Canadian multiculturalism, from ethnic communitarianism and 
from the French republican model. What we have here are the first steps 
toward inclusive pluralist republicanism.
8 Bouchard, Gérard and Charles Taylor, Accommodation and Differences: Seeking 
Common Ground. Quebecers Speak Out, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 2007, 
p. 21. See also Gérard Bouchard’s chapter in this book.
9 See Rocher, François and Micheline Labelle, “L’interculturalisme comme modèle 
d’aménagement de la diversité: compréhension et incompréhension dans l’espace 
publique québécois” in Bernard Gagnon (ed.), La diversité québécoise en débat. 
Bouchard, Taylor et les autres, Montréal, Éditions Québec Amérique, 2010, pp. 179-203. 
Since Pauline Marois won the election on 4 September 2012, there could be a change 
in the previous position on officially adopting interculturalism.
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This chapter focuses on what we believe could be three axes 
of convergence or points of encounter between inclusive pluralist 
republicanism and interculturalism. The first is the axis of liberty as non-
dependence; the second, the axis of civic virtue and the commitment 
to the common good; the third, the axis of the deliberative ideal and 
participatory citizenship. To show the viability of this last connection or 
point of encounter for dialogue, reference is made to the process of citizen 
consultation carried out by the Bouchard-Taylor Commission.
2. Axis of Liberty as Non-dependence
In recent decades and after experiencing an unexpected resurgence, 
numerous neo-republican political theorists, even when they present 
differentiated profiles, have made the wise decision to once again place 
on the table the discussion about the political freedom of citizens, 
simultaneously emphasizing the rejection of any form of subjugation, not 
only from a historical perspective, but also as a fundamental philosophical 
project whose transcendence is not circumstantial10.
Quentin Skinner, the well-known intellectual historian, an expert 
on early modern Europe’s republican ideals, has delved deeply into 
the hegemony of the liberal paradigm and several of his works focus 
on presenting arguments in favor of a third concept of liberty or, more 
specifically, in favor of a non-conventional reading of negative liberty11. 
We are confronting schools of thought that discuss the same concept of 
liberty but have competing theories about what it means to be a free, 
autonomous agent.
In accordance with the neo-Roman theory of liberty that Skinner 
defends, our understanding of liberty can be different than the one 
10 For contemporary republicans “the task is not simply one of excavation. History does 
not supply conceptions of political life that can be applied mechanically to current 
problems” (Sunstein, Cass R., “Beyond the Republican Revival”, Yale Law Journal, 
vol. 97, 1988, p. 1539). However, Skinner successfully illustrated that only if we are 
capable of reconstructing the theories of the past on their own terms will we be able 
to discover the reasons why some traditions, e.g., liberalism, have become hegemonic 
while others, e.g., republicanism, have been neutralized.
11 The third concept references Isaiah Berlin’s classic dichotomous taxonomy. Skinner 
believes this division, which was originally presented as a methodological approach, 
has led to a misrepresentation and weakening of the vision of liberty. In Skinner’s 
words: “I agree with Berlin that there are two concepts of liberty, one positive and the 
other negative, I do not agree with his further assumption that, whenever we speak 
about negative liberty, we must be speaking about absence of interference. It seems 
to me that, as I have tried to show, we have inherited two rival and incommensurable 
theories of negative liberty, although in recent times we have generally contrived 
to ignore one of them” (“A Third Concept of Liberty”, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, vol. 117, 2002, p. 237).
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propagated by the liberal tradition, where liberty implied a lack of 
coercion of the individual by other individuals or groups. In contrast, for 
the older tradition, individuals are also deprived of liberty if they live in 
conditions where they depend on other people’s good will. It is important 
to fully elucidate this detail in order to avoid mistaken interpretations. The 
conception of liberty that is defended by neo-Romans is characterized 
by the absence of constriction, but this constriction is caused not only 
by interference, but also by dependence. Therefore, individuals are free 
when they act without impediments and when they do not depend on 
other people’s possible good will. There is the possibility that in certain 
circumstances some individuals or groups do not impose impediments on 
others, but those who have the potential, or a greater degree of potential, 
for being hindered will always confront the threat that those obstacles 
or certain coercive practices will appear. In the same way, a community 
cannot consider itself free to the extent that it finds itself in a situation of 
dependence on the will of a neighbor community when it comes to making 
decisions because that means it is unable to govern itself. In republican 
thinking, liberty is closely tied to self-government; it requires, in other 
words, the presence of a political community capable of controlling its 
own future.
Skinner believes that while, for liberalism, coercion or the threat of 
the use of coercion “constitute the only forms of constraint that interfere 
with individual liberty,” for the authors he calls neo-Romans, “to live in a 
condition of dependence is in itself a source and a form of constraint”12. 
In this sense, liberty consists of people not feeling threatened by possible 
obstacles, impositions or the subjugation of others; in other words, they do 
not find themselves in a situation of dependence or subjection regarding 
an arbitrary volition. Following this logic, “the opposite of liberty is not 
coercion, but dependence. Being free, then, is not a circumstance (not 
being forced to do or not do something) but a structural condition: we 
stop being free as soon as we find ourselves in a position that makes us 
susceptible to being subjugated to someone else’s control”13.
In short, the republican political doctrine defends a compression of 
liberty as non-dependence (Quentin Skinner) or non-domination (Philip 
Pettit), which means a more reliable form of protection in the face of 
interference. Honohan provides a useful explanation by noting that it 
is not strictly a question of defying acts of interference, but combating 
the state of subordination that makes those acts possible. The political 
12 Skinner, Quentin, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1988, p. 84.
13 Palti, Elías, “Ideas políticas e historia intelectual: Texto y contexto en la obra reciente 
de Quentin Skinner,” Prismas. Revista de historia intelectual, nº 3, 1999, pp. 263-274.
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implications of this conception of liberty are reflected in the demands for a 
collection of institutions that provide guarantees in the face of illegitimate 
interference, in such a way that citizens are not dominated and are able 
to act in an independent fashion14. This means that institutions should 
assure the independence of individuals and safeguard non-domination.
This republican principle is found among others at the heart of the 
defense of what are called reasonable accommodations. The point of 
encounter between republicanism and interculturalism is not the demand 
that citizens’ individual identities should be recognized by the State; what 
has become important is that they not be dependent or dominated, either 
by members of their own community or by majority society. This requires, 
in turn, that equality be interpreted beyond its mere formal connotation.
Given the importance of this matter in our discourse, let us analyze it 
in more detail. It is possible to make a distinction between the legal norms 
that contain neutral and universal principles (for example, the equality 
of the sexes) and the norms and rules that reproduce the values and 
implicit norms of the majority culture (for example, the clothes women 
“should” wear). Regarding the first principle, both republicanism and 
interculturalism coincide in that they admit no possibility for exceptions 
or accommodation; while the second proposition is accompanied by a 
weaker type of normative force since it depends on a specific cultural 
context. This preoccupation with distinguishing between the universal 
and the particular – absent in other republicanisms – is found in inclusive 
pluralist republicanism; reasonable accommodations are compatible with 
a republicanism that knows that the public sphere is not culturally and 
religiously neutral and that we must adopt measures to express plurality. 
No one will claim, for example, that it makes sense to establish neutral 
policies regarding the language used for utilities, the courts, Parliament 
or schools. A political community cannot be completely neutral from 
the cultural point of view given that the norms of public life inevitably 
have a historic origin and emanate as a general rule from the cultural 
group that is in the majority. If the law is not neutral from the cultural and 
religious point of view15, certain reasonable accommodations in favor of 
members of minorities could be considered demands for non-interference 
14 Honohan, Iseult, Civic Republicanism, London and New York, Routledge, 2002.
15 If the norm of cultural neutrality is impossible to apply in practice, we should 
distinguish cultural neutrality from axiological neutrality: “The imperative of State 
neutrality requires that the State be neutral, not regarding public culture or language, 
but regarding citizens’ axiological positions, regarding their profound beliefs of a 
religious, moral or philosophical nature” (Courtois, Stéphane, “Le Québec face au 




and the reestablishment of equality16. In order to better understand these 
affirmations, we must address the question of reasonable accommodations 
more in depth.
An essential characteristic of all democratic societies is establishing 
the conditions to eliminate all forms of discrimination and, in culturally 
diverse societies, this includes discriminations that stem from cultural 
differences. In the face of the doctrine that decrees uniform application of 
the law, there is an alternative doctrine that enables a type of flexibility, 
the flexibility of reasonable accommodations, meant to combat any type 
of discriminatory condition caused by the strict application of a norm 
whose effects, in some cases, can be to undermine citizens’ rights to 
equality. The accommodation imperative is a particular modality of a legal 
obligation whose goal is to guarantee the exercise of the right to equality 
among individuals who belong to particular categories of citizens, often 
minority groups.
Reasonable accommodations are the legal consequence of under-
standing the principle of equality as a demand that allows differential 
treatment without it necessarily being interpreted as preferential. Gérard 
Bouchard, in his “What Is Interculturalism?”17 which is reproduced in 
English in this book, emphasizes that accommodations are not privileges, 
they have not been conceived only for immigrants, and they do not give 
free rein to values, beliefs or practices that are contrary to a society’s 
fundamental norms. The goal is that all citizens enjoy the same rights, 
regardless their cultural background.
This way of understanding equality also has its corollary in political 
theory, especially among the defenders of the paradigm of recognition; 
the proposal interprets recognition as a continuous dialogue. In an effort 
to reach agreement, the axis of reciprocity runs throughout the proposal. 
An ethics of recognizing minority cultures and difference constitutes not 
only a moral and political demand but also a matter of social justice18. 
16 Laborde, Cécile, Critical Republicanism. The Hijab Controversy and Political 
Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.
17 Bouchard, Gérard, “What is Interculturalism?”, McGill Law Journal, vol. 56 nº 2, 
2011, pp. 435-468 and reproduced in this volume.
18 Representative thinkers include Joseph Carens, Nancy Fraser, Bhikhu Parekh, Charles 
Taylor, James Tully and Iris Marion Young. See especially Carens, Joseph, Culture, 
Citizenship, and Community, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000; Fraser, Nancy, 
Scales of Justice, Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2009; Fraser, Nancy, “Identity, Exclusion and Critique. 
A Response to Four Critiques”, European Journal of Political Theory, nº 6, 2007, 
pp. 305-338; Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A 
Political Philosophical Exchange, London, Verso, 2003; Parekh, Bhikhu, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2002; Parekh, Bhikhu, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles 
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One of the background debates in which these authors are immersed 
is the consideration that faithfulness to the principle of equality means 
contemplating it with a view to a principle of equalization between groups, 
cultures and territories. Numerous norms that are apparently neutral 
and universal reproduce visions of the world, values, implicit codes or 
informal rules that are not explicitly formulated, but are extended and 
applied. The same right can sometimes lead to two different responses 
when it is a question of correcting a failure in the application of a law 
or rule, and this should not be interpreted as assigning privileges. For 
that reason, we affirm that treatments can be differential without being 
preferential19. The footnoted authors believe the model of integration 
that is configured according to abstract principles of homogeneity and 
equality is outdated. They are looking for a model of equality that can be 
realized within recognized difference. To advance in the logic of equality, 
we must value differences. To assure individual liberties, we must respect 
cultural plurality. For that reason, Maclure asserts that accommodations 
and the corresponding public policies of cultural diversity that follow 
these same principles can be considered “morally just and politically 
judicious”20. It is worth emphasizing that in recent articles, some authors 
have noted that a politics of recognition is now a necessary condition 
for culturally diverse democracies, but it is insufficient for attempting to 
deepen democratic quality21.
Reasonable accommodation is a formula the courts apply when they 
need to resolve conflicts stemming from religious practices concerning 
dress codes, vacation days, work schedules or places of worship, which 
has made it a very useful tool for managing diversity22. If the goal is to 
for an Interdependent World, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Taylor, Charles, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Harvard University Press, 1989; 
Taylor, Charles, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism. 
Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1994; Tully, James, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Tully, James, “Introduction” in Alain-G. 
Gagnon and James Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge 
Universities Press, 2001, pp. 1-34; Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990; Young, Iris Marion, Inclusion 
and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
19 Parekh, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002.
20 Maclure, Jocelyn, “Une défense du multiculturalisme comme principe de morale 
politique” in Myriam Jézéquel (ed.), La justice à l’épreuve de la diversité culturelle, 
Montreal, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, p. 77.
21 Gagnon, Alain-G., L’Âge des incertitudes: essais sur le fédéralisme et la diversité 
nationale, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2011.




regulate discrepancies and arrive at resolutions founded on the principle 
of equality in difference, then we have an instrument that facilitates 
integration, even when its first vocation is to avoid discrimination23. 
Woehrling makes a similar point when he notes that the primary goal of 
the politics of accommodation is 
to favor the inclusion of minorities and immigrants in the host society, 
especially by freeing them from the norms that entail direct or indirect 
discrimination. The politics of accommodation and pluralism are sustained 
on the commitment that the recognition of difference and adaptations that 
are afforded minorities will facilitate, in the medium or long term, their 
harmonious integration into society24.
Consequently, reasonable accommodations understood from the 
perspective of interculturalism have no place in a republicanism that 
defends coercive assimilationism as the route to social coexistence. 
They can, on the other hand, be a component of the inclusive pluralist 
republicanism that respects diverse differential characteristics with the 
goal of having different cultural groups enjoy the same opportunities 
as the citizens with whom they coexist, opportunities to live the type of 
life their culture establishes and to not be subject to legal demands that 
violate their convictions and way of life. Accommodations make sense 
and acquire legitimacy, Jézéquel affirms, if they are able to “maintain the 
balance between individual rights and the common good, if they manage 
to go beyond the commitment to reciprocal tolerance. The education 
of living together will depend as much on education about the value of 
accommodations as learning about reciprocal tolerance”25.
This dialogue between interculturalism and inclusive pluralist repub-
licanism, making use of the vocabulary of reasonable accommodations, 
is also appreciated by Cécile Laborde in her work “Républicanisme 
critique vs Républicanisme conservateur: repenser les ‘accommodements 
raisonnables’” [“Critical Republicanism vs. Conservative Republicanism: 
Rethinking ‘Reasonable Compromises’”]26. In those cases where the law 
and the public sphere are not culturally and religiously neutral, certain 
23 Jézéquel, Myriam (ed.), Les accommodements raisonnables: quoi, comment, jusqu’où? 
Des outils pour tous, Montréal, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007.
24 Woehrling, José, “Neutralité de l’État et accommodements: convergence ou 
divergence?”, Options Politiques, vol. 28, nº 8, 2007, p. 25.
25 Jézéquel, Myriam, “L’accommodement à l’épreuve des stratégies identitaires,” in 
Myriam Jézéquel (ed.), La justice à l’épreuve de la diversité culturelle, Cowansville, 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2006, p. 146.
26 Laborde, Cécile, “Républicanisme critique vs. Républicanisme conservateur: repenser 
les ‘accommodements raisonnables’”, Critique Internationale, nº 44, 2009, pp. 19-33. 
For a fuller discussion, see Laborde, Critical Republicanism. The Hijab Controversy 
and Political Philosophy, op. cit., 2008.
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reasonable accommodations in favor of minority members can be demands 
for what the author calls republican justice. Reasonable accommodations, 
to the extent they try to establish equality, are compatible with what 
Laborde considers republicanism properly understood; this republicanism 
comprehends that it is a good idea to take a critical look at its own cultural 
historical context. This type of critical approximation “has been absent 
from the republican debate in France,” but we find it “at the heart of the 
redefinition of the doctrine of minority integration in North America, 
especially Québec”27.
This approach leads to two questions that are important enough 
to demand attention. The first has to do with the deciding agent, the 
person who makes the decisions, regarding the practices of different 
cultural groups; the second alludes to the procedure, to how decisions 
are made. In other words, what is the procedure on the basis of which 
decisions will be adopted?28 These two questions are present, both in 
the discussion about who decides which groups/practices are deserving 
of recognition and accommodation, as well as the identities that are 
unjustly imposed on members of a political community. The answers that 
interculturalism affords have a republican flavor. Let us look at the first of 
these assumptions. Although it is true that cultures should be understood 
as plural, open and dynamic, that does not mean that accommodations 
should be assumed in all cases; both the behavior of the host society and 
that of minority immigrant groups should be perceived as potentially 
mistaken or in need of alteration. It is unquestionable that cultures are 
made up of beliefs and principles and that we should not speak in terms of 
superiority or inferiority, but that does not mean that we have to assume 
that every component of a given culture has value and that we should try 
to accommodate any notion; both majority and minority cultures hold 
beliefs that are indefensible in a democracy and the way to confront them 
democratically should be criticism and deliberation29. The Quebec model 
of interculturalism insists that, faced with the eventuality of a conflict 
between individuals and groups, the procedure to resolve it should 
correspond to democratic norms and especially that “deliberative measures 
such as mediation, compromise and direct negotiation are preferred, 
27 Laborde, op. cit., 2009, p. 20.
28 Tuly, James, “La conception républicaine de la citoyenneté dans les sociétés multi-
culturelles et multinationales”, Politique et Sociétés, vol. 20, nº 1, 2001, pp. 123-146.
29 Regarding the debate about the limits of a politics of recognition and the 
accommodations of cultural and religious diversity, see the arguments presented by 
Maclure, “Une défense du multiculturalisme comme principe de morale politique”, 
op. cit., pp. 66-90.
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leaving as much initiative and autonomy to the parties in question”30. In 
a democratic society, dialogues between a plurality of actors should be 
carried out in the best possible conditions of non-domination31.
Cultural identities that are worthy of recognition cannot be determined 
outside of the political process. There must be negotiation in order to 
construct agreement between citizens. The path is clearly political, and 
politics from a republican perspective “is action – the possibility of a 
shared, collective, deliberate, active intervention in our fate, in what 
would otherwise be the by-product of private decisions. Only in public 
life can we jointly, as a community, exercise the human capacity ‘to think 
what we are doing’ and take charge of the history in which we are all 
constantly engaged by drift and inadvertence”32.
Inclusive pluralist republicanism believes that politics is a continuous 
activity that opens the door to citizens so they can develop their 
individual potential and their public vocation. In order to do that, it is 
necessary that a series of institutional conditions be established to allow 
the free exercise of civic capabilities, deliberation and responsibility. 
The reason for this is, in the first place, to let citizens control their 
representatives and keep watch over the agents in whom they place their 
confidence if a political task has to be delegated to experts or specialists. 
Secondly, this will afford citizens the means to demand accountability 
from those who govern them (recalling that the fundamental reason for 
this is not to maximize preferences for the majority, but to minimize 
the risks of tyrannical actions on the part of a government). Lastly, it 
allows citizens to become jointly responsible for decision making33. For 
the same reasons, Linda Cardinal and Marie-Joie Brady note that the 
conditions that should exist so that citizens can realize a multi-voiced 
dialogue in conditions of non-dominance include, in the first place, 
recognizing the freedom all citizens have to change the rules of the 
constitutional game of mutual recognition and association as identities 
are transformed. In the second place, everyone should be able to 
participate in decision making, since decisions affecting the community 
must be made, through just and reasonable deliberative measures, by 
30 Gagnon, Alain-G. and Raffaele Iacovino, “Interculturalism: Expanding the Boundaries 
of Citizenship” in Ramón Maiz and Ferrán Requejo (eds.), Democracy, Nationalism 
and Multiculturalism, London, Frank Cass Publishers, Routledge, 2005, p. 32.
31 Tully, James, “Introduction” in Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (eds.), Multinational 
Democracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 1-34.
32 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, 
p. 28.
33 My analysis of this can be found in Wences, Isabel, “Cultura de la legalidad y rendición 
de cuentas,” in Manuel Villoria and Isabel Wences (eds.), Cultura de la legalidad. 
Instituciones, procesos y estructuras, Madrid, Catarata, 2010, pp. 67-88.
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all citizens, even when it is known that the opinion of a few may be 
excluded from the final decision. Nevertheless, “in the context of non-
domination […] defeated citizens know that they can eventually restart 
the multilogue”34.
The second of the two previously mentioned assumptions – namely, 
(1) who decides and (2) the procedures used to decide on the identities 
that are unjustly imposed on members of a political community – leads 
us to diverse terrain, but here we will briefly turn our attention to the 
area of national diversity, even though it is a side note to our main idea – 
which does not mean that it is a minor question. When the issue is how to 
find the best way to manage not only cultural but also national diversity, 
accommodation presents various dilemmas, especially if it is a question 
of the relationship between majority and minority nations, since the recipe 
of accommodation in this case could lead to the presence of a hierarchical 
point of view in power relationships that would raise questions about 
the legitimacy of the political actors. Faced with that possibility, some 
authors – and even politicians – propose strengthening cooperation in 
such a way that their life in common affords a relationship of equality 
where the minority nation is not perceived as a nuisance requesting 
accommodation, but as a partner with whom one can negotiate and 
whose relationship rests “on a set of principles that respect community 
pluralism, ideological pluralism and (why not) even legal pluralism”35. 
What is essential is finding a more harmonious balance among political 
forces so the inhabitants of minority nations are able to carry out their 
preferences in a way comparable to majority nations. Alain-G. Gagnon, 
from the Université du Québec à Montréal, states it clearly: “This quest 
for balance would contribute to renewed trust between communities as 
well as empower minority nations to achieve greater emancipation on 
the cultural, economic, institutional, legal, social and political levels”36. 
This is one of Gagnon’s recent projects in political theory: going beyond 
a politics of recognition, which is limited to the accommodation of 
nations without altering the vertical dynamic, and imagining a politics 
of empowerment, allowing minority nations to acquire the instruments 
34 Cardinal, Linda and Marie-Joie Brady, “Citizenship and Federalism in Canada: 
A Difficult Relationship” in Alain-G. Gagnon (ed.), Contemporary Canadian 
Federalism: Foundations, Traditions, Institutions, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 2009, p. 392.
35 Gagnon, Alain-G., “Reconciling Autonomy, Community and Empowerment: The 
Difficult Birth of a Diversity School in the Western World” in Alain-G. Gagnon and 
Michael Keating (eds.), Political Autonomy and Divided Societies, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 55.
36 Ibid., p. 57.
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necessary to achieve their full potential, avoiding the loss of social 
references and the risk of political alienation37.
We should now question whether this project is in line with a 
liberal notion of liberty or if it is more comfortable beneath the cloak 
of liberty in the republican sense that I have outlined here, where non-
dependence tries to battle subordination and subjugation to the will of 
the other, whether they be individuals or communities. The question that 
Alain-G. Gagnon has posed about how to provide minority nations the 
guarantee of liberty and force majority nations to take into consideration 
their legitimate demands, whether it be the right to self-definition, the 
right to self-representation, the right to self-government or the right to 
self-determination38, finds more resonance in the defense of an idea of 
liberty understood as the absence of dependence in agreement with which 
actions and decisions do not depend on the will of the other; they are not 
limited by them. This is confirmed in the following words: “A free state 
is one which is, in the first place, not subject to coercion, and that is, 
secondly, ruled by its own volition, understood as the general volition of 
all the members of the community”39.
The legal dimension that accompanies reasonable accommodation 
is recognized in the final report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission 
where it is noted that “the duty, under law, makes it the responsibility 
of the managers of public and private institutions to avoid all forms of 
discrimination by adopting relaxation or harmonization measures in the 
administration of certain statutes or regulations”40. Still, we must not 
forget that, when it comes to interculturalism, the indispensable role of the 
courts must be a last resort since what is essential is laying the foundation 
so that citizen action can be used in a friendly and informal manner to 
attempt to resolve disagreements that arise between the personnel of 
public or private institutions and other citizens.
This premise of interculturalism coincides with the idea of inclusive 
pluralist republicanism in constructing alternative systems of institutional 
design that, as Philip Pettit emphasizes, stimulate cooperative behavior 
by cultivating civic virtue, rather than simply inspiring repressive systems 
that punish behavior that deviates from the legal norm41. Reciprocity and 
37 Gagnon, Alain-G., L’Âge des incertitudes: essais sur le fédéralisme et la diversité 
nationale, Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2011.
38 Gagnon, “Reconciling Autonomy, Community and Empowerment: The Difficult Birth 
of a Diversity School in the Western World”, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
39 Ovejero, Félix, José Luis Martí and Roberto Gargarella, Nuevas ideas republicanas, 
Barcelona, Paidós, 2004, p. 20.
40 Bouchard and Taylor, op. cit., p. 285.
41 Pettit, Philip, Republicanism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. See especially chapter VII.
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a willingness to cooperate with others are attitudes and customs whose 
goal is to serve the common good42.
3. Axis of Civic Virtue and Commitment  
to the Common Good
For inclusive pluralist republicanism, talking about civic virtue means 
talking about civic commitment, which is reflected in the relationship that 
good citizens maintain with their political community, where there is a 
strong disposition for preferring the common good over private interests. 
Civic virtue is the willingness and capacity of citizens to fulfill the 
responsibility of participating actively and responsibly in the achievement 
of the good of the entire political community, restricting their individual 
interests. Only when citizens find something more in the exercise of their 
civic virtue than a mere instrument to achieve their own private goals can 
they live worthy and autonomous lives, not as submissive, passive subjects 
who accept any government suggestion. If people are conscious of their 
role as creators of a history of public life and they take responsibility for 
their destiny, they will avoid letting common problems (the environment, 
security, allocation of resources, the management of diversity, mutual 
recognition) slip from their control. In this sense, republicans judge the 
rights and obligations of citizens, which the liberal tradition considers 
essential for public life, insufficient for living life in common. For 
republicans, virtues are essential; rights, on the other hand – which enjoy 
unassailable top-billing for liberals – are subordinated in the republican 
tradition to the needs of the community43. As Skinner rightly affirms, 
“there can be no individual liberty without civic virtue”44. In order to 
defend a robust idea of liberty – as non-domination, as non-dependence – 
we need virtuous citizens.
Civic virtue constitutes the cornerstone of public life. However, the 
list of civic virtues that have been and are exalted by republican thinkers 
throughout history is rather extensive. It includes prudence, responsibility, 
honesty, benevolence, moderation, hard work, love of justice, generosity, 
nobility, political activism and solidarity45. Clearly, current republican 
42 Dagger, Richard, Civic Virtues, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 196.
43 Gargarella, Roberto, “La comunidad igualitaria y sus enemigos. Liberalismo, 
republicanismo e igualitarismo” in Andrés Hernández (ed.), Republicanismo 
contemporáneo. Igualdad, democracia deliberativa y ciudadanía, Bogotá, Siglo de 
Hombres Editores and Universidad de los Andes, 2002, p. 93.
44 Skinner, Quentin, “The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty”, in Gisela Bock, Quentin 
Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 305.
45 Gargarella, op. cit., p. 91.
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theorists do not herald a virtuous, engaged citizenry with all these attitudes 
and talents; what is important is not losing sight of the fact that “civic 
virtue has a permanent generic form – the commitment to the public good 
and the opposition to a particularist life view – but it is made manifest 
and realized (like any other virtue) according to the circumstances of the 
situation”46. In short, republicanism demands of its members an active 
commitment to public affairs, which presumes that citizens should direct 
their actions toward the attainment of the common good. Following this 
logic, civic virtue “is employed to denote the specter of capacities that 
each of us should possess as citizens: the capacities that allow us to serve 
the common good by our own volition”47.
If we expect citizens, members of majority and minority ethnocultural 
groups, to act in ways that support civic virtue, it is necessary, from the 
stand-point of interculturalism, to make sure that institutions and society 
have established minimum political, economic and social conditions so 
citizens find ways for integration. But what does it mean to be integrated 
and, more specifically, to be integrated in an inclusive manner?
In his argument in favor of interculturalism, Alain-G. Gagnon contends 
that integration is one of the central objectives of interculturalism since 
it is seen as essential for the political affirmation of ethnocultural groups 
and for their full participation when a common public culture is being set 
in motion. Interculturalism is reflected in a particular type of integrating 
pluralism that is based on the principle of reciprocity and responsibility 
between new arrivals and those who make up the host society48. In 
this sense, interculturalism is respectful of diversity and cannot be 
accused of protecting assimilationist whims or of falling victim to the 
excesses of cultural relativism and the fragmentation of other models 
of multiculturalism49. Clearly, for this to be possible, it is necessary, 
as Saskia Sassen correctly points out, to pay attention to the demands 
for visibility made by minorities and the disadvantaged; in the tension 
between formal nationality and effective citizenry, we find subjects who 
“are authorized, but not recognized”, in other words, full citizens who are 
not recognized as political actors50.
46 Peña, Javier, “Ciudadanía republicana y virtud cívica,” in María Julia Bertomeu, 
Antoni Doménech and Andrés de Francisco (eds.), Republicanismo y democracia, 
Buenos Aires, Miño y Dávila, 2005, p. 250.
47 Skinner, Quentin, “Las paradojas de la libertad política” in Félix Ovejero, Jose Luis 
Martí and Roberto Gargarella (eds.), Nuevas ideas republicanas, Barcelona, Paidós, 
2004, p. 106.
48 See Gérard Bouchard’s analysis in this book.
49 Gagnon, Alain-G., “Plaidoyer pour l’interculturalisme”, Possibles, nº 24, 2000, pp. 11-25.
50 Sassen, Saskia, Contrageografías de la globalización. Género y ciudadanía en los 
circuitos transfronterizos, Madrid, Traficante de sueños, 2003, p. 88.
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Inclusivity emphasizes the promotion and education of committed, 
participatory citizens and tries to avoid social fragmentation and retreat 
in search of personal interest, as well as the loss of self-government, 
scorn for the importance of public service and indifference to political 
participation. The political philosopher Charles Taylor claims that the 
identity of individuals constitutes a horizon of shared values. The social 
framework, ignored by atomism51, shapes human beings, and their 
identification with the interests of the community in which they live is 
essential to maintaining a free society. This society is only possible if 
citizens make a commitment to the defense of liberty and act with solidarity 
for the joint endeavor. Politics that emerge from atomist approaches that 
present citizens as mutually disinterested are not striving for integration 
and their emphasis is placed on the advancement of citizens who are 
“indifferent to the global perspective and the impact of their actions on 
the community”52.
Some authors might think that these affirmations reflect communitarian 
republicanism, but as we have tried to show here, inclusive pluralist 
republicanism promotes conditions so that virtue can be practiced and 
its action can focus on the public good, but unlike its communitarian 
counterpart, it does not attempt to defend dense cultural goods.
4. Axis of the Deliberative Ideal and Participatory 
Citizenship
In the republican family, there are notable differences regarding 
institutional proposals, but there is a consensus about the importance of 
the deliberative ideal53.
The deliberative dimension in the republican sense is essential to the 
politics of inclusion because faced with the imposition of a uniform idea 
of equality or a closed and unquestionable version of the national majority 
culture, there is an institutionalization of the process. This allows us, first, 
to debate the features of majority and minority cultures and, secondly, 
to discuss and reach agreement about the conditions of coexistence, and 
finally, to find the means for coexistence between distinct and at times 
covert identities.
51 Taylor, Charles, “Atomism” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences Philosophical 
Papers. Vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, chapter VII.
52 Taylor, Charles, “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere” in Philosophical Arguments, 
Cambridge, London, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 282.
53 Pettit, Philip, Republicanism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997; Sunstein, Cass, 




The ideal of open and public discussion, as befits the citizens of 
an inclusive pluralist republican citizenry, can, in modern culturally 
heterogeneous societies, find ways of connecting with the principles of 
difference. This presupposes, Ramón Máiz emphasizes, passing from a 
communitarian concept of the nation to a cultural political (or civic ethnic) 
concept. The pluralist and democratic nature of this concept should be 
accompanied by a principle of deliberation in whose public sphere the 
doors are open to the inclusion of distinct modes of life that are conflated 
in a political community where majorities and minorities coexist54.
The Quebec model of interculturalism calls attention to the fact that, 
faced with the presence of a conflict, it is preferable to adopt deliberative 
measures such as mediation, compromise and direct negotiation, affording 
the involved parties as much initiative and autonomy as possible. This 
model “values deliberation, mutual understanding and, generally, 
dialogue as fundamental characteristics of democratic life, in the realm 
of civil society”55.
However, it is useful to always bear in mind, as Seyla Benhabib does, 
that deliberation is accompanied by normative dimensions that cannot 
be renounced. First is “egalitarian reciprocity”, which stipulates that 
majority groups will not discriminate against civil, political, economic 
or cultural rights on the basis of membership in a cultural, religious or 
linguistic minority. Secondly is “voluntary self-ascription”, which means 
that an individual cannot be automatically assigned, on the basis of their 
birth, to a cultural, religious or linguistic group; they should be allowed, 
once they reach adulthood, to choose whether or not to continue being a 
member of that community. Thirdly is “freedom of exit and association”, 
which means one should be able to exit a community without excessive 
sanctions and should enjoy a flexible right to association, which may 
require accommodation56.
In this way, interculturalism believes it is essential to participate in 
the design of the management of demands that diverse cultural minorities 
carry out in order, first, to gain respect for their particularities, to assure 
themselves the right to recognition and, secondarily, to make their own 
preferences known. Alain-G. Gagnon presents it like this: “Interculturalism 
54 See Máiz, Ramón, “Nation and Deliberation” in Ramón Máiz and Ferrán Requejo 
(eds.), Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism, London, Routledge, 2005, 
pp. 58-80.
55 Gagnon, Alain-G. and Raffaele Iacovino, “Interculturalism: Expanding the Boundaries 
of Citizenship” in Ramón Maiz and Ferrán Requejo (eds.), Democracy, Nationalism 
and Multiculturalism, London, Frank Cass Publishers, Routledge, 2005, p. 32.
56 Benhabib, Seyla, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 19-20.
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affords special value to deliberation, to mutual understanding and 
dialogue, all of which are essential characteristics of democratic life, and 
help provide Quebec with a participatory citizenry”57.
Inclusive pluralist republicanism understands participation in a dif-
ferent fashion than liberalism does, which views it mainly as a procedure 
meant to guarantee individual rights. Interculturalism champions the 
existence of a common ground that will allow every group to participate in 
democratic life with dignity and equality. Alain-G. Gagnon’s explanation 
is helpful: “Interculturalism is viewed as a way to encourage every group 
to deliberate and participate in the public sphere, with the objective of 
achieving the greatest possible consensus in order to achieve greater social 
cohesion and the protection of individual rights”58.
One example of this participation is seen in work performed by the 
autonomous and independent Commission charged with consulting the 
citizenry about the practice of reasonable accommodation between the dif-
ferent cultures that coexist in Quebec (Bouchard-Taylor Commission)59.
Without a doubt, that consultation revealed the importance of creating 
an active public capable of discovering solutions to its problems on 
its own and conscious that democratic responses to the challenge of 
cultural diversity can only be achieved through a “genuine dialogue 
with the public”60. The consultative experience of the Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission generated a situation where “irreplaceable dialogue” allowed 
“participants to better articulate their respective positions and, perhaps, 
lay the foundations for a new language and a new shared identity”61.
In a previously published study62, we focused our attention on the 
consulting process and on citizen participation that came about within 
57 Gagnon, “Plaidoyer pour l’interculturalisme”, op. cit., pp. 14-15. For a related analysis, 
see Gagnon and Iacovino, op. cit.
58 Gagnon, “Plaidoyer pour l’interculturalisme”, op. cit., p. 15.
59 Décret numéro 95-2007, Concernant la constitution de la Commission de consultation 
sur les pratiques d´accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles (CCPARDDC), 
Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 2007.
60 Bouchard, Gérard, and Charles Taylor, Accommodation and Differences: Seeking 
Common Ground. Quebecers Speak Out, Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 2007, 
p. 6.
61 Laforest, Guy, “La Comisión Bouchard-Taylor y el lugar de Québec en la trayectoria 
del Estado Nación moderno”, Proceedings from the III Congreso Internacional sobre 
Derechos Humanos: La gestión democrática de la diversidad cultural nacional, 10-13 
June 2008, Bilbao, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno 
Vasco, 2009, p. 83.
62 Sauca, José María and María Isabel Wences, “Participación ciudadana y diversidad 
cultural: la Comisión Bouchard-Taylor”, Andamios. Revista de investigación social, 
nº 10, 2009, pp. 9-37.
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the framework of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission study. We analyzed 
it in the light of the crisis in representative democracy and the literature 
regarding participative and deliberative democracies, but we did not 
focus on a discussion of the results and the impact of the final report 
since that has received ample attention through the years. For the present 
study, what interests us is to revisit this process as an illustration of the 
belief, shared by inclusive pluralist republicanism and interculturalism, 
that involving citizens in the search and adoption of mechanisms and 
policies of intercultural harmonization is what allows the construction 
and/or consolidation of a common civic reality fostering understanding 
between cultures.
It is true that the citizen consultation led by the sociologist Gérard 
Bouchard and the philosopher Charles Taylor has sparked numerous 
criticisms. These include poor planning of the hearings, responding 
to purely political interests, becoming a circus of citizen complaints, 
propagating – with the help of the media – negative perceptions about 
the cultural values of “the Other” and leading to the retreat of certain 
communities. In contrast, I believe it was an exceptional participatory 
exercise whose lessons for the outside world should not be minimized63.
Some of the lessons we can draw from this citizen consultation through 
public debate are the following64: in the first place, we have witnessed 
one of the modalities of the institutionalization of participatory practice 
in which the inhabitants of this nation, individually or through their 
associations, had an equal opportunity to make their opinions known, as 
well as diverse and ample occasions to express themselves. The opinions 
of citizens were heard in this exercise, and many of those citizens heard 
other people in turn. This means that members of this culturally diverse 
community have a voice when it comes to trying to come to an agreement 
about how to integrate difference in a civic fashion. In this way, we not 
only have participating actors, but also an institutional context that has 
designed consultative instruments and also creates some of the resources 
necessary for the political production of preferences, including attention 
to other people’s positions, learning about other people’s cultural 
63 Some public officials, however, believe we cannot affirm that there was a “true debate 
about interculturalism in the public sphere”; they note that criticisms were expressed 
and concerns shared but that this did not lead to true deliberation (Rocher and Labelle, 
op. cit.).
64 I address some of these questions in greater detail in Wences, Isabel, “Cuatro lecciones 
de la Comisión Bouchard-Taylor: Acomodos razonables, pluralismo integrador, 
laicidad abierta y participación ciudadana” in Pedro Chaves and Carlos Prieto (eds.), 
Forma Estado, Plurinacionalidad y Transiciones Constituyentes, Madrid, Traficante 
de sueños, 2012, pp. 371-411.
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values and more about our own preferences65. For republicanism, it is 
essential to design institutions that assure the independence of citizens 
and encourage public discussion of the common good. Arguing about the 
common good is perceived as a way to contribute to self-government 
and to afford citizens a voice regarding the way they want to organize 
community life66.
In the second place, even when it is difficult to guarantee that the 
opinions that were shared were taken into account in political agreements, 
the quality of democracy is strengthened with the contribution of direct 
and local knowledge of problems because it allows us to obtain more and 
better information and, consequently, to have more information when it 
comes time to make a decision.
In the third place, the whole consulting process has revealed a society 
that has transitioned from merely tolerating difference to a society that 
opens doors to recognition. Tolerance “of the different ways of conceiving 
of oneself as a person leads to mutual recognition”67.
In fourth and last place, it is important to note that norms and decisions 
must be legitimized in a democratic system. Any process of legitimation 
requires deliberation and debate; it is, therefore, necessary that there be 
open channels for citizens to express their opinions. The hearings carried 
out in Quebec during the fall of 2007 to know what citizens think about 
how to harmonize cultural differences between everyone who lives in 
this common space are also particularly relevant for understanding 
the model of interculturalism, as well as the open secularism that 
the presidents of the Commission propose in their final report. This is 
important since, on the one hand, it is a proposal that attempts to help 
improve the political and social management of cultural diversity and 
legitimize the potential public policies that come from the Bouchard-
Taylor Commission recommendations. On the other, it is since it is a way 
for citizens to understand and accept the reasons for interculturalism and 
for the value of recognizing difference and its reflection in the creation of 
reasonable accommodations. And finally, it is important because it offers 
new elements that can help bring out the theoretical configuration of both 
interculturalism and a determined model of the State and society.
65 Máiz, Ramón, “Deliberación e inclusión en la democracia republicana”, Revista 
española de investigaciones sociológicas, nº 113, 2006, pp. 11-49.
66 Gargarella, Roberto, “El carácter igualitario del republicanismo”, Isegoría, nº 33, 
2005, pp. 175-189.
67 Seymour, Michel, De la tolérance à la reconnaissance. Une théorie libérale des droits 




If we want to continue viewing current Western societies as organic, 
objective wholes that are culturally homogeneous, heirs to a historical 
process of development and distanced from transformative processes, 
then internal diversity and the plurality of interpretations could simply 
be set aside. This would do nothing but exacerbate an uncritical discourse 
that is expressed in terms of ours versus theirs and that promotes the 
implementation of socializing guidelines established in the passive 
acceptance of tradition. The belief that minorities put the supposed purity 
of majority culture at risk leads us to a vision of the culture that is not 
only conservative, but isolationist and closed to any aspiration of free 
participation of everyone in the public sphere.
We were recently afforded the opportunity to observe a dialogue 
between inclusive pluralist republicanism, which is critical of monism 
and assimilationism, and an interculturalism that recognizes diversity and 
reciprocal integration and is critical of cultural relativism and fragmentation. 
This dialogue does not represent a conservative, communitarian model; 
it is an attempt to find ways of articulating the demands for recognition 
as well as political dimensions that emphasize non-dependence, equality, 
pluralism, participatory citizenry and the deliberative ideal. This requires, 
on the one hand, adopting an open attitude toward the demands of distinct 
identities and being able to distinguish between fundamental and trivial 
cultural features, accepting as a starting point the belief that there is no 
room for oppressive or humiliating practices. On the other hand, it means 
being inclusive, which signifies reaching consensus about the changes 
and transformations that accompany diversity for both majority as well 
as minority groups, for new arrivals as well as for members of the host 
society. Finally, it requires that the authorities establish a manner of 
guaranteeing that everyone, whether part of a minority or majority group, 
has access to full participation in the public sphere. If interculturalism 
and republicanism agree on all that, the doors for dialogue remain open.
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